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
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly, VOL. XIX No.1
January, 1992

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS IN THE GEOMETRY OF LOGIC

"Human reason is by nature architectonic."
(I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. B502)

The words "analysis" and "synthesis" are among the most widely used and misused terms in the history of philosophy. They were originally used in geometrical reasoning during the age of Euclid to describe two opposing, but complementary, methods of arguing (roughly equivalent to deduction and induction). Since then philosophers have used them not only in this way, but also to refer to distinctions of various sorts between types of judgement or classes of propositions. To some they are regarded as defining differences of kind, while others regard them as defining differences of degree. Moreover, they have been connected in numerous different ways with other distinctions, such as "a priori vs. a posteriori" or "necessary vs. contingent". Some philosophers have become so frustrated at the ambiguity attached to the various uses of the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" that they have given up all hope of assigning a coherent meaning to this distinction.

In this paper I have no intention of reviewing or attempting to clarify all of these ambiguities. Nor do I intend to say much about the various traditional ways of construing the meanings of the terms "analysis" and "synthesis".¹ Instead, I will introduce another way in which the distinction can be applied. My hope is that, rather than adding yet further ambiguity, my treatment will provide a well-grounded handle for grasping the other legitimate ways of using these terms, by exploring the connection between these opposing terms and some fundamental logical flaws. In this process I will call attention to a set of fixed logical patterns which correspond not only to the nature of analysis and synthesis, but also to the logical structure of certain simple geometrical figures. The method I will use in this article of "mapping" logical relations on to geometrical figures with the same structure, which I have developed in more detail elsewhere, I refer to as "The Geometry of Logic"². By returning these terms to their geometrical source, but in a

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new light, I hope not only to breathe new life into an old distinction, but also to encourage philosophers to take advantage of the logical patterns which are built into human reasoning.

A good example of a philosopher who recognized the importance of the structural patterns implied by analysis and synthesis is Immanuel Kant. Unfortunately, Kant's stress on what he calls the "architectonic" character of reason is often either ignored or thoughtlessly rejected by his critics and commentators, who assume that his architectonic plan only distorts the clarity of the arguments he develops in his critical works. The distortion is thought to be caused by Kant's supposed insistence upon forcing his subject-matter to fit certain preconceived patterns. Thus, it is believed that the true extent of the validity of Kant's arguments can be determined only by freeing them from these plastic patterns.

What this common approach ignores, however, is that Kant's use of an architectonic plan is an inseparable aspect of his a priori approach. In other words, Kant's assertion that there are certain necessary conditions for the possibility of any human experience just *is* the claim that human reason operates in accordance with a fixed *order*. If *reason* fixes this order for us, then philosophers ought to do their best to understand and follow this order whenever they adopt any a priori perspective in their philosophizing. The major problem in interpreting Kant is, I believe, not that his love of architectonic distorts his vision, but rather that he never explains in clear and unambiguous terms just what this plan *is*. If, instead of undermining the basis of the a priori approach at the outset, interpreters concentrated on gaining a deeper understanding of the rational structure of reason's architectonic plan—in other words, on making explicit what for Kant was always only implicit—then I believe they would stand a far greater chance of understanding what he, and other philosophers like him, were really trying to say.

The present study, however, has nothing directly to do with Kant.³ Rather, it will be devoted to the task of examining the way in which the architectonic structure of human reason can be seen to arise directly out of certain fundamental (fixed) "laws of thought".

Without a doubt, the most influential of all suggested "laws of thought" down through the history of philosophy has been Aristotle's famous "law of noncontradiction".⁴ This law can be stated in a wide variety of different ways, but perhaps its most common *informal* version is: "A thing cannot both be and not be in the same respect at the same time". The *formal* versions of the same law are now normally expressed in propositional terms, such as $P \rightarrow \neg (\neg P)$. (That is, if a proposition is

true, then it cannot be the case that its negation is also true.) An even simpler version, however, can be derived by regarding the law as referring to the bare relation between two *concepts* — in particular, between a concept (A) and its opposite ($\neg A$). Aristotle's fundamental law of all consistent thinking can then be expressed $A \neq \neg A$, or (informally) "Black is not not black", "I am not not I", etc. The simplest of all versions of this law would be one which abstracts the furthest from all content (i.e. from the "formal content" implied in any use of *P* to stand for any *proposition* or *A* to stand for any *concept*). This can be done by merely removing the "A" from both sides of the equation, thus leaving a kind of bare mathematical relation: $+ \neq -$ (positivity is not negativity). Hereafter, whenever I refer to the "law of noncontradiction", it is this latter version of the law which I will have in mind.

The law of noncontradiction is the absolute formal basis of all analytic reasoning. "Analysis" in this sense essentially refers to the process of dividing a thing, or concept, or proposition into two opposite parts. For example, the twenty-four hour period of time we call "one day" can be divided into "daytime" and "not daytime" (or "nighttime"). Of course, most analysis, both in philosophical and in ordinary discourse, does much more than simply divide one idea into two subordinate categories. For instance, there are certain times during the day when we hesitate to say whether it is "daytime" or "nighttime"; and as a result, a further level of analytic division is made between "dusk" and "dawn". Analyses of this type can and do go on to form quite complex patterns of relations between groups of concepts.

An interesting and largely unexploited parallelism exists between formal logic and the structure of certain simple geometrical figures. Taking advantage of this parallelism by using such figures as logical "maps" can help us to gain a clear understanding of some of the more intricate patterns of what I shall call "analytic relations".⁵ The simplest, twofold analytic relation, as defined by the law of noncontradiction, can best be mapped onto the two (equal and opposite) endpoints of a line segment, as in Figure 1. This is what I will call the standard map of a "first-level analytic relation" (1LAR).






Figure 1: *The standard 1LAR map*⁶

(The double-headed arrow should be taken to depict the fact that contradictory terms, such as + and —, repel each other: they point us, as it were, in opposite directions.) On its own, of course, such a simple map

is of little use, since it puts in a simple form something which is already simple enough. However, the same does not hold true when we apply the same principles to higher levels of analytic relations.

For example, the second-level analytic relation (2LAR) can be derived by performing a first-level analytic division on each side of a simple, 1LAR — i. e. by splitting both the + and the — into opposites by adding another + or — to each. This gives rise to four logical combinations of terms (hereafter called "components") :⁷ --, - +, + -, + +. The new level can be mapped by adding a line segment perpendicular to the one which appears in Figure 1. Accordingly, in Figure 2 the first term in each component represents the line segment itself in its relation to the other line segment, whereas the second term represents the opposition between the two endpoints of the line segment in question.



(c) Subordinate relations included

Figure 2 : 2LAR, mapped onto a cross⁸

As we can see, this standard 2 LAR map consists of an entirely new, and significantly more complex, set of relations than the corresponding

1 LAR map. Each higher-level relation will include two components whose terms are identical. These "pure" components (+ + and - - in 2LAR) will always play an important part as the "primary" or "root" components out of which the other, "impure" components (+ - and - + in 2LAR) arise. Therefore, the direction of flow on the main axes of the standard maps of higher-level analytic relations (i.e., 2LAR and up) will always go from the pure to the impure combinations, regardless of their positivity or negativity. The axes of the cross represent the two dominant relations in the standard 2LAR map. Subordinate relations can be included by connecting the - + and + - poles and the - + and + + poles with diagonal arrows (see the dashed lines in Figure 2 (c)). (Note that these subordinate relations, being the opposites of the dominant relations, flow from the impure to the pure combinations.) The only relations in a 2LAR which are absolutely contradictory (i.e., the only ones in which the two components being related do not share one common term) are the relations between the + + and - - poles and between the + - and - + poles. These pairs of components repel each other in a way which none of the other pairs do (hence the double-headed arrows). The reason is that they represent not second-level relations as such, but the two first-level relations out of which the 2LAR is derived.

The secondary or derivative nature of the impure components can now be made clear by including diagonal lines (dotted in Figure 2 (c)) between these two sets of contradictory poles (i.e., between the poles corresponding to the two pure components and those corresponding to the two impure components). If we follow the 2LAR arrows in Figure 2 (c), we can see the natural cycle which we all actually experience each day: day (+ +) points towards dusk (+ -), which in turn, drives us back into night (- -); night points to dawn (- +), which in turn ushers in a new day (+ +); and the cycle begins again.

Not all 2LARs follow this standard cycle so perfectly. This is not the place to examine the many variations which can arise. But one variation is worth mentioning here. Analytic relations from the first to the sixth level play a crucial role in determining the structure of the ancient Chinese book of wisdom, the *I Ching* (or *Book of Changes*). This book consists of sixty-four "hexagrams" (i.e., six-term components) which come together to form a perfect sixth-level analytic relation (6LAR). Each hexagram represents a certain situation, and by casting yarrow sticks (or flipping coins) two of the sixty-four components are chosen to represent a person's current situation. The *change* from one component to the other (i.e., the logical relation between them) is then

used as a symbol to help a person understand the potential benefits and dangers of the situation in question. The point of interest for our purposes is that whenever the hexagrams are grouped into sets of four and mapped onto a cross (for 2LAR), or grouped into sets of eight and mapped onto a double cross (for 3LAR), the contradictory pairs of components are always placed at opposite ends of the same axis of the cross. In other words, the two relations which I have depicted above as the first-level roots of the properly second-level relations are treated as themselves being the most significant relations, as in Figure 3.




Figure 3 : *The non-standard (or standard Chinese) 2 LAR map*

Without going into detail to account for the differences between this form of 2LAR and the form I have chosen as standard, it will suffice to say that the Chinese map emphasizes the (apparently) unresolvable tensions (which real life often presents to us as tasks to be resolved), while the standard map in Figure 2 explicates and emphasizes the polarities (i.e., pairs of components with one common term) which make it logically possible to resolve such fundamental tensions.

Regardless of the way in which the relations are mapped, one good way to explain or understand any 2LAR is to see it as arising whenever two sets of yes-or-no questions are asked side by side. For example, if we want to know what the weather is like outside, we might ask "Is it raining?" and "Is the sun shining?", to which there will be four possible answers (i.e., four components):

- ++ Yes it is raining, and yes the sun is shining.
- + - Yes it is raining, but no the sun is not shining.
- + No it is not raining, but yes the sun is shining.
- No it is not raining, and no the sun is not shining.

If all the components in such an analytic relation represent real possibilities, then I call such a relation "perfect". If one or more

components describes an impossible situation, the resulting relation is called "imperfect". (The above example is a perfect 2LAR, because all four possibilities sometimes occur in the real world: ++ in this example is uncommon, but it occurs whenever a rainbow appears.)

Because any true 2LAR can be regarded as arising out of two sets of yes-or-no questions, any time we map four concepts which we believe are related together in this way, we should be able to specify their logical relationships by defining them in terms of two sets of contrasting words (i.e., words contrasted with their negations). Thus, all possible weather situations implied by the two questions given above can be depicted in terms of the simple 2LAR map in Figure 4.




Figure 4 : *The weather, mapped onto a 2LAR cross*

Indeed, one of the greatest benefits of mapping analytic relations in this way is that it forces us to uncover the logical patterns which actually underlie the relationships we *thought* we understood between familiar concepts. Sometimes, when we attempt to do this, we find that the concepts we thought were related are not in fact related, or not related as simply as we had believed.

The process of twofold division can be carried on indefinitely to higher and higher levels of analytic relations, each of which can be represented by components which combine + 's and - 's in more and more complex ways, which in turn can be mapped onto more and more intricate geometrical figures. The formal apparatus adopted above can be used to express such higher levels by repeatedly dividing each of the previous level's components into two opposite parts by labelling each component with an additional + or -. Accordingly, the formula for deriving the number of terms and components for any level of analytic

relation is quite simple:

$$C = 2^t,$$

where "C" refers to the total number of possible *components*; and "t" refers to the total number of *terms* in each component.

(Note that "t" is also identical to the *level* of analytic relation under consideration.)

Thus, for example, the *I Ching* contains 64 different components because it is based on a sixth-level analytic relation ($2^6=64$). But of all types of analytic relation, 2LAR is probably the most important, and certainly the most frequently occurring in philosophical arguments. (It is, for example, the only type of analytic relation needed to understand the logical structure of Kant's table of twelve categories.) Therefore, it will not be necessary to discuss the higher levels here.

Instead, we can now turn our attention to another, quite different type of logical relation. Analytic relations are based, as I have explained, on Aristotle's law of noncontradiction. Indeed, the whole system of classical logic (and much of modern logic as well) is based on this most abstract of all analytic laws. (For this reason, I will refer to conventional logic as "analytic logic".) Many, perhaps most, philosophers assume a kind of absolute validity for this law: "Nobody will disagree that A and non-A are simultaneously impossible".⁹ However, not all thinkers — not even all philosophers — have agreed with this consensus (Aristotelian) view that words can carry a meaning only if they are noncontradictory. Heraclitus, for example, takes as a first principle of his philosophy the notion that "Opposites are the same".¹⁰ And Hegel, of course, raises this principle of synthesis to the status of a universal law, capable of describing the movement of all historical consciousness.¹¹ Moreover, the self-contradictory statements which can be found in the Scriptures of every major world religion are taken by many people to have a very profound meaning.¹²

How can any statement be meaningful if it breaks the fundamental law of thought? The full answer to this question would require an entire treatise on metaphysics. For our present purposes a rather dogmatic answer must suffice. The law of noncontradiction should be regarded not as the fundamental law of *all* thought, but rather, as laying the foundation for one *type* of thought, namely, the type which is the subject-matter of *analytic* logic. If contradictory expressions can in fact carry some meaning, then they must do so by depending on some other type of logic. I will refer to this "logic of paradox" as *synthetic* logic.

Since contradictions are not forbidden in synthetic logic, there is actually no way to talk coherently about it, except in terms of its analytic (noncontradictory) counterpart. Trying to describe synthetic logic on its own terms would give rise to a totally unintelligible bundle of contradictions which would not be anchored in anything concrete. The best way to talk about synthetic logic is to regard it as the *opposite* of analytic logic. So if analytic logic is based on the law of *noncontradiction* ($+ \neq -$), then synthetic logic must be based on the law of *contradiction*, which we can express as $+ = -$. (This new law defines what it means for two words or propositions to stand in a contradictory relation to each other.) Likewise, just as the analytic law of noncontradiction is closely related to the law of *identity*, $+ = +$, so also the synthetic law of contradiction is closely related to the law of *non-identity*, $+ \neq +$. These four laws actually form a perfect 2LAR, so they can be mapped onto a cross, as in Figure 5.




Figure 5 : Four basic laws of logic, mapped onto a 2LAR cross .

The two questions which give rise to this 2LAR are : (1) Is the law analytic (rather than synthetic)? and (2) Does the law define the nature of (non) identity (rather than the nature of (non)contradiction)?

Because synthetic relations do not obey the laws of analytic logic, they cannot simply be mapped straightforwardly onto line segments, the way analytic relations can be. Moreover, synthesis is not a process of division, or opposition at all, but a process of *combination* or *integration*. Consequently, it takes a minimum of *three* terms to describe a synthetic relation. If we again use analytic logic as a basis, then this threefold process can be described as the process whereby a pair of opposites ($+$ and $-$) are regarded as the same — that is, the two are *synthesized* into one whole. If we choose the symbol "x" to represent this paradoxical third step, then we can conveniently map a first-level

synthetic relation (ILSR) onto a *triangle*, as in Figure 6.




Figure 6: *ILSR, mapped onto a triangle*

Like analytic relations, synthetic relations can be combined with each other to produce higher levels of logical relations. For synthetic relations, the formula which determines the number of terms and components at each level is :



$$C = 3^i$$

However, for the limited purposes of this introductory sketch, a discussion of ILSR will suffice. This is particularly true because, as we shall see, ILSR is mainly relevant not on its own, but in conjunction with 2LAR.

If each component in the 2LAR is viewed as arising out of a prior ILSR, then an interesting, twelvefold pattern arises. The twelve new components can be derived by adding a third term (-, +, x, in succession to each of the four components in the 2LAR.¹³

---	+- -	- + -	+++
-- +	+- +	- + +	+++ +
-- x	+- x	- + x	+++ x

This "twelvefold compound relation" (12CR) can best be pictured by mapping it onto a circle. Accordingly, Figure 7(a) uses the circumference, and Figure 7(b) uses the area of a circle to map the structure of this important logical relation.¹⁴



(Note that the *quadrants* now represent the original 2LAR. And in order to derive all twelve components from a set of questions, we would need to add a third, "yes, no, or yes-and-no", question to the two "yes or no" questions from which the 2LAR is derived.)

The explanatory power of this and the other maps described above can hardly be underestimated, as long as they are not used haphazardly and without due attention to their logical structure (as is unfortunately the norm all too often on the rare occasions when scholars do resort to using maps). The 1ZCR pattern, for example, turns out to be precisely the pattern used by Kant in his Table of Categories. And light can be shed on the logical structure of many other systems, as diverse as the Western Zodiac and Jung's theory of psychological types, by using the same map as a guide. Such tasks, however, are beyond the bounds of my present goal (but see note 14), which has been to introduce the essential elements of the Geometry of Logic. Understanding the grounding of analysis and synthesis in the simplest of logical laws does not, of course, immediately dispel all the ambiguities concerning this distinction which have plagued philosophers over the years; however it should serve as a first step towards realizing the goal of presenting the distinction in a more coherent way, and in so doing, to encourage a proper appreciation of the architectonic structure of human thought.

Department of Religion and Philosophy STEPHEN R. PALMQUIST
Hong Kong Baptist College
224, Waterloo Road
Kowloon
HONG KONG

NOTES

1. I have discussed in detail the nature of the analytic-synthetic distinction and its connection to other related distinctions in: "Knowledge and Experience: An Examination of the Four Reflective Perspectives in Kant's Critical Philosophy", *Kant - Studien* 78.2 (1987), pp.174-183; "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: Mathematics, Method, and Pure Intuition", *The Review of Metaphysics* 41.1 (September 1987), pp.3-22; and "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: Naming, Necessity, and the Analytic A Posteriori", *The Review of Metaphysics* 41.2 (December 1987), pp.255-282.
2. The implications of this method of "mapping" logical relations onto

geometrical figures with a corresponding structure are worked out in considerable detail, and applied to numerous patterns used in philosophy as well as a number of other disciplines, in *The Geometry of Logic* (hereafter, GL) (manuscript in preparation). An early attempt to apply this method to various patterns in Kant's philosophy can be found in "The Architectonic Form of Kant's Copernican Logic" (hereafter "AFKCL"), *Metaphilosophy* 17.4 (October 1986), pp.266-288.

3. I have applied the above principles of interpreting Kant in various articles and in my forthcoming book, *Kant's System of Perspectives*.
4. This law is usually called the "law of contradiction", presumably because it denies the possibility of two contradictory statements both being true. Calling it the "law of noncontradiction" has the advantage of describing the *positive* side of the law: it defines the basic requirement for consistency. Another important reason for choosing this name will become obvious shortly.
5. In "AFKCL" I use the term "division" instead of "relation", because that is the word Kant uses in his important footnote on p.197 of *Critique of Judgment*. However, in synthesis, as we shall see, terms are not being *divided*, but *combined*; therefore "relation" can serve as a more general term to refer to the formal structure of both analytic division and synthetic combination (or *integration*, as I call it in GL).
6. The relative position of the - and + on such maps is purely a matter of convention. I have followed the rule, whenever possible, of placing the + to the right or on top of the -, because of the associations most people have with "top" and "right" being stronger, or more positive, than "bottom" and "left". However, a different set of rules could just as easily be chosen, without affecting the essential nature or value of the maps, which are themselves merely tools for visualizing logical relations.
7. I will use "term" to denote any *single* occurrence of a + or -. The word "component" will refer to any *set* of (two or more) terms which is used to represent *one member* of a logical relation. In "AFKCL" the word "variable" was used instead of "component", and the word "expression" was suggested in a footnote as a possible alternative. But "variable" could be taken (incorrectly) to imply that the logical status of each set of terms can vary when in fact it is fixed. And "expression" could be taken (incorrectly) to imply that each set of terms expresses some fixed *meaning*, when in fact it is an entirely abstract representation of a *logical possibility*. Although "component" is sometimes rather awkward, I think it is preferable to

these alternatives.

8. In "AFKCL" 277 I map a 2LAR onto the cross by putting "+" - at the three o'clock position, "- +" at six o'clock, and "- -" at nine o'clock. I have since adopted the convention of beginning at three o'clock with the negative ("-") and proceeding clockwise through "+" - and "- +" to the positive ("++") at twelve o'clock.
9. V. Y. A. Perminov, "On the Nature of Logical Norms", *Philosophia Mathematica* II.3.i (1988), p.37.
10. Frank N. Magill (ed.), *Masterpieces of World Philosophy in Summary Form* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p.12-13.
11. Hegel rejects the absolute authority of the traditional "laws of thought" (see e.g., G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraphs 299-300), putting in their place his law of "thesis, antithesis and synthesis". As a result, many of his claims appear to be straightforward contradictions. For example, in paragraph 808 of *Phenomenology* he describes "History" as a "a *conscious, self-mediating* process — Spirit emptied into Time", a process in which "the negative is the negative of itself."
12. I am thinking here of statements such as the following: "the ten thousand things are one" and "right is not right" (Taoism); "He who sees inaction in action and action in inaction, he is wise" (Hinduism); "the phenomena of life are not real phenomena" (Buddhism); "I and the Father are one" and "you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Christianity); etc.
13. In "AFKCL 280 I presented this twelvefold pattern as arising out of a simple synthetic relation, described incorrectly as consisting of an eightfold pattern of three-term components (called "variables" in AFKCL"). That eightfold pattern, however, is actually best regarded as describing the form of a third-level *analytic* relation (3LAR). Nevertheless, the idea of deriving the twelvefold form of a compound relation from an 8+4 pattern was correct. The mistake I made in "AFKCL" was to regard the eight three-term components as synthetic simply because they each contain three terms. "AFKCL" does correctly explain that the synthetic (threefold) aspect comes from combining pairs of opposites in the eightfold pattern to produce the fourfold pattern. In other words, although the eight three-term components themselves are not synthetic, the (4+4)+4 pattern as a whole does contain four separate synthetic, (threefold) relations. I have now attempted to make this more clear by introducing "x" as the third term in each of the four components which arise in such twelvefold relations. In "AFKCL" I

simply left off the third term in the four components derived from the synthetic operation. Taken together, these two factors explain why Figure 5 in "AFKCL" 281 looks so different from Figure 6(a) below. The two diagrams are actually based on the same formal structure, but the order and clarity of the symbolism is greatly improved in the map presented here in Figure 6(a).

14. The interrelationships and sub-patterns within a 12CR are examined in detail in GL, ch.6. The ways in which this pattern can be seen operating in Kant's Critical System are explored in *Kant's System of Perspectives*, chs.7, 8, 11.

CONCEPTUAL ATOMISM AND NĀGĀRJUNA'S SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS

Conceptual Atomism, if one may coin a term, offers the excessively ambitious or the careless philosopher a number of tempting precepts which stand in relations of Family Resemblance to one another. Consider some sayings which express several precepts of this kind.

(i) "When we agree that a concept like that of Bishop Tutu's body is distinct from that of Bishop Tutu's mind and thoughts, we must agree that his body is something detachable from his mind and thoughts, hence that either can exist without the other's existing or even having existed".

(ii) "More generally, if any two terms are distinct in meaning or any two concepts are distinct in content, and each term or concept corresponds to something real, then each of the pair corresponds to something real and separate or separable from the other".

(iii) "If it is even imaginable or conceivable that two things are separate or separable, so that one exists without the other, then they really are necessarily distinct and separable or separate".

(iv) "Since it is necessary that we as correct speakers of Latin or Greek or English, or Sanskrit or Pali, following the language's rules and norms, clearly distinguish the concepts of *BRAHMAN* and *ĀTMAN*, and *DIVINE FATHER* and *DIVINE SON*, no form of identity or essential connection prevents one from existing without the other".

(v) "Since *This Zen Abbot's face* and *This Zen Abbot's smile* are not the same concept, then the Zen Abbot's face could exist without a smile and the Zen Abbot's smile could exist without his face any longer existing".

The importance of such *fallacious* forms of reasoning and of others with a Family Resemblance should not be neglected. Spelled out so badly in saying (i) through (v), Conceptual Atomism's temptations to draw false inference may look infantile and dreadfully simple to detect. When, however, a Plato or a Hume or a comparably sophisticated and persuasively gifted philosopher becomes both the victim and the advocate of such temptations, the teachings may become insidiously potent and

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widely influential. Hume subtly pointed to the knowable distinctness of those experienced events which we take to be causes and effects, then subtly pressed the conclusion that we have no knowledge at all of causation as a nominal form of necessary connection. Two centuries later many positivists and neo-positivists stridently analyzed causality in terms of constant conjunction or entrenchment by custom and habit. Earlier Plato in several dialogues argued for a separate, timeless world of Transcendent Forms (*chorista eide*) on grounds including this one: the concept of the supreme and immutable value, *Goodness*, is quite distinct from the concept of *limited and changing particulars which are good*.

Human intellects are similarly fallible in certain respects, whatever zone they inhabit. So it is important not to neglect the possible influence of Conceptual Atomism on Eastern thought. For a fascinating example, one may try to confront the genius of the Indian philosopher Nagarjuna, the creator in the Second Century A.D. of sceptical arguments as challenging and sophisticated, and as successful in baffling others, as were many in Hume's epistemology and in his philosophy of mind. At some places where Nāgārjuna's reasoning draws with special boldness on areas where distinctness and separability are greatly in need of not being confused, philosophers of East and West should join in examining his sceptical moves. Two of his topics especially recommend themselves. Take, *first*, his treatment of the separateness of "Attachment" (*Rāga*) from what is called "*The attached place of resort or residing*" (*Rakṣa*). Take, *second*, some of his remarks on the *effability* of certain teams involved in talk of Time and Change. These include "origination", "Existence" and "Denial".

I

Some 'Separation' - Minded Arguments Of Nāgārjuna

The following extracts are adapted from M. Chatterjee's edition and translation of the great sceptic's work. I shall focus on matter in volume II of Chatterjee's edition of Nagarjuna's *Mula-Madhyamaka-Kārikā* (Calcutta, 1962). Here the arguments make use of at least rough synonyms for "separation" and related words in order to support some extreme types of sceptical claims:

(i) (part missing)

The nature of an X cannot be fully described without *some mention* of Y—ish things it is apt to attract, when they exist and when certain circumstances obtain. But the nature of X can also be described as capable of existence without Y-ish things' being attached to itself and without Y-ish things' existing at all. At any rate, this is true if we do not commit the error of trying

to infer by deductivism "If *F* can be, *F* will be". One is especially likely to invoke that principle on the grounds that, if there is a distinction between antecedent and consequent, there must be an actualized form of separation. But saying this is to confuse the actualizable with the actualized. At any rate, if one distinguishes at least two kinds of distinctness and also distinctness from separation, Nāgārjuna's argument gives the impression of collapsing.

(ii) "Opponents think they can similarly argue from the existence of *Rakta* (the attached place) to the existence of *Rāga* (attachment). But can *Rāga* exist before *Rakta*? Then *Rakta* would have to come into being and grow by depending on *Rāga* (attachment), even though there is no longer any necessary connection between *Rakta* and *Rāga*! But *Rakta* could not have the faintest chance of doing this (perhaps otherwise conceivable, if incredible) thing, if *Rāga*, as postulated, exists before *Rāga* does. For now there is a time at which attachment exists and the supposed locus for attachment (or attached place) does not exist. They do not co-exist (and their existences are not constantly conjoined). They are not completely comparable. So how is *Rakta* to come into being and grow if it necessarily depends on *Rāga*? And if *Rāga* does NOT exist before *Rakta*, things are no better: if *Rāga* is non-existent, it has got no possibility to produce *Rakta* — *Rāga* cannot produce *Rakta* either in its position as before *Rakta* or after it." (pp.26-27.)

Comment : *Rāga* is a technical Buddhist term for a kind or worldly attachment that strikes a human (through the mediation of sense experience) in a particular way in a certain mental-emotional 'place'. It is in at least one way *distinguishable* from that mental-emotional 'place' *Rakta*, as we saw with passage (i), since the 'place' may be apt for attracting attachment, but in principle need never be attached to *Rāga*. To talk, however of *Rāga*'s existing before, without or after the existence of *Rakta* is to move from "distinct" to "separable" in a way that produces a contradiction in terms. Nāgārjuna goes on to argue rightly, however, that certain Buddhists cannot remove all problems about the relations between *Rāga* and *Rakta* by making them perfectly *simultaneous in origin*: two such simultaneous things need not be *interdependent*, and these Buddhists seek *interdependence* for *Rāga* and *Rakta*. (30). Unfortunately, Nāgārjuna's examples of mutual interdependence and simultaneous origin again show likely confusions of distinctness with separation. "According to the Buddhist, colours (like blue, etc.) and tastes (like salt, etc.) are not interdependent though they simultaneously originated with the earth. The two horns of a cow originate simultaneously, but one is not

dependent on the other". Let us suppose that a certain kind of tapeworm and a certain kind of mammal are simultaneous in origin; such a tapeworm must have a constant supply of *that* and only that mammal's blood and such a mammal must have that and only that tapeworm purifying its blood for its kidneys' and survival's sake. The organisms are quite distinguishable, but causally inseparable as far as survival goes. Or suppose a human's left cerebral hemisphere simply cannot *exist*, let alone function without the right one and *vice versa*. The organs are distinct, but causally inseparable as far as sheer existence goes. Yet these cases, though quite analogous enough as a pair to Nāgārjuna's, miss the relation of causal-cum-conceptual-independence between *Rāga* and *Rakta*. There is far too much distinctness and an intolerable separability arises - conceivable or imaginable separability, at least.

(iii) Next (32) Nāgārjuna argues that "Separateness (*Prthaktva*) cannot be regarded as the cause (*Avyabhicarita*) of co-existence (for *Rāga* and *Rakta*). Light and darkness, like cow and buffalo, are *different* from each other, and so are *not the same* as each other. But their co-existence cannot be always accepted as a rule. So co-existence cannot be proved through separateness as a cause. In the case of light and darkness on the other hand, separateness as a cause will contradict co-existence. Thus, it is clear that the co-existence of *Rāga* and *Rakta* cannot be proved either in the identity or in the difference of *Rāga* and *Rakta*. If *Rāga* and *Rakta* are admitted as the same thing, then their co-existence cannot be proved, because co-existence is possible only in the case of more than one object. Unless the objects are different, how can co-existence be possible? One never states that a pot co-exists with itself . . . If on the other hand, *Rāga* and *Rakta* are regarded as different from each other, in that case also their co-existence cannot be proved, because we are to say that their co-existence arises out of their separate existence."

Comments: There is much to be said for conceding respect and sympathy to Nāgārjuna's intuitions that co-existence could not be a reflexive relation, even if it were a symmetrical and transitive relation; also, that his point about co-existence should raise doubts about the reflexivity of Sameness as well. But treating *Rāga* and *Rakta* as identical might involve a form of Mind - Body Identity Theory, however, whose curious consequence would be that temporal predicates applied to attachments might differ somewhat from temporal predicates applied to the attached place. Leibniz's 'Law of Identity' implies that if A is identical with B, then A and B must have exactly the same properties. Some exceptions, modern semanticists would allow, are acceptable for, e.g.,

"That thief" and "Xavier Smith"- but not *too many* exceptions. Some of the remarks suggest a trend in Nāgārjuna's times to analyze causality in terms of constant conjunctions, whose excesses he is rightly resisting. What Nāgārjuna fails to consider hard enough is the question of what sorts of otherness are required for two things to be said to coexist. Is separateness usually a necessary, though not a sufficient condition of co-existence? (His talk of requiring at least two things for co-existence seems partly to suggest this.) Or are certain sorts of distinctness quite enough for coexistence - as with distinct, but inseparable properties of some spatiotemporal objects like length and width? How distinct must close emotions be if they are said intelligibly to co-exist? How greatly separated and by what may two shadows be to co-exist - or may they merge perfectly and still be two shadows? If I cause much more darkness to cover the room by blocking the one small aperture with one finger, and cause more light to appear by very briefly creating a spark as I strike a flint on a stone with the other hand, then the light and dark are of separate origins *and* have separable causes *and* have very different intensities and durations. But surely this does not stop them from co-existing?

(iv) "Is the separateness of *Raga* and *Rakta* proved? If it is not proved the question of their co-existence does not arise at all. So it will have to be admitted that their separateness exists, but in actual cases it will be found that such separateness is not clearly existent. Separate existence of the two objects in different places simply *has* to be proved first. This is essential before one tries to demonstrate the co-existence of two entities. So if *Raga* and *Rakta* exist independently in different places, then the establishing of this as a definite fact will cause one to say 'Yes! They really are independent in that way. So they truly *do* co-exist.' But no such fact has been established about their independence as existing things. What basis have we, then, for supposing that it is ever *possible* for them to co-exist?" (38).

Comments: Now Nāgārjuna clearly takes a much tougher line: only if there is a spatial separation of objects can there be meaningful talk of co-existence in the case of those objects. He makes it clear how right Chatterjee has been to stay with terms like 'separate' and "separation" in translating the text, never 'toning them down' to "distinguish" or "distinction". Again it is obvious that he demands a degree of separation, rather than distinctness from *Rāga* and *Rakta*. But this can lower his brilliant dialectical arguments to strange levels of invalidity and obscure verbiage, unless he specifies very carefully what are to count as objects or relevant subjects of his discourse. Even then he must justify

his restrictions on what sorts of subjects of discourse are relevant to *this* argument with the Buddhists.

II

Nāgārjuna's Attacks On Time And Change

(2) (Citation 20) "This verse is inserted here specifically to stress that the origin of objects in reality does not exist ... Objects are classed under two heads - existing (*Sat*) and non-existing (*Asat*). Let something be viewed as *Sat*, then it must be considered to be eternally *Sat*, even before its origin. For an existing object always remains an existing object and can never be *Asat* (non-existent). So, if something is *Sat* before it comes into being, then it is futile to reflect on its origin. For we never find cases of the repeated origin of something which *exists*. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that what is ever-existing (*Sat*) has no origin at all. But suppose we think of something as *Asat* (non-existent). It cannot have any kind of roughly distinguished, then something is highly suspect about (i) the distinction, (ii) the existence that is said to be distinct, (iii) the change that is said to be distinct. Note again: we sometimes distinguish between a baby's birth or clay's emerging from the place of firing and the baby's life time or the clay plate's span of useful service. But we also sometimes count the baby's time in the womb and time spent being born as part of its lifetime or part of its span of existence. We sometimes count the period when the clay plate was being fired as part of the time when it exists as a domestically attractive thing to have. We cannot force *one* sort of 'separation' on the child's or plate's existence which will correspond to *both* ways of distinguishing time."

Rather similarly, the term 'TIṢṬHATI' can be used if properly inflected, properly fitted into suitable sentences, etc., so that present, past and future assertions are correctly made, as desired, about various sorts of existing, once existing and not yet existing individuals. But Nāgārjuna infers that, because such momentous distinctions must be clearly marked in different parts of time, vastly greater linguistic separations are required than differences in inflections and sentence structure and the like. Perhaps separate terms should be used, along with quite separate rules of word order, to express judgements about different areas of time with different existential presuppositions. But since there are potentially infinite numbers of distinctions to be drawn on such subjects, we might need an infinity of separate words, grammars, vocabularies, languages, etc., to mirror Reality as Nāgārjuna implies that we should.

At any rate, because verbs can be used temporally or atemporally, yet preserve the same root meaning, and because semantic truths about root meaning are timeless, it may seem to follow that timelessness is inseparable from meaning and intelligibility. Temporal distinctions are separable from root meanings. Root meanings are real enough. So only the timeless is real.

Any such pattern of thinking about the timelessness of Sense, hence of Reference, about the timelessness of predominant root meanings in timelessly two sentences about meaning, about the dispensability of the tensed, but not the tenseless for the sake of preserving intelligibility, about a resulting necessity that the temporal must take is internally incoherent as well as excluded by tenseless discourse, will involve a tissue of confusions. (See discussions of Saint Augustine, McTaggart and others). But it is the fallacies of Conceptual Atomism, confusing distinguishability in thought with separation in reality, and with possible or necessary *exclusion from* reality that fuels the flames of such thinking. On the other hand, forms of mystical experience may provide a measure of serious support for treating Timelessness as what is ultimately real. That may be a partly exculpating point in Nāgārjuna's favour.

Concluding Remarks

If this short study has caught enough of Nāgārjuna's cunningly part-shielded meaning in his bold attacks on orthodoxy in his place and time, then several fallacies of Conceptual Atomism are there to be detected and rejected in a notable Indian sceptic. Errors resembling those sometimes found in Hume's partly sceptical Naturalism and in Plato's case for knowledge of Transcendent Forms have, I hope, been exposed in passages of a brilliantly original Indian thinker. It is to be hoped that Richard Bosley will soon complete and publish his book on what he calls *The Pure and the Modal - or - Modified Principles of Atomism*. For, perhaps there is a surprisingly widespread human tendency for professional and homespun philosophers to be attracted by a curious span of historically persistent confusions. The Philosophy of Religion is unlikely to be spared.

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alta
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JOHN KING-FARLOW

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CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: THE SEARCH FOR A METHOD OR REDISCOVERY OF ITS CONTENT ?

I

The purpose of this paper is to present the background to the current debate on African Philosophy and to offer some Criticisms and recommendations where I find it appropriate to do so. The issue of African Philosophy is one that animates the following questions: "What is African Philosophy?" It appears that in an attempt to address the former, the debate has shifted primarily to the latter, and in doing so the essential issue which is the content of African Philosophy seems to have been either abandoned or considered less important.

I shall begin, however, with what I consider to be the cause of the controversy, with the points raised on *writing* as the vehicle of reason's expression. To deny a people the capacity to reason is to deny them the possibility for critical reflections on their thoughts, beliefs, practices, and rational justification for them. Consequently, it is to question their capacity for philosophical dialogue.

Writing, many scholars argued, stood alone among the fine arts as the most salient repository of 'genius', the visible sign of reason itself. In this subordinate role, however, writing, although secondary to reason, is nevertheless the *medium* of reason's expression. We *know* reason by writing, by its representations. Such representations could assume spoken or written form. And while several superb scholars give priority to the spoken as the privileged of the pair, most Western scholars privileged *writing* — in their writings about Africans, at least as the principal measure of Africans' humanity, their capacity to progress, their very place in the great chain of being.

The direct correlation between economic and political alienation on the one hand, and racial alienation on the other hand, Henry Louis Gates wrote, is epitomized in the following 1740 South Carolina Statute that

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attempted to make it almost impossible for black slaves to acquire, let alone master literacy:

And *whereas* the having of slaves taught to write, or suffering them to be employed in writing, may be attending with great inconveniences; be it enacted, that all and every person and persons whatsoever, who shall hereafter teach, or cause any slave or slaves to be taught to write, or shall use or employ any slave as a scribe in any manner of writing whatsoever, hereafter taught to write; every such person or persons shall, for every offence, forfeit the sum of one hundred pounds current money.¹

Learning to read and write, then was not only difficult, for the black slaves, it was a violation of the law. As early as 1705, a Dutch explorer, William Bosman, had encased the commodity function of writing and its relation to racial and economic alienation in a myth which Africans he 'discovered' had purportedly related to him. According to Bosman, the Blacks believed that in the beginning God created Black as well as White men; thereby giving the Blacks the first election, "who chose Gold, and left the knowledge of Letters to the white". In granting their request God was incensed at their avarice and resolved that "the whites should forever be their masters, and they obliged to wait on them as their slaves".²

Bosman's fabrication, of course, was a claim of origins designed to sanction through mythology a political order created by Europeans. But it was Hume, writing midway through the 18th century, who gave to Bosman's myth the sanction of Enlightenment of philosophical reasoning. In a major essay, *Of National Characters* (1748), Hume discussed the "characteristics" of the world's major division of human races. In a footnote Hume added in 1753 to his original text, he posited with all the authority of philosophy the fundamental identity of complexion, character, and intellectual capacity:

I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There was never a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers amongst them, *no arts, no sciences*. Such a uniform and constant difference made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity....³

Citing the case of the Jamaican born poet and Cambridge educated, Francis Williams, who wrote verse in Latin, Hume referred to William's

achievements "as very slender.... like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly".⁴ Hume's opinion on the subject, as we might expect, became prescriptive. In his *Observations on The Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764), Kant elaborates on Hume's essay in Section 4, entitled "Of National Characteristics So Far as They Depend Upon the Distinct Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime". Kant first claims that the fundamental difference between "the black and white races of man ... appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color".⁵ Kant, moreover, is one of the earliest major European philosophers to conflate color with intelligence, a determining relation he posits with dictatorial surety:

Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for laughty treatment toward his wives, answered, "You whites are indeed fools, for first you make great concessions to your wives, and afterward you complain when they drive you mad." And it might be that there were something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, clear proof that what he said was stupid.⁶

The correlation of "black" and "stupid" Kant posits as if it were self evident.

Hegel, echoing Hume and Kant, claimed that Africans had no history, because they had developed no systems of writing and had not mastered the art of writing in European languages. In judging civilizations, Hegel's strictures with respect to the absence of written history presume a crucial role for *memory*, a collective, cultural memory. Metaphors of the childlike nature of slaves, of the masked, puppet-like personality of the black, all share this assumption about the absence of memory. As Martin Bernal (1987) points out, Hegel's true feelings seemed to emerge in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*,⁷ given between 1816 and 1830, where Hegel explicitly showed his love for Europe, respect for the Asian mountains and India, a complete contempt for Africa.⁸

Mary Langdon, in her novel *Ida May: A Story of Things Actual and Possible* (1854), writes that "they (Africans) are mere children ... you seldom hear them say much about anything that's past, if they only get enough to eat and drink at the present moment".⁹

The above picture of Africa and Africans was further echoed by Levy-Bruhl when he described Africans as "primitive" and of "primitive mentality" - a mentality which is pre-logical, pre-scientific, pre-literate, etc. The term "pre-philosophy" is of course a logical consequence of the culture and life of the primitive man which perhaps leaves the hope that this culture might one day evolve into a scientific and reason-oriented

culture. In reaction to Levy-Bruhl's claim, Oruka in his "Sagacity in African Philosophy" writes: "Levy-Bruhl and the anthropologists of his kind left no such hope (for Africa): what they claimed to have established in Africa were: (a) the impossibility for a philosophical dialogue and, (b) an obvious non-existence of a tradition of organized philosophical systems".¹⁰ Oruka notes that the latter is a logical consequence of the former, while the former follows as a "tautology from the fact of the nature of the black man's mind, a primitive mentality".¹¹

The foregoing claim running from Bosman to Hume, Kant, Hegel and Levy-Bruhl seems to define consistently that without writing, no *respectable* sign of the workings of reason could exist. And by parity of reasoning, without memory or mind, no history could exist; without history no humanity. Consequently, the current debate on the nature of African Philosophy arose as a response to allegations to its absence.

II

Africans and people of African descent responded to these profoundly serious allegations about their "nature" as directly as they could. Accused of lacking a formal and collective philosophy, African philosophers and philosophers of African descent dispersed throughout the world (as well as their sympathizers) published individual accounts of "philosophies" in Africa, which, taken together, were intended to narrate in segments the larger yet fragmented African philosophy. In the attempt to create an authentic voice — a voice of deliverance from the deafening discursive silence which an enlightened Europe cited to prove the absence of philosophy and therefore African's humanity, an unhealthy debate emerged - a debate on methodology rather than the content of African philosophy.

There is no doubt that the content of any subject area presupposes its methodology since it is the methodology that defines its subject matter, and it is methodology that delineates the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences one from the other, however, the three decades of the debate on the nature of African philosophy seems to be an unnecessary storm in a tea pot. To avoid the risk of repetitiveness or overcanvassing the main lines in that debate, four major trends can be discerned in contemporary African Philosophy: (a) Ethno-philosophy, (b) Philosophic Sagacity, (c) Nationalist-Ideological Philosophy and (d) Professional Philosophy.

I do not intend to take issue as such with any of the factions except

to show that the energy and time dissipated on the debate should have been channeled into reconstructing the African past which either major migrational trends or colonialism had fragmented. This will be made clear when we discuss in detail in the next section the importance of ancient Egypt in that reconstruction. But suffice it to say, as Keita (1986) points out, that one way to resolve the issue concerning the foundations of contemporary African philosophy would be to locate the historical roots of African thought in the literate ideas of ancient Egyptian thought and Medieval Africa in conjunction with philosophical analysis of traditional ethnic beliefs.¹²

Ethno-Philosophy: Placid Tempels' Bantu Philosophy is an example of a text that is no longer considered real anthropology but which has gained the status and influence in its time, and its ghostly presence keeps returning in the debates over the nature of African philosophy. Tempels begins his work by blaming the misunderstanding between Europe and Africa on Europe's failure to recognize the African worldview as a valid philosophy. It is Tempels' argument that unless Europe tries to understand the African metaphysic, "the gulf between Africans and whites will remain and widen so long as we do not meet them in the wholesome aspirations of their own ontology".¹³ African ontology, Tempels continues, is identified as a single value: vital force and the African life finds its resonance in terms of a balance of forces; African cultural formations are mechanisms for maintaining that balance. It is by this worldview that the Bantu (Africa) differs essentially from the European. So, a proper articulation of the value system inherent in the culture of Africa (Bantu in Tempels' work) has to be situated within the metaphysical matrix that underlies that culture. In order to avoid the Eurocentrism of Kant and his group, a kind of hypothetical sympathy is needed to understand the African ontology and this requires picking up the other end of the walking stick in order to appreciate and perspectivize the African metaphysical framework.

Similarly, Leopold Senghor's "Negritude" has argued that logic is Greek as emotion is African. European philosophy is also taken to be individualistic, that is, a body of thoughts produced or formulated by various individual thinkers. So "communalism" as opposed to "individualism" is brought forth as the essential attribute of African Philosophy. Consequently, according to proponents of this view, African philosophy is identified with communal or folk philosophy. As Tempels succinctly puts it in Bantu Philosophy, the "wisdom of Bantu based on the philosophy of vital force is accepted by everyone, it is not subjected to

"criticism" for it is taken by the whole community as the "imperishable truth".¹⁴

One also witnesses Leo Apostel's forceful defence of this view of African philosophy founded on the principles of African thought as articulated by Tempels' *Bantu Philosophy* and Kagame's (1956) *La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de L'etre*.¹⁵ Apostel's position conduces to the view that in the interest of the mutual interpretation of Africa and the west, critical, demonstrative and polemical expositions of varieties of the (African) Bantu worldview should be developed and presented.¹⁶

As defined by both African and European scholars, ethno-philosophy serves the function of the subjective valorization of traditional African thought in contradistinction to colonial anthropological thought which engaged in a purportedly objective devalorization of the African intellectual efforts. Genuine African philosophy consists, therefore, of descriptive comments on ethnological concepts of time, ethics, personhood and general cosmology.¹⁷

Yet others raise the question as to whether the belief systems discussed by ethno-philosophers may be regarded as genuinely philosophical for the following reasons:

- (a) every philosophy is explicit, not implicit,
- (b) every philosophy is systematic, and not just intuitive,
- (c) every philosophy entails the existence of proof, and critical comparison of systems with each other. If these requirements

are accepted, one can at best take ethno-philosophy to represent a worldview and not a philosophy in the technical sense of it.¹⁸

Philosophic Sagacity

In a recent article of Odera Oruka "Sagacity in African Philosophy"¹⁹ Oruka tries to advance a solution to the above problems raised for ethno-philosophy by arguing that African philosophy could be founded on the ideas of rigorous indigenous thinkers in various African ethnic groups. Even where these thinkers (sages) do not have the benefit of modern education, they none-the-less are original and critical independent thinkers who have the art for speculative and reflective reasoning as well as the capacity for rational judgment rather than by the authority of the communal consensus. According to Oruka, these sages "are capable of taking a problem or a concept and offer a rigorous philosophical analysis of it making clear rationally where they accept or reject the established or

communal judgement on the matter".²⁰

Judging from Oruka's thesis, it is, however, difficult to extricate philosophical sagacity from the very problems for which Oruka rejects ethno-philosophy. Even though Oruka argues that philosophic sagacity is both "dialectic and individualistic", the reason adduced that "it is a thought or reflection of various known or named individual thinkers"²¹ begs the question. It also appears that Oruka's claim that philosophical sagacity is the movement in African philosophy best equipped to "give an all acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy" is not fully adequate since it can be argued that philosophic sagacity seems to be an attempt to re-enunciate the principles of ethno-philosophy.²² It is hard to sustain that Oruka's "Sages" can philosophize in a vacuum, that is to say, independent of the cultural matrix or the belief system from which their thoughts operate; and the fact that they happen to think more dialectically cannot be taken as enough ground to claim that the view they espouse are original. The novelty of their "Philosophies" would certainly derive their characterization from the fact that they must have been founded on critical analysis of existing belief systems. The absence of this proof in written form makes Oruka's claim spurious and hence the distinction he tries to make arduous.

Nationlist-Oriented Philosophy

Other contributions to the debate came from nationalist-oriented scholars like Nkrumah and Nyerere²³ who argue that since colonialism was built on the ruins of what was supposed to be the cardinal ethical principle (maxim) of traditional humanist Africa - communalism - the required social theory, Nkrumah claims need to embrace communalism as one of its basic tenets.

In communalism, a person's ethical or political capacity can roughly be said to be measured by the span of his "we". Individualism marks off an isolated "I", and beyond this boundary discovers only "he" and "she", finding ethical contests in the clashes of these irreducible cores, the one against the many, each unit pursuing its own interest. Communalism finds "others" and even in its pluralistic nature, (it) is couched in sympathetic capacities. The individual is so moved to identify with the other that the capacity to say "we" emerges. The individual is stretched over to the other and doesn't stop with the individual's skin but overflows to the kin. Ethical maturity comes with a widening of that sense of kinship, and, with broad enough recognition of this togetherness, the

self is immersed in a communal life. The dialectics between the individual and the "other" culminates in a communal structure and as Nyerere wrote in *Ujamaa* " ... the individual was poor or rich only to the extent that the society was poor or rich and vice versa ".²⁴

There is no doubt that communalism, either as an ethical or political philosophy finds a comfortable niche in the general metaphysical framework of African Holistic View. However, it is claimed by critics that the nationalist-oriented philosophers lacked the philosophic tools to properly articulate the essential features of their philosophy. Using the Marxist dialectics to demonstrate the striking similarity between communalism (African socialism) and the Marxist model, they robbed their "philosophy" of what would have been distinctively African in it.

Professional (Book) Philosophers

Rejecting the assumptions of ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity and national-ideological philosophy, a group that has come to be known as philosophers of the "Books" claims that African philosophy started with formal education and contact with the west. Philosophy, the group argues, "must have the same meaning in all cultures" although its content might be culture bound.²⁵

In a much more forceful and radical tone, Hountondji advocates a complete departure from the "ghetto" of ethnic difference, a *prise de conscience* by the African of contemporary rather than traditional reality:

Nous devons a tout prix liberer notre pensee du ghetto Africaniste ou on a voulu l'enfermer.²⁶

(We must at all costs liberate our thought from the Africanist ghetto where some have sought to lock it up).

Towa in "Essai Sur la Problematique Philosophique dans l'Afrique Actuelle".²⁷, shares Hountondji's view and claims that to be different, to have an identity, is to be a slave. In regard to all worship of difference and identity, "we must cultivate a systematic skepticism, without which we run the risk of confirming our own servitude".²⁸ In order to gain the "secret of the West", one renounces the secrets of Africa. The anti ethno-philosophers ask rhetorically: "What is African?"

It is, therefore, the contention of Book philosophers (European Books) that even though pre-literate societies, Africans or otherwise, express their worldview, their shared ideas on reality in their works of art, drawings, religion, myths; this is not philosophy in the strict sense of a

rational, systematic activity of a reflecting people.²⁹

This view is further canvassed by Wiredu when he argues that contemporary African philosopher has "no written tradition of written philosophy in his continent to draw upon". Comparing him to his Indian counterpart, Wiredu claims that whereas the Indian has "longstanding written philosophical heritage to advert his mind",³⁰ the same cannot be said of the African.

But in Africa where according to Wiredu "we do not have even a written traditional philosophy, anthropologists have fastened on our folk world views and elevated them to the status of a continental philosophy".³¹

To say the least we find Wiredu's position unacceptable and very shocking. The situation is all the more compounded by the fact that colonial and post colonial African universities were modelled essentially after their European counterparts. Consequently, philosophy in African institutions means European philosophy, either Anglo-American or continental philosophy and often a combination of the two. The pioneers responsible for this model happened to be of course the "Book Philosophers" trained as it were in the West. To this group, the "march of modernization is destined to lead to the universalization of philosophy everywhere in the world".³²

In following this debate which has gone on for over two decades, one seems to observe an appalling ignorance and misrepresentation on the part of the so called Book Philosophers. When Wiredu and Hountondji argue that the African had no written philosophy or philosophical literature to draw upon, they seem to forget or ignore the African heritage in Ancient Egypt.

We need to point out some professional schools of thought in Ancient Egypt to demonstrate that the problem was not necessarily lack of written African philosophical literature to "advert their minds" but that the pioneer African philosophers had failed to do what their Indian counterparts had done with their own ancient heritage.

According to classical writers, Heliopolis was a major center of learning where, for instance Eudoxos studied and for the Freemasons, it was the epitome of ancient esoteric wisdom. The city was a major center of the sun-cult associated particularly with Ra who became associated with Osiris by the 18th Dynasty. The Hermitic texts refer repeatedly to this perfect city, founded by Hermes Trismegistos which is closely associated with the sun.³³ Writing about the cosmogony of Hermopolis, Bernal informs us that the first type of euphemism, the non-personalized

abstraction of natural forces, seems to have been present in Egyptian thought from the earliest times. It is certainly "true of the cosmogony of Hermopolis, which has been linked to Thoth and to the cosmogony of Taaautos described by Sanchunation:.³⁴ The abstraction is indicated by the fact that not one of the eight gods of the city of Hermopolis, the four pairs of beings or forces from whom the universe was created had temples or cults, though they were sometimes equated with divinities which did.³⁵

Unanimous testimony of ancient scholars like Herodotus and Plutarch seem to reveal that the Greeks owe their philosophy and science to Ancient Egyptian. To use Bernal's aphorism (1987 p. 121), it was Egyptian wisdom and Greek transmission. In the "Isis and Osiris," Plutarch reported that, according to the testimony of all Greek scholars and philosophers taught by Egyptians, the latter were careful about secularizing their knowledge. Solon, Thales, Plato, Lycurgus, Pythagoras encountered difficulty before being accepted as students by the Egyptians. The Egyptians, according to Plutarch, seemed to have preferred Pythagoras because of his mystical temperament. As will be made clearer later, the Greek philosophical giants, notably Plato and Aristotle owe the originality of their thoughts to Egypt.

Amelineau in his Introduction to *Prolegomenes, a l'etude de la Religion Egyptienne* writes:

I also realized that the lofty genius of the Greeks had been able to present Egyptian ideas incomparably, especially in Plato; but I thought that what we loved in the Greeks, we should not scorn nor simply disdain in the Egyptians.³⁶

Amelineau's argument seems to be that when two authors, for instance, collaborate, the credit for their work in common is shared equally by each but in the case in question, "I fail to see why ancient Greece should reap all the honour for ideas she borrowed from Egypt."³⁷

The Athenian orator Isokrates in his *Bousiris*³⁸ portrayed the land of Egypt and its people as the most blessed in the world. Isokrates admired the caste system, the rulership of philosophers, and the rigor of the Egyptian philosopher/priest (paideia-education) that produced the contemplative man (anertheoretikos) who used his superior wisdom for the good of his state. The division of labour allowed a "leisure", *schole*, which allowed for *schole*, "learning". Above all, Isokrates insisted that philosophy (philosophia) was, and could only have been, the product of Egypt. Writing about the Pythagoreans, Isokrates notes: "On a visit to Egypt Pythagoras became a student of the religion of the people, and was

the first to bring to the Greeks all philosophy".³⁹

There are striking similarities between Isokrates' *Bousiris* and Plato's *Republic*. In the latter, there was division of labour based on Castes ruled by enlightened Guardians produced by careful selection and rigorous education. We know that Plato spent some time, probably around 390 B.C. in Egypt. In *Phaedrus* Plato had Socrates declare that "He (Theuth) the Egyptian God of wisdom) it was who invented numbers and Arithmetic and Geometry ... and most important of all letters..."⁴⁰ In *Philebus* and *Epinomis*, Plato went into more detail on thought as the creator of writing, even of language and all sciences.⁴¹

Bernal (1987) argues that the only possible reason why Plato did not explicitly proclaim the *Republic* to be based on Egyptian political model was for the following reason:

Plato's contemporaries mocked him, saying that he was not the inventor of his *Republic*, but that he had copied Egyptian institutions. Plato attached so much importance to his rivals and mockers that he attributed to the Egyptians the story of the Athenians and the Atlantines to make them say that the Athenians had really lived under this regime at a certain moment in the past.⁴² It becomes clear why even in modern times scholars like Karl Marx accept that Plato's *Republic*, in so far as division of labour is treated in it, as the formative principle of the state, "is merely an Athenian idealization of the Egyptian system of castes".⁴³

Aristotle, a student of Plato, is known to have also studied at the Academy under Eudoxus of Knidos, the great mathematician and astronomer who spent sixteen months in Egypt shaving his head in order to study with the priests.⁴⁴ In Aristotle's *Metaphysika*, he argued that the Egyptians had created the caste system and hence "Egypt was the cradle of mathematics because the caste of priests were given great leisure, scholē".⁴⁵ According to Aristotle, the priests had invented the *mathematikai technai* (mathematical arts), which included geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy, which the Greeks were beginning to possess.⁴⁶

According to Bernal (1987, p.109), Aristotle's admiration for Egypt went beyond that of Herodotus because while the latter believed that Egyptians had developed geometry, the key science, for practical reasons to measure land after landmarks had been washed away by the Nile flood—Aristotle maintained that it had been developed theoretically by the priests.

Regarding the attitude of the Church Fathers towards Egypt, Bernal shows that after the crushing of Neo-Platonism, the Hellenic,

pagan descendants of Egyptian religion, and Gnosticism, its Judeo-Christian counterpart, christian thinkers tamed Egyptian religion by turning it into a philosophy. The process was identified with the figure of Hermes Trismegistos, a euphemized or rationalised version of Thot, the Egyptian God of wisdom. The church Fathers were divided on whether or not Trismegistos antedated Moses and Biblical moral philosophy. It was claimed that Saint Augustine's weighty opinion came down firmly in favour of the priority, and hence the superiority of Moses and the Bible. Following the classical tradition, however, the Fathers were united in the belief that the Greeks had learned most of their philosophy from the Egyptians (Bernal, 1987, p. 24).

III

In view of the foregoing, which clearly demonstrates the indebtedness of Western philosophy and Science to Ancient Egypt, how can one possibly understand the tragic conclusions of African Book philosophers (Hountondnji, Towa, Wiredu, etc.) that abandoning one's cultural past seems to be the best way to gain the "Secret of the West?"

Let us for the sake of argument agree with this group that the intellectual pursuit of Western science and technology should be Africa's main task, it is important to recognize that:

- (a) Science and technology cannot thrive in a vacuum, that is, in an absence of a metaphysical framework;
- (b) Starting from traditional African culture, there is a need to build a bridge to connect Africa's cultural heritage with Ancient Egypt so as to provide that much needed metaphysics which will enable the move towards a scientific culture in Africa.

Items (a) and (b) will provide the foundations on which the unity of thought can be built in the African continent. This is to say that a systematic reconstruction of the African worldview or its philosophy cannot be complete, it will ever remain suspended in the air over unnecessary debates on method, until African scholars dare to connect their multiple forms of cultures or ethno-philosophies with Ancient Egyptian thought. Our position needs to be appraised in the light of, for example, Cheikh Anta Dipo's thesis that the "African historian who evades the problem of Egypt is neither modest nor objective, nor unruffled; he is ignorant, cowardly, and neurotic".⁴⁸ Imagine, if you can, the uncomfortable position of a Western historian who was to write the history

of Europe, without according to Diop, "referring to the Greeco-Latin Antiquity and try to pass that off as a scientific approach".⁴⁹

The position we have tried to argue so far in the paper is that two options are now open to African philosophers. First, if we accept that Western philosophy was influenced by Egyptian thought and that the Greeks took from Egypt what they needed to restructure their society and in the process "discover the intellect", African "Book Philosophers" can borrow a leaf from the Greeks. Given that over three millennia have passed since the evolution of what is now called Western philosophy, it becomes an almost impossible task to reacculturate what the West borrowed from Africa without running the risk of completing the cultural as well as intellectual assimilation of Africa by the West—the unfortunate legacy of the African colonial experience. The question, therefore, becomes: to what extent can you call the fruit of such a philosophy African? Perhaps the answer lies in the second option, which is to say that in acquiring from the West what Egypt had shared with it (cosmogony and science), there is the need to rearticulate what is acquired in the African metaphysic. For instance, there is the frequently quoted passage in *Epinomis* by Plato that whatever the Greeks acquired from foreigners (Egyptians) is finally turned by them into something finer. (Bernal 1987, p. 198). Similarly, as the popular writer Oliver Goldsmith wrote - in his 1774 *History of the Earth* strikingly paraphrasing *Epinomis*: "Those arts which might have had their invention among other races of mankind have come to their perfection in Europe".⁵⁰

There is no doubt that Pythagorean mathematics, Platonic Idealism, the theory of four elements of Thales of Miletus are rooted in Egyptian cosmogony and science. However, on the one hand their evolution in the West stripped them (because of the materialistic tendencies in the western culture), of the religious, idealistic shell in which the Egyptians had enveloped them. On the other hand, the West has advanced moral values diametrically opposite to Egyptian moral values which was based on special collectivism, optimism, relatively easy peaceful life, once it had been regulated by a few social laws — a Dionysian approach to life.

It can further be argued that what the West borrowed from Egypt was either what their Egyptian teachers (the priests and scholars) were willing to secularize, what is probably with a few exceptions already apparent in the culture, or what these scholars particularly found appealing to complete their intellectual formation.

To illustrate the point we are trying to make, it is common

knowledge that library information contained in textbooks and other educational materials are often available to whoever wants to consult them. Major discoveries in the sciences even when they are under patent, can be used in the classroom to educate students. But this is not to say that once you know the basics that one can go ahead to manufacture the products. There is still the essential component(s) which the owners of the patent(s) keep to themselves. These "essentials" are not for public consumption and are only available on a franchise or guarded by the owners. This is to say that the release of such "information" depends on the extent to which it does not jeopardize the interests, the national pride or security of the owners. By parity of reasoning one can draw an analogy that what the Greeks and medieval scholars got from Egypt was what the custodians of that cosmogony and science were willing to secularize and release to their students. That which was under "patent" and guarded jealously by the priests were the "essentials" of Egyptian wisdom. Since these essentials were couched in the African psyche, it is the task of African philosophers to attempt to decipher its content so as to justify whatever claim Africa has on Ancient Egypt. This will also provide the metaphysical framework under which whatever is reacculturated from the West and other cultures would find its perfection.

Department of Philosophy
University of Port Harcourt
NIGERIA

JOSEPH IKE ASIKE

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PROF. G.R. MALKANI ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Prof. G.R.Malkani Essay Competition either in English or Hindi from undergraduate or post-graduate students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "Secularism in Indian Context" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs.200/-and Rs.100/- to the essays adjudicated to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published in course of time either in Students' Supplement of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* or *Parāmarsā (Hindi)*, quarterly journals published by the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows:

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
 - (a) the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
 - (b) the essay is written by him/her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. Mangala R. Chinchore, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31.5.1992.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on the count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind,
Pune 411 007.

THE DEBATE ON AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL SURVEY

This is a work in the history of philosophy - precisely the history of African Philosophy. It seeks, in a historical, nonetheless critical manner, to provide a survey of the set of arguments which have come to delineate a distinctive phase in the development of African philosophy - i.e. that phase in which professional African philosophers in a self-conscious manner sought to consider two separate, nonetheless related, questions:

- (1) the question of the meaning of the phrase 'African philosophy; and
- (2) the question of what should be the attitude of African scholars to the cultural heritage of their people.

These questions which are aspects of a complex question - of African philosophy - have produced a formidable body of literature which now define the nature of that phase in the development of African philosophy, the exploration of which is the concern of this paper.¹ The point of this paper, then, is to serve as a prolegomenon to contemporary African philosophy. It is an attempt to delimit, in a critical manner, the set of questions and theoretical positions that can provide the gateway through which contemporary 'trends and perspectives' in African philosophy can be understood.

Now, the question of African philosophy is, essentially, the question of what we may mean when we talk of 'African philosophy'. Its primary focus is on 'the world-views and value systems of traditional African societies'²: Are they philosophical? The issue here, as Prof. Blocker rightly points out, is that of 'the meaning of cross-cultural statements'³. It has to do with the question of the extent to which African world-views, beliefs and so on can be said to satisfy the criteria for inclusion in *Philosophy*.⁴ It is a philosophical question which, in recent times, has dominated discussion among professional philosophers in the

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academic departments of African universities⁵.

Originally, before the emergence, particularly since independence, of a group of professional African philosophers, it had been taken for granted that there was an African philosophy. This was associated with the traditional world-views of Africans. Thus, works like Tempel's *Bantu Philosophy* (Presence Africaine 1959), Mbiti's *African Religions and Philosophy* (Heinemann, 1969), Iddowu's *Olodumare; God in Yoruba Belief* (Longman 1962) and other works of their type were seen as embodiments of African philosophy. Fr. Tempel's *Bantu Philosophy*, in particular, was for many African scholars the paradigm of African philosophy. Small wonder then, that earlier attempts at attacking the colonial myth of the mental inferiority of Africans saw in this work the 'African Metaphysics' and epistemology which could serve as the theoretical basis of the nationalist ideologies (Negritude, for example) which served as rallying points for the anti-colonial struggle. Leopold Sedar Senghor's writings on 'The African Apprehension of Reality' and 'African Metaphysics', can be seen as a celebration of this work.⁶

With the emergence of professional African philosophers- most of them trained in Western universities, however, this conception of African philosophy was challenged. Many of these new-bred philosophers reject the original conception of African philosophy on the following grounds. First, they argue that those who equate African philosophy with the traditional world- views of Africans fail to make a clear-cut and necessary distinction between philosophy in the popular or 'unique' sense and philosophy in the strict, that is academic sense.⁷ They maintain that whereas, in the first sense, 'everyone is naturally a philosopher, and so is every society'⁸, philosophy, in the second sense, is a theoretical discipline like physics, algebra, linguistics and so on. The argument for the rejection of traditional African world-views as philosophy, in the words of one of the leading members of this group of philosophers, is that :

.... If we pose that it is absurd to speak of unconscious algebra, geometry, linguistics, etc. and if we accept that no science can exist historically without an explicit discourse, then by the same token we must regard the very idea of unconscious philosophy as absurd. Conversely, if we believe that it is the essence of any science to be constituted by free discussion, by the confrontation of hypotheses and theories created by the thought of individual... and reaching total convergence through reciprocal amendment, then we must also find absurd the idea of a collective, immutable and definitive 'philosophy' abstracted from history and progress.⁹ Thus, on the basis of a definition of philosophy as a rational and

critical activity, an activity of which argument and clarification are essential elements, these philosophers - modernists we may for the sake of convenience call them - reject the 'folk-philosophies' (this is Hountondji's) which were originally presented as African philosophy and contend that the title 'African philosophy' should be reserved for 'the philosophy that is being produced by contemporary philosophers' ¹⁰. It is, therefore, 'still in the making'.

There is, however, a more significant argument (more significant from the point of view of praxis) for the rejection of African traditional world-views as philosophy by the modernists. This has to do with the question of the adequacy or otherwise of these world-views for contemporary African societies which are confronted, not only with the urgent task of developing industrially and technologically, but also that of how to ensure that this is accomplished without damage to what is best in our traditions. The argument here is this: since development is the goal of modern African societies and since this cannot be achieved in the contemporary world without science and technology, then

The habits of exactness and rigour in thinking, the pursuit of systematic coherence and the experimental approach characteristic of science are attributes of mind which we in Africa urgently need to cultivate not just because they are themselves intellectual virtues but also because they are necessary conditions for rapid modernization. ¹¹

The urgent task for African philosophers, therefore, is to create in their societies those conditions necessary for scientific and technological development - a task they can accomplish, not by glorifying an 'ossified past', but by subjecting to critical analysis, in the light of the demands of contemporary times, their traditional world-views. For the modernists, then, 'it is the present and not researches into archives which determines our understanding of the past' ¹².

This, in outline, is the position of those professional African philosophers - Profs. Wiredu, Bodunrin, Hountondji, Oruka, to mention but a few of them - who reject the position that African traditional world-views constitute an authentic African philosophy.

There are, however, other African philosophers - Drs. K.C. Anyanwu and C.S. Momoh for example, who strongly feel that the works rejected by the modernists constitute an authentic African philosophy. This group of scholars, the traditionalists - not only insist on a definition of philosophy that is broad enough to accommodate African traditional world-views. They also, on the basis of this definition and their interpretation of the

contemporary life in Africa, see the task of contemporary African philosophy in a different light. For them, philosophy 'is essentially a reflective activity'¹³. It is the reflection of man either on the experience of themselves or the experience of the world-process of which they are an integral part. And since, the argument goes, there 'is no part of the world where man never reflected on such basic questions about the physical universe'¹⁴, we cannot deny, without absurdity, that there was philosophical activity in traditional African society. This explains the reason why some of them, Dr.K.C. Anyanwu for example, still see Tempel's *Bantu Philosophy* and his doctrine that for the African being is force or life-force as providing a paradigm of 'African Metaphysics'¹⁵.

The position just outlined in the preceding paragraph should, of course, be seen against the background of the colonial myth which portrayed Africans as an inferior, backward and barbarous people who never made any significant contribution to human civilization. It is a position born out of the nationalistic urge to defend African culture and civilization 'against external contempt and underestimation'. No wonder, then, that the traditionalists see, in opposition to the modernists, the role of African philosophers, indeed any African scholar, in contemporary African societies as consisting in a combination of two tasks. 'First, to expose and destroy all false ideas about African peoples and cultures that have been perpetrated by Western scholarships'¹⁶; and second to 'endeavour to present the institutions of African peoples as they really are'¹⁷ - in short, to promote an understanding of 'What existence or reality as experienced in African Culture ... means to African thought'¹⁸ through an exposition of its underlying assumptions.

This is where the question of African philosophy goes beyond the issue of what philosophy is and whether certain materials in Africa fulfil the criteria of that definition to the normative issue of what should be the attitude of the African philosopher to the cultural heritage of his people. The question, seen in this perspective, is a manifestation in philosophy of the problematic which has, since independence, come to define the African condition - that of fashioning modes of development both intellectual and socio-political, which will enable Africans to confront the challenges of today while, at the same time, preserving that which is best in our traditions.

We may now, at this juncture, consider the strength and weaknesses of the two schools of thought whose positions on the question of African philosophy we have tried to clarify. This in an attempt to bring

to put in sharper focus the assumptions or presuppositions underlining them and to underscore the significance of this debate for a clear understanding of contemporary African reality.

The modernists, we have seen, base their rejection of African traditional world-views as African philosophy on two grounds. First, a conception of philosophy as a self-conscious, critical activity and second, a critical interpretation of the 'African condition', which is given expression in the African search for self-identity. Now, some critics have argued that the definition of philosophy on which this rejection is based is rather narrow and partisan. We have a view of this line of criticism in J. Paratt, when he remarks:

.... that to reject tradition altogether as a valid basis for constructing a philosophy may be a prejudice formed from the European model of "Written" philosophy". Because the history of philosophy in Western civilizations is largely a history of individual literate philosophers, this need not imply that African philosophy must be the same kind of thing.¹⁹

G. Salemohamed expresses the same line of thought when he comments on P.O. Bodunrin's "The Question of African Philosophy" thus:

....when Bodunrin speaks of philosophy, he has in mind only the British-American philosophical tradition. Although he is quite happy that this could co-exist in African universities with continental philosophy, he does not investigate from the latter point of view what might be the merits of including in the philosophy curricula of African universities everything that he at present rejects.²⁰

The point of these criticisms is to emphasize the need for African philosophers to relate to the collective world-views of their people, for this may well provide the basis for 'an African orientation in philosophy'. Yet, it does not appear that they sufficiently come to grips with the spirit that informs the agenda for African philosophy the modernists present. The modernists do not deny that African traditional world-views are worthy of philosophical study. (Indeed some of them, Prof. Wiredu, for instance, are actively engaged in this study.²¹ What they emphasize is that this study, rather than consisting in a mere narration or description of what these world-views were, should involve a critical engagement with them. The point of this critical engagement being the determination of the extent to which the insights offered by traditional world-views are adequate for dealing with 'contemporary African experience with its many sidedness'²². The argument for this advocacy for a critical approach to the study of traditional world-views, simply put, is

this: that since the cardinal goal of contemporary African societies is development, and since the key to this (development) in the contemporary world is science and technology²³, than African philosophy, to be relevant to contemporary African experience, should, as a matter of urgency, promote the scientific attitude. But if the scientific attitude is defined by such features as 'freedom of inquiry, openness to criticism, a general type of scepticism and fallibilism and non-veneration of authorities'²⁴ then it cannot be said to be compatible with the traditional world-outlook which, among other things, stresses conformity to social norms at the expense of individual initiatives. If, therefore, the modernists argue 'for a conception of philosophy that is pluralistic, self-critical and open-minded, i.e., one which is the very opposite of dogmatism and authoritarianism or unjustified belief and opinion'²⁵, it is not because this happens to be the conception of philosophy that now defines the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition, or because they do not see the relevance of oral tradition to the development of African philosophy. Rather it is because they believe that it is only this kind of philosophy that can promote the scientific spirit, without which the goal of development in Africa may become unrealisable.

To defend the modernists in this manner, however, is not to suggest that their position is flawless. For, in emphasizing science and technology and the role of philosophy in promoting the intellectual attitudes necessary for their development, we (Africans) may unwittingly make a fetish of the scientific spirit, thereby laying a solid foundation for imperialism in the guise of science. That this fear is not completely out of place can be seen in the fact that an uncritical acceptance of the Western notion of development by many African societies has led to the acquisition of sophisticated technology which, rather than alleviating the sufferings of the people, have added to their misery, by endangering even those aspects of their culture that can provide the foundation on which their contribution to world civilization in contemporary times can be built. (Witness, for instance, the negative effects of the infiltration into these societies of the consumerist ethos of Western, capitalist, civilization - an occurrence that has made corruption and violence facts of life the people have to contend with, in addition to the formidable problems of poverty, ignorance, disease and so on). The crucial challenge to the modernists then, is the issue of how to achieve significant sciento-technical development, without losing in the process all that is good in the African tradition.

This is where the position of the traditionists has some relevance. For, in advocating that African philosophers set themselves the task of

justifying African traditional world-views and their underlying reason, what they stress is that any attempt by Africans to develop and contribute to world civilization can only be meaningful from the stand-point of African culture itself. But, in stressing this point, the traditionalists do not display a sufficient awareness of the evolutionary nature of culture. They tend to believe that culture is something static, a commodity, as it were, which could be preserved, bought and sold by a people. Yet, nothing can be further from the truth. Culture is not such a finished product; it is something that is 'constantly in making', in consonance with the dynamics of the continuous socio-economic development of a society. African culture, therefore, is not anything we may preserve at all times. Rather, it is something, parts of which we may want to remake or change in accordance with the dictates of our socio-economic reality and the ends (both theoretical and practical) the achievement of which we have set for ourselves, as a goal. Thus, although the traditionalists may be right in insisting that our contribution to the world should be from the stand-point of our culture, they may not be far from being wrong in insisting that the visions and insight offered by our traditional world-views are adequate for the understanding of our present socio-economic reality. For while we may confidently assert, with Earl Lovelace, that

Nobody is born into the world. Everyone of us is born into a place in the world, in a culture and it is from the stand-point of that culture that we contribute to the world,²⁵

we also cannot but hold, with Bodunrin, that,

The forward march of science and technology will ensure not only that no nation lives in isolation from others but also that purity of culture is not maintained.²⁷

The question confronting Africans, then, is not that of whether they need science and technology or not, but that of the kind and manner of acquisition of these important agents of development. But if this is the case, then the role of philosophy in breaking down 'the cultural constraints to scientific patterns of thought' in African societies can never be overemphasized.

It should be clear from our survey thus far that the question of African philosophy is not, as a critic contends, a question raised by some African philosophers who deliberately 'reduce socio-historical considerations to obstructions, as if philosophy were an entity that floats above the societies which have produced our philosophers'²⁸. For, as we have seen, it is not simply a concern with meaning, but more significantly

and closely connected with this, an attempt by African philosophers to reflect on the African problem of self-identification which, as Wiredu argues, 'at its most fundamental level ... is a philosophical problem'²⁹. Thus, apart from producing a formidable body of literature which has come to form the inner core of contemporary African philosophy and making some African philosophers, Wiredu for instance, to begin to turn their critical searchlights on the traditional world-views of their peoples, the debate on this question has brought into sharper focus the magnitude, at least in intellectual terms, of the crisis of identity which (thanks to colonialism) has now come to define the African condition. It is, therefore, in addition to being a significant building-block in the unfolding architecture of African intellectual history, also a reflective and worthwhile contribution by African philosophers to the understanding of contemporary African socio-economic reality.

Department of Philosophy
University of Ibadan
Ibadan
(NIGERIA)

OLUSEGUN OLADIPO

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INDIVIDUAL, INSTITUTION, NATION BUILDING AND OBLIGATION : A REVIEW ESSAY

Chasing a philosopher and his work is not a matter of joke and one must attempt only if one has the inbuilt innovative competence to adjust to the idiosyncrasies of the philosopher which rests more in the intangible dimensions rather than the tangible ones. As a philosopher R Sundara Rajan (RSR) can be classified as what Adam Smith would label as a 'public spirited man' who displays respect for legitimate power and the 'privileges of individuals and groups'. The present work¹, thus, does attempt to provide a technical treatment to the role of the individual, its interrelationship to institutions within which he exists, the tangible results in the form of nation-building and issues of obligations of each section to the other in an inter-dependent mode. However, this review article is not going to confine itself merely to the ideas of the *Primacy of the Political* (POP) but link up with RSR's other two works i.e. *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason*² (TCCR) and *Innovative Competence and Social Change*³ (ICSC). While the completion of the trilogy for the author represents a decade of work to examine the role of the political from within the context of social to the theory of culture and culminating by pitting political competence against political culture, the present article will contextually and thematically examine by centralizing the role of the individual, institution and nation-building process in the context of obligations.

The question, thus, arises whether RSR has been able to cement the trilogy into a unified whole or has he left at a point in front of which is a gaping unbridgable chasm or has he landed us within the proximity of a philosophical black-hole from which neither the individual nor the institution nor a nation-building process can escape total oblivion. The density of ideas and spirits encapsulated from the works of individuals incorporated ranging from Aristotle, Kant, Kautilya, Locke, Hobbes, Marx, Adam Smith, Hausser, Dilthey, Riceour etc. of the past and Almond, Sidney Verba, Coleman, Rajni Kothari, Myron Weiner etc. of the living present has led to a situation where individual identities of ethics and rhetorics, or the issues of classical and contemporary theories or the

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connection between political action and political judgement, instead of being discernible for comparison against each other, tends towards physical singularity, thus creating a fusion of a nature from which neither the author nor the undiscernible reader would be in a position to extract himself.

It is, thus, essential at this very crucial cross-road of world history to examine and understand the polarisation that has occurred between the individual, the role of the institution and the nation-building process. It appears that for the first time in the history of our human civilization the institutions and nation states, due to their organic and functional myopicity, will be the cause of structural violence and where man has been so strongly urged individually to turn against his own nature, simply because institutions are insensitive to the requirements of social justice and nation states, are oblivious to the higher ethos of tradition and cultural preconditions.

While reviewing RSR's earlier works viz. TCCR and ICSC, it was observed⁴ that he has tried to link and operationalise the abstract notions of theory into possible implementable policies for national integration and that he has grown to believe and work out the framework of analysis in the field of social philosophy and concern for the operation of political domain. The trilogy, when applied as a whole, has far reaching consequences in the area of development and developmental strategies. *The Primacy of the Political* analyses political problems as a 'search for legitimate authority' with the aim to protect 'the social order and arts of life'. In the process he identifies two contextual problems i.e. (a) the autonomy of the new nation states in the context of encroaching dominance and (b) the internal integrity of the state *vis-a-vis* various groupings and ethnic pressures and pulls. One is, thus, tempted at this stage to postulate the emergence of the individual in the new world order and secondly examine the inter-relationship between the nation-building and the individual in the most contemporary context. More of that, however, later.

With the end of the cold war, the ideological battle between the two dominating military powers following two different political ideologies for governance have taken different dimensions in the area of international relations, international political economy and international balance of power. The basic premise of RSR's *Primacy of the Political*, as observed earlier, is formed by the interplay of the two notions i.e. political competence and political culture must necessarily begin with the central position of the individual in the above-mentioned background in the post cold war

era - individuals who will belong to a new class called international business community.

These individuals will be identified as a new class of world citizen maintaining different passports without any bearing to their country of origin, transnational in nature, highly qualified professionally and capable of working out their briefcases with a lap-top computer, a cellular telephone hooked to a world wide communication system and a plastic credit card for using international banking system and facility. Such individuals will surpass even the mobility and flexibility of multinational companies and international banking systems. Backed by the latest communication facility they will have exceptional access to information and operational activity in their professional levels of existence. Being individuals and not belonging to any institution, country or system will make them totally a commodity on which no control-factor can be implied and, hence, such entities will display no national ethos or emotions towards a set of culture or traditions. One can see the emergence of a biological robot which can think for its own existence, development and growth and, hence, more dangerous than any form of artificial intelligence.

According to the parameters prescribed by RSR, the 'political' is mediated by ethics whose interrelationship 'preserves its normative character as concerned with vision of good life' and rhetorics provides the political with a 'dimension of friendly discourse with others in which one is willing to persuade as well as be persuaded by'. Does it not strike as significant that the role of ethics and rhetorics, when actually seen in action, resulting in the formation of an individual in contemporary situation comparable to an inhuman machine more dangerous and destructive than any other form conceivable? Where, then, is the applied value of the work in trilogy?

There are seminal notionalities which are well-postulated, corroborated and documented in RSR's work. The first is directed towards the understanding of the theory of modernization, nationalism and concept of political development. RSR indicates that the twin consequences of the contemporary theory of modernization primarily makes us concentrate our attention on the regional level rather than on the global level and allows the growth of the elites within that system which is primarily urban based. Yes, as well as no. One is not sure if one could stratify the way the above observations have been made. John Galtung, the celebrated peace researcher, has often taken recourse to centre-periphery models of analysis to explain the theory of structural

violence incubated in the international relations among nation states. Concepts of nation and national autonomy, far from being marginalised, come to the forefront of international system at a systemic level to an extent that the pressures and pulls exerted by local actors at regional level become the turning point of peace and stability at the global level. One can argue conversely that it is essentially the impact of science and technology in the form of technocratism following naturally and essentially to the regional levels of underdevelopment which raises the issue of participation and obligation at a global level.

Thus, from the highest point of modernization to the nascent stage of incorporation of modernization, the attention necessarily is at global perspective — this is a direct output of the shrinking world in a age of communication explosion. The reality of our situation and that of the world we are living in are very much rooted in the relationship between nation-building and the individual on one hand and the interrelationship between nation-building and theory of modernization both at macro levels of world politics of internationalism and at the micro levels of regional inter-nationalism. One, thus, may have to disagree with RSR's attempt to delink the theory of nation-building from the theory of modernization which allows him to postulate in terms of new categories of nationalism and nation states.

From a critical point of view, it will be interesting to postulate the intrinsic linkage between nation-building and the individual in the changed world order today. The individual is both the receptor and the responder to the fast changing situation and his role in nation-building is far more pertinent. The situation has been accentuated because of the explosion of population in less developed nations states and an unending requirement of skilled manpower in amongst developed nations of the world. Peace, stability, nationalism and development *per se* will all be affected by the transient nature of the individual in the modern age and hence there would be the emergence of new linkages between nation-building and the individual.

Nation-building is a process of development which must incorporate harmonious interaction between the individual and institutions for achieving political and technological optimization in order to improve the quality of life. For political it creates traditions, norms and values and for the technological it creates institutions and centres of excellence. Thus, the individual in his own right and merit is encouraged by the institutions within the country to optimise the efforts of his skills to fulfill the needs of a nation at large. In developing countries, economic

disparities reduce individual's choices while trying to utilise one's own skills which have been acquired due to the availability of subsidised educational system sponsored by respective governments. Thus, the third world countries, which produce a plethora of skilled human resources, are unable to absorb them fully in their own country leading to a continuous attempt for migration to developed countries.

Interestingly, the absorbed part is not necessarily the best amongst those produced. Their selection within is influenced by a variety of factors ranging from subjective sociological reasons to political anticidents. The remainder remains unemployed, virtually sitting on the fence waiting for the opportunity to move out for absorption in the international labour market.

A country like India over the past forty years has produced and accumulated the third largest pool of scientific manpower in the world - the best portion of which have systematically relocated themselves by migrating to greener pastures of the United States, Western Europe or in the oil rich countries of the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, the manpower available in India, be it in the field of management, technology or scientific, are far from the very best produced.

Controlled planning and over protectionism due to ideological overtones have destroyed the individual's ability to stand upto the challenges at all levels of operations. The individual, hence, finds himself at a loss while encountering cut-throat competition. The decision making elites in general lack vision, creative outlook and culture to promote individuals with potentials. Institutions, be it educational or corporate, are infested with mediocrity and are over politicised at all levels of functioning, making them unaccountable in the absence of work ethics and norms. Manpower is, thus, produced in a mechanical fashion and those employed for nation-building process are incapable of achieving targets of excellence as expected of them. Role of skilled manpower, thus, never becomes fully complimentary to nation-building process and at best remains adhoc in nature.

The new world order and the subsequent rearrangements in market forces will eradicate all past barriers that existed between the individuals *per se* and international political economy. The individual will be alienated against his own nation state, institution or the roots to which the individual claimed his cultural moorings. Freed from the bonds of culture, religion, tradition and even society the individual is now on the threshold to exist as an entity utterly devoid of all humanness and categorises himself as a part of the world business civilization. Hence, in

the new world environment the individual will be singularly responsible for de-humanizing the entire developing countries to a level of primordial ethnic existence as never seen or envisaged before. The ethos of "primacy of the political" as expounded in the utterances of Aristotle or Kautilya in *Arthashastra* with a view to acquire, preserve & distribute with social justice for the good of the many will now be superimposed by the ethos of business in culture and market forces in traditions and civilizational preconditions.

The new world order will also eradicate all constraints and political linkages that each developing country had with either of the super powers. Communication explosion and technological revolution will widen the gap between the developed and developing countries further. Real power will rest on the economic, social and technological advancement and the way these variables would be monopolised. The developed countries led by the USA, Western Europe and Japan would require an equally unending supply of the best skilled manpower working with total freedom to develop technologies, create data-banks transferable through vast and frighteningly fast communication set up. Ironically, this entire revolution will be carried out mainly by the human resources produced in the third world nations. Thus, the new world order is poised to utilise the individuals of the third world to under develop the very roots from which they have emerged. This is a frightening inevitability.

We have earlier observed that this review essay must link up RSR's earlier two works with the present. RSR has already moved from a Marxian view point to a deeper commitment to Kant and his central notion of 'what is man'. His methodology to make the reader understand the meaning contextuality, functions of exemplars and the study of the inter-relationship between meaning and actions is pertinent to the observations that have been made in the preceding paragraphs as a commentary on nation-building and the individual. Thus, in the book *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reasons* one has to accept fully the originality of RSR's contribution which connects Kant's notion of aesthetic ideas with Ricoeur's perspective on speech and textual discourse.

The same strand of original interpretation can be seen in the second and the third chapters of the *Primacy of the Political* which attempts to describe two specific paradigms of the political - the classical and the contemporary. The two approaches are dubbed as discursive model and the behavioural model, respectively. In the discursive model an essential linkage between political judgement and political action is shown along

with the one between language and communication.

The fourth chapter on language, politics and judgement is virtually a must reading for all who teach communication as a specialised subject. The subtle technical differences between speech and language in terms of subject, addressee and references are well expounded. There is much to learn even in definitional terms from this chapter as it clearly charts out the strategy to spell out the inner connection between language and politics. The author has done well by starting with Ricoeur, touching Wittgensteinian 'argument concerning the impossibility of private language, moving to Kuhn's conceptualisation of paradigms in which stability of judgement is seen in terms of the dominance of a reigning paradigm', to highlighting Plato and Aristotle's obsession with forms of government and transformation of constitution to show that classical perspectives ingested the dimension of power. Similarly enunciated is a very lucid exposition of Kant's consideration of judgement, attitude towards rhetorics and the contrast between Aristotle and Kant on the value of judgement.

Chapter four is hence a chapter intended to mobilise ideas on the theme of judgement and the nature of judgement and their co-relation to political competence. In his complex deliberation RSR has intimately commented on Periclean judgement of political exigencies, Thucydidean's interpretative historical judgement and Aristotle's meta-theoretical judgements. In the process the author shows as to how in all the three contexts there exists a linkage between politics and ethics on the one hand and with rhetorics on the other.

The fifth and the last chapter merely re-states the Primacy of the Political and the implications for philosophy of Science. What is essential to point out is the innovative skills of RSR to link up the role of science for ethical responsibility to society and to provide an integrated concept of development in five interlinked stages as quoted below:

1. The acquisition of what has not been gained
(science as an innovation)
2. The preservation of what has been acquired (science
as conservation)
3. The improvement of what has been preserved
(science as empowerment)
4. The distribution of what has been improved (science
as participation)
5. The transformation of what has been improved

into quality of life (science as enrichment)

No where one can find a better integration of Kautilya's nation-building conception with the role of science and technology. RSR, thus makes science both as responsible and responsive with a view to taking it out of its apolitical nature and make it an integral part of the principles governing the primacy of the political.

By giving science a placement in creative and preservative modes, the philosophy of values governing the role of action or inaction of scientists is put on a plane where its services are necessarily directed towards the justification and preservation of life and not for the purposes of destruction. Thus, what emerges as a communicational model of science places it in an 'essential relationship' with other orders and interests. RSR points out the essentiality of not allowing any form of knowledge to become a power over life. In essence what comes out unerringly is that man's perceptions, intuitive acumen coupled with rational, ethical and moral sense, must formulate policies to harness science or the philosophy of science to the service of life and mankind and not the other way round.

It is necessary to provide at the end comments on the entire trilogy of work submitted by RSR to serious students not only in philosophy but those in other disciplines of social sciences and sciences alike. This will essentially mean that we must also reiterate what we have already recorded in the reviews earlier and place it in the context of a new world order which is emerging today. Most astounding of the development in the world polity will be that by 1st January 1992, the red flag with its golden emblem of the great Soviet Union will no longer be fluttering over Moscow. RSR makes a pertinent observation that every social system has somehow to come to terms with three problems of 'efficiency, justice and happiness'. The world events of today could not be better explained than by the theoretical premise of the above statement. Ideologies are no longer confrontational and tolerance is not only a methodological norm for philosophy but also of ideology. No where is self reflexivity more profound than in political ideologies which are in the process of fore-shadowing the twenty-first century.

The Primacy of the Political, thus, cannot be the end of the quest for RSR for a just world order. Rather it should serve as a beginning for a larger dimension of understanding of developmental strategies for mankind which is today standing on the cross road of history. From the strategic dimension of the use of force and the role of war seen as an extension of policy by other means by Carl von Clausewitz, we have to shift the focus

of RSR and goad him into placing the principles of the primacy of the political into the non-strategic dimensions for the protection of the environment, security of energy, reduction of population, balancing of ecology and protecting the ethical right of the unborn. RSR must answer and I will hold him responsible to articulate the issue as to whether man has inherited the world from his ancestors or he merely been permitted to borrow it for living from his children.

RSR would have done better if he would have also hinted on works of two contemporary thinkers - Gandhi's concepts of the primacy of the political and his strategies to operationalise during the freedom struggle and Amartya Sen's deliberations on Ethics and Economics. However, it is absolutely understandable and reasonable to see RSR's rigorous and methodological treatment in his triological work. He has vitalised, reinterpreted the thematic forms of Kant, Marx, Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Plato, Hegel and hoard of others in a single stroke of his pen. No work can be totally total and no work can be beyond criticism. Our critical views must be seen as genuine appreciation of RSR's daring to articulate the unmanagable without being unconventional. The trilogy has a tangible message to all aspiring scholars and students alike - a teacher who exemplifies the correctness of research-methodology, rigorous display of scholarship with academic integrity. In a world where specific questions on morality of authorship are being raised, RSR stands out as an exemplary teacher, scholar and a researcher. I cannot help but repeat once again that the world of philosophy in India and in the sub-continent is richer by RSR's contributions.

Department of Defence and Strategic Studies
University of Poona
PUNE - 411 007

GAUTAM SEN

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The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Philosophy Department,
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Pune 411 007.

DISCUSSION

I

TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

I The changes of the picture of the world

1. When we consider various changes of our picture of the world we distinguish two main classes: creation-destruction, conjunction-disjunction, synthesis-analysis. We are speaking about two forces of change, two sources of change.

When our picture of the world is changing (for example when we perceive a new object, or when we introduce a new notion) the state of our knowledge is changing too, so we also speak about two sources of knowledge.

2. From all the changes we distinguish those, which we assume as consequences of our own actions. These changes are important because by selecting one or another action (and obtaining corresponding change of the picture of world) we can achieve the desired state (achieve our goals (*artha*)).

Thus, we divide the changes (both classes) as "dependent on our activity" and "independent" of it ("free" and "forced").

II Synthesis

1. Preliminary definition: Synthesis is an introduction of general notion, assertion from the given collection of notions, assertions. This sort of introduction is one source of knowledge; it acts by producing new notions, assertions. Thus, we must have, first of all, observation of some similarity and then-introduction, construction of general (notion or assertion).

Examples: 1) generalisation, abstraction (for example introduction of the notion of "number"). 2). "abstraction from some quantities" - the same as 1). 3). introduction of new general law from the (similar) experiments ("scientific method"). 4). application in some theory analogues from the other (this amounts to using some assertions, common for both theories).

Now we must note that when we introduce a new notion or new

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assertion from the collection, then this collection (for example of notions) we take not separately from anything but with some of their connections with others; indeed we take (and synthesize) collection of sub-theories, sub-pictures of world (sub-schemes of notions-connections). Thus, it is more perhaps proper to speak not about synthesis of notions or assertions but about synthesis of sub-pictures of world from the collection ("similar") sub-pictures (sub-theories). Thus, one source of knowledge operates on the collection of (sub) pictures of the world, making some new (sub) picture (sub-theory, subscheme).

2. Next example of synthesis

a) synthesis in the process of achievement of given goals.

Let us consider the following process of emergence of new notions, assertions (sub-pictures of the world). Sometimes in undertaking some actions for certain achievement or (recurrent) goals we observe-introduce (recurrent) objects, connections, complexes of sensations. More exactly, in the process of achievement of some goal (some state) from the given state we undertake actions and thus construct (in memory) a collection of states (pictures of world). From them we may observe-introduce recurrent ("similar and yet different") complexes of sensations (sub-pictures): for example it may be sub-goals, preliminary stages, which have been observed after (successful) achievement of our goal (*artha*). These observations-introductions are brought in by the first source of knowledge which synthesizes ("sees") from the created collection of pictures of world α scheme β (invariant, general notions and (their) connections).

In this example we add new objects, notions to our scheme of notions-connections (our picture of the world) - because of our free actions. We can say that (by free will) we are creating picture of the world (free in the sense of free choice of our actions: the initial source of knowledge makes its work "automatically").

In the same sense the abovementioned examples are also examples of "free construction" of world (free choice of sub-pictures of world for the synthesis) — we also choose some sub-schemes, direct them into our memory then (after "accumulation") initial source of knowledge creates (sees) from them further pictures of the world.

b) synthesis of external world

Let's consider now the changes of our picture of world which are caused by our physical movements. Here, from the given state (picture of world) α we create collection of pictures of world L_g (where $g \in G$ - group of all our physical movements). By synthesis of these sub-pictures scheme of invariant (general) notions and connections between them—

external world-is created. Previous elements of the picture of the world may now be considered as variable characteristics of these invariant notions (for example coordinates) (which are transformed by $g \in G$).

Thus external world is created by the apparatus of synthesis from the collection ("accumulation") of states which are created (in memory) from one picture by running through our physical movements. External world is common (invariant) part of various sub-pictures of the world (sub-pictures that relate to the sense perception), which have been obtained from one picture by running through our physical movements; its objects are invariants of these movements (elements of synthesized picture of world).

c) synthesis of common world

When observer α has obtained from observer β some of his sub-picture of the world (for example, some part of sense perception or sub-picture) α creates it (in his memory) as his own sub-picture. By comparing (thus, synthesizing) this picture and his own, common (for both α and β) notions and connections are constructed. (Meanwhile as for the sense perception common world is equal to external world if observer α differs from β only on some physical movement).

d) " synthesis of picture of all our worlds

Now we can note that even if we don't make any actions (or don't sense that we make any action) our picture of the world, nevertheless, is changing with time (for example we perceive new objects). Thus, we can speak about collections of pictures of the world α_t where $t \in T$ - time group. This collection of states α_t we can call as flow of moments (*ksana*).

Like previous cases, after some accumulation of these pictures α_t the initial source of knowledge may introduce through synthesis new objects. However, because we do not classify these changes as dependent on our activity, this introduction (of new objects) also may seem as independent from us (without our activity). (The flow of "forced" sensations makes its work without our activity; so it may seem that construction (introduction) of the world by α also is "almost independent").

Thus, synthesis of the flow of moments creates (new) general names, labels, sub-goals of the world. Further, new objects, new worlds are being created.

Here has been described a process of changing of (preliminary) given state (picture of world) α_0 in some t_0 . This initial state may be considered as critical point (critical in the sense of appearing of new level, for example new abilities) in the beginningless flow of moments. (Meanwhile, the observation-introduction of new object or new connection

(for example law of nature) also may be considered as a quantitative step towards a critical point.

3. Thus, synthesis occurs after accumulation of sub-schemes ; it constructs from many sub-schemes one (sub-scheme). These sub-schemes appear (accumulate) to be running through our abilities (for example movements, thinking directing attention) or are "forced" on us. In the first case we are speaking about free transformation, creation of the world; in the second case, the constructing is independent of us.

III. Analysis

Analysis is the II source of knowledge. Analysis introduces difference, disjunction of objects where connections are previously undivided.

One of the analytical procedures is logical inference: assertions, that were identical (relatively "true" and "false") become, after its application, different. An example of logical inference is a syllogism.

The cause of introduction of differences is "disachievement of the goal" (achievement of negative results).

(A brief account about analysis and logic is presented in next note).

IV. Stability

Synthetic notions, connections, theories may be unstable.

Duration of their existence depends on: 1) our goals and abilities (after changes of some goals or abilities for the achievement of these goals) our theories may disappear (as useless) 2) changes in the external world: synthetic connection (for example accepted law of nature) may be "broken" by another (accepted) connection (for example some fact or some another law) if it has "higher force ", "higher credibility " than the first law.

We can note that duration of some connections (their appearing in another moment of time-stability) may correspond to our desires; also changes that are independent of us may correspond with some (for example unconscious, and may be stronger) desires.

Any synthetic world exists only for finite time.

C/O Vostrepovahija
Moscow State University
Moscow - 117234
(U.S.S.R.)

M. SIMAKOV

II

TRUTH-FALSE ASYMMETRY IN THE LOGIC OF DHARMAKĪRTI

1. In the propositional logic we have some asymmetry between "truth" and "false". For example, if proposition A is true, we can write $T \Rightarrow A$, if A is false $A \Rightarrow F$ (but not $F \Rightarrow A$), (here \Rightarrow denotes logical consequence).

T and F may be considered as the characteristics (predicates) of proposition A (notion). But such considerations do not give an explanation for the asymmetry (because we write in this case $T(A)$, $F(A)$). Thus, for the finding the cause of this asymmetry we must consider the character of ascribing truth value to the proposition more exactly.

2. We ascribe T or F to the proposition A: a) by the sense perception b) if A or A is an axiom c) as logical consequence. Main case is a).

Let us consider the ascribing of T, F in the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. As it is said in the *Nyāyabindu* (2.13 and following commentary of Dharmottara, also 2.26) A is true if it is perceived, B is false if representation (imagination) of B will cause a negative sensation. Thus, A is true: $1 \rightarrow A$, A is false: $A \rightarrow -1$ where \rightarrow is a symbol for "cause reaction", "have a sequence" (thus also reflects time's order), ± 1 - positive and negative reaction, the sense of existence. Thus, in ascribing T or F we have a difference in time's order (for connection with positive and negative sensation). (Afterwards, when we consider the theory with A, B, ... as related to the one and the same moment of time this difference disappears (for example, when we consider T and F as characteristics (predicates) of A). It appears again in the abovementioned asymmetry of $=$, also in properties of \rightarrow (formal implication).)

(Because of this origin of ascribing of T, F to the propositions we may use in some cases instead of Z_2 -model of propositional logic with (0,1) isomorphic model with $+1, -1$).

3. As an application of given approach let's consider the foundation of double negation law in the *Nyāyabindu*. According to 2.27 (see (1) if A was perceived ($1 \rightarrow A$) then assumption that A is false ($A \rightarrow -1$) is followed by -1 ("is impossible"). $(1 \rightarrow A) \Rightarrow ((A \rightarrow -1) \rightarrow -1)$, (where \Rightarrow denotes logical consequence), or, shortly, $A \Rightarrow A$. This law is completely natural, for if A has been perceived then representation

(imagination) of impossibility of A will cause a negative reaction. Reverse proposition, $A \Rightarrow \neg A$ in the terms of Dharmakīrti may be formulated as follows: "if an assumption about non-existence of A causes a negative reaction, then it is possible only if A has been perceived". $(A \rightarrow \neg 1) \rightarrow \neg 1) \Rightarrow (1 \rightarrow A)$. This proposition may seem "less evident" and indeed we cannot find it in the *Nyāyabindu* (that is in connection with modern variation of this law). (Literature: Stecherbatsky T., *Buddhist Logic*, Leningrad, 1932.

C/o Vostrepovahija
Moscow State University
Moscow - 117234
(U.S.S.R.)

M. SIMAKOV

BOOK - REVIEW

BILIMORIA, PURUSOTTAMA; *S'ABDAPRAMĀṆA : WORD AND KNOWLEDGE*, Studies of Classical India, 10 Kluwer Academic Pub., The Netherlands, 1988, + 383, Price UK £ 69.00

This book is primarily a study of *Advaita Vedānta Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājādharīndra (17th century) with cross reference to *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa* on *Sābdapramāṇya* - the reliability of knowledge derived from the utterance of words. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* is a primer-like book on *Vedānta* written in the *Navya Nyāya* Style, allotting more space to the consideration of the theory of knowledge than the other works on *Vedānta*. *Sābdapramāṇa* is the basis for religious and philosophical traditions of interpretation. It is very important except for Buddhism, Jainism and the *Lokāyata*. Hence, any contribution to the study of *sābdapramāṇa* is quite welcome. Moreover, all the spheres of human activities come under pervue of language - no activity of human being is there where language is not involved (VP.I.118-131). The author draws upon the conceptual resources of contemporary analytical philosophies and phenomenological studies.

What are the conditions to be fulfilled in order that the sentence may convey convincingly the truth? This is the issue discussed. All the conditions according to different systems (*Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* etc.) are considered and explained but without a preference for one or the other.

Three factors are involved in our understanding - language, reality and consciousness. The differences in opinion on all these will be based on the differences in understanding the nature of language, reality and the self. So also, there is no understanding of the language alone without reference to reality, and there is no understanding of the reality alone without reference to language. The nature of the self will affect both the understandings. The *Advaita*, *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya* and *Vyākaraṇa* are not having the same understanding on all these matters. Moreover, the Analytic Philosophy will not admit any relationship of the internal to the external and the part to the whole but this relationship is basic to the Indian thought. A compromise with all these without violence does not seem

possible.

Śabda may mean the word, the sentence and the language. The *Naiyāyikas* and the *Mīmāṃsakas* presuppose that language is there and putting together the words or the meanings the sentence is formed. The issue the *Vaiyākaraṇas* discuss (VP.I 43-66) is the condition/s of the possibility of use of language ; not how the words are used but how (conditions) the words can come into use. The following are the conditions : the word, the form of the word, the referent and the form of the referent. The form of the word and the form of the referent are the universals. The word is from the system of language and the reality is from the unity of reality. The relationship is to be established between the two through the identity of the universals of the word and the object. When something is said (there is a chair) the object is singled out from all the other realities and the word is singled out from all other words in the system of language and the relationship is grasped (flashed) through the identical universal. This is the *spṛṣṭa*. Therefore, the issues are different and their compromise is likely to engender greater confusion.

We do not have a word or a reality independent of each other. Language and reality are in one to one relationship. But we can think of a reality without a word to express it and of a word without a reality to mean. This is only an abstraction. From the chaotic state something comes to the object state when there is a word to express it. If there is no word to express it, it is not an object, though it is a reality. That is why Patañjali started his *Mahābhāṣya* : *Siddhe śabdārtha sambandhe* = the relationship of the word and the meaning is already there. This relationship is different for *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*.

Śabdapramāṇa in fact is the truth of the sentence. The author discusses the problem, what is the unit of language communication, the word or the sentence ? For Vedāntins and the grammarians it is the sentence and for the *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā* it is the word or meaning of the word. The author again seems to compromise this. Bhartṛhari devotes a full chapter (VP.II) to establish that sentence is the primary unit of language communication (see especially VP. II - 441), though the issue is implicit in VP. I 62. This issue is as old as that of *RK Prātisākyā* II. i, *padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā* which can be analysed as *bahuvrīhi* or *taipuruṣa* and accordingly the word or the sentence is the basis of language.

Naturally the author is expected to show his preference for the theory of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. This entails that the disadvantages and the

advantages of such a perspective must be discussed in relation to *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa*. Instead, we are given a collection of all the views. If the whole *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* were to be studied coherently and issue-wise it would have brought out different possibilities of that book both as far as the *śābdapramāṇa* and the related issues, and not merely what the author could see and discuss. The reader also would have been enabled to see more the possibility of such a thought. The proper contribution to the Indian thought is to be made by bringing out the different possibilities of the thought by the study of the text, the perspectives of which can be compared with the other classical thought. As a non-critical primary text the *Śābdapramāṇa* is a very useful book for the students.

Sometime at least there seem to be inaccuracies in understanding the theories ; e.g.

1. On p.21 the author says correctly that *apauruṣeya* means objective truth. But what is this objective truth ? In fact it means this - whatever is authored has an author including the *Vedas* and it is *pauruṣeya*. But for the truth contained therein we are not indebted to a particular author. Even if he were not to write it, it was in the experience of mankind and someone else would have written it. Also it means that even if we destroy all the scriptures, man will continue to be religious and moral and new scriptures will be written any way.
2. Pp.43 - 44 and ref. 16. I. 19 last sentence "Rather, the view here is that the process is essentially one of a holistic grasping in a 'flash' of intuition (*pratibhā*) upon hearing an utterance without necessarily requiring the assimilation of the discrete words, their meanings and relations". Grammarians also require the discrete understanding of the words and their meanings to understand the sentence (VP. I.57). Moreover, the function of *pratibhā* is not to give an understanding without necessarily requiring the assimilation of words, their meanings and the relations. If we attempt to understand the relation between the meaning of a sentence (the flash) and the meaning of words, we have to repeat ourselves e.g. 'this cow is red' is related to the meaning of 'this', 'cow', 'is', 'red' in such a way that this cow is red. The two have the same form but this cannot be explained. If the explanation of the form can be given by

explaining the meaning of words and relating them, we would have a position like that of the *Mīmāṃsaka*. *Spṛṣṭa* is the universal, sequenceless word. It, as it were, belongs to the word or language. *Pratibhā* is the individual's way of understanding the *spṛṣṭa* through the understanding of the words of the sentence.

3. P.61 para. 1 "some regard the speech to be essentially undivisible (for example Bhartṛhari VP.I. 75 ff)". Here VP.I. 75 - 92 what Bhartṛhari considers is the relationship between the sequenceless (the *spṛṣṭa*) and the sequential (the spoken word), i.e., the universal and the spoken word in order to understand the possibilities of the alternative understanding of the word in the intellect and the spoken word (VP. I. 67 - 74). The whole issue is not what the author says.
4. P.76, 2nd para., first sentence ... "the 'word' ... is less of a physical 'entity' and more a psychic 'entity'. Bhartṛhari himself points to this view '*śabda buddhiṣṭhaḥ*..." Here again (VP.I. 46) Bhartṛhari speaks about the two aspects of the same word - the universal (*śabda buddhiṣṭhaḥ*) and the uttered word. Here, there is no question of less physical and more psychic.

The author has taken nine years to accomplish the work. He has consulted all the important scholars and words on the subject and he also has visited all the important centres of learning on the subject. The book contains a comprehensive and useful bibliography and profuse notes for further work. The book has a very impressive get up but an ordinary Indian scholar will not be able to possess a copy of it due to the exorbitant price. This book will surely inspire many to contribute in this line of thought.

Centre of Advanced Study
in Sanskrit

J. OUSEPARAMPIL

University of Poona, Pune 411 007.

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DREAM OBJECTS, REFERENCE AND NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

1 Introduction and Thesis

The two most important questions that the sceptic asks regarding knowledge¹ are :

(a) Is knowledge possible?

(b) What are its justifications?

(a) is called *knowledge* scepticism, (b) is called *justification* scepticism. Our essay is mainly about (a), or rather about one way to deal with (a). This essay is mainly polemical in nature. In this essay my main aim is to defend Quine's position of naturalizing epistemology² as the only solution to the traditional problem of the sceptic regarding our knowledge of the external world (regarding question (a)), against people who see it as taking help of the very science whose validity is in question. The critic foremost in my mind is Barry Stroud⁽²⁾. Let us call all Stroud-type criticism the SP-thesis. The core of SP-thesis can be summarized thus : to reduce epistemology to the problems of language learning and language acquisition (which is what naturalized epistemology³ suggests) is circular in so far as it takes the help of that very science whose validity is in question. Our thesis in this paper is this :

The traditional epistemologists who tried to give all kinds of 'theories of knowledge' to counteract the sceptic are really trying to deal with the sceptic's problem in an 'external' way. Such an 'external' way of looking at a problem arises because for them the problem of knowledge of the external world is a problem of reference, whereas for Quine the problem of our knowledge of the external world is causal; so anyone criticizing Quine's natural epistemology has to criticize his theory of reference. Once we accept the problem of reference as a semantical and not causal problem, the only epistemology we are left with is a causal one. So SP-thesis is a piecemeal criticism, in so far as it tries to overcome only *partially* NE as an answer to the sceptic's

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problem of the external world, which can be overcome.

Let us introduce the following shorthands :

The problem of reference : T_r .

The traditional epistemologists theory of reference : R_t .

Quine's (and all Quinian) theories of reference : R_q .

Problem of the knowledge of the external world : K_{ew} .

Relation of word to world : T_{ww} .

Relation of word to background word: T_{wb} .

Now let us remember the following points.

(1) For R_t , T_r is T_{ww} .

(2) For R_q , T_r is T_{wb} .

(3) For R_t , K_{ew} is a semantical problem. Let us call this S_p .

(4) For R_q , K_{ew} is a causal problem, not a semantical problem. Let us call a causal problem C_p .

(5) Once, K_{ew} is taken as a C_p not an S_p then the only solution is a NE. In other words we can say that, $T_{ww} = \sim S_p$ then the only reply to the sceptic's problem is NE.

(6) Now, further, R_q is an inevitable consequence of Quine's theory of meaning and indeterminacy of translation, let us call these M_q and S_q respectively.

Further, $M_q \neq T_r$, according to R_q (contrary to what is assumed by R_t). So the problem of meaning is not there in the sense of how to relate words to the external world. Any such relation is outside the scope of a 'theory of knowledge'. The latter question is a 'scientific question', one that can be answered from 'within' science, and not from 'outside' of it. And hence we are free to use science in building up an epistemology.

From my point of view SP-thesis is unfair in the sense that it criticises Quine in the wrong direction when it says that Quine is avoiding the problem or arguing in a circle. If SP-thesis has to reject NE, then it has to first reject M_q and S_q , which is the backbone of R_q , which again implies T_{wb} . We can see that Quine's view is really entrenched in his whole philosophical framework. Only global adjustment to Quine's view will help, if we are keen in giving an alternative answer to the sceptic. SP-thesis has only a piecemeal criticism of naturalized epistemology. Although this essay is all about (a) and not regarding (b), and although we shall allow Quine's assertion, that 'Humean predicament is the human predicament'(3)⁴, we will devote a section to show that may be justification of knowledge (as we see it) is possible too.

One of the corollaries that will be reached and discussed by us towards the end of this essay is that, so long as we are either in the empiricist or the rationalist camp, we are prone to give a *theory of knowledge* to the sceptic's problem (from an 'external viewpoint'), all of which at the end will prove to be useless in so far as refuting the sceptic's argument goes. Once we reject both empiricism and rationalism for a more thoroughgoing pragmatism, we give up the idea of a 'theory of knowledge' or foundational certainty (of which both the rationalists and empiricist are guilty) and NE seems to be the only viable answer to the sceptic.

The main body of this essay will be devoted to show how NE follows from Quine's theory of translation, meaning, reference and in general his naturalistic behavioristic conception of language. This essay will be divided into three main sections (with subsections). In the first section I shall introduce the sceptic's problem regarding the external world and various formulations of it from Descartes, Kant and Carnap. I shall try to reformulate Quine's account of the sceptic's formulation of the problem of the external world and how he responds to it. Next I shall consider the SP-thesis. In section two I shall discuss how naturalized epistemology follows from Quine's general outlook on language. In the following section I shall consider whether, given a NE, we can answer (b). In the conclusion we shall consider how by rejecting both empiricism and rationalism we are left only with an epistemology that is natural.

2 The sceptic's position and natural epistemology

Descartes ends his *First Meditation* by saying that : " I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams.... by this means it is not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth"(4). Further Descartes also states "... there is a great difference between the object and its idea"(5). This is, in a nutshell, the sceptic's position. In a similar vein Kant drew a complete general distinction between that which is received through senses and what is or is not true of the outside world which cuts us forever from the knowledge of the external world. Carnap in his *Logische Aufbau* tried to show how the theoretical statements of science can be correlated to statements of sensory experience. According to Carnap, though philosophy appears to talk about the real world it really does not do so. Philosophy talks of

particular linguistic framework within which all problems are to be solved. And the problem of relating it to the real world remains. One way to reward this problem is this : we have to recognize that there is a gap between the input received by the human subject from the external world and the output the subject puts about a description of a three-dimensional external world and its history. In other words, there is a difference between the 'meagre input' and the 'torrential output' (6).

Having seen what the essence of the sceptic has to say regarding our knowledge of the external world is, let us see what the responses are. Descartes tried to respond to the sceptic by giving a 'theory of knowledge' consisting of two levels of truth : *foundational knowledge*, which had *intuitive certainty*, and a derivative knowledge which was *logically* deduced from the foundation and hence certain too. This sort of certainty involves foundational statements like 'I am in pain' and the laws of logic like contradiction, excluded middle, and identity, all of which will pass the test of indubitability and stand the sceptic's criticism. If knowledge of the external world is rationally deduced from them we can believe in its existence too. But we have reasons to think that these foundational evidence like 'I am in pain' is psychological, and psychological certainty is no guarantee for truth. Even the logical laws can be doubted in face of self-referential statements. Also, they can be doubted by virtue of the fact that intuitive certainty in the sense of mental vision does not work in providing the infinitely many substitution instances of the schematic "elementary truth" like, $\sim(S \text{ and } \sim S)$. Hence, a theory of knowledge based on them fails in so far as it tries to counteract the sceptic. Kant gave us an epistemology in which he claims to give only the knowledge of our world of experience and not knowledge of the external world. So, he too, by his 'theory of knowledge', failed to answer the sceptic. Carnap tried to reduce all statements of science to observational statements, and as Quine correctly realizes(7), had not succeeded. Now, what sort of line are we to take here? In answering this question let us go back to the sceptic's problem once more. There are actually two questions that the sceptic is asking:

(a) How do we know?

(b) Even if we know, what *justifies* such knowledge?

As Hume correctly realizes regarding (b) there is no way we can *justify* our belief in the external world. However, regarding (a) we have seen that all our 'theories of knowledge' have failed. Why so? because they have all taken an external position in trying to solve the problem of knowledge. What is this 'external position'? Let us see by going back to

Descartes. Descartes in his *First Meditation* detaches himself from the physical world, and tries to solve the problem by appealing to certain apriori knowledge. If Descartes is taken as the model of R_1 then what R_1 has failed to realize is :

"The crucial logical point is that the epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science"(8). "Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge, also, was what prompted doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science"(9). Since doubt is an offshoot of science there can be no "cosmic exile". Everyone, including the philosopher has to abandon all 'external position' for "... he cannot study and revise the fundamental conceptual scheme of science and commonsense without having some conceptual scheme, the same or another in which to work"(10).

So let us ask again, how do we know? Taking the above into account the only logical answer is that in answering this question we can make free use of science, because what we are asking is a scientific question. Philosophy is, in this sense, not 'external' to science, but differs from the latter only in the 'breadth of categories'(12). The last and the most crucial step is the one which follows from the above two: Since our theory of the world far outstrips our 'sensory or stimulatory background'(11) what we need to do is a scientific study of perception, learning, language acquisition, development and transmission of human knowledge. Like all other sciences the 'science of epistemology' has a body of 'theoretical knowledge' based on relative 'data'. Here we have 'hypotheses' like other sciences, and our hypotheses here are 'physical objects', because, "physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience"(28). This is the position of W.V.Quine.

Now there are certain significant criticisms that have been pointed out against Quine's idea of reducing epistemology to the study of language learning and language acquisition, in short of 'naturalizing epistemology', in an attempt to answer the sceptic. In putting forth these criticisms I shall follow the SP-thesis.

The first criticism of the SP-thesis is that Quine has changed the subject matter of epistemology. Stroud construes "the original epistemological problem" to be one of explaining how knowledge is possible. He says that insofar as Quine's NE claims to be an enlightened epistemology (as against the traditional 'theories of knowledge') it is a failure, for it does not answer the sceptic for it changes the subject-matter altogether(22). Furthermore, he says, that NE cannot answer the

sceptic(14).

To this objection Quine replies, "A far cry, this, from old epistemology. Yet, it is no gratuitous change of subject matter, but an enlightened persistence in the original epistemological problem. It is enlightened in recognizing that the sceptical challenge springs from science itself, and that in coping with it we are free to use scientific knowledge. The old epistemologist failed to recognize the strength of his position"(15).

However, the main criticism of SP-thesis against NE is that it *assumes the validity of science in order to prove it*. In our view, this criticism is unfair. This is because Quine is quite justified in using science in NE as, for him, the whole problem of knowledge is a scientific problem. One of the main epistemological problems is the problem of relating our knowledge to the external world. So, the problem of relating words to the world is a causal, not a semantical problem for R_q (as opposed to the traditional epistemologists) or, in other words K_{ew} is C_p , and not a S_p . Epistemology has very little to do with meaning. The problem of the relation of ideas to the external world, when posed as a causal problem is not a 'meta-scientific problem' but a scientific problem. Hence, we can make free use of science to solve it. On the other hand, for R_p , K_{ew} is S_p . The problem of failure, in the case of R_p , arises in the first place because they take the problem of relation of our ideas to objects to be S_p , and they do not know how to deal with this problem except to give various alternative frameworks which all have the same pattern: an indubitable foundation, and a system built up from it. In this sense, R_p was trying to solve the problem in the wrong direction. Whereas in R_q to prove that words mean something we do not have to try to relate them to the external world, we have to relate them to other words, to a background theory and the study of semantics will do this. To relate words to external world is no way to show that words or ideas have reference, because reference is indeterminate, so the former has to be understood causally. So, by putting the word-world or ideas-world relation into proper perspective Quine has definitely made an improvement over the traditional epistemologist.

The main body of this paper is devoted to show that SP-thesis is unjustified when applied *piecemeal* to Quine. For the most important thesis for Quine is that all we have got to work with are words, whose relation to the outside world does not belong to the study of meaning or to semantic theory but to causal theory. The work of semantics is to relate words to the background words. So the only way that we can

understand the relationship of words to the world or T_{ww} is by studying how they are acquired, and this is a scientific study. With this shift from ideas in one's mind to words or utterances, their relationship with other words, and the problem of their meaning and reference we are inevitably led to naming their acquisition as a study of language learning. So, if SP-thesis rejects Quine's shift from traditional epistemology to the 'liberated epistemology' as circular then first it has to reject Quine's rejection of ideas, together with his theory of meaning and reference. Once this framework (R_q) is accepted, 'naturalized epistemology' seems to be the only logical conclusion.

3 NE : Logical outcome of Quine's Transition

Our main aim in this section is to show that all the traditional epistemological problem with the sceptic has been that there was no way he could provide for the latter a theory of knowledge by means of which he could then show that the ideas in his mind correspond to the real objects, that is, ideas have cognitive value. For Quine this problem does not arise. As a result of his radical turning of the question of reference of words (rather than objects) to other *words* the problem of reference now is to relate words to background words not to the real world. So instead of word- world relationship we now have a word- word relationship, or rather w_b to w_g relationship, where w_b stands for the word in the background, and w_g to the word that is not in the background. So the problem of reference has changed. In the new perspective, the problem of knowledge is how to relate words with the world which is a causal problem. Once we accept this, the only epistemology left is a natural one, and not some supra-scientific 'theory of knowledge'.

3.1 Quine : From Ideas to Words

Quine's first milestone is a shift of attention from 'ideas to words', and of focusing the analysis of representation upon linguistic expression or utterances, rather than upon thoughts or ideas. C. Hookway says, "The merit of this shift was that attention could turn from shadowy objects of introspection to more easily examined public representations"(16). Once this shift is made, now we require a second shift. One problem of the traditional epistemologist who believes that we have ideas which can be grasped by the rational mind is how these

ideas or mental images correspond to the real objects in the outside world from which these ideas get their significance. Similarly, when Quine talks of words, his problem would be what do these words *mean*, or what do they correspond to? This for Quine is a wrong way of questioning about words. What these words we use mean has nothing to do with what they correspond to in the real external world. In other words, the question of meaning of linguistic expression has to be divorced from the question of *reference* of the linguistic expressions. Let us see in the next section how this can be done.

3.2 Quine : Meaning and Reference

Our first task is to divert Quine's theory of meaning from his theory of reference. In TD⁵ Quine gives certain arguments why meaning is not the same as referring. Take the case of singular expressions 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'. They have the same reference or denotation, i.e., the planet Venus; however, they do not *mean* the same thing. Further, take the case of general propositions: 'creatures with a heart' and 'creatures with a kidney, both have same denotation or extension, i.e., *true of the same things*, but do not have the same meaning. From this we can see that meaning or reference are not the same thing.

Further take the following sentences :

- (7) Boston is in the U.S.A.
- (8) Shakespear is British.
- (9) Jane is the sister of Mary.
- (10) L.A. is to the south of San Francisco.
- (11) It is not the case that San Francisco is to the south of L.A.
- (12) Boston is in the US and Shakespear is British.
- (13) Othello killed Desdemona.
- (14) Centaur was half goat half man.

Now the above sentences include : singular terms, predicates and relations. Take the case of singular terms first: 'Boston', 'Shakespear', 'L.A.', 'Jane', 'Mary', 'San Francisco', 'Othello', 'Desdemona'. How do we understand them? By understanding the object they denote or stand for. Now take the case of predicates like 'is British' or 'is in the U.S.A.'; how do we understand them? Let us take the predicate 'is British'. It does not refer to any concrete objects like Shakespear or Boston. What are they and how do we understand them? One answer is that since I understand the predicate 'is British' it must be meaningful. Being meaningful it must stand for *something*. As it does not stand for anything

concrete, it must stand for something abstract, the *attribute* of being British. Regarding this view Quine says: "We do not believe in abstract entities. No one supposes that abstract entities - classes, relation, properties, etc., - exist in space and time, but we mean more than this. *We renounce them altogether*"⁶ (18). Further Quine also rejects the view that such things as Othello or a centaur exist, even in the form of an *idea* in anyone's mind. For Quine when we talk about Othello or the centaur these are not the subjects of factual discourse, even though we pretend they are, they are merely 'frivolous' discourse. If this is Quine's view on the relation of reference and meaning, then how is it that we understand the meaning of each other's words and are able to communicate meaningfully? Further, what constitutes reference? According to Quine there is no 'museum myth of meaning', just as there is no fixed reference for any word. Meaning is actually some kind of public observable discourse. In order to understand this theory we have to turn now to one of Quine's most famous theory, the theory of meaning together with the theory of indeterminacy of translation and reference.

3.3 Meaning, Translation and Reference.

Quine's theory of meaning is closely bound up with his theory of translation. In *Words and Objects*, Quine gives us the essence of his theory of translation: "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in diverse ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" (19). In order to understand this let us understand Quine's notion of *radical translation*. Let us imagine an English-speaking linguist called Noam, who is among the Martian's: let us call the latter's language *Eta*. Noam is trying to translate Martian's language into English. This is called radical translation because the language which is being translated here is without any preexisting aids. Noam is trying to translate the words that a Martian named SHRDLU is uttering. Now let us consider the steps which Noam follows in translating SHRDLU's language.

Step(1) is to translate the SHRDLU's utterances keyed to present events that are conspicuous to Noam and to the subject. Suppose a cat scurries by, SHRDLU says 'Malai', and Noam notes down the sentence 'cat' (or 'Lo, a cat') as tentative translation, subject to testing in further cases⁷. Step(2) is to look for assent and dissent. The question is not what SHRDLU assents to when uttered a single word in the presence of the

correct stimulus, but what SHRDLU could have uttered in the case of that stimulus. So Noam in the presence of a proper stimulus, utters the word and waits for assent or dissent from SHRDLU. One problem with this is that is no way to guarantee what a sign for assent or dissent is in *Eta*. One partial criterion for this is the following : Suppose in the presence of appropriate stimulus a Martian is asked by Noam, he will assent to it under similar episodes in the receptual neighbourhood of the episodes near to which he volunteers the same sentence. A partial criterion for dissent is that a speaker will dissent under no circumstances producing episodes in the receptual neighbourhood of the episodes to which he volunteers the sentence. This is specially difficult in the case of observation sentences, but Noam can always guess.

Step(3) Next after quering an object several times and getting assent, Noam can *inductively* establish which word correspond to which. Now, with this there always remains the possibility of mistake in the process of this query, so with the next dissent we discard whatever translation we have made. Even with continous assent say repeatedly Noam asks 'Malai?' in the presence of a cat and is repeatedly getting assent. Now with a high degree of certainty he can write in his manual 'Malai' as the translation for 'cat'. But even though there is this high degree of certainty, still it remains vague as to whether 'Malai' is a translation of 'cat' or 'cathood' or 'Lo, a cat' or 'cat stage'. This is what Quine refers to as the *indeterminacy of translation*.

The steps indicated above requires the step of *analytical hypothesis*. Noam divides the Martian's utterances into short "words" and compiles them. Various of these he hypothetically equates with English. But analytical hypothesis does not provide absolute equations of English and *Eta*. If these hypotheses are not certain how can Noam arrive at them? According to Quine Noam apprehends a parallelism in function between some component fragments of a translated whole(SHRDLU) sentences and some component words\ of the translation of the sentence⁸. The prior assumption of Noam is a projection of prior linguistic habits. Thus, he uses analytical hypothesis, and by the momentum of his home language is thrown into the Martian's language. One interesting fact about this is that Noam brings his own conceptual scheme and superimposes his own language on SHRDLU's language at almost every step. Now, what is more interesting is to see that here we have not only an indeterminacy of meaning, but also an *indeterminacy of reference*. How is the theory of indeterminacy of translation related to the theory of reference? Quine says that "when we

merely explain what a thing a theory is about or what things its terms denote" (27) what we want to show is "how to translate all or part of the object theory into the background theory" (27).

Quine says about his theory of reference that the indeterminacy of translation now confronting us cuts across extension and intension alike. The term 'cat', 'undetached parts' and 'cat stage' differ not only in meaning; they are true of *different things*. Reference itself proves behaviourally inscrutable⁹. Let us see what exactly Quine means by this here? Suppose we want to know what 'Malai' means in SHRDLU's language. As the indeterminacy of the translation shows that it can mean any of the three above ('cat', 'cathood', or 'Lo, cat'), and *all three are equally defensible in the absolute sense*. So, the reference of 'Malai' is absolutely speaking indeterminate. From this instance we can generalize that all terms have indeterminate reference.

Now, statements about a terms' relative reference *do not show how to relate the term to the world, but how to relate it to its background theory*. Further Quine also says that, "It is really a matter of showing how we propose, with some arbitrariness, to relate terms of the object theory to terms of the background theory; for we have the inscrutability (i.e. indeterminacy) of reference to allow for" (23). Now as Aune points out, "These remarks suggest that, for Quine, statements of the form ' \emptyset refers to (denotes, is true of) K's actually relate words to other words rather than (or at least directly) relating words to the world" (25). Next let us work out to see how this background theory is reached¹⁰. As we have seen before ' \emptyset refers to K' relates, according to Quine, words to other words. In other W_o is not related in R_q to the other world, but to the background theory. So, for R_q , K_{cw} is not T_{ww} but T_{wb} . Now go back to our story of Noam and SHRDLU. There must be at least some terms in Noam's vernacular (which is English) which is co-referential with some terms in SHRDLU's vernacular which is *Eta*, although one is not a good translation of another. 'Only domesticated feline' has the same reference as 'cat', but it is not a good translation of 'cat'.

If we represent a chosen translation manual, *Lisp* or shortened as L , then to the question 'How is a relative reference related to its translation by a certain manual?' we can have the following answer:

(15) \emptyset refers _{L} to K s iff $(x) (x \text{ is a } K \text{ iff } Tx)$.

Here T is our translation, according to our manual named *Lisp*, or L , of the \emptyset . Now, if we take the meaning of \emptyset refers to K as, for all the substitution instances of x , \emptyset refers to x , iff x is a K . Logically,

(16) $(x) (\text{refers}_L x \text{ iff } x \text{ is a } K)$.

The right hand side of (15) allows us to deduce the truth of

(17) $(x) (x \text{ is a } K \text{ iff } Tx)$

(18) $(x) (\emptyset \text{ refers}_L \text{ to } x \text{ iff } Tx)$.

So Quine's implication is that a term's relative reference do not relate the term to the world, but shows it its relation to other term, we can infer the following regarding R_q :

(19) $T_r \rightarrow T_{wb}$.

(20) $T_{wb} \rightarrow \sim C_p$

So $T_r \rightarrow \sim C_p$.

But $K_{ew} \rightarrow C_p$.

(21) $\sim C_p \rightarrow \sim K_{ew}$.

Therefore, $T_r \rightarrow \sim K_{ew}$.

However, for R_i problem of knowledge is taken as S_p , which again implies T_{ww} . Once this is done, there is no way the sceptic could be answered. They fall into the sceptic's hand. To answer the sceptic we have to divert the T_r from C_p , and connect it with S_p , and we can say that the R_i was looking at the solution in all the wrong places. What is needed to be done to answer the sceptic is a revision of their theory of meaning and their theory of reference, and not a building up of a 'theory of knowledge'. And once we have in our hand M_q and S_q , NE is definitely the only answer in NE.

4 Can we justify knowledge?

Let us begin with what Quine says. Quine says that there is no way we can answer Hume's question, which is : "What is the justification for our knowledge of the existence of the outside world?". In answering question(a) we saw that inspite of the SP-thesis we can make free use of science to refute the sceptic. Can we make free use of science in the case of (b)? Well, maybe Quine is right in saying that Hume's criticism cannot be avoided. However, if we peruse NE, as an answer to (a), we thereby accept that the problem of knowledge is a *scientific problem*. After all, by accepting NE, we have accepted epistemology as a science but differs from the latter only in the 'breadth of categories' (12)¹¹. If it is a scientific problem, then why not use the same justification that natural science uses? After all, we claim to have knowledge in natural science. The traditional epistemologist will probably ask : How do you know that science gives us knowledge? Our answer is : your question is an external one. There is nothing 'meta-scientific' in knowledge in so far we accept

(a). We are *not* trying to justify an answer to (b) by itself, but by assuming that we have accepted NE as an answer to (a). So far we have accepted NE as an answer to (a). Instead of undermining the foundation of science, we can enquire what it is that gives knowledge in science. On the other hand, by accepting NE, we have accepted epistemology as a science. The SP-thesis stands a chance *only if it rejects our other theories (such as M_q and S_q), about which it says nothing.*

We have already said that we accept epistemology at par with other sciences, only as a wider science. If so, then why not apply here the same justification as the other sciences? So, we turn the tables now, instead of trying to justify science, we first establish the new broad science called epistemology, and then we go to other sciences to find their method and use it here. What sort of knowledge do scientists claim to have in their fields of enquiry? **Not certain knowledge but probable knowledge based on some evidence, and the power of prediction which may subsequently be refuted by gathering of further evidence.** But so long as no contrary evidence is available our current body of knowledge is held to be certain. What sort of justification goes on in science? Suppose, we have to confirm a scientific hypothesis H on the basis of evidence E. One important thing about a scientific hypothesis is its power of prediction. Suppose we say that :

IF H and C, the R

C obtains

R obtains

Therefore H is confirmed to a degree of profitability.

On the other hand, If H and C, then R

C obtains

R does not obtain

Therefore H is refuted.

Now statisticians have given powerful tools for the confirmation of hypothesis. These have the virtues of a deductive theorems. To test whether there are protons, for example, the scientist predicts that if the gas is passed through the gas of a Wilson cloud chamber, distinctive trail of ionized gas will be observable. Such predictions can be made and if they come out true then the result will be approximately true. Of course, the conditions can change, and then this prediction will come out false. Many hypotheses in science are tested like this. One popular theorem for testing the most probable hypothesis is :

$$P(h/e) = \frac{P(h).P(e/h)}{P(e)}$$

$P(h/e)$ is the updated probability, $P(h)$, $P(e)$ are prior probabilities, and $P(e/h)$ is the likelihood.

This together with conditionalization will give us the best result for testing a hypothesis. What the latter rule does is to update the older hypothesis and use it as new evidence.

One important thing must be reminded by here : that is that, we are not trying to answer the philosophical question : what is the *guarantee for knowledge*? We are merely trying to explore what the *scientist does when she/he is claiming to establish an hypothesis*. We have already seen that there is no logical contradiction *within our theory of meaning and reference in implying a scientific epistemology*, or NE (as Quine and Quinians call it) so there is no harm *within this framework to guarantee a theory of justification at par with the other natural sciences*.

5 Conclusion

In the foregoing pages, we have tried to defend NE, from the SP-thesis whose basic criticism is that NE, in refuting the sceptic's argument, takes science for granted whose very validity is in question. One thing is clear from the above pages. All those who are trying to give an answer to the sceptic by giving a 'theory of knowledge' are assuming some *certain foundations of knowledge*, from which to build up a 'theory of knowledge'. And this holds both for the empiricist and the rationalists. Once we reject any such *a priori foundation*, we are no longer under the obligation to *go beyond science* in order to validate the objects of science. Moreover, once we accept that the theory of reference has nothing to do with word-world relationship, which is causal theory, the question itself demands a scientific answer. So, once we see the theory of reference in proper perspective and accept NE as the only epistemology, we can, without doubt, use science without fear of losing some 'certain foundations', as supposed by the rationalistic or empiricistic camp. For, our whole concern is now pragmatic. Quine says that the conceptual scheme of science is a tool, "Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits." (28) Further, we can *turn the table in answering the second question*. We do not *seek the ultimate justification for science* but we *go to science and analyse its foundation to see what it uses, and*

return with whatever justification it has given us.

I am not suggesting that NE is foolproof against Hume's scepticism regarding (b), and Aune is perhaps, after all, right in saying that, in choosing our basic premises in induction we can only be guided by our epistemic end, and not by any other apriori justification. My claim, in this essay, is rather restricted: that is that, the SP-criticism of NE being circular is *piecemeal*. Once we recognize this, the rest of our thesis follows naturally.

352, Bartlett Hall
Department of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003 (U.S.A.)

RINITA MAZUMDAR

NOTES

- ¹ Although the sceptic is interested in all kinds of knowledge, we in this essay, are primarily concerned with knowledge of external world.
- ² See 'Epistemology Naturalized'(1)
- ³ Henceforth NE.
- ⁴ We shall discuss this later.
- ⁵ Short for 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'(17)
- ⁶ Italics mine
- ⁷ I have adopted this formulation from Quine with some changes, see Quine(20).
- ⁸ See (21).
- ⁹ See OR p.35(24).
- ¹⁰ I owe this idea of words relating to background words and the whole working out of this particular thesis to Aune's paper, 'Quine on Translation and Reference'(26)
- ¹¹ See above.

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- (3) HK p. 347.
- (4) HK p. 113.
- (5) HK p. 119.
- (6) HK p. 352.

- (7) from *HK*, pp. 241-53.
- (8) *Roots of Reference* by W.V.Quine, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974, p.2. henceforth *RR*.
- (9) 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', in S.Guttenplan edited, *Mind and Language*, Oxford 1975, p. 67.
- (10) *Words and Object* by W.V.Quine, henceforth *WO*.
- (11) *WO*, p.3.
- (12) *WO*, p.275.
- (13) *HK*, p.252.
- (14) *SPS*, p.243.
- (15) *RR*, p.3.
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- (17) *HK*, p.241.
- (18) *Quine : Language, Experience and Reality*, by C.Hookway, California, SUP, 1988.
- (19) *WO*, p.27.
- (20) *WO*, p.29.
- (21) *WO*, p.70.
- (22) *SPS*, p.228.
- (23) *Ontology, Relativity and Other Essay*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. p.61, henceforth *OR*.
- (24) *OR*, p.35.
- (25) 'Quine on Translation and Meaning', *Philosophical Studies*, 27, (1975): p.223 Henceforth *QTM*
- (26) *QTM*.
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune - 411 007

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LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE AND INDUCTIVE EQUIVALENCE

The notion of inductive equivalence has been developed by Professor Pranab Kumar Sen as an alternative to that of logical equivalence in the context of the problem of confirmation of scientific paper 'Approaches to the Paradox of Confirmation', published in *Ajatus* (Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of Finland, XXXIV, 1972.) It is usually claimed that if two hypotheses h_1 and h_2 are logically equivalent then :

- (a) h_1 and h_2 are interchangeable in all contexts.
- (b) h_1 and h_2 will be confirmed and disconfirmed by the same evidence.
- (c) h_1 and h_2 are different formulations of the same hypothesis.

The equivalence between any hypothesis and its contrapositive is a paradigm of logical equivalence. Thus, one may hold 'All ravens are black' (h_1) and 'All non-black things are non-ravens' (h_2) to be logically equivalent. As such (a), (b) and (c) are true of h_1 and h_2 .

The author of the paper mentioned above, raises serious objections against the above claims (a), (b) and (c) about logical equivalence and presents his concept of 'Inductive Equivalence' which he thinks satisfies the said claims better. I made some passing observations on this concept of 'Inductive Equivalence' in an earlier paper¹ and reserved a fuller discussion on it for the future. I take this opportunity to present a comparative analysis of the two concepts of *Logical Equivalence* and *Inductive Equivalence* and examine how far the claim that the latter should replace the former is logically justified. In Section I, I propose to explain briefly the notion of logical equivalence *vis-a-vis* contraposition and logical equivalence. In Section II, I propose to explain the concept of inductive equivalence as introduced in the said paper and try to determine its relation to logical equivalence. Section III is an attempt to critically evaluate the notion of inductive equivalence.

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I

A very simple and brief exposition of the concept of logical equivalence may be found in Jeffrey. In defining 'Logical equivalence' Jeffrey writes, "Sentences are logically equivalent if and only if they have the same truth-value regarding the joint truth and falsity of the sentence letters that appear in them."² It is known to every student of formal logic that logically equivalent sentences may be obtained in various ways of which application of the rule of contraposition is only one.

Further, it is claimed by formal logicians that when two sentences have exactly the same meaning, they become logically equivalent; and conversely, when two sentences are logically equivalent, they actually have the same meaning. Sentences represent states-of-affairs. When and only when two sentences, p and q, represent the same state-of-affairs, they are said to have the same meaning. Consequently, p or q may be true, if and only if the common state-of-affairs they represent be a fact; and otherwise they would both be false. This means, two sentences may have the same meaning if and only if they are logically equivalent, i.e., made true or false by the occurrence or non-occurrence, respectively, of the same fact. This is another way of saying that two logically equivalent sentences are propositionally, semantically or cognitively identical. This point has been vigorously challenged by Sen, the author of the concept of inductive equivalence.

It has been claimed that :-

- (a) Application of the rule of contraposition cannot guarantee logical equivalence.
- (b) Two logically equivalent sentences may not be propositionally or cognitively identical.

Traditional logicians directly contrapose :

- (1) 'All ravens are black'
- into :
- (2) 'All non-black things are non-ravens'
- and hold that

(1) and (2) are equivalent statements.

According to Sen, these two statements cannot be equivalent. (1)

is a statement about ravens which turns out to be either false or pointless in a world that does not contain any raven, but (2), which is a statement about non-black things, may be a true statement in that world. Again (2) turns out to be false or pointless in a world that does not contain any non-black thing, though (1) which is a statement about ravens, may very well be true in that world. According to him, every categorical statement bears some sort of existential commitment (or presupposition, in the language of Strawson) in respect of its subject term such that if the subject term be empty then the statement concerned cannot be true, - it would be false in Aristotelian view and pointless in Strawsonian view.³

There is, however, a different method of demonstrating the equivalent between (1) and (2). This method is usually adopted by modern formal logicians. Formal logicians first translate (1) and (2) respectively into :

(1a) ' (x) (Raven x \rightarrow Black x)'

and

(2a) ' (x) (-Black x \rightarrow -Raven x)'

and easily show that one is the contrapositive of the other.

As (1a) and (2a) are, thus, logically equivalent. (1) and (2) must also be logically equivalent. Sen is inclined to accept the equivalence of (1a) and (2a). But he rejects the claim that they are translations respectively, of (1) and (2). So, according to Sen, the equivalence of (1a) and (2a) does not in any way prove the equivalence of (1) and (2). The standpoint adopted by Sen is clearly Strawsonian.⁴ (1) and (2) have some existential commitments. (1a) and (2a) have none. The author has other objections against the notion of logical equivalence. It is normally held by logicians that two logically equivalent statements are also semantically or cognitively identical, i.e. they express the same proposition. If S_1 and S_2 are logically equivalent statements and S_1 express the proposition p, then S_2 must also express the proposition p. Under such a situation, S_1 and S_2 would convey the same information, they would be cognitively equivalent, i.e., they would have the same meaning, they would be semantically identical. While speaking of two logically equivalent sentences Jeffrey says, 'The columns of "t"s and "f"s under the two sentences are the same and, therefore the two sentences have the same meaning. Facts that would make the one sentence true would make the other true as well, and facts that would make one of them false would falsify the other, too!'⁵ Sen accepts the

idea that two logically equivalent statements are interchangeable in all entailment statements, but rejects the idea that they are interchangeable in all confirmation statements. The former follows from the definition of logical equivalence, the latter does not. Two statements to be interchangeable in all confirmation statements have to be cognitively equivalent, i.e. they have to express the same proposition. But according to Sen, two logically equivalent statements may not be cognitively equivalent. It is in this context that Sen introduces his notion of 'Inductive Equivalence'. Two inductively equivalent hypotheses, he thinks, would be cognitively equivalent, since they would express the same proposition.

II

The author introduces his concept of inductive equivalence by help of two definitions :

Definition 1 : Any pair of hypotheses h_1 and h_2 are inductively equivalent if and only if they are interchangeable in every statement of confirmation or disconfirmation.

Definition 2 : Any pair of evidence e_1 and e_2 are inductively equivalent if and only if they are interchangeable in every statement of confirmation or disconfirmation.⁶

The first definition, Sen adds, implies that the hypotheses h_1 and h_2 can be said to be inductively equivalent if they are confirmed and disconfirmed by exactly the same evidence, and cannot be said to be so if they are not. The second definition, similarly, implies that the evidences e_1 and e_2 can be said to be inductively equivalent if they confirm and disconfirm exactly the same hypotheses, and cannot be said to be so if they do not.

According to Sen it is only inductive equivalence that may ensure cognitive equivalence.

Sen declares that he would be concerned almost exclusively with the first definition expressing a relation between hypotheses. He, thus, puts off all further discussion on the second definition expressing a relation between evidences. I cannot, however, resist the temptation of raising a point that appears hostile to his second definition. The following two evidences, both, confirm the hypotheses 'All Swans are Web-footed':

e_1 - This Canadian white Swan is Web-footed

e_2 - This Australian black Swan is Web-footed

The evidence e_1 and the evidence e_2 are, therefore, inductively equivalent. Can we say that e_1 and e_2 are also, on that account, cognitively equivalent, i.e. they express the same proposition? Obviously not. e_1 and e_2 might create illusion of being cognitively equivalent only when they are expressed thus :

e_1 - This swan is Web-footed

e_2 - This swan is a Web-footed.

But the 'This swan' of e_1 and the 'This swan' of e_2 are not synonymous. The first refers to a Canadian white Swan and the second to an Australian black swan. Therefore e_1 and e_2 , even in this form, do not express the same proposition and, thus, lack propositional identity. The use of what Russell would call 'an ego-centric word', '-This'- might have given the illusion of propositional identity of e_1 and e_2 . I would rather emphatically state that no pair of evidences e_1 and e_2 certified by the above definition 2 to be a pair of inductively equivalent evidences can really be a pair of two propositionally identical evidence statements, unless e_1 and e_2 be mere notational variants of each other. If e_2 can increase the probability of any hypothesis h_1 already confirmed by e_1 , then e_1 and e_2 must have different propositional or cognitive content, though they are inductively equivalent as per Definition 2. This appears enough to prove the sterility of the concept of inductive equivalence of evidences. Of course, Sen has not, in so many words, claimed propositional identity for two inductively equivalent evidence statements. But the context in which he presents his second definition of inductive equivalence makes it relevant, only if two inductively equivalent evidences e_1 and e_2 be claimed to be cognitively equivalent as well. If it is in the mind of the author that propositional identity can be claimed only for two inductively equivalent evidences, then I think this should have been clearly spelt out.

It is unintelligible why this second definition has been introduced at all.

The two immediate consequences of his definition of inductive equivalence between hypotheses i.e. his definition 1, are, according to Sen - the following :

- (a) It is both sufficient and necessary that the hypotheses h_1 and h_2 should be inductively equivalent if we are to infer that an evidence confirms h_2 from the fact that it confirms h_1 . It is sufficient for, if h_1 and h_2 are inductively equivalent, h_2 can be

substituted for h_1 in the confirmation statement " e confirms h_1 ". It is necessary, for, if h_1 and h_2 are not inductively equivalent, such a substitution cannot be made.

- (b) The question of confirmation is *Logically prior* to the question of inductive equivalence. If to say that h_1 and h_2 are inductively equivalent is to say that they are confirmed (and disconfirmed) by the same evidence, then we cannot conclude either that h_1 and h_2 are inductively or that they are not, unless we have decided whether or not they are confirmed (and disconfirmed) by the same evidence before concluding either that they are inductively equivalent or that they are not.

It occurs to me that the consequence (a) is Truism. It does not state anything more or less than the definition 1, and that the consequence (b) really does not follow from the definition 1. What really follows from the definition 1 is that the question of confirmation is only factually prior (not logically prior) to the question of inductive equivalence. Logically, they are only equivalent, as the definition commits :

$(e)(h_1)(h_2) \quad (((eCh_1.eCh_2) \rightarrow (h_1 \text{ is inductively equivalent with } h_2)) \rightarrow ((h_1 \text{ is inductively equivalent with } h_2) \rightarrow (eCh_1.eCh_2)))$.

(e = any particular evidence; h_1 and h_2 = two hypotheses;
C = confirms)

Sen proceeds to announce that consequences similar to (a) and (b) follow immediately from definition 2 in which inductive equivalence is construed as a relation between evidence.

If we accept Hempel's equivalence condition⁷ as well as Sen's concept of inductive equivalence, then we have to admit that logical equivalence must logically imply inductive equivalence. Otherwise, Hempel's Equivalence Condition, according to which :

For any evidence e , and any pair of hypotheses h_1 and h_2 , if e confirms h_1 and h_1 is logically equivalent with h_2 , then e also confirms h_2 .

cannot be valid. But it appears quite possible to Sen that two hypotheses are logically equivalent, in the sense of being interchangeable in all entailment statements, but not inductively equivalent in the sense of being interchangeable in all confirmation statements. So, Sen concludes that Hempel's equivalence is invalid.

The contention of Sen is obviously paradoxical. Logical truths, like mathematical truths, are necessary. Two logically equivalent hypotheses are *necessarily* equivalent. They necessarily have the same Truth-value. So, they must have the same truth-value under all conditions, and only if h_1 and h_2 necessarily have the same truth value, they may entail each other. If it is possible that h_1 is true and h_2 is false, h_1 cannot entail h_2 . Again if it is possible that h_2 is true and h_1 is false, h_2 cannot entail h_1 . So, if two hypotheses h_1 and h_2 are logically equivalent, they must under all circumstances have the same truth-value. Either both the hypotheses must be true or both the hypotheses must be false. If their truth-value is not exactly known, they must have the same degree of probability. If it is found that the two hypotheses h_1 and h_2 , though logically equivalent, are not inductively so, then it seems probable that the two hypotheses h_1 and h_2 , though surely have the same truth-value, may yet have different truth-values.

This is indeed a contradiction in terms. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Sen's argument fails to invalidate Hempel's equivalence condition as stated above.

Sen points out that logically equivalent hypotheses need not be alternative formulations of the same hypothesis as Hempel has taken them to be. So, logical equivalence cannot entail inductive equivalence. Only if two hypotheses express the same proposition, they may be inductively equivalent, i.e., they may be confirmed or disconfirmed by the same evidence. The only sorts of equivalence that may guarantee propositional identity are, firstly, definitional equivalence, and secondly, equivalence by mere notational variation. All logically equivalent statements may not be either definitionally equivalent or mere notational variants of one another as claimed by Hempel.

My point against such a standpoint of Sen is firstly, that two hypotheses, if logically equivalent, have to be inductively equivalent as well without regard to the question whether they express the same proposition or not. This I have already explained. Secondly, I like to emphasize that two logically equivalent hypotheses must also express the same proposition, since they have the same truth-value under all conditions, and if they express the same proposition, they must have the same meaning. A proposition is the meaning of an indicative sentence. If two hypotheses, h_1 and h_2 bear different sets of meaning elements, they

cannot be said to have the same truth-value under all possible conditions. Let us imagine that h_1 bears the meaning elements m_1, m_2 and m_3 while h_2 bears the meaning elements m_2, m_3 and m_4 . It is easy to see, then, that any condition which would falsify m_1 and uphold m_2, m_3 and m_4 would falsify h_1 but uphold h_2 . Again any condition that would uphold m_1, m_2 and m_3 and falsify m_4 , would uphold h_1 but falsify h_2 . Any possible difference in meaning is bound to bring in some differences in truth-conditions. Jeffrey, thus, categorically maintains that when two sentences are logically equivalent, they make the same statement. "Thus "It will not both rain and snow" is another way of saying that either it will not rain or it will not snow.....". The columns of "t"s and "f"s under the two sentences are the same and, therefore, the two sentences have the same meaning.⁸

Sen, however, presents a counter-example to such claims. The raven hypothesis $(x)(Rx \rightarrow Bx)$ and its contrapositive, after Max Black, $(x)((Rx \vee \neg Rx) \rightarrow (\neg Rx \vee Bx))$ are logically equivalent. But they do not express the same proposition. Thus, Sen holds that the two expressions, though logically equivalent, are not merely notational variants of each other; they bear different meaning. They are cognitively different.

I find it difficult to accept the view of Sen in regard to the two expressions mentioned above. Even if one accepts Sen's criterion, i.e., inductive equivalence of the hypotheses concerned, one may see that the two expressions

$$\begin{array}{llll} (x)(Rx \rightarrow Bx) & \dots & \dots & S_1 \\ (x)((Rx \vee \neg Rx) \rightarrow (\neg Rx \vee Bx)) & \dots & \dots & S_2 \end{array}$$

really express the same proposition. Let us enquire what sort of evidence confirms these two hypotheses. No body objects to the view that the existence of a black raven, i.e., RB , confirms S_1 and that of non-black raven, $R\bar{B}$, disconfirms it. This is just an application of Nicod's instance theory of confirmation. But what confirms S_2 ? S_2 being a contingent expression needs confirmation by empirical evidence. Everything satisfies the antecedent of S_2 which is a tautology. But everything is not relevant to its contingent consequent. The truth-value of any expression with a tautologous antecedent is the truth-value of the consequent under all circumstances. S_2 simply exemplifies a universally quantified expression with a tautologous antecedent and a contingent consequent. The claim that $(x) [(Rx \vee \neg Rx) \rightarrow (\neg Rx \vee Bx)]$ is true is nothing more and nothing less than the claim that $(x) (\neg Rx \vee Bx)$ is true. Thus, the truth of the comprehensive S_2 is totally dependent on the truth

of $(x) (-Rx \vee Bx)$. The evidence that confirms $(x) (-Rx \vee Bx)$ is the only evidence that can confirm S_2 and the evidence that disconfirms $(x) (-Rx \vee Bx)$ is the only evidence that disconfirms S_2 . So $(x) (-Rx \vee Bx)$ is inductively equivalent with $(x) [(Rx \vee -Bx) \rightarrow (-Rx \vee Bx)]$, i.e. S_2 . But the propositional functions $-Rx \vee Bx$ and $Rx \rightarrow Bx$ are only notational variants of each other by definition. So,

$$(x) (Rx \rightarrow Bx) \quad \dots \quad S_1$$

$$(x) [(Rx \vee -Rx) \rightarrow (-Rx \vee Bx)] \quad \dots \quad S_2$$

are indeed inductively equivalent. But, then, they must be cognitively equivalent too, expressing the same proposition. S_2 is an extremely circumlocutory way of saying what S_1 says.

Sen's points against logical equivalence are many and varied. He, firstly, argues, "Logical equivalence is relative to a system. For, it is determined by the entailment relations in which the sentences that are said to be logically equivalent stand with one another, and with other sentences in the system".⁹ These entailment relations, in their turn, are determined by the rules of inference which the system recognises. But the rule of one system may not be recognised by another. So, the sentences that are logically equivalent in one system may not be logically equivalent in another. If so, then confirmation becomes relative to a system. We may only say: If $h_1 \equiv h_2$ in a system L , and if e confirms h_1 , then e confirms h_2 in that system. This contention of Sen does not give possibly the full story about logical equivalence. It is not logical equivalence, but notations used and meaning attached to different notations that are really relative to particular systems. Logical equivalence between propositions is an ontological relation. Different systems are different ways of understanding logical relations between propositions. The ontological relations between propositions may not be identical with the way a system understands them. Had it been so, science and civilisation would all end in chaos, meetings and conferences would turn into battlefields.

It has further been said, "The minimum (and, most probably also the maximum) requirement for propositional identity, i.e., identity in respect of the proposition expressed, between S_1 and S_2 , it appears to me, is that S_1 and S_2 , are derivable from one another by definitional equivalence alone."¹⁰ This drives a wedge between logical equivalence and definitional equivalence - the former cannot guarantee propositional identity while the latter can. Such a distinction between logical

equivalence and definitional equivalence seems to be unwarranted. A logical equivalence must be either itself a definitional equivalence or, derivable from it according to rules that are meaning preserving.

Notwithstanding what has been said above, we may provisionally accept the view that rules of logic are relative to the system, that a pair of sentences that are treated as logically equivalent in one system may not be so in another system. But the statement: "If h_1 is logically equivalent with h_2 , then h_1 inductively equivalent with h_2 " must be admitted. This is true for every system. Two systems of logic, L_1 and L_2 , may differ in their attitude towards the rules of double Negation, Simplification, Disjunctive Syllogism or Contraposition. So they may differ as to whether h_1 is really logically equivalent with h_2 . This is altogether a different question. But if a system accepts that h_1 is logically equivalent with h_2 , it has to admit that they are inductively equivalent as well. A system, say L_1 , would just contradict itself by accepting the logical equivalence of h_1 and h_2 in L_1 , and rejecting their inductive equivalence. Two tailors may have different yard-sticks of measurement, such that according to one a particular piece of cloth is 2 ft. in width while according to the other it is only $1\frac{3}{4}$ ft. Yet, they both agree that $2\text{ ft} \times 2\text{ ft}$ is equal to 4 ft. None of the tailors can say, 'I do not agree that $2' \times 2' = 4'$, because what is 2' in your yardstick is not so in my yardstick'. None of Sen's argument is an effective challenge to Hempel's equivalence condition laid down in the second premise of the paradox generating argument of Hempel. For any evidence e , and any pair of hypotheses h_1 and h_2 , if e confirms h_1 and h_1 is logically equivalent with h_2 , then e also confirms h_2 .

However, Sen does challenge that logical equivalence between 'All non-black things are non-ravens' and 'All ravens are black' asserted by the third premise of the paradox generating argument, since he refuses to accept contraposition as a valid rule that may guarantee logical equivalence. I shall not discuss this point in this paper in detail partly because this has already been argued against in an earlier paper¹¹ and partly because this is strictly outside the scope of the present paper. I may be permitted here only to mention that Sen refuses to accept the derivation of $(x)(\neg Bx \rightarrow \neg Rx)$ from $(x)Rx \rightarrow Bx$ because this would involve the acceptance of the law of Double negation: ' $p = \neg\neg p$ '. Neither equivalence between p and $\neg\neg p$ is definitional, nor is the difference between them merely notational. If we recall that ' \neg ' is a

contradiction forming operator, that ' \neg ' means ' p is false' in the sense that p is not true, then the equivalence between p and $\neg\neg p$ becomes definitional and the indifference just notational. In fact, the equivalence between p and $\neg\neg p$ must be a theorem in all systems that accept ' \neg ' as a contradiction forming operator.

III

I am strongly inclined to believe that there is something wrong with the notion of inductive equivalence. Confirmation is a matter of degree, but equivalence is not. So, equivalence of any sort cannot be based on confirmation. The question of confirmation establishing propositional identity does not, therefore, arise.

Counter example - 1

Propositions with the same subject and the same predicate differing only in modality are all confirmed or disconfirmed by the same evidence. But they are neither cognitively equivalent nor propositionally identical.

Thus :

h_1 - Possibly, all Swans are white.

h_2 - All Swans are white.

h_3 - All Swans must be white.

All will agree that h_1 , h_2 and h_3 of this example are all confirmed by the evidence of a Canadian White Swan. They may all be disconfirmed as well by the evidence of an Australian black Swan. h_1 , h_2 and h_3 of this example are, therefore, inductively equivalent. But nobody would treat them either as cognitively equivalent or propositionally identical.

Inadequacy of the concept of inductive equivalence may be proved in a different way.

Counter example - 2

Let us assume that there are ravens in all countries of the world including Australia. Three Ornithologists O_1 , O_2 and O_3 , make the three hypotheses, one each, respectively :

- h_1 - All ravens are black.
- h_2 - All Australian ravens are black.
- h_3 - All African ravens are black.

'Australian ravens' and 'African ravens' represent two non-empty subclasses of the non-empty class represented by 'ravens', such that if h_1 i.e. 'All ravens are black' be true, h_2 i.e. 'All Australian ravens are black' and h_3 i.e. 'All African ravens are black' also become true, because h_1 intuitively entails h_2 and h_3 . There is no system of logic that may challenge this. A research worker R finds the evidence of an Indian black raven which we name e_1 . Then, he finds e_2 i.e. the evidence of an Australian black raven, and e_3 , the evidence of an African black raven. That e_2 confirms h_2 and e_3 confirms h_3 will be readily acceptable to all. But whatever confirms h_2 or h_3 must also confirm h_1 because instances of h_2 and h_3 are also instances of h_1 . Again e_1 is also an instance of h_1 . So, each of e_1 , e_2 and e_3 confirms h_1 according to the instance of theory of confirmation. But h_1 entails h_2 and h_3 . Does not each of e_1 , e_2 and e_3 thereby confirm h_2 and h_3 as well? Obviously it does. Whatever evidence confirms h_1 also confirms h_2 and h_3 . But then h_1 , h_2 and h_3 become inductively equivalent. According to Sen h_1 , h_2 and h_3 , then, should be cognitively equivalent as well, having propositional identity. I do not believe anybody will accept such a position and commit that 'All Australian ravens are black' means the same thing as 'All African ravens are black', or these two have the same meaning as 'All ravens are black'.

The concept of inductive equivalence is, thus, logically sterile. The concept of confirmation, though useful to science, cannot be a criterion of any equivalence of logical importance. An evidence confirms different statements not only in different degrees, but also in different ways. The above Counter-example - 1 demonstrates a condition of confirmation, the modality condition, which may be expressed as :

For an evidence e_1 , and any pair of hypotheses h_1 and h_2 if e_1 confirms h_1 , and h_1 differs from h_2 only in modality, then e_1 also confirms h_2 .

The Counter example - II similarly demonstrates the entailment

condition of confirmation that may be stated thus :

For an evidence e , and a pair of hypotheses h_1 and h_2 , if e confirms h_1 , and h_1 entails h_2 , then e also confirms h_2 .

As a condition of confirmation, Hempel's equivalence condition must be a stronger condition than the modality condition or entailment condition, because two hypotheses that are logically equivalent to each other have more factors or points common between them than two hypotheses differing in modality or two hypotheses of which only the one entails the other.

I therefore, conclude that inductive equivalence cannot guarantee propositional identity. Rather, it is propositional identity between two statements that may enable them to be confirmed equally by the same evidence. However, the propositional identity turns out to be wild goose if pursued beyond formal limits.

Department of Philosophy,
Sreegopal Banerjee College,
Bagati, P.O. - Magra 712 148
Hooghly.
West Bengal

AMIYANSU DEB

NOTES

1. Deb : 'Paradox of Confirmation' - *The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1981.
2. R.C.Jeffrey : *Formal Logic : Its Scope and Limits*; (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p.20.
3. A critical evaluation of the views of Aristotle and Strawson appears in the following two papers :
 - (a) Deb : 'Strawson's Interpretation of Traditional Form' - *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, 1979.
 - (b) Deb : 'Strawson on Existential Import of General Propositions' - *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1980.
4. A fuller account of this notion of general propositions may be found in:
 - (a) P.F.Strawson : *Introduction to Logical Theory*, (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1952)
 - (b) P.K.Sen : 'Analysis of General propositions' - *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol V, No. II, 1978.
5. Jeffrey : *Op. Cit.* p.20.

6. P.K.Sen : 'Approaches to the paradox of Confirmation' - *Ajatus* (Year Book of the Philosophical Society of Finland), p.57.
7. C.G.Hempel : 'Studies in the logic of Confirmation' - *Mind*, Vol.LIX, 1945, Also in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, (New York, 1965)
8. Jeffrey : *Op. Cit.* pp.19-20.
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10. Sen : *Op. Cit.* p. 60.
11. Deb : 'Paradox of Confirmation' - *Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. xx, No.2, 1981.

WITTGENSTEIN ON RULE FOLLOWING

In the early phase of his philosophical enterprise that covers the themes of *Notebooks 1914-16.*, *Prototractatus* and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*¹ (hereafter, TLP) Wittgenstein was of the opinion that there is a striking resemblance between the structure of language and the structure of the world (reality). This isomorphism between language and the world, felt Wittgenstein, can be vindicated by introducing a 'logically perfect language' (ideal language), which is totally governed by a single, unique, rigid system of calculus that does not allow any loose-play. In other words, such a calculus acts in accordance with the fixed rules of truth-functional logic. Accordingly, the 'picture theory of meaning' (denotative theory of meaning) advanced by Wittgenstein in his TLP suggests that to understand the meaning of any expression one has to have adequate mastery of the rules that govern its use. The true transition in Wittgenstein's line of thinking towards the workings of language and its underlying logical structure is obvious in his well acclaimed posthumous publication *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter, PI). In this matured work of Wittgenstein the repudiation of the views advocated in his TLP towards the 'logic of language' is normally attributed to the following reasons. First of all, realising the vulnerability of the view that language has a unique discoverable function, namely, the 'logical clarification of thought' which can be expressed by means of structure revealing analysis of language and the world; and such analysis has a single underlying logic, Wittgenstein put forward a thesis in his PI that there is no one 'logic of language', but there are many 'logics of language' that govern our linguistic practices. It amounts to saying that the 'logic of language' has no unique essence but has collection of innumerable practices. Secondly, the belief that there can be a systematically worked out philosophical theory that can solve the philosophical riddles which arise out of our misunderstandings of the workings of language is misleading. What Wittgenstein felt was that instead

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of formulating a systematic theory to solve the problems of philosophy we must aim to 'dissolve' these problems by clearing away the misconceptions about language. This allows philosophy to be a 'therapeutic'² enterprise rather than a systematic exercise. Thus, informalism replaces formalism. Nevertheless, both *TLP* and *PI* share the claim that the problems of philosophy arise out of our misunderstandings of the language at its functional level. In addition to that, both the works share the view that our inquiry into the workings of language is a 'grammatical inquiry'.³ The point at issue at this juncture is not whether Wittgenstein's philosophy can be compartmentalised into early and later phases, but to show the continuity of certain cardinal issues that traverse in all his philosophical literature. One such important issue worth consideration is his treatment of the notion of rule-following.

Wittgenstein, *inter alia*, was deeply concerned with the view whether understanding⁴ a language is a rule-governed activity. He makes an undaunted attempt to reconsider his views in respect to the workings and understanding of language. The explanation given in *TLP* as regards the understanding of language reveals that language as an activity abides by certain fixed rules which determine the meanings of various expressions. In this sense, a person is said to have understood the meaning of an expression provided he has mastered the rules that govern the structure of language. What Wittgenstein aims to show in his *PI* is not that language is not a rule governed activity, but the rules that determine the meanings⁵ of various expressions in language have a single, unique, rigid calculus that controls the rules. More than anything, it is the view that these rules exist independent of us made Wittgenstein philosophically more uncomfortable. According to him, the proclivity of most of the philosophers is to look for generality, whether such a generality has any rational basis. This description of rule-following is often referred to as Platonism⁶. Against this Platonism, Wittgenstein argues that language has many logics. These logics are identified with 'language games'⁷ whose use-rules are open for public accessibility.

I

The argument put forward by Wittgenstein in order to show the absurdity of Platonism assumes the form of *reductio*. According to this

argument, the supposed distinction between 'obeying a rule' and 'disobeying a rule' - which is the base for Platonism - is illfounded. In an attempt to vindicate this point Wittgenstein proceeds in the following way.

The uniformity of rules followed in logic and mathematics determines the value structures of various propositions in advance so that one can always check whether one is following a rule correctly. The inexorability of logic and mathematics lies in their following a rigid, uniform system of rules. Thus, Platonism can be best compared with rails laid down in advance to infinity. To quote Wittgenstein in this context :

Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule.

All these steps are really already taken means : I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole space. But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help?...⁸

The point that Wittgenstein was trying to make here is not that rules do not guide us to correctness; rather the general misinterpretation of the rules in terms of fixed rail track laid in advance to infinity reduces a rule-follower to the level of a machine or an automata that blindly follows the track to which it is latched. If this model is employed in language, argues Wittgenstein, then the very purpose of language as a medium of communication is defeated. He maintains that language consists of diversity of rules that govern the use of various expressions. The absurdity of Platonism, according to Wittgenstein, can be shown in the following way.

Let us assume that there are rules laid down in advance like a 'rail track'. A rule follower may think that he is following a rule. In this situation, contests Wittgenstein, we have to look for a connection between a rule-follower and the rule followed by him. The rules laid down in advance to infinity like rails do not serve the purpose unless the complete guidance of rules is in the mind of a rule-follower which made him stick to the rules. Now, a rule follower may have a flash

of understanding with regard to the meaning of an expression. This he may attribute to the rules that he follows. Wittgenstein asks: if a rule-follower has an ordinary flash of understanding when he was not following a rule, then does he attribute this to the rules that he follows otherwise? Wittgenstein says:

This was a paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.⁹

Thus, the question of 'obeying a rule' or 'disobeying a rule' does not arise. Once this point is proved the very edifice on which Platonism is erected collapses.

Another important flaw that Wittgenstein notices in Platonism is that to obey a rule is to have a sense of being guided or coerced by a rule. In other words, the rule dictates terms to the rule-follower. Thus, a rule-follower is prevented from contributing anything to what counts as following the rule. Now, the real problem, holds Wittgenstein, with the notion of rule-following is that the belief that one is being guided by a rule does not really guarantee that the rule is being followed. Someone might think that he is following a rule when he is not applying it correctly. Similarly, a person who has no knowledge of the existence of a particular rule may be following that rule inadvertently. In a sense, he is not following a rule at all. This point drives Wittgenstein home as the supposed distinction between obeying a rule and disobeying a rule, in this context, is illogical; and hence illfounded.

Wittgenstein attacks the view that rule-following is an inner mental activity. Some philosophers are of the opinion that some thing really occurs in the rule-follower's mind when he is following a rule and provides him an infallible guidance. Wittgenstein questions: what is this something? If this 'something' is that one which attaches a rule-follower to the fixed rails like rules laid down in advance to infinity, then it qualifies as an instant 'mental talisman'. What does this 'instant mental talisman' signify? Is it a mental image or a picture? To throw some more light on this point Wittgenstein puts it in the following manner.

It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash:

Like what e.g.? - Can't the use - in a certain sense - be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not? The point is, that it is as if we could 'grasp' it in a flash in yet another and much more direct sense than that -- But have you a model for this? No. It is just this expression suggests itself to us. As the result of the crossing of different pictures.

You have no model of this superlative fact, but you are seduced into using a super-expression. (It might be called a philosophical superlative.)¹⁰

Wittgenstein does not deny the fact that we grasp the whole use of the word (meaning of the word) in a flash. But the description of the flash as an 'instant mental talisman' that occurs to a person when he grasps the use of a word that gives the meaning cannot have any mental model. This shows that Platonism not only requires the fixed rails like rules, but also an 'instant mental talisman' that connect what is happening in the rule-follower's mind to the fixed rules. This requirement, maintains Wittgenstein, can never be met.

Another equally important feature of Platonism is that rules have an independent existence. Wittgenstein holds that this unwarranted conviction is grounded in the belief that rules give rise to objectivity. This conception is so strong in the minds of the rule-followers as it is obviously clear from the rules of arithmetic which impose certain standards of correctness on the rule-followers. It is this belief in the objectivity or externality that gives the rule-follower a sense of satisfaction. Against this conception, Wittgenstein holds that the rigid calculus employed in arithmetic may not hold good when it is employed in language. Because in language what constitutes a rule is our collective use of it. In this regard what really counts as following a rule is to adopt a common practice that is guided by agreement in judgements in a community of language-users. In other words, the agreement in judgements is necessarily an agreement in shared 'custom'. To recall the statement of Hume, in this context, that what we call the 'necessary relation' between cause and effect is only based on habit and custom. In fact, for Hume, there are no external standards that guarantee the causal nexus in any possible way. Likewise rule-following, according to Wittgenstein, is a collective activity based on certain accepted linguistic practices of a community of language-users. There is no rigidity involved in this practice. The concept of understanding language is the concept of an acquired skill. For

Wittgenstein, language is an instrument of measurement of our 'customs.' Further illustration in this regard is provided by Wittgenstein. Let us think of a 'signpost'. It is meant to serve a definite purpose. This does not mean that a 'signpost' imposes its purpose on us. Its purpose simply rests upon the fact that there is a custom, a general practice to use 'signposts' for providing directions to the public. In a sense, it is its function. Similarly, in language, "A rule stands there like a signpost."¹¹ A natural corollary to this statement is that "a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there exists a regular use of signposts, a custom."¹² It amounts to saying that "The application of the concept of following a rule presupposes a custom."¹³ As a matter of fact, the terms 'custom', 'institution', 'use', 'practice' are used as synonyms by Wittgenstein.

II

The two most important considerations that follow from Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following are : (1) Rule-following is neither an inner mental activity nor a mysterious practice. This is clear from the analogy of 'signpost'. When a person goes in the direction that 'a signpost' indicates, it is not, according to Wittgenstein, that he is internally 'obeying a rule' and behaving in accordance with his internal mental act. To understand rules and to follow them is to familiarise oneself with the existing customs of a community of language-users. (2) Following a rule is essentially a social practice. This social practice suggests that rule-following is a mutual agreement in judgements that is prevalent in a community of language-users. Wittgenstein remarks that the word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are cousins. Because "If I teach anyone the use of one word, he learns the use of the other with it."¹⁴ This conception of Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of an outlaw formulating his own rules and observing them. Even if he follows a rule in accordance with his own formulations there is no way for him to check whether he is following it correctly. Thus, a man in isolation from the community of language-users cannot follow any rule, as rule following is not a private affair. Whether someone is following a rule correctly is checked through the available public criteria. The key notion in Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following is the notion of 'custom'. He insists that the notion of custom must be taken in its literal sense. A custom is something regular, repeated and established. Since use-rule

are based on well established customs there is no extrinsic or objective factor present in rule-following. In such a situation one is said to have 'disobeyed a rule' only when his linguistic practices do not conform to the existing social customs. Otherwise, there is no external justification, maintains Wittgenstein, excepting relying on these customs. He feels "Giving... grounds... come to an end... the end... is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."¹⁵ Language, for Wittgenstein, is necessarily built on a prelinguistic system. In order to comprehend the workings of language we must go beneath it and investigate its foundations. These foundations serve as hinges on which our linguistic practices firmly sit. In a sense to follow a rule is to follow it unreflectively. This point is further substantiated by the remark of Wittgenstein "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly."¹⁶ Thus, he advances a thesis that following a rule is a skill or an ability to use certain expressions. This skill or ability is achieved from our training as the members of a community of language-users. The immediate reaction to the whole analysis of rule-following is that if the use-rules of language are based on the agreement of certain customs of a community of language-users without any objective constraints, then it amounts to saying that what we call 'truth' or 'falsity' is also grounded in such practices. The truth becomes a matter of agreement in judgements. Anticipating this problem, Wittgenstein asks: "So are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false? - It is what human beings say in that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. This is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life."¹⁷ The concept of 'form of life' plays a dominant role in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. A form of life as Wittgenstein describes it, is an underlying consensus of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, assumptions, traditions, practices, customs, natural propensities that are shared by the individuals as members of the community of language-users. All these aspects are presupposed in the language they use. In a way language is woven into the patterns of human activity. The meanings, thus, are conferred on the expressions by the shared linguistic practices of the members of a community.¹⁸

III

The above account of Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following

invites our attention on certain crucial issues that have to be viewed critically: First of all, the rule-following method employed in exact sciences like logic and mathematics cannot be extended to the matters related to human practices and customs. This is obvious from the analysis of rule-following advanced by Wittgenstein in his later writings. But it was Hume and logical positivists who made it clear that the methods employed in exact sciences cannot be employed in empirical sciences. Influenced by logico-mathematical model, Wittgenstein tried to develop a kind of 'logically perfect language' that can mirror the reality as it is. Then, it was the same Wittgenstein who launched a scathing attack on his views expressed in *TLP*. This is because Wittgenstein realised the fact that the problems of sociological nature cannot be given a logical cover. Thus, the analysis provided by Wittgenstein in later writings as regards the notion of rule-following is self-stultifying. No one ever ventured to reduce language to a mysterious rule-following activity, but "the mystery here is all in Wittgenstein's imagination!"¹⁹ Secondly, if all the rules of language are somehow located in the customs or agreements or practices that are observed by a community of language users, then why should there be rules at all. One can simply say that our linguistic practices are based on the customs of a community than on any rules. Then, obeying a rule or disobeying a rule in this context does not arise. Another important thing to notice here is that majority of the interpreters of the later philosophy of Wittgenstein are of the opinion that the 'use-theory of meaning' - which is central to *PI* - advocated by Wittgenstein suggests that language has an autonomous status. But this view loses its ground once it is admitted that our linguistic practices are rooted in our pre-linguistic behaviour (customs, traditions, natural propensities etc.). Although Wittgenstein could put a Platonist at bay by countering his view, namely, the rules somehow exist independent of us, the dogmatic acceptance of customs as the real source of our linguistic practices completely ignores the ontological status or experimental phenomenology of such customs. Even a novice in the field of language learning looks for an apt justification of the use of a word before he starts using it. Apart from that, the use of an expression in language need not necessarily reveal its meaning as otherwise believed by Wittgenstein. For example, if a person wants to know the use of a hammer as a tool, one can give him a long list of its uses. But none of these uses gives us the meaning of the word 'hammer'. Thus, 'use' and 'meaning' are two different things.

Wittgenstein rules out the possibility of a putative language speaker following the rules of his own language on the ground that there is no criterion for him to check whether he is following a certain rule correctly. But the same applies to the community of language users in the sense that "How does the community tell us whether it is following a rule? The answer Wittgenstein gives us is: it cannot tell."²⁰ Then, in what way community's claim of following a rule is better than that of a putative private language user? Then, the paradox is not really solved. Wittgenstein's attempt to disprove Platonism is a vain attempt. Even if he has disproved it, he has not provided us with any viable alternative as his thesis is ridden with internal contradictions. The presuppositions on which his thesis rests are philosophically questionable. No one would ever say that I can speak language at my own will. One can do so in so far as it is intelligible to others. What makes language intelligible? Any attempt to answer this question may lead one to a vicious circle as no interpretation in this regard would be final and immutable.

Sri Aurobindo School of Eastern
and Western Thought
Pondicherry University
Kalapet
PONDICHERRY - 605 014.

K.SRINIVAS

NOTES

1. As a matter of fact, *Notebooks 1914-16*, and *Prototractatus* are considered to be the drafts of *Tractatus*.
2. Wittgenstein used the term 'therapeutic' in its literal sense. According to him, the philosopher's treatment of a philosophical problem is like the treatment of an illness. In the process he defies all the conventions of formalism to adopt an informal approach which can dissolve a problem.
3. Here, the term 'grammatical' is not used in its ordinary sense of the term 'grammar' but is used to denote logic. To be more precise the 'logic of language' is like the logic of given linguistic practice.
4. Prior to taking up the issue whether understanding a language is a rule-governed activity, a brief note about Wittgenstein's analysis of the nature of understanding is necessary. According to him, understanding is not a mental

process as otherwise thought to be. To understand something means to master a technique. To master a technique means an ability to perform certain actions.

5. In *PI* Wittgenstein identifies 'meaning' with 'use'. Many a time they were used as synonyms in his later works.
6. Why it is often referred to as Platonism is that for Plato the 'Forms' are fixed, infallible structures that guide our actions in the world of phenomena. These 'Forms' (ideal structures) exist independent of us. Similarly, the rules (use-rules) that govern the structure of language have a unique essence and are independent of us. This analogy allows philosophers to use the term 'Platonism' as a label for rigid rule-following activity.
7. A 'language-game' is a 'form of life' that involves a practice of agreement on certain basic or foundational beliefs that give meanings to the usage of various expressions in our linguistic practices.
8. L.Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, paragraphs. 218-19.
9. *Ibid.*, paragraph 20.
10. *Ibid.*, paragraphs: 191-192.
11. *Ibid.*, paragraph 85.
12. *Ibid.*, paragraph 198.
13. L.Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Basil Blackwell, p 132.
14. L.Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, paragraph.224.
15. " *On certainty*, paragraph 204.
16. " *Philosophical Investigations*, paragraph 219.
17. *Ibid.*, paragraph 241.
18. *Ibid.*, paragraphs. 19,22,241.
19. J.N.Findlay, *Wittgenstein: A Critique*, RKP, 1984, p. 131.
20. A.C.Grayling, *Wittgenstein*, OUP, 1988, p. 111.

INDETERMINATENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON

The objective of this paper is to argue for the position that the concept of a person is indeterminate and loose. I propose first to show the inadequacy of the dualistic position of Cartesian variety and argue in favour of the Strawsonian analysis of the concept of a person. In the second part, I discuss some weaknesses in this analysis and try to show that while Strawsonian analysis gives us the necessary condition of being a person, it fails to provide a sufficient condition of the same. On the basis of observations regarding what constitutes sufficient condition of something being a person, I put forward the proposal that the concept of a person is indeterminate.

I

In one of his recent works, Richard Swinburne observes : "... it is coherent to suppose that a person could continue to exist with an entirely new body or no body at all."¹

This conclusion brings into focus the entire controversy regarding the concept of a person and that of personal identity. Much of the discussion of the concept of a person in contemporary philosophy is a discussion of the problem of personal identity, that is to say, of the problem of specifying necessary and sufficient condition of a person at time t_2 being the same as a person at t_1 . This is not surprising, since answers to the two questions go hand in hand. The question of the criterion of personal identity cannot be discussed without taking into account what sort of being counts as a person and what is regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity also provides an answer to what counts as a person.

Two claims are made in the lines quoted above, (1) a person can exist in a disembodied state and (2) a person can have two numerically

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different bodies at two different points of time. The second point concerns the question of criterion of personal identity and we would not discuss it here. The first claim can be interpreted in two ways: (i) a person having once embodied existence can continue to exist in a disembodied state or (ii) a person can remain disembodied throughout the period of his/her existence. Strawson accepts the first possibility, namely, that the concept of pure individual consciousness might have a "logically secondary existence"² though it cannot exist as a primary concept. On the dualistic definition a disembodied or pure consciousness is a person in a full-blooded sense. Swinburne says, "... all that a person needs to be a person are certain mental capacities - for having conscious experience (e.g. thoughts or sensations) and performing intentional actions."³ Thus, anything that has the required capacities is entitled to be called a person, it being immaterial whether this something is a human being or some other kind of being or a disembodied entity. Having these capacities is both necessary and sufficient condition of being a person. The influence of Descartes here is quite obvious.⁴ For dualists like Swinburne a person is essentially a soul and what entitles some being to be a person is capacity for thought and intentional action. The two capacities are certainly very important for an adequate analysis of the concept of a person. Another thing which often figures in definitions of 'person' is self-consciousness and awareness of one's identity over a period of time. Thus, Locke defines 'person' as "... a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as self, the same thinking thing in different times and places."⁵

Cartesian dualism allows both for the possibility of a person having different bodies at different times and being a disembodied being. But equating person with an incorporeal thinking substance or a soul fails to provide an adequate analysis of the concept of a person. Much has been written on the difficulties of mind-body dualism of this kind. Two points in this context seem the most important. One, if a person is regarded as an incorporeal substance, no account can be given of how a person is to be identified, (one cannot observe the soul of another).⁶ Two, no criterion of reidentification of such substance can be provided. It may be argued that in one's own case, one has direct knowledge of one's identity over a period of time. This knowledge, however, would have to be restricted to those past moments of which one has personal memories. But even here, as Kant has pointed out, there is

Indeterminateness of the Concept of a Person

no contradiction in the supposition that not one but many successive souls are the subjects of different experiences at different times and each soul conveys all its knowledge to its successor.

Dualists regard it as something obviously true that thoughts and feelings, that is to say, states of consciousness cannot be ascribed to corporeal substances but only to thinking substances. However, there does not seem any contradiction in the supposition that something may be both extended and have thoughts. As a matter of fact, if we reflect over our ways of talking about human beings, this is precisely what we do, namely, ascribe both corporeal characteristics and mental states or states of consciousness to the same embodied being. Strawson's analysis of the concept of a person is based on this basic insight.

II

Strawson rejects both Cartesian dualism and no-ownership theories and defines 'person' as a kind of subject to which both predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and those ascribing states of consciousness can be applied. The concept of a person is of a kind of individual to which both M and P - predicates can be ascribed. On Strawson's view, two things emerge clearly from the way person words are used ordinarily. One, states of consciousness are ascribed to something and two, they are ascribed to the very same thing to which corporeal characteristics are ascribed. This does appear to be the case. We never say, "There is a pain" but that "I have a pain", or "He is in pain" or "She was in pain". Similarly we not only ascribe thoughts, feelings and emotions to persons, we also ascribe height, weight, colour etc., to them.

Two important points emerge from Strawson's discussion : i) a person is a subject and ii) a subject to which both M and P-predicates are ascribable. The first goes against no-ownership theories. Such a theory, Strawson says, cannot state the relationship between a person's state of consciousness and his body consistently. The statement of this relationship is supposed to be synthetic and significant but on this theory it becomes analytic and trivial. The statement that a person's states or consciousness are causally dependent upon his body is meant to be a significant one. The no-ownership theorists, then, must have the concept of a subject of states of consciousness different from that of the body;

otherwise, the statement in question is reduced to a trivial one.

The no-ownership theorist presupposes correlations between some states of consciousness and certain body and these correlations must be empirically discoverable. The body is independently identifiable but states of consciousness can be identified only by reference to the person whose states they are. How can, then, these correlations be discovered empirically? Further, correlations between a person P's body and states of consciousness can be established only after these states have been identified as belonging to P. A way to avoid this circularity has been suggested by Ayer.⁷ He says that the general statement 'Every experience is causally dependent upon a body' is analytic, whereas the more specific statements which describe relationships between states of consciousness and bodily conditions are empirical. This suggestion, however, does not remove the difficulty. From the general statement merely this follows that every state of consciousness is causally dependent upon some body but which states depend upon which body is a further question which remains unanswered by the no-ownership theorist.

Against the dualism of two kinds of substances, Strawson puts forward a dualism of two kinds of predicates. The important point, however, is that both these can be ascribed to some subjects which person words refer to. For a theory of this kind, it is important to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of predicates.

III

Does the concept of a being to which both M and P-predicates are ascribable give us the concept of a person? Is it necessary for something to be a person that both kinds of predicates be ascribable to it? Let us first take up the question of ascription of M-predicates. If some M-predicates must be ascribable to a person, then no disembodied soul or pure ego can be a person.

A disembodied soul or ego can be said to be a person only if the following are granted :-

- 1) Ascribability of only P-predicates matters for personhood, not of M-predicates.
- 2) Ascription of P-predicates to a disembodied soul or pure ego is

intelligible.

The first admission goes against Strawsonian criticism of Cartesian dualism and the very spirit of his analysis of the concept of a person. A disembodied soul cannot be regarded as a person even in a logically secondary sense, because it is impossible to provide a principle of individuation for it. Every psychological characteristic can have more than one instance, i.e. can be possessed by more than one person. Even this is logically possible that memories of two persons may be exactly alike. Psychological characteristics, thus, cannot enable us to uniquely identify one ego or soul from another. Therefore, it is not possible to give a principle of individuation purely in terms of psychological characteristics of an entity.

Nor can the previous association of a soul or a group of psychological characteristics with a body can be of help in this context. Such association does not leave a mark on the soul or one such group such that in the disembodied state one soul or one such group can be differentiated from another on its basis. The possibility of association with a certain body in the future also does not help. It is possible that any soul or any group of psychological characteristics may in future be associated with any body. Even if it is granted that certain psychological characteristics can be associated only with a certain type of body, it remains possible that a soul or a group of psychological characteristics may in the future be associated with any one of a certain type of bodies.

Many philosophers have maintained that a disembodied soul can continue to have not only thoughts and memories but also sensuous experiences. As far as perceptual experiences are concerned, it is far from clear that they can occur without there being any physical body. Even in the case of thinking and memory, it is not obvious that they can occur in the absence of a body. We must distinguish between two positions here : i) that an experience can occur without being correlated with the part of the body with which it is actually correlated. For example, seeing may not be dependent upon eyes as it actually is but on some other part of the body, and ii) that an experience can occur in the absence of a body. The first can be accepted since it is a contingent matter that one kind of experience is causally dependent upon a certain part of the body and could be so dependent upon some other part. But from

this we cannot jump to the conclusion that this experience, say seeing, can occur in the absence of the body. While a proposition asserting causal dependence of (or correlation between) certain kinds of experiences (states of consciousness) and certain parts of a body is contingent, the same cannot be said about the proposition 'Every experience is causally dependent upon (or correlated with) some body (or part of a body)'. It does not seem possible to define "experience" in such a way that such causal dependence upon or correlation with a body does not figure in it.

From what has been said above, it follows that a subject to which no M - predicates are ascribable cannot be said to be a person. A question, however, still remains to be answered. Does the concept of a person allow ascribability of any M - predicates or only of some specific M - predicates? For example, can a non-living thing be regarded as a person, if some P - predicates are ascribable to it? Or can artifacts like robots be called persons if their behaviour suggests that P - predicates can be ascribed to them?

It seems that the concept of a person does require that some M - predicates be ascribable to a subject so regarded. One may add that it also requires that certain specific kind of M - predicates be ascribable to it. For example, it may be said that only a living being can qualify for personhood. A robot or a non-living thing would then not qualify to be a person. It is, however, not something straightforwardly clear. Suppose there is a robot capable of complex behaviour similar to the behaviour of human persons. Is this robot a person? Perhaps in such a case it would be incorrect to regard this robot as a non-living object. It follows that having a specific physical form (say like that of human beings) is not a necessary condition of being a person but the subject in question must be a living being. The concept of a person, thus, does not require that certain M - predicates be ascribable to a subject but only that any of those types of M - predicates, the possession of which makes the subject a living being.

Let us now consider the ascription of P - predicates. Some predicates like 'is smiling' or 'is walking' do not clearly fall either into the class of M - predicates or P - predicates; they rather seem to be a complex of both kinds of predicates. P - predicates, Strawson says, are those which imply possession of consciousness by that to which they

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are ascribed. Their peculiarity consists in the fact that while M-predicates can be "properly applied" to both material objects and persons, P-predicates can not be ascribed to material objects. Strawson writes, "We would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness"⁸ to material objects. It is not clear, however, why ascription of P-predicates to material objects is improper. The impropriety does not seem to consist in the fact that such ascriptions are always false, since "The idea of a predicate is correlated with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly though not necessarily truly affirmed."⁹

P-predicates, then, cannot be significantly ascribed to material bodies in Strawson's view. It is, however, far from clear why such ascription does not make sense. It is not the case that certain M-predicates can only be ascribed to persons, nor that P-predicates are ascribable to those individuals alone to which certain M-predicates are ascribable. Since M-predicates are properly applied to both persons and material objects, it follows that any M-predicate can be significantly ascribed to a person, whether such ascription is true or false is another matter. In case of ascription of P-predicates to material objects, the ascriptions being said to be not merely false but devoid of significance.

One way to explain this point is to say that ascription of P-predicates to material objects commits a category mistake. This can be maintained only when a distinction between material bodies and persons is already drawn and available independently of the distinction between the two kinds of predicates. Since the distinction between these two kinds of individuals is itself drawn on the basis of ascribability of different types of predicates, it is not, then, open to Strawson to base the distinction between M and P-predicates on the distinction between material objects and persons. When Strawson says that ascription of P-predicates to material objects does not make sense, he is presupposing a categorical distinction between two kinds of individuals.

Another way to understand Strawson's position would be to maintain that ascription of P-predicates to material bodies is not significant since any subject to which P-predicates can be ascribed is not a mere material body. Then, ascribability of P-predicates to material bodies would be ruled out by way of definition. Again, it would be necessary to provide distinction between M and P-predicates without

bringing in the distinction between material bodies and persons. The distinction between the two kinds of predicates could be proved if 'consciousness' and 'possession of consciousness' can be explained without reference to persons and perhaps it is possible to do so on the basis of behavioural criteria.

Yet another difficulty arises in this context. Some predicates which when applied to persons, fall into the category of P - predicates are also applicable to material bodies. For example 'adds', 'calculates', 'remembers' are correctly used, in the case of computers. Conversely, a predicate like 'is running', when ascribed to a person, means ascription of P - predicate but when ascribed to a river or stream, is treated as M - predicate. One may here say that such cases involve analogy. For some of these predicates their standard use may be regarded as the one in case of material bodies and the other becomes a case of analogy. For others (like 'remembers') their standard use becomes the one in the case of persons and their ascription to computers a case of analogy. One would have to say then that 'remembers' does not mean the same in the two cases of ascription; and cannot be a P - predicate when ascribed to a computer, since a computer cannot be thought of as possessing consciousness.

But how do we arrive at this conclusion? For Strawson behavioural criteria are logically adequate for ascription of P - predicates to others, while in one's own case such ascription does not depend on behavioural criteria. So possession of consciousness by computers can be denied on the ground of such criteria. The kind of computers we have at present do not engender serious problem. Suppose a computer or a robot is developed which exhibits behaviour associated with some P - predicates and even has some language (though different from the languages used by human persons) to communicate with others, would we be prepared to regard such a computer or robot as a person? Ordinarily, we hesitate in categorising anything non-living as a person. In case of living beings we are less reluctant to ascribe states of consciousness to beings different from humans. If we come across a monkey or a chimp or some other animal for instance, whose behaviour is remarkably similar to humans we would not hesitate in ascribing appropriate P - predicates to it. One may at this juncture say that a robot (or computer) cannot be called a person since it is not a living being. This position can be entertained only if 'being a living being' constitutes a

necessary condition of 'being a person'. However, the question whether 'calculates' and 'remembers' in the case of a robot are to be treated as P-predicates seems to depend on a prior decision whether a robot is a person or not. In the Strawsonian scheme, ascription of P-predicates would have to be based on behavioural criteria alone. Therefore, if it becomes possible to have robots which are capable of highly complex behaviour of the type associated with P-predicates in the case of human beings, we will have to admit that states of consciousness can be ascribed to these. These robots may still not be regarded as persons because they are not living beings. This suggests the possibility of conscious but non-living individuals which are neither material bodies nor persons., (such beings may on the contrary cease to be treated as non-living in the light of their behaviour). A second possibility is of living beings who do not fall into either category. That such beings are not merely a hypothetical possibility but actually exist would emerge in the following passages.

Let us return to our original question. Does the concept of a subject to which both M and P predicates are ascribable, give us the concept of a person? The answer is "NO". The ascribability of both kinds of predicates constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition of being a person. The concept of a being to whom both M and P-predicates can be ascribed gives the concept of a sentient being but not of a person. On this definition, any being to whom some states of consciousness can be ascribed would qualify as a person. A monkey or a chimp seems to satisfy this requirement. In most of the contemporary discussions of 'person' the evolution of biological species seems to have been ignored. This presents a misleading picture as if all individuals can be neatly divided into two classes - material bodies and persons. But there is no sharp dividing line between the two classes, rather there is a whole class of beings, namely animals, that fall in between.

Arguing for the primitiveness of the concept of a person, Ishiguro¹⁰ says that the primitiveness of a concept is not affected by the fact that the extension of that concept is a proper subset of the extension of another concept. It is quite true that the mere fact that the individuals qualifying as persons also fall under the extension of another concept would not pose a problem. The problem here, however, is that the primitive concept of a subject to which both M and P predicates are ascribable is not that of a person. One requirement for a sortal concept is that it enables us to identify certain things as things of that sort. But

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to pick out an entity as the subject of both M and P predicates is not to pick it out as a person. This way of defining 'person' leaves the concept undetermined. It seems necessary, therefore, to further determine it by including certain types of P - predicates. Capacity for self-awareness, intentional actions and having second order desires etc. seem unavoidable for defining 'person'. It is also sometimes suggested that the capacity for using language is defined in a way such that ways of communication by animals do not come under it, is necessary for being a person.

It is by no means easy to clarify P - predicates that must figure in an analysis of the concept of a person. If we include certain predicates, the concept may become too narrow, whereas if we exclude certain other predicates the concept may become too wide. Take capacity for self-awareness or reflective thought. Suppose these two are included in the concept of a person, a very young baby would not qualify as a person. Killing such a baby, then, would not amount to killing a person and this seems far from obvious. Similarly, it may be asked whether a foetus, which is, say seven or eight months old, is a person or not. The looseness of the concept of a person comes into sharp focus when we discuss the question of abortion. Does abortion amount to murder of a person? If human foetus is a person right after conception, then yes. If conception is rejected as the beginning of a person, then when does one become a person? Does birth mark the beginning of a person? But, then the difference between a newly born baby and a developed foetus is so small as regards states of consciousness that making birth the dividing line seems absolutely arbitrary.

Similar difficulties arise in the case of individuals suffering from severe mental retardation. If we specify the P - predicates in such a way that such individuals are included in the class of persons, there is a danger that some other beings, which are generally not regarded as persons, would also get included. On the other hand, if we specify the P - predicates keeping in mind normal human persons, there is a danger that mentally retarded individuals would be excluded from the class of persons and this may lead to some unacceptable consequences. It follows that our concept of a person is not so tidy that its application in every case is clear. In some cases it has clear application, in others not. There may be cases where it is not clear whether the entity in question is to be regarded as a person or not.

On the dualistic conception, something is either a person or not a person. If X is a soul or has a soul, X is a person, otherwise not. The Strawsonian analysis of the concept of a person is correct as far as necessary condition of being a person is concerned. But when we consider what provides a sufficient condition of being a person, the concept of a person is found to be indeterminate. A corollary of the dualistic position that the concept of a person is determinate, is the view that the concept of personal identity is determinate. On this view the necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity is identity of the soul, continuity of character and memory is only evidence of such an identity. This view also faces serious difficulties which require detailed discussion.¹¹

Department of Philosophy
University of Delhi
Delhi - 110007

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2. P.F.Strawson, *Individuals*, Methuen, London, 1959, p.115.
3. Swinburne, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
4. While discussing the nature of self, Descartes says that it is "... a substance whose entire essence or nature is only to think, and which in order to exist, has no need of a place nor depends upon any material thing. So that this "I", that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body... and even if the body had never been, the soul would not fail to be everything that it is." - Discourse Concerning the Method" in *Rene Descartes : The Essential Writings*, ed. J.J.Blom, Harper & Row, 1977, p.135.
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7. A.J.Ayer, *The Concept of A Person and Other Essays*, Macmillan, London, 1963.
8. Strawson, *op.cit.*, p.104
9. *Ibid*, p.99 (footnote)
10. H.Ishiguro, 'The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person', *Philosophical Subjects*, ed.Z.V.Straaten, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p.64
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CAUSALITY, MEANING AND CULTURE

In what follows, I wish to present a critical analysis of Pitirim Sorokin's views on culture and society. Further, in this connection, I will examine the methodological doctrine that he advocates to study the same. To begin with, it is necessary to present in detail, Sorokin's views on culture. He maintains :

"In the broadest sense it (culture) may mean the sum total of everything which is created or modified by the conscious or unconscious activity of two or more individuals interacting with one another or conditioning one another's behaviour."¹

From the above mentioned quotation it is clear that culture is an artificial object opposed to a natural one. That is to say, culture has not grown and developed like a natural object.

Let us reflect on this aspect of culture. What does it mean to say that culture is an artificial product ? On behalf of Sorokin, it can be said that culture is peculiar to human beings only. That is to say, other non-human creatures cannot be said to have any culture at all. A further question may be raised in this connection. It is this : Why is it that other creatures cannot be said to have any culture at all? Birds prepare nests, honey bees construct hives and spiders weave a kind of net. How is it that we treat a piece of painting as an art or culture object but not the bee hive? What could be the possible answer on behalf of Sorokin for not treating the bird's nest as an object of art? If Odissi and the Kathak dance are regarded as cultural products, what does compel us to exclude the dance of the peacock and the queen bee from the domain of culture and cultural products? Further, it may be added in this connection that the dividing line between an art object and say for instance, a bee hive is purely arbitrary. One way of answering these questions is to distinguish between various types of the so called artificial objects. Though both a bird's nest and a piece of painting are artificial yet there is a great deal of

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difference between the two. A bird prepares a nest only at a fixed period of the year. But a painter can paint a picture at any time of the year. This clearly shows that there is an element of decision involved in the case of human action and it is absent in case of other non-human creatures. Decision is a conscious activity. A person who takes a decision can be said to be conscious of what he does. It is linguistically odd to say that one has taken decision but one is not aware of what one has done. Again, self-awareness manifests in other forms of action. That is to say, self-awareness and amenability to correction go together. If one knows what one is doing, then one knows what is correct or incorrect, right or wrong in that connection. Consequently there is a possibility that one might change the course of one's action in the light of further information and knowledge. This sort of change usually takes place in case of human action. But such changes have not yet taken place in the non-human world. Therefore, it is not appropriate to characterise the nest of the birds and the hive of the bees as pieces of culture objects. A culture object is one which has been made or built consciously with a purpose. Seen in this light, only human beings can be said to have cultures. In short, only objects made by human beings can be treated as culture objects.

Sorokin maintains that a culture object sometimes gets modified and affected by unconscious activity of men. But now the question is : How to understand this statement? What does it mean to say that a culture object gets modified by the unconscious activity of men? The answers to these questions depend upon what we mean by 'unconscious activity'. If by 'unconscious activity' is meant that which is not at all intended or known by anybody at all, there cannot be any such activity at all. In fact, unconscious activity is a contradiction in terms. An act *per se* is bound to be conscious phenomenon for the simple reason that the agent must recognise it, otherwise it is not an action at all. This is precisely what distinguishes an action from an event. But there is another meaning of the term 'unconscious activity'. It might mean unintended consequence. Sometimes human beings perform certain actions, the consequences of which they are not aware of. These consequences affect other aspects of human life. Further, these unintended consequences sometimes prove very significant in that they affect already existing cultures. This process has been taking place incessantly and this is one of the major factors of cultural change. But what does actually happen in case of cultural change? Is cultural change a kind of juxtaposition of objects or items from two separate cultures?

Effective and fruitful cultural change results in a kind of assimilation and enrichment of meanings. 'Unconscious modification' can be understood only in this sense.

If this interpretation is accepted, it will lead altogether to a different view of culture. Culture turns out to be a concatenation of meanings in this context. This way of viewing culture makes it ideational nature. Further, this view of culture may not be acceptable to a realist. To a realist, culture includes, among other things, what is known as the culture objects, and such objects are empirical in nature. As for example, a piece of painting or sculpture is primarily an empirical object for the simple reason that painting is done either on a piece of paper and carving is done on a slab of stone. Further, even if the art objects most of the time happen to be material in nature yet they undergo transformation in the hands of the artist. The so called dead and inert material does not remain in its original stage. The artist, in a way, recreates the objects. But in spite of being recreated the material object remains as an object, as an entity. It gets remodelled and reshaped. But at the same time, no material object becomes a piece of art unless it enters into what is known as the nexus of intelligibility. That is to say, an art object has to be meaningful and significant. It has to be recognised as an art object and to do this is to treat an art object or cultural object as a concatenation of meanings. If one is not acquainted with the 'meanings' one cannot be said to appreciate or understand a particular art object. Further, not only the art object but for that matter no object can be known and recognised without coming under a concept or meanings, to use a Kantian idiom. To be known or understood means to enter into the sphere of meaning and intelligibility. Besides, art and cultural objects have added meanings. It is these meanings that make an object an art object. So, it can be said that in the case of art or culture objects there is what is known as double application of concepts or meanings. The fact that sometimes we fail to understand and appreciate a piece of art, music or even the cultural tradition of other people goes to prove that we fail to grasp the meanings. Therefore, in a crucial sense, to understand the culture of other people is not merely to be acquainted with the physical activities of those people but to understand the meanings that underlie those activities. Cultures can be said to be understood and appreciated when meanings are understood. The culture idealists surely have a point when they argue that cultures are concatenations of meanings. But the expression 'meaning' is likely to create confusions. It might be taken to

mean subjective intentions and thereby might give rise to the suggestion that cultures are subjective phenomena. I wish to point out in this connection that the fact that inter subjective communication and understanding are possible, shows that meanings cannot be subjective at all. Meanings in this sense are neither the denizens of the world of things nor the world of mind. They belong to a third realm. Each use an expression or a sentence expressess a meaning. Further, meanings are so inextricably mixed up with culture and human society that it is in a way impossible to separate the two. That is to say, in the context of culture, it is not possible to detach the meanings from facts.

It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the so called social facts are really the institutional facts, to use a term of Searl's. Let us take the examples of marriage, prayer, procession and etc. These social phenomena cannot be understood purely in physical terms. That is to say, the act of marriage cannot be described as two human persons just coming and living together. It is much more than that. Similarly, the act of prayer cannot be understood in terms of individual human beings just walking to the places of worship and bending their heads. The belief system, the social norms, attitudes and ideas and above all, the world view associated with it that turn out the so called physical facts into a social act. The so called brute fact is really an abstraction. It is a myth. Even the so called natural facts cannot be treated as brute facts *per se* for the simple reason that nothing can be characterised as a fact unless it comes within the ambit of intelligibility. Further, to be intelligible means to be conceptualized and to be coloured by meanings. Therefore, the concept of raw and brute fact is unintelligible. If this arguement is accepted, then the so called social facts turn out to be doubly coloured by meanings. First, as an object and second, as an object of social reality.

Now the question is : what does constitute the subject matter of anthropological study of culture? Do anthropologists study artifacts in the name of culture? In other words, can culture be exhaustively defined in terms of artifacts which in a way are made up of dead and inert matter? In answer to these questions it can be said that culture primarily consists of a set of meanings whether descriptive or evaluative and in the absence of these meanings, an object is not at all a culture object. The richer the meaning aspect, the richer is the culture of the group or society. If the distinction between material and non-material

culture has been made to highlight the point that there are cultures which are material and there are cultures which are purely abstract or non-material then it is not acceptable for the following reasons : The material object cannot be treated as standing for culture. What makes a material object an object of culture is the meaning associated with it. If meanings are absent, an object is not a culture object at all. A culture object cannot be identified only with reference to meanings without any reference to the material in which it gets incarnated. Therefore, the anthropological distinction between material and non-material culture breaks down for the simple reason that no culture can be defined in terms of material elements; culture has to be defined in terms of meanings and meanings are non-material. So, cultures have to be non-material in nature.

Sorokinian Taxonomy

Sorokin classifies societies and cultures into three main types : (1) Ideational, (2) Idealistic, and (3) Sensate. Sometimes, he makes subdivisions of the main categories. In fact, according to Sorokin, societies, culture, politics, knowledge, science, music, art and everything what man creates can be classified into these three major types. This type of broad classification of reality into three types corresponds to the classification-schema advanced by the Sāṃkhya philosophers of ancient India. It is not being argued out here that Sorokin has been influenced by the Sāṃkhya system of thought. What is being pointed out is that there is a conceptual affinity between Sorokin and the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy with the only difference that the former seeks to classify social world whereas the Sāṃkhya thinkers seek to classify the whole world in terms of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

The ideational, idealistic and sensate culture mentalities stand for three different world views. They are as follows : The ascetic, the sensuous and the mixed one. The question now arises : Does Sorokin arrive at these world views through empirical studies of different social groups? In answer to this question it can be said that Sorokin is presenting a macro-social theory. Ideational, idealistic and sensate are logical or ideal types in terms of which he seeks to explain all social groups. But what could be the justification for accepting such ideal types? Sorokin does not give any reason in support of his thesis. Rather, he goes on citing illustrations from philosophy, science, religion, moral codes and other forms of social institutions in support of his apriori doctrine.

He treats enjoyment and renunciation as the extreme poles of the measuring rod of civilizations and cultures. Renunciation, ascetism and other ancillary forms of values, including the relevant world view are put together in one side and enjoyment, perception, sensibility and the relevant world view are put together on another side. Further, a mixture between the two has also been visualised. The ascetic renouncing culture mentally has been termed as ideational, the mentality of enjoyment has been termed as sensate, and the mixed one has been termed as idealistic.

The nature of the schema of classification is such that it is unalterable and in a way fixed for all time to come. Further, such a classificatory schema has its own inherent difficulties. It is not clear what Sorokin wants to prove with the help of these categories. Does he mean to say that there are civilizational and cultural areas which are exclusively ideational, idealistic or sensate? Or does he mean to say the these trends are present almost in every culture in certain form? As a matter of fact, there is no culture which can be exclusively characterized as ideational, idealistic or sensate. Further, while characterising cultures, Sorokin does not seem to have taken into account the actual practice of people in general. In fact, he bases his findings and characterisation purely on textual analysis of different aspects of culture. In short, Sorokin does not try to bridge the gap that continues to be there between the so called text and context of cultures. But at the same time, he treats culture as a growing phenomenon. Cultures grow and alternate with different shifts. In fact, no culture remains static and constant. Ideational, idealistic and sensate periods may alternate with one another even within the same culture. This type of view about culture shift has ultimately led Sorokin to advocate cyclical theory of social change as against the linear one. As a matter of fact, he advocates what is known as crisis - catharsis - charisma - resurrection model. According to Sorokin, the European society has reached the climax in its sensate culture. Not only man but values have been atomized. He smells catharsis and is convinced that in near future the European society will be regenerated and rejuvenated. This type of social prophecy is not peculiar to Sorokin; many philosophically inclined social scientists like Toynbee and others have gone in the same line. In this respect, Sorokin's views come very close to the Hindu conception of time consisting of four distinct aeons such as *Satya*, *Tretā*, *Dvāpara* and *Kali*. But, then, the question is : are there social and cultural cycles? This question cannot be answered unless an answer to the question what is social cycle is found out. As a matter of fact, the

historical developement of various societies exhibit different trends, sometimes very simple and at certain period very complex. The same type of developement has taken place at the same time in all societies throughout the world. But perhaps the urge to discover an order, a rhythm in everything including human societies and cultures is as old as mankind. The religious instinct has coloured historical and social enquiries. But, then, the fact remains that any theory building activity about human society and culture is bound to be very general and philosophical in nature, for the simple reason that to build a theory is not just to put together or join discrete and atomized particulars. To the extent to which a theory is logical or conceptual construct, to that extent there is bound to be extrapolations in it and more so in the case of social theories. Further, certain type of social theorists in their attempt to comprehend both past, present and future of man have tried to make prophecies about future. Sorokin is one such theorist. As an individual cannot be understood without reference to his past, present and future so is the case with human society. All the grand social theories in this sense are attempts to understand society on the model of individual man, his past and his aspirations. Seen in this light, Sorokin's attempt to understand human society in crisis - catharsis - charisma - resurrection model, appears meaningful and intelligible. Though he is neither an individualist nor an atomist, yet he visualises society after the nature of individual human being.

Understanding Culture

Positivistically inclined social scientists seek to understand society primarily in causal terms. That is to say, they treat society and culture almost on par with material objects. Sorokin, on the other hand, treats causal understanding of culture as an inadequate mode of understanding. For him, to understand a particular culture is to understand the meaning underlying various so called culture objects. It is the meaning that defines a culture and meanings cannot be causally explained. Different parts of meanings are not related in the manner of cause and effect. They form a configuration which is either coherent or incoherent, consistent or inconsistent. Coherence and incoherence, consistency and inconsistency are not causal concepts. So, that which is characterised by consistency and etc. cannot be adequately explained in causal terms.

Sorokin visualises four different ways in which various

culture objects happen to come together. (1) Spatial or mechanical adjacency, (2) Indirect association through a common external factor, (3) Causal or functional integration, and (4) Logico-meaningful integration. To present a list of culture objects in any culture area or civilizational zone is not to study culture. In short, presentation of a mere list of various objects that happen to be there in any physical space at a particular period of time does not amount to the study of a society or culture. Different items have to be correlated and presented as an integral whole or unity. It may so happen that in somebody's drawing room culture objects from various culture areas might have been collected and kept but that does not mean that those objects form or constitute a coherent meaningful unit.

Further, different culture objects might be existing side by side because of some of the external causal factor, say, for instance, a particular type of food, clothing and shelter might be prevalent in a particular area because of certain climatic conditions. Sorokin argues that to trace out the external factor that brings the discrete objects together is not to make a study of culture at all. Neither spatial adjacency nor external factor create any meaningful unit of culture.

Causal-functional analysis may be treated as something inclusive and very broad in nature for the simple reason that by adopting this method one might present different culture objects as integral parts of a causal nexus. But the view is not acceptable to Sorokin. Causal analysis of culture cannot be adequate and comprehensive. So, a more comprehensive method has to take its place. It is the method of discovering the logico-meaningful unity in any culture object or culture area. Now the question is : What is this logico-meaningful method? How is it different from causal functional approach? How is it that the causal functional approach is not suitable and adequate in study of culture? Let us first concentrate on the nature of logico-meaningful method. Sorokin uses the term 'logico-meaningful' in two different senses: (1) As a criterion of measuring the degree of cultural integration, and (ii) As a method of studying culture and society. The logico-meaningful integration has been treated by Sorokin as the supreme form of integration. Further, consistency, deducibility and non-contradictoriness have been advanced as additional criteria for measuring the degree of culture integration. But these are the logical or semantic criteria and they cannot be applied in study of things or material objects. These criteria suggest that culture is basically non-material. Further, it suggests that culture is a system of

meanings or ideas, for the simple reason that only meanings or ideas can be said to be either consistent or inconsistent, self-validating or self-contradictory. It is this presupposition about the nature of culture that makes Sorokin characterise integration in logico-meaningful terms. Seen in this light, Sorokin can be characterised as a culture idealist. For him, culture is a system of ideas or meanings and not a congeries or conglomeration of things or objects.

This view of culture and culture integration has led Sorokin to advance logico-meaningful method as a genuine or proper method of studying culture and society in general. Now the question is : Is causality inoperative in any study and analysis of culture? In answer to this question, the following remarks can be made. Causality has a very loose kind of application in study of human society in general. Predictability is closely associated with causality. That is to say, given a particular cause the effect can be predicted. This shows that there is some kind of necessity between cause and effect and this kind of necessity can be characterised as causal necessity. But among social phenomena this kind of necessity is absent. The same set of phenomena present in two different societies may not give rise to the same effect. Further, even the same set of causes present in the same society at two different periods of time may not give rise to similar effect. In short, this type of anomalous condition prevails because of the presence of restraining and triggering factors and these factors cannot be ruled out from any social group at all.

But does it mean that no causal analysis of culture can be made at all? As a matter of fact, one can distinguish between different aspects of a culture and can trace out the historical process that has gone into its making. But, for Sorokin, to understand or study a particular culture is not to find out its historical roots but to spell out the hidden meanings behind it. Causal or historical explanation of culture presents a particular culture in its historical perspective. It traces out various currents and tributaries that have joined and enriched a particular culture. But this type of exercise does not present different aspects of a culture as forming a synthetic and consistent unit. Logico-meaningful analysis of culture seeks to discover the logical tissues that bind different aspects of a culture. Causal understanding is one kind of understanding. Non-causal understanding is another. Sorokin characterises the non-causal understanding as logico-meaningful. He seems to be visualizing

culture as an organic unit, the different parts of which are logically connected. But is this acceptable? Only in an artificially constructed system, different elements can be said to be logically or necessarily connected. But in a culture system, one element does not necessarily follow from another element, though a kind of congruence can always be discovered in it. It may so happen that at a particular time instant the philosophy, music, literature, dance and other art forms of a particular social group are so much well knit and integrated that each one of them express the same or common spirit. This type of thinking has very often prompted some social thinkers to visualize what is known as the spirit or soul of culture. Even if it is provisionally accepted that there is something known as the spirit or the soul of culture, yet this thesis cannot explain different orders of cultures. As for example, there is a sense in which it can be said that there are Islamic, Hindu and Christian cultures along side what are known as Asian, European and Indian cultures. When we talk of cultures in religious context, a monistic idea might emerge. As for example, the Islamic Koranic culture or world view is one that is in consonance with the sacred text. But when we talk of cultures in geographical and national terms something else emerges. Is Indian culture the same as the so called Hindu culture? In fact, certain items of Hindu culture might come in conflict with the so called Indian or Asian culture or *vice versa*. Some sort of monism might be discovered in case of religious culture but in the political or national context, one always comes across what is known as cultural pluralism. Now the question is : Does Sorokin take note of cultural pluralism? Is cultural pluralism consistent with the thesis that culture is a unified system of ideas or meanings? Cultural pluralism advocates that there are different systems of meanings and the acceptance of this view will militate against Sorokin's thesis. In fact, cultural pluralism appears antagonistic to cultural monism. But Sorokin's view on culture-integration keeps the room open for cultural monism. In short, the possibility of different meaning system coming together and forming a unitary whole cannot be ruled out at all. To the extent different meaning systems come together and coalesce, to that extent they can be said to have been integrated. Hinduism and Indian culture exhibit such a kind of meaning synthesis to a very high degree. As a matter of fact, Hinduism has acquired practices and beliefs from various sources but in due course of time, has synthesized these discrete elements into a meaningful unity. The intense the degree of integration, the nearer is the approach towards cultural equilibrium. For Sorokin, the equilibrium takes place at the level of

meanings. There are certain cultures which are highly integrated and there are certain others, where the degree of integration is relatively low.

To conclude, according to Sorokin, culture is a system of meanings or ideas. Meanings and ideas are non-material in nature. They are a kind of Platonic entities. If this view of culture is accepted then it (culture) cannot be adequately explained in terms of causality. By saying this, we do not imply that causal explanation has no scope at all in any study of culture. What we wish to suggest is this : Culture being non-material, its nature is symbolic and symbols can be adequately understood only through non-causal analysis and the non-causal analysis consists of discovering the central meaning of the culture-universe.

To study a culture means to grasp the meanings that permeate its different parts and not to break it into various causal and functional items. To itemise and atomise a culture is to miss the meaning and significance which is its soul. In this sense, understanding a culture is akin to the understanding a piece of art, or a musical concert. In short, a kind of holistic understanding is required to appreciate and understand a culture and it is bound to be non-causal in nature.

Department of Philosophy
North Eastern Hill University
Nongthymmai
Shillong - 793 014
MEGHALAYA

N. MALLA

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DISCUSSION

HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS

In the continent of Europe, we find that the German philosopher Martin Heidegger has tried to evaluate Kant's view relating to metaphysics quite differently from his own philosophical perspective. In this article, a brief review on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's doctrine has been offered.

Throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant denied the theoretical knowledge in the realm of traditional metaphysics since human cognitive faculties are strictly limited to the realm of possible experience only. Kant states clearly in the *Dialectic* that human reason is so constituted that it cannot overcome the realm of possible experience. Heidegger interprets the above Kantian thesis in his own way. Heidegger thinks that *to limit human cognitive faculty is to limit man itself*. Actually, the limitation of knowledge reveals man's fundamental limitation, that is, man's *finitude*. It is simply because man's relation with the world, as manifested in the knowledge situation, reveals the essence of man, that is, the essence of his finitude. In fact, Heidegger used Kant's notion of man's limitation in the transcendental sphere of knowledge to express the essence of his doctrine, that is, the finitude of human being.

Heidegger thinks that Kant's purpose in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not to construct a theory of knowledge but precisely to lay foundation for metaphysics. Heidegger's attempt is to rediscover Kant in that light. He, in his book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, rejects the idealistic interpretation of the *Critique* denying both the assertions of the priority of consciousness and the cognitive relation of the world. Heidegger thinks that Kant's problem is not in the realm of knowledge but in the realm of the ontological speculation concerning *man's* place in the world. Actually, Heidegger's own quest was not for his metaphysical

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leaning 'but for an understanding of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as metaphysics of man, or in other words, as the ground-work for a metaphysics of man.

Heidegger thinks that the fundamental ontology must investigate what Kant calls the "natural propensity" (*naturanlage*) of man for metaphysics. According to Kant, the three fundamental problems of metaphysics are the world, Soul and God. Heidegger thinks that these three questions lead to a fourth one : "What is man?" The reason as stated by Richardson is simple : " a knowledge (ontic) of those beings with which *metaphysical specialist* is concerned would be impossible, unless the metaphysician already possessed some previous comprehension of the structure of those beings (ontological knowledge). This according to Heidegger, is the proper sense of the famous 'Copernican revolution', i.e., that ontic knowledge is rendered possible only by an ontological comprehension that precedes it and resides in the very structure of the knower.'¹

It is to be noted here that although the school of Marburg describes Kant as the founder of philosophy of science, Heidegger nowhere admits the central role of science in the domain of philosophy. Heidegger thinks that its primary role is to reveal the essence of man. The role of man cannot be realised without a detailed analysis of the "essence of man in the real world". So, we have no way out but to analyse the realm of the metaphysics of man. In fact, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's metaphysics (as the metaphysics of man) is guided by certain fundamental concepts, namely, ontology, transcendence and finitude. In order to clarify Heidegger's position *vis-a-vis* Kant we have to take into consideration above three concepts. Basically Heidegger aims at an "ontologization" of Kant's *Critique* and ends up in attributing a thesis of finitude (of man).

(A) *Ontology* :

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes a distinction between "Ontology" and "Ontics".² By the term "Ontology", Heidegger means the consideration of the meaning of Being. Being in its ontological standpoint, is a consideration of the meaning of Being in general. He thinks that Being has meaning for the man who understands it. Thus, the realm of ontology correlates man and Being. Having considered in this light, Heidegger interprets Kant's transcendental philosophy as ontology.³

Heidegger's attempted ontologization of knowledge reveals Kant's formulation of the problem of the possibility of ontology as the problem of the synthetic - *a priori* judgement. The problem of synthetic - *a priori* judgement is the problem of the possibility of knowing the datum by virtue of pure knowledge and of determining it with universality, necessity and novelty. In Kant's philosophy, the problem belongs, of course, to the realm of the theory of knowledge but Heidegger converts the whole problem of knowledge into the problem of *Being*. Being contains within itself not only the predicate of its own but certain judgements of peculiar type which are identical with Kant's synthetic - *a priori* judgements.⁴ Such judgements are prior to experience, still they assert something about the world as a whole.

(B) Transcendence :

Usually the term "transcendence" stands for the fact of there being something separate and beyond. But Heidegger ascribes another meaning to the concept "transcendence". It is precisely because of man's profound and fundamental *subjectivity* that the problem of experience arises altogether. In fact, the problem of experience arises simply because of *man's removedness from the world*. This removedness reveals man's subjectivity, that is to say, man's self enclosure.⁵ Man goes beyond himself and in him there is subjectivity on the other hand.

(C) Finitude :

By the term "finitude", Heidegger does not mean the limits of human knowledge in terms of its scope and degree of validity. But Heidegger links up the finitude of man with the finitude of knowledge attainable by human being. It is simply because he thinks that "the finitude of man" is the pivotal concept in his philosophy and consequently the axis of interpreting Kant's theory. Heidegger thinks that man's going beyond or transcendence is due to his finitude. Human knowledge is composed of two elements, immediate intuition and universalising judgements. Both are finite. The faculty of intuition is essentially receptive as it consists in a primary "acceptance". Again human understanding knows objects and places them before itself but such an understanding is not the creator of those objects but it merely unifies different concepts.

With Heidegger, the ontologization of human knowledge consists in the "essence" of man, that is, the finitude of man. But the concept of "finitude" can be grasped properly only in relation to "productive imagination". Heidegger thinks that both the faculties of knowledge (sensibility and understanding) are provisional in character and have their common root in transcendental imagination. The role of productive imagination is vital one since the three faculties of knowledge are rooted in the basic one known as productive imagination. The transcendental imagination is the root not only of the pure understanding, but also of the pure reason which is the power of the ideas. The ideas organise the rules of understanding in different modes of totality. Heidegger argues that the practical reason, too, is rooted in pure imagination. Thus, the transcendental imagination is the common root from which stem both pure intuition and pure reason, practical as well as theoretical. In other words, it is the centre of "entire man".

To sum up Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of metaphysics, we can say that -

- (a) Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's *Critique* depends upon the fundamental ontology or in exact language, upon the *ontologization* of the theory of knowledge. Here, any question regarding knowledge or even the so-called synthetic - *a priori* judgement is treated as question relating to being.
- (b) Incidentally, whereas Kant speaks of three faculties of cognition, Heidegger strives to reduce them to a single one, viz., imagination / productive imagination, which is taken as constituting the common root in respect of the rest of faculties.
- (c) The 'Imagination' with Heidegger in his attempt to interpret Kant's philosophy (*Critique* as a preparation / groundwork for *Metaphysics*) may be said to be of paramount importance. Apart from its relevance in the context of the question of (man's) transcendence, imagination is viewed as one of important marks of finitude since it reveals the essential finitude of human cognitive faculties.
- (d) This notion of finitude, according to Heidegger, remains the most pervasive of Kant's philosophy and with this, "the Ontologization" which Heidegger seeks to institute in respect of Kant's *Critique*,

becomes complete.

Throughout his work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger states that the intention of the *Critique of Pure Reason* remains fundamentally misunderstood if one interprets his work as a "theory of experience". Heidegger fights against the assumption that Kant's essential goal consisted in grounding metaphysics on epistemology. He thinks that Kant's entire work is a *doctrine of being*, i.e., an ontology. The entire "*Critique*" leads to one fundamental question, i.e., "the question of man".

In this connection Professor Cassirer's article "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics"⁶ is worth mentioning. In this article he evaluates Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's concept of metaphysics. Professor Cassirer says that before criticizing him we have to consider the actual perspective and circumstances on which Heidegger has considered Kant's view.

Heidegger designated the problem of the finitude of human knowledge as the central theme of Kant's criticism of reason. He thinks that Kant does not begin with the theory of the general essence of the things; rather he begins with the question concerning the essence of man. As Heidegger says :

"The foundation of metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning the finitude in man and, in such a way, that this finitude can only now become a problem."⁷

The primary task of metaphysics is not merely to describe 'the things in themselves' or being as such but to describe the finitude of man.⁸ According to Heidegger, finitude itself is the main problem of metaphysics which deserves notice. Automatically the questions arise : What does it characterise the object of knowledge? The answer given by Kant is very prompt and clear. Kant says in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' that human knowledge is the joint product of sensibility and understanding. The faculty of sensibility is 'receptive'; it creates nothing but only receives the manifold of intuitions. Human understanding, on the other hand, "knows" object but this faculty of knowledge does not create such object of knowledge. Kant admits "the spontaneity of understanding" and he develops this concept of spontaneity more clearly in course of his deduction. According to Heidegger, this emphasis must be understood

only as a certain characterisation of finite knowledge. All the thought as such, even the purely logical use of understanding, carries the stamp of finitude. As Heidegger says :

"This discursive character which belongs to the essence of the understanding is the sharpest index of the finitude."⁹

Thus, according to Heidegger, the three-fold division of knowledge into sensibility, understanding and reason has a provisional character. It does not lead us into the centre of Kant's problem but is rather only a means and vehicle of the mode of presentation. Heidegger thinks that there really do not exist for Kant three different faculties of knowledge which are sharply separated from one another. Rather they are originally unified in a fundamental faculty, i.e., the faculty of transcendental imagination. According to Heidegger, such faculty of imagination is the original unifying faculty and is the source of sensibility, understanding and reason.

Professor Cassirer thinks that Heidegger has completely misunderstood Kant's position. According to Heidegger, Kant artificially constructs the structure of schematism and also introduces the faculty of transcendental imagination for merely external reasons of symmetry and architectonics. Prof. Cassirer states clearly that there lies the seed of misunderstanding. "If we want to understand and interpret the doctrine of the finitude of knowledge in Kant's own spirit we have to see the double point of view which Kant establishes for all investigations in the field of transcendental philosophy and which he retains throughout."¹⁰ In Kant's philosophy, we see that throughout his entire philosophy, Kant separates the sensuous and intelligible worlds, experience and idea, phenomena and noumena from one another. But Heidegger does not find any justification for this complete separation. Heidegger thinks that human understanding is also to some extent finite since it does not create objects but merely receives sense-data to form the object of knowledge. Prof. Cassirer states firmly that the faculty of understanding is not merely a receptive faculty of knowledge and thereby finite. He says that although it cannot create an absolute existence or derive such an existence from its concepts, still it cannot be denied that human understanding is "infinite" in so far as the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions belongs to its peculiar and essential task.

Further when understanding refers to intuition it does not

make itself absolutely dependent upon intuition nor does it subordinate itself to intuition. It is the synthesis of the understanding that lends definiteness to sensibility. The objectivity that we ascribe to knowledge is, therefore always an achievement of spontaneity and not of receptivity. It is the view of Kant, as interpreted by Heidegger, all kinds of knowledge is ultimately dependent on intuition. Since the faculty of intuition is in its ultimate nature receptive, the faculty of understanding is also receptive and thereby becomes finite. But we find Kant saying firmly that the understanding is service for, not under, intuition. Understanding requires the manifold of intuition but it is not relevant to intuition. In fact, it is the view of Kant that each form of knowledge requires the function of synthesis of manifold and the function of synthesis is the function of understanding. Prof. Cassirer thinks that the misunderstanding regarding the view of finitude of knowledge becomes clear as soon as "We make the transition from the pure concepts of the understanding to the concept of reason", that is, from the 'Transcendental Analytic' to the 'Transcendental Dialectic'. The faculty of reason never refers immediately to intuition but rather pertains to the use of the understanding itself. Consequently, we get the "Idea of the Unconditioned". Moreover, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* we get the concepts like "freedom", "a purely intelligible Kingdom of Ends", "the moral law", etc. Such concepts reveal that we are not limited to whatever the forms of our existence present us. It is clear that reason can entertain notions to which no experience can confirm. So, there is no sufficient reason to claim, as Heidegger does, that human existence for Kant is finite.

In fact, Heidegger interprets Kant's doctrine, as stated by Prof. Cassirer, in a peculiar fashion which is not Kantian at all. Heidegger thinks that the doctrine of Kant is not the theory of experience but it is the discovery and revelation of the essence of man. Prof. Cassirer thinks that Kant's theory of schematism and transcendental imagination does not justify Heidegger's theory. Since Kant's entire theory does not treat the existence of man immediately, his theory deals with the objective condition of empirical knowledge. The schematism that is demanded for the pure concepts of understanding shows that the schematism belongs to "the phenomenology of object" and not to "the phenomenology of subject". Prof. Cassirer states clearly that Heidegger has not interpreted the place of imagination in Kant's 'First Critique'. The doctrine, actually, belongs not to Kant's theory of man but rather to his theory of empirical objects.

Department of Philosophy KRISHNA BALA (BANDYOPADHYAY)
Shibpur Dinobundhoo Institute (College)
HOWRAH - 711 102
WEST BENGAL

NOTES

1. *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, Richardson, Introduction; Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974.
2. *Being and Time*; pp.11 - 12 (Quoted after Rotenstreich's *Experience and Systematization*).
3. In a foot note of *Being and Time* Heidegger explains that the positive product of *Critique* is not a theory of knowledge but the natural logic of the region of being called 'Nature'.
4. *Being and Time*; p.24.
5. *Ibid.*, p.186.
6. See Ernst Cassirer's article "Kant and the Problem of Mataphysics" published in *Kant : Disputed Questions* ed. by Gram Quadrangle, Chicago, 1967.
7. *Ibid.*, p.136.
8. *Ibid.*, p.137.
9. *Ibid.*, p.138.
10. *Ibid.*, p.137.

BOOK - REVIEW

G.W.F.Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, (tr.) Leo Rauch. Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. : Hackett Publishing Company 1988. Pp. xvi + 106.

This translation of handwritten lecture notes gathered by Hegel's students is presented here as a posthumous *History of Philosophy* together with an Appendix taken from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. The English translation as given by Leo Rauch is commendably clear and readable. At times there may be some question as to how to render certain key concepts from the German, e.g., *Aufhebung* or *Geist*, but altogether the translation flows smoothly into an English idiom that makes for pleasurable reading.

We are given a fairly straightforward account of Hegel's notion of the unfolding of history in the light of World Spirit. In brief, Hegel believed that history may make use of the many irrational drives unleashed by the major actors on the world stage in order to achieve history's goal, an even higher rational peak to which humanity constantly strives even in the presence of a great deal of suffering. Hegel is concerned, not with actual examples from history, but with world history as such, a history for which there can be no textbook reference. In history we might almost say that we are looking for an intellectual rather than a factional representation of what has transpired in the past. Paradoxically, history is historical content with facts omitted, infused with the spirit of historian. The writing of history is meant to have a morally admirable influence for good upon the present. What is required is a world history that is philosophical in nature including the history of law, art and religion, the application of speculative thought to the selective events from whatever the past may have to offer.

In the writing of history it is taken as a presupposition that none other than reason rules the world, an observation first made by Anaxagoras. World history has from the start been rational in its course and the actualization of reason rather than chance has furnished the very content of history. World history is said to be solely the product of creative reason. Hegel at the outset makes clear that although physical nature impinges on world history, it is Spirit that is the substance of history,

lending a concrete reality to both nature and the affairs of mankind. Spirit, to be effective, must become manifest in the consciousness of selfhood truly in the spirit of freedom for all human beings. The free demonstration of Spirit in consciousness becomes largely the story of the interests, the needs and the passions of all sentient creatures in existence as they work toward an ideal which cannot be other than rational., for it is emphasized almost continuously that Reason is the ruler of world history and is ever immanent in the unfolding of history.

The entire business of world history builds toward the universal goal of bringing the concept of Spirit to fulfilment in the self-consciousness of life. Spiritual developement is a necessity, while freedom is taken as whatever appears in the conscious will of individuals in accordance with their manifest interest. The will of World Spirit is projected into the aims and achievements of outstanding heroic individuals such as Caesar or Alexander the Great who make their appearance on the stage of history, although the individuals themselves may well be sacrificed along with their aims to the ongoing march of events. Yet, by virtue of the divine in him, the individual is an end in himself, requiring an intrinsic and responsible moral commitment, which for Hegel is a commitment working toward the ideal of a rational and total fulfilment for humankind.

It is maintained by Hegel that whatever is ultimately rational in world history must be achieved by means of human knowledge and the will, that is, that human knowledge rather than isolated events alone must be considered to be the materiality of history itself. The human will must needs be a rational will, brought to its fulfilment and reaching its ethical totality within the limits of law and the secular state. The State constitutes the genuine ethical life. Hegel goes so far as to say that only within the state is the realisation of freedom achieved, and it would seem that we find here an overemphasis on the role and importance of the State, all of which is quite characteristic of Hegel's ethical and political philosophy. Exemplified in the laws of the State is the divine Idea, the objectification of Spirit. Ethical life achieved through one's duty to society and the State is to be carried out as if it were one's second nature. Only by this means can any progress be made toward the attainment of true freedom. In and through Statehood is manifested the culture of a nation wherein Spirit comes to consciousness by way of religion. Religion is taken as that wherein a people appropriate to itself definitively whatever

it holds to be true and of ultimate worth. The State rests upon religion insofar as individuality is seen as a positive aspect of World Spirit, and therein lies the consciousness of true freedom in selfhood. The nature and structure of the State must not differ from the objectives of the shared religion of a people. At the same time it must not be forgotten that history provides abundant evidence that mankind bears the capacity for not only change, but for development toward spiritual perfectability.

History cannot reveal itself in its intrinsic universality, it goes without saying, except as history makes itself known to a consciousness that is aware of itself. Yet, it may be noted, historical investigation in respect to the events of history and the verification thereof is in a sense redundant, for what are taken to be the events of history can only be verified against what are presupposed to be the empirical facts themselves. Narrated history must begin with the first events of history that are properly considered to be of historical worth, to the exclusion of those segments of the past that are left to be clothed in nothing but silence. Whatever may be achieved in world history through the Idea of Spirit moves for Hegel, it may be observed in passing, on a much higher level than that on which morality exists, where the term 'morality' refers to the private sentiment or conscience of the individual. To be thus convinced is to spare ourselves the trouble of asking whether we as human beings may have made any improvement through the course of history on a moral level, as it were, redundantly. World history, Hegel believes, is concerned with making a record of the actions of the Spirit of a people while at the same time abstaining from making only specific or even factual judgments concerning such actions.

Culture in the form of poetry, philosophy and art in the interests of Reason, it is maintained, can only reach its full development in the life of the State, a freely determinate Reason which, nevertheless, sets limits for itself. Self-consciousness in accordance with Reason amounts to moral freedom for the individual where individuality is renounced in order to achieve moral worth. World history is the unfolding of a form of spirituality through time in a restless succession of human activities bringing to fruition those interests, hopes and fears that are of critical human concerns.

Empires and civilizations change and decay, and Eastern people especially have grasped the important truth that death in outlasting life

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can only lead to new life. As with the Phoenix, fresh life constantly emerges from the ashes of destruction, and a purer and more worthy selfhood is elevated and transfigured into new forms of life, forms which persist in the laws and institutions of a people. For Hegel the whole of world history is simply the manifestation of the eternal Idea, an immortal Spirit, not at some remote time in the past or future, but essentially in the present, even though Spirit may appear (or not appear) to have left behind it some trace of the lingering past. Hegel is saying that various stages of history are negated only to rise in answer to a more self-reflective, comprehensive and universal level of spirituality.

The Philosophy of History indeed unfolds in typical Hegelian fashion. History becomes not simply a narrative account of the activities of individuals or nation states over the centuries, but the drama of unfolding events is seized upon as the vehicle to demonstrate the thesis that Absolute Spirit not irrationally proves its universal worth in the development of human affairs. Although the secular world does not by any means entirely conform to the Spiritual, where Spirit is taken to belong to the dimensions of the Eternal, the ongoing March of world history may still be said to be the actualisation of universal Spirit. The Idea of World Spirit is continuously active in the lives of individual mortals, in their participation in world affairs and in their drive toward individual happiness and fame.

In summary, Hegel's main thesis has been that history is said to be a configuration of World Spirit in its progress toward a free ethical self-consciousness, with the main focus on the formal realization of the Absolute Idea in the service of the nation state.

59 Victor Street, London, Ontario,
Canada N6C 1B9

ALBERT W.J.HARPER

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 Addresses ... (i) Dr.Surendra Sheodas
 Barlingay,
 Philosophy Department,
 Poona University,
 Pune - 411 007.

 (ii) Dr. Rajendra Prasad,
 Opposite Stadium Main gate
 Premchand Path
 Rajendra Nagar
 Patna - 800 016.

- (iii) Dr M.P.Marathe,
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune - 411 007.
- (iv) Dr Mrinal Miri,
Philosophy Department,
N.E.H.U.,
Shillong - 793 014
- (v) Dr R.Sundara Rajan,
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune - 411 007.
- (vi) Dr S.S.Deshpande,
Philosophy Department,
Poona University,
Pune - 411 007.

Whether Citizens of India ...Yes.

6. Names and Addressess of ... Department of Philosophy,
Individuals/Institutions Poona University,
which own the newspaper Pune - 411 007
And its
Pratap Centre of Philosophy,
Amalner - 425 401

I, Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sd/- Surendra Sheodas Barlingay

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WITTGENSTEIN AND THE AVAILABILITY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE

In this paper I intend to explore the possibility of a transcendental critique in Wittgenstein's philosophy. A transcendental critique, as the history of philosophy has so far evidenced, is the representative of a critical self-awareness, a breaking away from the monotony of unexamined orthodoxy and above all, the spirit of questioning the assumptions and methods of philosophy itself. Philosophy is subjected to self-examination, its scope and limits are redrawn and its methods of enquiry redesigned. The critique is not merely an abnegation of the natural habits of thoughts and so of the well-entrenched modes and methods of understanding, but a self-abnegation calling for intellectual austerity and the resulting self-withdrawal signalling the end of intellectual adventurism and the soft options of reason. This critique can rightly be called transcendental to the extent it examines the possibility of philosophy as a rational activity and suspends the natural attitudes of reason for the sake of a critical attitude regarding the on-going business of theoretical reason.

The unfoldment of a transcendental critique has been the continuing preoccupation of western philosophy right from the days of Kant to those of Husserl and the hermeneuticists.¹ The search for the transcendental origins of our ideas about the world, that is, our understanding of the world including ourselves has led to the evolution of the dichotomy between science as the discipline of the critical reason. The transcendentaal turn of philosophy marks the end of the hegemony of science and scientific reason. It marks the return of the native reason to itself, the subjectivity and its original home, language. Kant and Husserl identified philosophical progress with the uncovering of the subjectivity, while Wittgenstein and to some extent, the hermeneuticists have identified it with the unfoldment of the grammar of our language which is the original home of our ideas, meanings and experiences. From the transcendental subjectivity to transcendental grammar the road has

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been very zigzag and often bristling with the broken hopes of a universal science and a universal grammar. Yet, there has been a road and a continuing link.

I intend to explore the interface between the transcendental subjectivity and the transcendental grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy so as to suggest that Wittgenstein gave a transcendental turn to philosophy and that in his effort to understand the grammar of language he opened up the transcendental method of enquiry into the possibility of our language, experience and the world.

I. THE LAYOUT OF THE WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

For Wittgenstein philosophy is essentially a critique, a critique of language as he rightly called it (*TLP* 4.0031). It studies language not because language is problematic and so needs immediate philosophical solution, but because language solves all *our* problems and a study of language is the philosophic way of solving or dissolving these problems. The philosophical critique does not derive its origin and authenticity from the genuineness of the problems, metaphysical or otherwise, but from the fact that these problems arise despite language and despite our native reason. That is why Wittgenstein talks about the possibility of a reason 'bewitched' by means of language (*PI* § 109) which remains the object of philosophical battle, the critique. The 'bewitched' reason is unnatural, unphilosophical and far removed from the native reason and so needs philosophical treatment, the much needed therapy (*PI* §§ 133, 225). Philosophy is, therefore, a call to the native reason, the native language and the natural history of man (*PI* § 415) because in this lies the complete 'disappearance' of all problems (*PI* § 133).

Philosophy dramatizes the dichotomy between the natural and the speculative reason, and seeks to annul the latter since the latter alone faces the prospect of bewitchment, puzzlement and the torment of self-estrangement. It is the proverbial 'fly in the flybottle' (*PI* § 309) which philosophy shows the way out. Philosophy does not reform the speculative reason but shows it to be unnatural and ultimately abolishes it. The natural reason prevails and we are back with our native language and natural intelligence. The abolition of the speculative reason is the abolition of the artificial, the contrived and the manipulative operations of reason. It is the abolition of the so-called strange-looking deep problems of reason which have been projected as the source of philosophical illumination. In fact, these deep problems are 'deep disquietudes' (*PI* §

111) and are as such deformities of reason rather than signs of its healthy functioning. Wittgenstein puts it with a characteristic poignance :

The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. These are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. - Let us ask ourselves : why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) (original italics, *PI* § 111).

Our forms of language are subjected to disquieting misinterpretation and, thus, are given to creating grammatical illusions (*PI* § 110) which can masquerade as the profound products of intellectual enlightenment. Hence, philosophy wants its abolition, its complete disappearance. "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to, - the one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question" (*PI* § 133).

By abolishing the speculative reason along with its hallowed products, does philosophy gets itself abolished? This question haunts the Wittgensteinian critique to great measure. Wittgenstein asks, "where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)" (*PI* § 118). The answer to this question is that philosophy gets its importance just because it has to destroy the so-called 'great and imporant', and "what we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which we stand" (*Ibid*). The return of the natives reason is the return of our natural language and philosophy is the triumph of the natural reason. We are 'back to the rough ground' (*PI* § 107) and thus back to the native home of reason. Philosophy takes a turn towards what is original, natural and native. 'The axis of reference' of our philosophy is rotated (*PI* § 108).

Philosophy, as the return to the native, signals that it must do away with the pretensions of the theoretical reason. The theoretical reason is trapped in the constructions of its own which have no sanction of the native reason, that is, have not been legitimized by the grammar of the natural language. The legitimacy sought for happens to be rooted in the grammar of the native language and therefore must be brought to the fore through philosophical analysis. Philosophy itself does not supply the grounds of legitimacy or proof for any theoretical construction. It only points out that legitimacy or justification lies in grammar. There is no urgency on the part of philosophy itself to offer a theoretical construction, since it has no source of validating or proving a theory. Philosophy is not "a body of doctrine but an activity" (*TLP* 4.112); its task is to clarify, to

elucidate. "Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct : its task is to make them clear and give them 'sharp boundaries' (*Ibid*). But what philosophy is most concerned about is the legitimacy of the ideas or thoughts which cluster our theoretical constructions. The needed criteria of legitimacy are shrouded in the grammar of our language and therefore what is most urgently required of philosophy is that it be concerned with the grammar of our language.

Thus, in a sense the return to natural reason is the return to the grammar of language. It is the grammar that determines the limits of language and languages use, and, thus, determines what is legitimate in our concept-formation. Philosophy becomes philosophical grammar since in raising the question of grammar it resolves itself into a grammatical investigation (*PI* § 90). It undertakes the investigation how grammar can account for the "possibilities of phenomena" (*Ibid*) and how we can in presenting grammar provide a "perspicuous representation" of language, experience and the world. For, as Wittgenstein puts it, "the concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the account we give, the way we look at things. (*PI* § 122).

II. THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN

If the above layout of the Wittgensteinian critique is any guide, it takes positively a transcendental turn, a turn towards what is original and given in the human discourse. The language of human beings constituting the broad framework of thought, experience and forms of life promises to be the ultimate sheet anchor of the native reason. It is in the network of the linguistic activities, i.e., the language-games that reason seeks its ultimate unfoldment and its multiple activities. Reason becomes the living discourse, the unfolding life-force underlying the language-games. Language-games are the forms of life representing the vitality of the integrating reason, which holistically encompass the motley of linguistic activities, techniques and conventions into the broad life-world. Life and language become one, and so are reason and the life-force. All of them point to one reality, the reality of the unfolding language of the human beings, or, in short, the natural history of the human beings (*PI* § 415, *RFM*, I, 142). "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - *forms of life*" (*PI*, p. 226, original emphasis).

The transcendental turn is not towards studying natural history or histories as causal phenomena, as the historical-natural events in an anthropological repertoire. An anthropology of the natural histories is

called for if our interest is in documenting their causal ancestry and their historical necessities. It is the goal of a scientific endeavour to dissect a natural history and to bind together the fleeting details into a statistical or otherwise network of scientific laws. This results in a casual explanation of the anthropological phenomena. But philosophy hardly bothers to provide a causal explanation. As Wittgenstein has repeatedly emphasized, philosophical problems are not empirical problems and philosophy must do away with all explanations including the causal ones (*PI* § 109). He writes,

If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history - since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes (*PI* p. 230)

Thus, Wittgenstein does away with the scientific explanations of our natural history which includes our language-games and the concept-formations. The interest is not in the causes of the phenomena, but in their reasons, their grammar so to say. That philosophy opts for the descriptions of the grammar of the phenomena is very clear from the following statement :

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains or deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions (*PI* § 126 original emphasis).

Philosophy puts the grammar before us which itself neither needs explanation or justification. Language which grammar codifies in rules and paradigms needs no further philosophical justification or explanation. Philosophy puts everything as it is (*PI* § 124). It is, as Wittgenstein puts it, "our mistake to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said : this language-game is played" (*PI* § 654).

Thus, the transcendental turn amounts to a cancellation of the causal and the scientific mode of explanation. It is the transcendental epoche of the naturalistic attitude, the suspension of our empirical habits of thought, as Husserl² would have put it. It marks the end of philosophy

being directly concerned with the facts of nature, i. e., the natural world. It is grammar of the phenomena that becomes transcendently the subject-matter of philosophical enquiry. Two considerations weigh heavily for grammar being the focus of philosophical investigation. One, grammar is the ultimate source of normativity and necessity involved in our thought and experience, and two, grammar contains the possibilities of phenomena. Grammar as the source of necessity in our thought and experience is the transcendental ground of all language-games, since the latter are the linguistic moves already permitted by the grammatical rules. Rules of grammar define the limits of the possible language-games and so are writ large on the latter. Each language-game is the actualization of rules of grammar. Rules are embedded in the very structure of a language-game, so that the rules and what they permit make one unity of grammatical space. The grammatical space is the space of all linguistic possibilities, the actual as well as the possible language-games. Apart from this fact, grammar contains the possibilities of phenomena (*PI* § 90), the ground of all existence. "Essence is expressed by grammar" (*PI* § 371), as Wittgenstein so aptly puts it. This only suggests that grammar contains the grounds of all possible existence in the world. The essence of the world is as it were reflected in grammar. The following passage is revealing in many ways :

But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as a custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the properties of language, but in rules for this language which exclude nonsensical combinations of signs (*PR*, p. 85).

This explains how the essences deposited in grammar show the essence of the world such that the world is already reflected *a priori* in grammar. More revealingly, as Wittgenstein puts it, "grammar tells what kind of object anything is" (*PI* § 373).

The transcendental nature of the critique, thus, stands clear with grammar as the concern of the enquiry. Grammar as the realm of the possibilities of the phenomena and the realm of the necessity of rules in the ultimate transcendental subject-matter of philosophy. Kant would have gladly welcomed this if the following passage from his *Critique* is any guide :

I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the modes of our knowledge insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy (*italics original*).³

Whatever the precise definition of a transcendental method, it remains an

accepted truth that it is not simply a study of the *a priori* possibilities of knowledge alone, but also the study of the *a priori* grammatical correlate of knowledge, that is, the rules of concept-formation which explain the possibilities of knowledge. In a changed context, Wittgenstein would like philosophy to be concerned with grammar and its *a priori* rules to lay bare the precise contours of the realm of experience and above all the world of natural facts. The traces of Kantianism⁴ and broadly of the transcendental thrust⁵ are loud and clear.

Wittgenstein's transcendental philosophy is, however, not without the moments of its conflict with the opposite pull of naturalization of philosophy or, to be precise, the anthropologizing⁶ of our methods of enquiry. This conflict arises from Wittgenstein's admitted concession to the descriptive account of our natural histories, the customs and practices of people, societies and cultural groups. The interest in natural history is not an interest in anthropology, however. It is only from within a philosophical standpoint that the study of natural history becomes important. That philosophical standpoint is grammatical and in a sense trans-empirical and trans-anthropological.⁷

III. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RULES

If we still search for an exact characterization of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar, we can very well call it the phenomenology of rules, since Wittgenstein called philosophy a description of the rules of grammar. However, what marks this approach to phenomenology as different from phenomenology proper is its non-recognition of any pure realm of experience, that is, the realm of the given as the locus of meaning and essence. The realm of experience which is the transcendental subjectivity of pure phenomenology⁸ is resolved into the realm of grammar and, thus, a further transcendental epoche is made to cancel the difference between experience and grammar. The methodological duality between experience and grammar is denied in the ultimate transcendental plane for the reason that such a distinction is extra-grammatical and so empirical in nature. Empirically we do make a distinction between what language is about and the rules of description of what it is about. The objects described in language are empirically distinguished from the rules of description of such objects. But not so transcendently, since what is termed the object is part of the method of representation, i. e., the rules of description (*PI* § 400, 401). As Wittgenstein puts it,

What looks as if it had to exist is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our language-game; something with which comparison is made. And this may be an observation; but it is nonetheless an observation concerning our language-game - our method of representation (*PI* § 50).

This move to characterize the so-called facts of experience as internally grammatical and thus to reduce ontology to grammar has the result of cancelling phenomenology of experience as an independent discipline. Phenomenology is ultimately the phenomenology of rules, the methods of description and the paradigms of concept formation (*PR*, pp. 51-53).

The rules of grammar which language embodies and which constitute the linguistic moves are not given to our transcendental consciousness and are not therefore eidetically derived from an absolute pure experience. The rules are there unfolded in language and constitute our experience itself. That is to say, the rules are the internal constituting conditions of language-games and our experience as such. Experience is dependent on the language-games and so on the constituting rules themselves. Wittgenstein thus does not admit experience as pre-grammatical and so as constitutive of grammar. The phenomenological attempt to situate grammar⁹ in the domain of intentional experience, i. e., the eidetic acts of transcendental subjectivity falls short of recognizing grammar as the ultimate source of the essences and the *a priori* rules of constitution. Husserl accepts the constitutive essences of grammar¹⁰ but does not admit that these essences are subjective phenomena and are to be discovered through transcendental epoche.

Thus, though Husserl and Wittgenstein agree on philosophy as a description of the essences of language and experience, Husserl's attempt is to derive the essences from a self-evidently given transcendental domain of consciousness. For Wittgenstein, however, the essences, the rules, are there *sui generis* and do need no derivation or explanation, transcendental or otherwise. Just as language is spontaneous so are the rules, and beyond the rules there is no eternal domain of consciousness which gives them their constitutive character. All our explanation, according to Wittgenstein, stops at the rules of grammar and everything else including our experience of the world is derived from them. Of course, the rules are not themselves unconscious bits of sediments of our experience but they are not products of consciousness either. What we call consciousness is a matter of application of rules, the rule-following and their non-applicability beyond the domain of agreed meaning and definition.

Wittgenstein's attempt to make grammar and the rules

autonomous¹¹ can be seen as the philosophical move to block the possibility of a causal and also a mentalistic account of grammar. Grammar has no mental or physical origin; it is the universal domain of possibility - the possibility of language and the world. It stands for the grammatical space, the unique realm of rules, paradigms and the methods of description. The grammatical space itself is not accountable to any reality beyond itself since reality, the world is accountable to grammar and is constituted by it. Hence rules are arbitrary, according to Wittgenstein. He writes,

The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary" if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language.

If someone says, "If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts" - it should be asked what "could" means here (*PI* § 497).

The temptation to explain grammar as constituting facts or to justify it by what could or could not be without grammar seems to be ungrounded, since grammar cannot be justified in this way and it goes against the fact that the rules are arbitrary (*Z* § 331). The fact of being arbitrary is a transcendental fact, a fact of grammatical necessity and so concerning the very possibility of a certain kind of languages-game and the concept-formation. We cannot conceive of a certain kind of fact, if we do not have a certain language-game, and a certain set of rules of concept-formation (*Z* §§ 350, 352). That is, however, not an explanation but a description of a grammatical truth. In this we have reached the limit of all explanation. Hence that is ultimate for us.

IV SUBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 'WE'

The limits of our explanations are the limits of our concept-formation. These are the limits laid in our grammar, since grammar determines what can be counted as possible experience. However, "the limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct: they are the ways in which we make comparisons and in which we act" (*RFM*, VII 21). That is to say that grammar as embodying all our possible acts, that is the language-games takes care of all that matters as significant in our thought and experience. Therefore a phenomenology of experience is considered redundant in view of the availability of a philosophical grammar.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a phenomenology of rules does not logically preclude the possibility of a transcendental subjectivity,

however diluted its role may be in the account of grammar and its rules. This has been made clear by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (5.6; 5.62, 5.64) while considering the philosophical availability of a transcendental 'I', the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world. The fact that 'the world is my world' brings in the metaphysical self or the subject but not without a transcendental overtone, since an empirical or, for that matter, a psychological self is considered unimportant from the philosophical point of view. "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631), asserts Wittgenstein reminding us of the non-availability of a thinking self that empirically can legislate over the world. The only self that is available "does not belong to the world" (5.632) and is rather a limit of it, leaving the world alone untouched by the transcendental self. The transcendental 'I' is no extra-world centre from which the world can be viewed except *sub specie aeternitatis*. But that is not a view-point which can be said. It can only be shown. Nevertheless, the limit-self is still significant, since the possibility of the world is shown by this self, and that accounts also for the possibility of language. The visual room, to refer to Wittgenstein's analogy, cannot be significantly considered if there is no owner, but the owner "cannot be found in it, and there is no outside" (*Pl* § 398). The owner of the visual room is like the farmer of the imaginary landscape who, though owns the house, cannot enter it (*Ibid*). This only shows the transcendental of the self or the subject which can be viewed as the supposed owner of thoughts, experience and language. There is language and there are thoughts and experience but there is no owner of them in the empirical sense of the term.

That the transcendental subject is a transcendental need¹² for understanding language and experience has been recognized by the Wittgensteinian protagonists. This is more so as a matter of methodological requirement, since without a transcendental "we"¹³, as Williams puts it, we cannot explain how language is possible as a totality of linguistic activities. The transcendental 'we' is the transcendental bedrock of the language being *our* language and the world being *our* world. This reiterates a continuation of the transcendental move in Wittgenstein's early philosophy in bringing philosophy closer to a transcendental idealism.¹⁴ However, it should be clear that Wittgenstein is no protagonist of either idealism or solipsism or realism in the available sense of the term since these are one-sided ways of construing grammatical facts. So far as grammar is concerned it is neutral to these constructions. For example, the grammatical fact that the limits of our language are the limits of our world

can be subjected to both solipsistic and realistic constructions. In that sense the world is what it is, whether we call it *our* world or simply *the* world. As Wittgenstein puts it, "Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (*TLP* 5.64). This reaffirms the need of keeping grammar free of metaphysical constructions and of stating it rather than interpreting it.

Nevertheless the transcendental standpoint which grammar subserves cannot be jettisoned as a purely metaphysical construction. It is the fact of grammar that brings in the necessity of a transcendental 'we', the veritable analogue of a transcendental subjectivity of Husserl and the transcendental unity of consciousness of Kant. But Wittgenstein steers clear of the Kant-Husserlian subjectivity and opts for a transcendental standpoint without a transcendental subjectivity of the idealist type, since the latter is only a grammatical need and not a metaphysical requirements. The question of the transcendental 'we' is the question of making our grammar intelligible as the domain of the rules of language use and the associated forms of life. The empirical availability of forms of life which make the bulk of our natural history does underline the need of a transcendental horizon in which our empirical life-world gets significance. Without this horizon, our forms of life gets dissolved into the contingent accidents of natural history.

Wittgenstein is not advocating, as it is claimed in some quarters, a relativization of our forms of life, our language and grammar including logic and mathematics. The general tendency of this type of interpretation is to reconstruct the multiple natural histories i. e., the forms of life which are empirically available into genuine alternative histories so as to show that language and grammar are bound up with communities and cultures, and that the rules of grammar are the products of cultural and social agreement. This necessarily results in a kind of relativism with the attendant conventionalist overtone. Wittgenstein is considered a relativist, conventionalist¹⁵ and an advocate of the communitarian¹⁶ view of language and rules. Wittgenstein, however, has considered the so-called alternative forms of life as model forms of life which *could* be thought or conceived so that we remind ourselves of the uniqueness of *our* forms of life. The following two remarks from *Zettel* suggest what forms of life other than ours could mean :

I want to say : an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation for quite different concepts (*Z*, 387).

For here life would run on differently - what interests us would not interest them. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable (Z, 388, original emphasis).

This shows how forms of life and conceptual schemes altogether inaccessible to us could be imagined. What interests Wittgenstein in this thought experiment is not so much their reality as their conceivability, since, according to him, we cannot say that ours is the only form of life, nor can we actually compare the different world-pictures (*OC*, § § 94, 95) as a matter of evaluating what is right or wrong in other world-pictures. All that we could talk about is the logical possibility of different forms of acting, thinking and reacting to situations. There is no reason why a group of people acting very differently could not be considered at all (*OC* § § 609, 612). But that does not throw any light on whether they are actually available and even if they are so, whether they actually amount to being alternatives to our world-picture. First of all, even if they are empirically available, they may not be alternatives to ours and so may be accessible to us. Secondly, if they are inaccessible to us, we may not be able to understand them and so they must be considered non-significant for us.¹⁷ Thus the so-called forms of life do not pose a threat to ours, and do not take away the uniqueness of our forms of life. As Williams rightly points out, "the imagined alternatives are not alternatives *to us*; they are alternatives *for us*, markers of how far we might go and still remain within our world - a world leaving which would not mean that we saw something different, but that we ceased to see" (*italics his*). The forms of life we have and the concepts that we share remain an absolute fact for us and they determine what we can think and experience at all. They determine the very nature of our thinking and experiencing, that is, precisely what we are. That our forms of life are absolutely what they are and could not be otherwise is a transcendental fact, and cannot be further justified. It is the bedrock of our justification. As Wittgenstein puts it, "if I have exhausted the justifications I have reached the bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do" (*PI* § 217). Thus what seems ordinarily as our forms of life do point to the transcendental dimension which conceals the availability of the socio-cultural relativism threatening to engulf our language and grammar.

The transcendental critique thus serves the interest of language and grammar by insulating it against the claims of socio-anthropological explanation and the dominant pressures of usual modes of thinking. The critique is a safeguard against philosophy being dissolved into a science

of nature and natural language. Though the dominant concern of philosophy is the natural language, it is not interested in the explanation of natural language as such but in the transcendental horizon which makes natural language what it is. This is not another kind of explanation but a kind of "showing" of what it means to be a language and a form of life. If the transcendental critique is a kind of describing what grammar is and what it means to be bound by grammar, then it is a kind of plainspeaking and a kind of "assembling reminders" (PI § 127) for the purpose of warding off possible misunderstandings. The availability of the critique is a standing testimony of the fact that we are in the constant need of plainspeaking and of plain seeing. The critique is just an eye-opener.¹⁹

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Hyderabad - 500134
(A.P.)

R. C. PRADHAN

NOTES

1. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (Crossroad, New York, 1975) part II and III.
2. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. by J.N. Findlay (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970) Vol. 2 862-63.
3. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by N. K. Smith (Macmillan St Martin's Press, London, 1920), p. 29.
4. See Jaakko Hintikka, "Wittgenstein's Semantical Kantianism", in *Ethics, Foundations, Problems and Applications* (proceedings of the 5th International Wittgenstein Symposium. 25th to 31st August, 1980, Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria) eds. Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (Holder - Picher - Tempsky, Vienna, 1981) pp. 375-90.
5. See Jonathan Loar, "Transcendental Anthropology" in *Subject, Thought and Context*, eds. P. Pettit and J. McDowell (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 267-98.
6. Cf. *Ibid*, pp. 270-72
7. *Ibid*.
8. See Maurice Natanson, *Edmund Husserl, Philosopher of Infinite Tasks* (North Western University Press, Evanston 1973), pp. 42-146.
See also J. N. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy* (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985) pp. 191-246.
9. Cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations* Vol. 2, pp. 522-29.

10. See Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) Chapter 6.
11. See G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar and Necessity* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp. 34-64.
12. See Bernard Williams, "Wittgenstein and Idealism" in *Understanding Wittgenstein* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 7, 1972/73) (Macmillan, London, 1974), pp. 76-95.
13. Cf. *Ibid*, p. 79.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 92-95.
15. Cf. Michael Dummett, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics", in *Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations*, ed. George Pitcher (Macmillan, London 1966), pp. 425-26.
16. See Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1982) pp. 54-113.
17. See Barry Stroud, "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity", in *Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigations*, ed. George Pitcher, pp. 477-96.
18. Williams, "Wittgenstein and Idealism", pp. 91-2.
19. This paper was presented and discussed in the ICPR Seminar on "Wittgenstein- New Perspectives" held at Delhi University from 5-8 March, 1990. I wish to thank all those who participated in the discussion and offered valuable comments on the paper.

THE TAGORE-GANDHI CONTROVERSY REVISITED - I

-Or, Further, In Search of Development - I

We wish to pick up the threads of a dialogue started sometime earlier¹ which, unfortunately, found few takers (or, shall we say, no takers?). In its essentials, the paper we refer to attempts to point out the salient features of the Gandhi-Tagore ideological controversy² and correlates it with the condition of the Indian mind today as it gropes its way 'in search of development'.

We would like to divide our discussion in the following manner in this paper as a prelude to the ones to follow :

- A) The Tagore-Gandhi Controversy;
- B) Mutual Appraisals and tributes;
- C) Conclusions

Further papers will tackle the modern implications of this controversy and its importance for the future (Part II), outline the germinations of the national debate already initiated (Part III) and present our take off from there (Part IV).

A. THE TAGORE-GANDHI CONTROVERSY

We feel it essential to highlight some features of this controversy before going into their implications. This is to serve two purposes : as a foundation for the discussion to follow and to excite further enquiry along these lines in the minds of the reader. This essay will not necessarily attempt to discuss every feature of their controversy nor even analyse every feature that we ourselves mention. In fact it may discuss few of them. There is, however, little need to offer an apology for this because although we wish to highlight some features of this controversy, we reserve the right (we think justifiably) not to comment on them. Often, just a juxtaposition of thought makes standpoints stand out in bold relief, making further comment redundant. Nor do we envisage a critical-comparative point-by-point study as the scope of the present exercise. This does not mean we do not wish it done : in fact we could not wish less. This is precisely the reason

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why we have juxtaposed the two contrary thoughts and leave that as a future exercise, if at all necessary. In the meanwhile we would rather go on from here to trace the worth of these contrary viewpoints in our present day search for development. We may, therefore, be pardoned if we comment on only those aspects of the controversy which we believe are material to such an exercise.

Further, we do believe that though controversy is often inevitable, nay integral, to the vitality of debate, it is erroneous to consider it sufficient to nurture this vitality. Often our errors in this respect are less those of omission and more ones of commission. We tend to over-feed ourselves on controversies elsewhere, as also in our philosophising, and this, by sheer force of habit, we tend to employ in all appraisal. For what can better arrest attention than to present a controversial argument? Has it not been said 'When a thing ceases to be a subject of controversy, it ceases to be a subject of interest'³? And if one were to ask : 'What is controversial about Philosophy?; One may simply answer, : 'What is not?' Of course one worthy suggestion to avoid the enormous wastage of intellectual effort that is involved in the perennial disputes of what text or thinker really meant, what is to begin afresh by asking new questions which disrupts the closed circle of accepted knowledge and opens up a new vista of thought⁴. For, "Genius shows itself not so much in the discovery of new answers as in the discovery of new questions. It influences its age not by solving its problems but by opening eyes to previously unconsidered problems"⁵. But, this, by itself, is no guarantee that it would not form the nidus for a fresh crop (and waste?) of intellectual interpretarial gymnastics. And a fresh controversy. Be that as it may, the point here is that controversy, as such, is like a rudderless boat. It needs to be constantly guided by constructiveness, otherwise it must sink and take with it all those on board. And the survivor list can be pretty small. What makes good sensational stories may fail as torch-bearer for conceptualization of basic principles or policies needed in national reconstruction unless guided necessarily in this manner. And to arrest attention is not necessarily to launch reconstruction. It can often be a means to skilfully obliterate its awareness.

With this prelude, let us now come to the controversy proper.

(i) Foreign Clothing

Tagore did not approve of the Gandhian movement of burning foreign clothes. Writing his two articles 'The Call of Truth' (*The Modern Review*, Oct. 1921; pp 41-73 in TGC) and 'The Cult of the Charkha' (*The Modern Review*, Sept. 1925; pp 83-106 in TGC) he thought it another

instance of a magical formula that considered something impure just because it was foreign, the burning of which would give India instant Swaraj. Tagore believed nothing great could be got cheaply and we only cheated ourselves when we tried to acquire things that were precious with a price that was inadequate. And "... the foundation of Swaraj cannot be based on any external conformity, but only on the internal union of hearts"⁶ (p. 96). He exhorted Gandhi's followers to stop obeying orders blindly for he felt it would be better if the clothes were given away to the poor to whom they belonged rather than "heaped up before the very eyes of our motherland shivering and ashamed in her nakedness", (p 66), (for) the clothes to be burnt are not mine, but belong to those who most sorely need them. If those who are going naked should have given us the mandate to burn ... the crime of incendiarism would not lie at our door. But how can we expiate the sin of the forcible destruction of clothes which might have gone to women whose nakedness is actually keeping them prisoners, unable to stir out of the privacy of their homes?" (p.68). The question of using or refusing cloth of a particular manufacture belonged mainly to economic science and should be discussed in the language of economics. This movement according to him was based on a confusion between economics and ethics : "... if there be anything wrong in wearing a particular kind of cloth, that would be an offence against economics, or hygiene, or aesthetics, but certainly not against morality" (p.67).

To this, Gandhi replied by his piece in *Young India* entitled 'The Great Sentinel' (13 Oct. 1921; pp 74-82 in *TGC*). He agreed that passing mania, slave mentality and blind acceptance even out of love would be an extremely sorry state to be in : "... I would feel extremely sorry to discover that the country has unthinkingly and blindly followed all I had said or done. I am quite conscious of the fact that blind surrender to love is often more mischievous than a forced surrender to the lash of the tyrant. There is hope for the slave of the brute, none for that of love. Love is needed to strengthen the weak, love becomes tyrannical when it extracts obedience from the unbeliever" (pp. 74-75). He then built his thesis by explaining the meaning of the collective burning of foreign cloth. It was a manifestation of a responsibility upto now unacknowledged, the expiation of and purification from a sin that the nation has consciously or unconsciously acquiesced in : "I venture to suggest to the Poet that the clothes I ask him to burn must be and are his. If they had to his knowledge belonged to the poor or the ill-clad, he would long ago have restored to the poor that was theirs. In burning *my* foreign clothes I burn my shame, I must refuse to insult the naked by giving them clothes they do not need instead of giving

them work which they sorely need" (p. 79). And, "On the knowledge of my sin bursting upon me, I must consign the foreign garments to the flames and thus purify myself" (p. 79). Further, answering the question of the distinction between economics and ethics, he said, "I must confess that I do not draw a sharp or any distinction between economics and ethics. Economics that hurt the moral well being of an individual or a nation are immoral and therefore sinful. Thus the economics that permit one nation to prey upon another are immoral". (pp. 78-79).

(ii) Foreign Language and Non-cooperation with the British

In March and May 1921, Tagore wrote in *Letters to a Friend* that Gandhi in his blind zeal for crying down modern education was adopting a policy of Non-cooperation with the West which itself was a form of *himsa* (p.18). He was especially critical of Gandhi's call to students to give up study in British Government run schools before they had other schools to go to. He recounted an incident when a crowd of young students approached him during the Swadeshi movement in Bengal: "They said to me that if I would order them to leave their schools and colleges they would instantly oblige. I was emphatic in my refusal to do so, and they went away angry, doubting the sincerity of my love for my motherland. And yet long before this popular ebullition of excitement I myself had given a thousand rupees, when I had not five rupees to call my own, to open a Swadeshi store and courted banter and bankruptcy. The reason for my refusing to advise these students to leave their schools was because the anarchy of a mere emptiness never tempts one, even when it is resorted to as a temporary measure. I am frightened of an abstraction which is ready to ignore living reality" (pp. 20-21).

Non-cooperation went against the very grain of the sensitive Poet. He could foresee where such a policy would ultimately lead the people who practised it. For him it was political asceticism, barren like a desert, and as much against life as was the brute force of the raging sea: "Our students are bringing their offering of sacrifices to what? Not to a fuller education but to non-education. It has at its back a fierce joy of annihilation which at its best is asceticism, and at its worst is that orgy of frightfulness in which the human nature . . . finds a disinterested delight in an unmeaning devastation, as has been shown in the late war and on other occasions nearer to us. No in its passive moral form is asceticism and in its active moral form is violence. The desert is as much a form of *himsa* (negligence) as is the raging sea in storm; they both are against life" (pp. 19-20).

He called upon India to shun her negativistic knee-jerk responses and stand for co-operation of all people of the world. For, "The West has misunderstood the East which is at the root of the disharmony that prevails between them. But will it mend the matter if the East in her turn tries to misunderstand the

West? The present age has powerfully been possessed by the West; it has only become possible because to her is given some great mission for man. We from the East have to come to her to learn whatever she has to teach us; for by doing so we hasten the fulfilment of this age. We know that the East also has her lessons to give, and she has her own responsibility of not allowing her light to be extinguished, and the time will come when the West will find leisure to realise that she has a home of hers in the East where her food is her rest" (p. 23). It was in realizing the fundamental unity of the spirit of man that India had her message to give, not in decrying modern influence or preaching 'segregation form the rest of the world' or 'provincialism of vision'. Or more so an 'immoderate boastfulness' that asserted 'India is unique in every way', or worse still, 'a self-depreciation which has the sombre attitude of suicide' (p. 27). It was not by isolation of life or culture but by coming into, "Real touch with the West through the disinterested medium of intellectual cooperation, (that) we shall gain a true perspective of the human world, realize our own position in it, and have faith in the possibility of widening and deepening our connection with it" (p. 27). For Tagore firmly believed that from now onward, "any nation which takes an isolated view of its own country will run counter to the spirit of the New Age, and know no peace," (p. 70). And, "a perfect isolation of life and culture is not a thing of which any race can be proud. The dark stars are isolated, but stars that are luminous belong to the eternal chorus of lights" (p. 27); and, therefore, "response is the only true sign of life" (p. 72).

Gandhi in his reply entitled 'Evil Wrought by the English Medium' (*Young India*, 27 April, 1921), 'English Learning' (*Young India*, 1 June, 1921) which he continued as 'The Poet's Anxiety' (*Young India*, 1 June, 1921) answered most of the charges of the Poet. He felt the English language was mainly studied for commercial purposes, so-called political valve or as a passport to marriage. "Our boys think, and rightly in the present circumstances, that without English they cannot get Government service. Girls are taught English as a passport to marriage" (p. 34). He felt, "Of all the superstitions that affect India, none is so great as that a knowledge of the English language is necessary for imbibing ideas of liberty, and developing accuracy of thought" (pp. 24-25). He believed English education as administered had emasculated the English-educated Indian, while putting a severe strain on the Indian students' nervous energy, making them imitators (p. 23): "I know husbands who are sorry that their wives cannot talk to them and their friends in English. I know families in which English is being made the mother-tongue. Hundreds of youths believe that without the knowledge of English, freedom of India is practically impossible. The cancer has so eaten into the society, that in many cases, the only meaning of education is a knowledge of English. All these are for me signs of our slavery and

degradation. It is unbearable for me that the vernaculars should be crushed and starved as they have been . . . I would not have a single Indian to forget, neglect or be ashamed of his mother tongue, or to feel that he or she cannot think or express the best thoughts in his or her vernacular" (pp. 34-35). He sincerely believed that of all the defects of the British government the system of education they foisted on India was its most defective part : "It was conceived and born in error, for the English rulers honestly believed the indigenous system to be worse than useless. It has been nurtured in sin, for the tendency has been to dwarf the Indian body, mind and soul" (p. 25). He made bold to say, "Rammohan Roy would have been a greater reformer, and Lokmanya Tilak would have been a greater scholar, if they had not to start with the handicap of having to think in English and transmit their thoughts chiefly in English" (p. 24).

Answering Tagore's charge that Non-cooperation was a form of *himsa*, Gandhi said, "I respectfully warn him against mistaking its excrescences for the movement itself. It is wrong to judge Non-cooperation by the students' misconduct in London or Malegam's in India, as it would be to judge the Englishmen by the Dyers or the O'Dwyers" (p. 35). And while he was as great a believer in free air as a Poet, for, "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed" (p. 34), he also warned, "I want the culture of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any. I refuse to live in other people's houses as an interloper, a beggar or a slave" (p. 34). Dilating on his ideal of Non-cooperation, he said, "Non-cooperation is intended to pave the way to real, honourable and voluntary co-operation based on mutual respect and trust. The present struggle is being waged against compulsory co-operation, against one-sided combination, against the armed imposition of modern methods of exploitation masquerading under the name of civilisation" (p.37). He elaborated further : "This deliberate refusal to co-operate is like the necessary weeding process that a cultivator has to resort to before he sows. Weeding is as necessary to agriculture as sowing.... (In fact) Non-co-operation is intended to give the very meaning to patriotism that the Poet is yearning after" (pp.40-41). For, "An India awakened and free has a message of peace and goodwill to a groaning world" (p.41). He did agree that Non-co-operation may have come in advance of its time in which case India and the world have to wait, "but there is no choice for India save between violence and Non-co-operation" (p.37). And he believed, "In my humble opinion, rejection is as much an ideal as the acceptance of a thing. It is as necessary to reject untruth as it is to accept truth. All religions teach that two opposite forces act upon us and that the human endeavour consists in a series of eternal rejections and acceptances. Non-co-operation with evil is as much a duty as co-operation with good" (p.39). This Non-co-operation with the system of the British was in fact designed to supply India a platform, "from which she will preach the message of peace and good-will to a groaning world" (p.41). And

to achieve this it was not literary training that was of the essence. Since Tagore was concerned students had nowhere to go to study if they abandoned their schools and colleges, Gandhi countered, "I am firmly of the opinion that the Government schools have unmanned us, rendered us helpless and Godless. They have filled us with discontent, have made us despondent. They have made us what we were intended to become- Clerks and interpreters... if it was wrong to co-operate with the Government in keeping us slaves, we were bound to begin with those institutions in which our association appeared to be most voluntary. The youth of a nation are its hope. I hold that, as soon as we discovered that the system of Government was wholly, or mainly evil, it became sinful for us to associate our children with it" (p.38). In any case, he had already clarified earlier that he was never able to make a fetish of literary training : "My experience has proved to my satisfaction that literary training by itself adds not an inch to one's moral height and that character building is independent of literary training" (p.38).

(iii) The Charkha

Tagore, again, in his article "The Call of Truth" (q.v.) and "The Cult of the Charkha" (q.v.) was especially averse to Gandhi's claim that if everyone turned the charkha for half an hour a day, India could get Swaraj in a year's time. Tagore objected to this as a form of ritual "... if man (can) be stunted by big machines, the danger of his being stunted by small machines must not be lost sight of" (p.65). For, "... the performance of petty routine duties... imparts skills to the limbs of the man who is a bondsman, whose labour is drudgery; but it kills the mind of a man who is a doer, whose work is creation" (p.85). Further, "... the depths of my mind have not been moved by the Charkha agitation ... (and) there are others who are in the same plight as myself - though it is difficult to find them all out. For even where hands are reluctant to work the spindle, mouths are all the more busy spinning its praises ... I am afraid of a blind faith on a very large scale in the Charkha in the country which is so liable to succumb to the lure of short-cuts when pointed out by a personality about whose moral earnestness they can have no doubt" (pp. 87-88). And further, "By doing the same thing day after day, mechanical skill may be acquired; but the mind, like a mill-turning bullock, will be kept going round and round a narrow range of habit" (p. 91). And "... to call upon man to make the easiest of offerings to the smallest of gods is the greatest of insults to his manhood. To ask all the millions of our people to spin the Charkha is as bad as offering the tomato to Jagannath. I do hope and trust that there are not thirty-three crores of Gopees in India" (p. 95)⁷. And further still, "the Charkha is doing harm because of the undue prominence which it has thus usurped. ..." (p. 103).

Gandhi accepted the Poet's warning as a welcome and

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wholesome reminder to eschew 'impatience' and 'imposition of authority', howsoever great, and to practice eternal 'watchfulness' for, "A reformer who is enraged because his message is not accepted must retire to the forest to learn how to watch, wait and pray" (p. 74). But he as well cautioned the Poet from mistaking the surface dirt for the substance underneath. He denied any large scale blind obedience in the country to his ideas on the Charkha. Although he was not sure whether educated India had understood the truth underlying the Charkha, he urged atleast the Poet to go deeper and search if the Charkha had been accepted from blind faith or from reasoned necessity :

"I do indeed ask the Poet and the Sage to spin the wheel as a sacrament It is my conviction that India is a house on fire because its manhood is being daily scorched; it is dying of hunger because it has no work to buy food with Our cities are not India. India lives in her seven and a half lakhs of villages, and the cities live upon the villages . . . The city people are brokers and commission agents for the big houses of Europe, America and Japan. The cities have cooperated with the latter in the bleeding process that has gone on for the past two hundred years To a people famishing and idle, the only acceptable form in which God can dare appear is work and promise of food as wages. God created man to work for his food, and said that those who ate without work were thieves. Eighty percent of India are compulsory thieves half the year. Is it any wonder if India has become one vast prison? Hunger is the argument that is driving India to the spinning wheel 'Why should I who have no need to work for food spin?' May be the question asked. Because I am eating what does not belong to me Trace the course of every pice that finds its way into your pocket, and you will realize the truth of what I write A plea for the spinning wheel is a plea for recognizing the dignity of labour It was our love of foreign cloth that ousted the wheel from its position of dignity. Therefore I consider it a sin to wear foreign cloth it is sinful for me to wear the latest finery of Regent Street, when I know that if I had but the things woven by the neighbouring spinners and weavers, that would have clothed me, and fed and clothed them . . . I must consign the foreign garments to the flames and thus purify myself, and thenceforth rest content with the rough Khadi made by my neighbours" (pp. 76-79). Further, he said, "the Poet lives for the morrow and would have us do likewise But I have had the pain of watching birds who, for want of strength, could not be coaxed even into a flutter of their wings I found it impossible to soothe suffering patients with a song of Kabir. The hungry millions ask for one poem - invigorating food. They cannot be given it. They must earn it. And they can earn only by the sweat of their brow" (p. 81)⁸.

Gandhi clinched his argument in defence of the Charkha by stating elsewhere, "I have asked no one to abandon his calling, but on the contrary to adorn it by giving every day only thirty minutes to spinning as sacrifice for the whole nation. I have indeed asked the famishing man or woman who is idle for want of any work whatsoever to spin for a living and the half-starved farmer to spin during his leisure hours to supplement his slender resources. If the Poet span half an hour daily his poetry would gain in richness. For it would then represent the poor man's wants and woes in a more forcible manner than now" (pp. 110-111). Charkha thus becomes a symbol of care for the have-not, for the needs. And when we spin, we contemplate him, we meditate in a frame of mind that directs attention to his state. Gandhi further refutes the argument that the Charkha is used to bring about forced conformity, "a death like sameness . . . The truth is that the Charkha is intended to realize the essential and living oneness of interest among India's myriads" (p. 111). He further adds, "Swaraj has no meaning for the millions if they do not know how to employ their enforced idleness. The attainment of this Swaraj is possible within a short time, and it is so possible only by the revival of the spinning wheel" (pp. 77-78).

(ix) The Bihar Earthquake

In the *Harijan* issue of 16 February, 1934, Tagore wrote his article *The Bihar Earthquake* to which Gandhi wrote his rejoinder *Superstitions vs. Faith* (pp. 115-121). Tagore considered Gandhi's view that untouchability had brought down God's vengeance upon certain parts of Bihar in the form of an earthquake as 'unfortunate', 'unscientific' and "too readily accepted by a large section of countrymen" (p. 115) : "If we associate ethical principles with cosmic phenomena, we shall have to admit that human nature is superior to Providence that preaches its lessons in good behaviour in orgies of the worst behaviour possible" (p. 116). This amounts to "making indiscriminate examples of casual victims . . . in order to impress others dwelling at a safe distance who possibly deserve severer condemnation" (p. 116). He felt the kind of argument that Gandhi used by exploiting an event of cosmic disturbance far better suited the psychology of his opponents than his own; and, "We, who are immensely grateful to Mahatmaji for inducing, by his wonderworking inspiration, freedom from fear and feebleness in the minds of his countrymen, feel profoundly hurt when any words from his mouth may emphasize the elements of unreason in those very minds -- unreason which is a fundamental source of all blind powers that drive us against freedom and self-respect" (p. 117).

Gandhi replied by saying that he long believed physical phenomena produce results both physical and spiritual; and, "The converse I hold to be equally true . . . We do not know all the laws of God nor their working . . . I believe literally that not a leaf moves but by His will. Every breath I take depends upon His sufferance . . . what appears to us as catastrophes are so only

because we do not know the universal laws sufficiently . . . (catastrophic) visitations . . . though they seem to have only physical origins are, for me, somehow connected with man's morals . . . My belief is a call to repentance and self-purification . . . even as I cannot help believing in God though I am unable to prove His existence to the sceptics, in like manner, I cannot prove the connection of the sin of untouchability with the Bihar visitation even though the connection is instinctively felt by me" (pp. 118-120). And the utilitarian then spoke and bared himself thus, "If my belief turns out to be ill-founded, it will still have done good to me and those who believe with me. For we shall have been spurred to more vigorous efforts towards self-purification . . ." (p. 120). And answering Tagore's stinging comment that "our own sins and errors, however enormous, have not got enough force to drag down the structure of creation to ruins" (p. 117), he said, "On the contrary I have the faith that our own sins have more force to ruin that structure than any mere physical phenomenon" (p. 120). And he concluded, ". . . the connection between cosmic phenomena and human behaviour is a living faith that draws me nearer to my God, humbles me and makes me readier for facing Him". Gandhi, in arguing thus, is proved one who must maximise utility and make use of every circumstance to forward ends he considers desirable. And his conviction about his belief obliterates from consciousness any apparent factual inconsistencies that his system of faith has with a physical phenomena as ordinarily understood. Both, in their own way, are relevant and unimpeachable.

Tagore was essentially an analyst, a discerning viewer who could see through and beyond events. This was just an appropriate manifestation of that creativity which he channelized to such effective use in all his other writings. Gandhi was essentially a pragmatist, a doer, who needed the lowest common denominator in thought to put into action and thus galvanise a people. That the former should find faults with the latter's actions and convictions is but understandable. And appropriate. That the latter should forbear it with patience and understand the legitimacy of its thrust is again just appropriate. It speaks for his insight, his tolerance, and the tranquility of a self in perfect command of itself, convinced of the need to alter the environment it wishes to change. Tagore's reasoned questioning became absolutely essential both to submit this tranquility to critical scrutiny and add that dimension of thought which an excessive concentration with action may have unwittingly neglected.

B. MUTUAL APPRAISALS & TRIBUTES

Both Tagore and Gandhi, for all their committed espousal of dearly held opinions, shared the greatest regard for each other. Although they met only twice (in 1915, and again in 1920) they seemed to

communicate (by means of *Young India* and *Harijan* on the one hand, and *Modern Review*, *Letters and Visva-Bharati Quarterly* on the other), their intimate thoughts to each other, and for the benefit of a wider audience. The controversy raged essentially between 1919 and 1925, and again in 1934 following the Bihar Earthquake. Even in disagreement, Tagore said, "It is extremely distasteful to me to have to differ from Mahatma Gandhi in regard to any matter of principle or method. Not that, from a higher stand-point, there is anything wrong in so doing; but my heart shrinks from it" (p. 105). He gently cautioned, "Nothing is more wonderful to me than Mahatmaji's great moral personality. In him divine providence has given us a burning thunder-bolt of shakti. May this shakti give power to India, -- not overwhelm her, -- that is my prayer!" (p. 105). And thus spoke Gandhi, "There is nothing of the Poet about me. I cannot aspire after his greatness. He is the undisputed master of it. The world today does not possess his equal as a Poet. My Mahatmaship has no relation to the Poet's undisputed position" (p. 108). And, "Gurudev and I early discovered certain differences of outlook between us. Our mutual affection has, however, never suffered by reason of our differences . . ." (p. 118). And he too gently cautions, "The Poet makes his *gopis* dance to the tune of his flute. I wander after my beloved Sita, the Charkha, and seek to deliver her from the ten-headed monster from Japan, Manchester, Paris etc. The Poet is an inventor, he creates, destroys and recreates. I am an explorer and having discovered a thing I must cling to it . . . The world easily finds an honourable place for the magician who produces new and dazzling things. I have to struggle laboriously to find a corner for my own worn out things" (p. 109). And he goes on to say, "... there is no competition between us . . . I may say in all humility that we complement each other's activity" (p. 109).

Gandhi also says earlier, "Why should mere disagreement with my views displease? If every disagreement were to displease, since no two men agree exactly on all points, life would be a bundle of unpleasant sensations and therefore a perfect nuisance. On the contrary the frank criticism pleases me. For our friendship becomes the richer for our disagreements. Friends to be friends are not called upon to agree even on most points. Only disagreement must have no sharpness, much less bitterness, about them. And I gratefully admit that there is none about the Poet's criticism" (p. 108). And further, "He has a perfect right to utter his protest when he believes that I was in error. My profound regard for him would make me listen to him more readily than to any other critic" (p. 118). Tagore had already anticipated this emotion in Gandhi, while criticizing his stand on Charkha, when he said, "I feel sure that Mahatmaji himself will not fail to understand me, and keep for me the same forbearance which he has always had" (p. 106).

Even while accepting Tagore's stinging criticism of the fetish surrounding Charkha, Gandhi says, "... there is nothing in the Poet's argument which I cannot endorse and still maintain my position regarding the Charkha. The

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many things about the Charkha which he has ridiculed I have never said (what Gandhi earlier referred to as table-talk). The merits I have claimed for the Charkha remain undamaged by the Poet's battery" (p. 114; parenthesis added).

Only once did Gandhi acknowledge being hurt during this controversy and he makes haste to offer explanation, "One thing, and one thing only, has hurt me, the Poet's belief, again picked up from table-talk, that I look upon Rammohan Roy as a 'Pigmy'! Well, I have never anywhere described that great reformer as a pigmy, much less regarded him as such. He is to me as great a giant as he is to the Poet . . . I do remember having said . . . that it was possible to attain highest culture without Western education. And when some one mentioned Rammohan Roy, I remember having said that he was a pigmy compared to the unknown authors, say of the Upanishads. This is altogether different from looking upon Rammohan Roy as a pigmy. I do not think meanly of Tennyson if I say that he was a pigmy before Milton or Shakespeare. I claim that I enhance the greatness of both" (pp. 114-115). And simultaneous with the explanation of his hurt is the remark, "If I adore the Poet as he knows I do, inspite of differences between us, I am not likely to disparage the greatness of a man who made the great reform movement of Bengal possible and of which the Poet is one of the finest fruits" (p. 115).

Tagore in his speech on Gandhi's birthday, 1937, delivered to the students of Shantiniketan, said, ". . . many wondered if India could ever rise again by the genius of her own people, -- until there came on the scene a truly great soul, a great leader of men, in line with the traditions of the great sages of old . . . Mahatma Gandhi. Today no one need despair of the future of this country, for the unconquerable spirit that creates has already been released" (p. 126). And later he says, "... though Christ declared that the meek shall inherit the earth, Christians now aver that victory is to the strong, the aggressive . . . It needed another prophet to vindicate the truth of this paradox and interpret 'meekness' as the positive force of love and righteousness, as Satyagraha . . . Gandhiji has made of this 'meekness' or *ahimsa*, the highest form of bravery, a perpetual challenge to the insolence of the strong" (p. 130).

Again writing in 1938 on Gandhi the Man, (published in the *Gandhi Memorial Peace Number (Visva-bharati)* in 1949 after Gandhi's death) Tagore revealed his genius by a caricature of Gandhi few may have ever equalled :

"An ascetic himself, he does not frown on the joy of others, but works for the enlivening of their existence day and night. He exalts poverty in his own life, but no man in India has striven more assiduously than he for the material welfare of his people. A reformer with the zeal of a revolutionary, he imposes severe restraints on the very passions he provokes. Something of an idolater and also an iconoclast, he leaves the old gods in their dusty niches of sanctity and simply lures the old

worship to better and more humane purposes. Professing his adherence to the caste system, he launches his firmest attack against it where it keeps its strongest guards, and yet he has hardly suffered from popular disapprobation as would have been the case with a lesser man who would have much less power to be effective in his efforts. He condemns sexual life as inconsistent with the moral progress of man, and has a horror of sex as great as that of the author of *The Kreutzer Sonata*, but unlike Tolstoy, he betrays no abhorrence of the sex that tempts his kind. In fact, his tenderness for woman is one of the noblest and most consistent traits of his character, and he counts among the women of his country some of his best and truest comrades in the great movement he is leading. He advises his followers to hate evil without hating the evil-doer. It sounds an impossible precept, but he has made it as true as it can be made in his own life. I had once occasion to be present at an interview he gave to a certain prominent politician who had been denounced by the official Congress Party as a deserter. Any other Congress leader would have assumed a repelling attitude, but Gandhi was all graciousness and listened to him with patience and sympathy, without once giving him occasion to feel small. Here, I said to myself, is a truly great man, for he is greater than the party he belongs to, greater even than the creed he professes" (pp. 132-134). He goes on to say further, "Great as he is as a politician, as an organizer, as a leader of men, as a moral reformer, he is greater than all these as a man, because none of these aspects and activities limits his humanity . . . an incorrigible idealist and given to referring all conduct to certain pet formulae of his own, he is essentially a lover of men and not of mere ideas . . . If he proposes an experiment for society, he must first subject himself to its ordeal. If he calls for a sacrifice, he must first pay its price himself . . . none of the reforms with which his name is associated was originally his in conception. They have almost all been proposed and preached by his predecessors or contemporaries . . . Nevertheless, it remains true, that they have never had the same energizing power in them as when he took them up; for now they are quickened by the great life-force of the complete man who is absolutely one with his ideas, whose visions perfectly blend with his whole being . . . Perhaps he will not succeed. Perhaps he will fail as the Buddha failed and as Christ failed to wean men from their iniquities but he will always be remembered as one who made his life a lesson for all yet to come" (pp. 134-136). And to this Gandhi had already said seven years earlier, in 1931, ". . . I owe much to one who by his poetic genius and singular purity of life has raised India in the estimation of the world" (p. 121). And three years later, "The Bard of Santiniketan is Gurudev for me as he is for the inmates of that great institution" (p. 118). And six years later still, in 1940, "Gurudev

himself is international because he is truly national. Therefore, all his creation is international and Visva-Bharati is the best of all" (pp. 138-139).

Kakasaheb Kalelkar's appraisal of both (in the *Preface to the TGC*) is worth quoting : "They were great friends, they adored each other, almost like lovers. But, their temparements were different, their Sadhana of life was different. They attracted and influenced Indian humanity in different ways. They were, thus, one might say, poles apart in everything but the spirit. They knew they had to walk along their own different respective paths. But they also knew they were complementary to each other. Their paths were different but their souls were in unison" (p. vii).

Talking further of the response of the ashram inmates, he says, "We would love and revere the Poet, but we would follow the fighting Karmaveer" (p. viii), an eminently suitable position, for did they not know, "(in) openly opposing each other . . . it was the Poet who took the lead. There was no occasion when Gandhiji voiced his opposition to anything which the Poet said or did. . . . Gandhiji welcomed him as a Great Sentinel and came out by merely asserting his deepest thoughts. They were marked by directness of utterance and depth of conviction. Gandhiji never claimed to be a conversationalist. He contended himself with giving expression to his inmost feelings" (pp. viii-ix). Ofcourse "(some) could not understand the meaning of the controversy and felt bewildered and sided with either of them according to their own predilections... we... were deeply pained at the controversy but at the same time welcomed it as an element of great education for our people and our minds..." (p.ix).

C. CONCLUSIONS, AND A CURTAIN RAISER

When masters perform, often all one can do is stand up and applaud. But then to stand up should not become the means to stand aside. For the applause must ultimately die down, and we are left with the problem of what to do next with our hands.

Theirs was an awe inspiring presence, but that need not make it an ominous one. Where they were clear in exposition, and clearly understandable, no further comment need be made. But where they were not, and where it is necessary to clarify issues that can guide us in our search for development, the awe of a profound thinker need not intimidate an essential analysis. For though we grant that analysis often cannot capture the vibrance of an original thought, and to that extent must appear insipid, often our predilection for taste may mar our ability to ruminate and digest. Moreover, such an analysis should serve to conclude our discussion for the present and become a curtain-raiser for what must follow.

If the poet wove his thoughts with care, as befits a poet and creative writer of his stature, he was mostly content to rest at that. He appeared to invest most energies in this weaving, in the fluid charm of undulating thought and the crest and ebb of language, and considered that an end in itself. In fact one suspects he was often content to lose himself in the flow of his own thoughts. He never considered it necessary to generate a mass following to his ideas, though he did express it forcefully enough. Of course it is a moot point whether his expertise really lay there, and one may be granted the argument that it was not. For the writer, his writing is his creation, his off-spring, that he nurtures with great care and nurses like a child; and he is content to lay back and behold the creation that he invests all his energies in. He often has nothing further to offer, atleast of the same caliber and on his own (if he can avoid), and is not dissatisfied that this be so. For the work of creation having been accomplished, he expects the beholders to take on from where he leaves.

For Gandhi, on the other hand, words expressed both anguish that accompanied the trauma of experience and resolve that wells up as an unsurmountable force within to quell it. And though he too chose his words with care, there was no patterning of thought and filling up of interstices as comes naturally to a creative writer. He himself acknowledged that there was none of the poet in him. That his thoughts were no less inspired is not to be discounted, however.. Thought, for him, and its expression, had to be direct and straight from the heart, its worth lying in its simplicity and lack of embellishments. There must in fact not be any of the fluid grace of a delicate lattice here; what must manifest is the solid uncut edginess of a weather-beaten rock that must bear the burden of humanity's toils. This only befits a man of action, for, here every thought is a launching pad for the activity to follow, either for a mass-movement or for self-purification. Nothing more, nothing less. And to achieve this, he must avoid embellishments. For, if ornaments can enhance beauty, they can also serve as effective means to deny the underlying beauty of its legitimate status. They can skew perspectives. And sometimes lack of ornamentation bring out the core beauty in bold relief as much as ornamentation seek to dominate it and therefore undermine it. Here the boundaries between figure and ground can be dangerously blurred. Moreover, skilfully woven thought patterns do create an attractive picture that may serve to be falsely satisfying when they are meant to lead on to action. They may in fact be considered the end of endeavour and serve to adroitly avoid that commitment which should be to action that must follow and is really of the essence. For often when the mind gets so attached, it abdicates the power of leaving its

attachment to its creation when it should.

Thus, if one cannot but be enthralled by the fluid grace of a Tagore, Gandhi's staccato rapier-sharp broadsides must jolt us out of any accompanying stupor. And complacency. And aimless reveries. And vacuous castle-building. For often a litling melody can haunt the mind and endear itself so greatly that it becomes hypnotic to the limbs that must shake themselves free of the shackles that surreptitiously bind them in the meanwhile. Between the two of them, then, they encompass the whole panorama of that human potential which for its vitality must remain eternally vigilant, and ever active. An open-eyed reason combined with firm-footed resolve, then, is the message the two have bequeathed us as a beacon light for the grim tasks of nation-building lying ahead.

All developing societies, especially those which have been under foreign yoke, have to struggle with two opposite forces. On the one hand, they must search for their identity and seek to establish it. In so doing they strive to preserve whatever it is that they identify as their own, and that which is unique to them and they can pride over. In so doing there can be fanatical propogation of what are considered 'core' ideals, with repeated affirmations to uphold them. This of course is as much a manifestation of an insecurity struggling to establish its moorings as an acknowledgement that such expression is unavoidable, if not altogether legitimate. On the other hand, they must also assimilate the draughts of outside influences that impinge tantalizingly (or menacingly, according to some) on the consciousness. Here the difficulty is again with the individual afraid of being swept off his feet, since he has not established firm moorings. It then boils down to the search for the firm foundation of that national life which a people's consciousness should seek to articulate. In other words, that which is Swadeshi.

Now, it is true that the first of these activities is essentially narcissistic and therefore anathema to some, for it can easily transform itself into obscurantism, fundamentalism or fanaticism. The other, again, is essentially anarchical and on that count equally anathema to others, for it can easily transform itself into identity crisis, culture shock or aimless drift, and equally fanatical attempts to deny one's origins. Both these are realistic fears and must be respected. But that cannot be a justifiable reason to avoid passing through this self-scrutiny, or become the means to avoid it. For it is no use trying to wish it away, or negate its articulation. Neither need it help deny expression within ourselves of that which can disrupt the comfortable oasis of order we may have managed to build for ourselves amongst all the struggles and ruins of the less fortunate around. For the

oasis is really a mirage, and discomfort is inherent in any struggle to establish personal and social identity; and inevitable too. Some may appear to traverse these stages faster, others may get less disturbed by the concomitant self-scrutiny. But the journey must be undertaken, and the disturbance must be experienced. Part of the search for development must proceed in those privileged sections which have the power to deny this articulation. For they can contribute quite handsomely, if only they can be motivated to abandon the fears, mainly of whether such enquiries on their part will anarchize their smugness. It indeed can, and must, to the extent necessary. For it is only when smugness is anarchized that development flowers.

The Tagore-Gandhi controversy hints at some of the issues that must engage our attention here. To put them simply they are :

1. Nothing that is foreign can be totally identified with. The attempt itself is doomed to failure. But nothing that is foreign need be rejected purely because it is so. And nothing that belongs to self is to be accepted because it is so, either. All that is beneficial in the modern trend cannot but be assimilated by the prudent before it is forced on in circumstances that evoke cynicism, hurt and obscurantism. In this assimilation there can be either the open-minded welcome of a perceptive Tagore with faith in the vital spirit of man which cannot ever be stifled; or the guarded-calculated reserve of a down to earth Gandhi fully aware of the folly and foibles of an easily swayed laity. For, if one must caution against unhealthy isolation, the other must insist on assimilation on one's own terms, when one is ready to repay what one takes with decent interest⁹.

For example, if a foreign language is to be used, it cannot be at the cost of an Indian language. If a foreign cloth is to be used, it cannot similarly be at the cost of Indian cloth. But no language or cloth need be rejected just because it is foreign. In fact there is every need to both learn from an outside influence and to incorporate it into one's system. Any rejection, if at all, must be on the basis of a reasoned debate. Any influence also has to be similar. A simple rule to follow in this matter is to put oneself in the place of a nation and think what we ourselves feel about interaction with others. For example, just because we write and you read, are you destabilized? Can you not assimilate without losing your identity? Can you not decide what is proper and what improper in this influence? Should you not exert yourself to so decide? And should not whatever prevents you from assimilating that which is proper be got rid of? Should we, or rather can we, shut off our perspective apparatus to outside influences to preserve ourselves? And if we do so, what sort of an identity are we preserving?

Would it not be better to efface it to actualize that which is true and healthy, which can develop only after this occur?

As with individuals, so with a people. This should make each one of us understand why we adopt the varied stances toward outside influences that we do. For often our stances in the social field only mirror our ideas at the personal level.

2. The Charkha controversy must make us aware that there should be no blind following. Equally truly, not everything that arouses mass fervour need be shunned. For, if often it involves lack of reason, it can sometimes also articulate the genuine aspirations of a people. While no one need surrender his reason, it is at times necessary to curb its blind forays into purposeless opposition, or cynical blame-opportuning. It is also necessary to blunt such of its offensives as point out errors which can hurt the thrust of development. For, there is a proper time for criticism, as for evaluation. And although one may be tempted to think that a mass fervour that is easily blunted by criticism is not worth having at all, one must be aware that a strong gust of breeze only sways a tree but can uproot a sapling. If the accent is on growth, the sense of when and how can never be lost sight of.

Equally important is it for all followers of a wave, any wave, to be eternally vigilant of the traps and malevolence of its propounders, and more so their lieutenants. While often the primary source of all revolutions, as indeed of most endeavours, as unimpeachable, it is the second order propogators, or cronies, who hold the potential for mischief and misrepresentation. Their ability to identify with the original messiah must be under constant surveillance.

3. The controversy over the Bihar earthquake should make it clear that reason has achieved its epitome of success in the scientific attitude. This has not unreasonably possessed our age. It must subject our most cherished, most 'intuitively felt' of beliefs to a careful scrutiny, and lay bare the phoney and the unreasonable. It must make us aware where our beliefs are subterfuges for fears of the unknown, for the greater beliefs often hide the greater such fears. It must also unveil those fears that masquerade as dogma, as godliness, as superstition. For, all these can manifest as much in ideas of sect superiority as the mushrooming of God-man offering instant solutions and pontiffs exorcising our catastrophies. Secondly, with all its defects and all its destabilizations, modern civilization has come to stay. It cannot be wished away, much less destroyed. Similarly no one can go back to the old in its physicality. What need be done is hold on to, or, rediscover, certain amongst the old that are worth holding on to, find

modern paradigms for their application, and reject the flotsam and jetsam of trivial ritualizations that obscures the truly pure from view. In this we must use our critical abilities to evaluate all spheres of our beliefs - our religions, our faiths, our ideologies, our superstitions, even our indigenisation. We may be shocked to find that all these will be found to have their points of relevance, as they have their points of relevance, as they have their points of irrelevance. Yes, *all* of them; and we include the superstitions here. Similarly all amongst us will have to closely study the modern paradigms of progress; which them need not be rejected, which made more relevant, and which rejected outright.

Our dress, our language, our work and our beliefs are the four areas represented by the Tagore-Gandhi controversy. Between them, they traverse the whole gamut of activities that can occupy the people of a nation. In each sphere, there are distinct points of worth, as well as intersecting issues of concern. As the issues are laid bare, man constructs himself.

To achieve this, open-ness must be our oars, reason our boat, dialogue our current, faith our pole-star and development our destination. The man who has preferred to drive such a boat for more than forty years now has managed to lead it far astream. Need he drop anchor now, atleast temporarily? *Can* he? Or need he keep headlong in pursuit of that he has learnt to cherish? Need he row against the currents? Again, *can* he? Are his oars working well? Is his boat in need of repairs, have all the holes been plugged? Are his own rowing hands steady enough? Is the star that he has identified really *the* pole-star? Has his intellect decided on the destination? Is he rowing in that direction? Is his vision faulty, does the foliage obscure the goal that lies at hand-shaking distance; does he really need the binoculars he is using?

These then would be the questions the Poet would want to ask of us today. And the Mahatma expect us to answer.

14, Shiva -Kripa
Oppo-St. Mary's Convent
Nahur, Mulund(W)
BOMBAY - 400080

AJAY SINGH and SHAKUNTALA SINGH

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Cf. K. J. Shah's, "In Search of Development", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan - 1984, pp 5-13.
2. Cf. (1) above for a basic background of the issues involved and salient features of this controversy. Cf. also the book on which it is based: *Truth Called Them Differently (Tagore-Gandhi Controversy) - heresafter, TGC*: Compiled and Edited by R.K. Prabhu and Ravindra Kelekar, Navjivan, Ahmedabad, 1961.
3. William Hazlitt, 1830, quoted in *Controversy in Psychiatry* by J.P. Brady & H.K.H. Brodie (ed.), Saunders, Philadelphia, 1978, p xiii.
4. Cf. Daya Krishna's "Thinking Vs Thought", *JICPR*, Jan-April, 1988, pp 47-57 : 'How much misguided intellectual effort would have been saved if nobody had worried about what the Bible or the Koran or the Vedas really meant... The amount of effort that has been wasted on finding what Marx or Freud or Wittgenstein or Hegel really meant is truly astonishing' (p. 48).
5. Gilbert Ryle, *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 210.
6. All quotations in this section from TGC above; parenthesis, if any, added. The page number of TGC appears in parenthesis. Some of them are also in (1) above. TGC mentions the original source at the end of every chapter.
7. Tagore describes a humorous anecdote of his childhood servant, Gopee, who went to Puri on a pilgrimage and did not know which fruit to offer since the Lord could not eat any. So he offered him a tomato, which he disliked really, "never having reason to repent of such clever abnegation" (p. 95).
8. Tagore would reply to this thus, "In working for his livelihood he ought to have earned not only his daily bread, but also his eternal truth.... It has been said in the *Upanishads* that *Brahma* is reason, *Brahma* is Spirit, but *Anna* also is *Brahma*, which means that Food also represents an eternal truth, and therefore through it we may arrive at a great realization, if we travel along the true path" (p. 98-99).
9. cf. his remark, "My Swaraj is to keep intact the genius of our civilization. I want to write many new things but they must all be written on the Indian slate. I would gladly borrow from the West when I can return the amount with decent interest". *Young India*, 26 June, 1924

ON LOGICAL FORM OF ACTION SENTENCES

A teacher tries to make the point clear that no assertion can be made unless it is either supported by evidence or is justified through arguments which the student adamantly ignores. The teacher thumps the table between him and the student sitting opposite. The desk reacts to the thumping by generating wave-sequence in the atmosphere (perhaps of an unexpectedly high pitch) which, when reaches the ear, is called sound. The student, on the other hand, reacts by making the allegation -- the teacher has been deliberately trying to delay the submission of his work¹. The desk is unfortunately unable to make out any "deliberation" or "intention" of the teacher in the action described by "thumping the desk", but the student does. The student not only sees an "intention" in the action performed by the teacher but he also hopes to communicate the same to the higher authorities. Obviously, he does not see it as a mere "generation of sound". He does not describe his teacher's action as merely "thumping of the desk" but as "a deliberate attempt to delay the submission of his work".

Before the student can muster enough courage to face the higher authorities, he expresses his views to his friends and other teachers. Many of them are quite sympathetic to him. When he finds enough sympathisers (perhaps also advisers who suggest him what to do under the circumstances!), he finds himself in an enviable position -- the discoverer of the *truth*.² The truth being with him and he being with the truth, he prepares himself to take the *true* (proper) step. He, with his full conviction regarding the state of affairs, meets the higher authorities. After giving him a patient hearing, the highest authority, the Vice Chancellor, rejects his allegation as baseless. The Vice Chancellor does not see any "deliberate" intention of delaying the submission of his thesis. The Vice-Chancellor does not see any *connection* between "thumping the desk" and "deliberately trying to delay the submission".

The story has an obvious moral. The only witness to what happened between the teacher and the student are they themselves. But the

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student found many sympathisers or so it seemed to him, while he had been telling about the incident of "thumping the desk" or "deliberately trying to delay the submission". Obviously, while describing the incident, he fails to put every details of the happening into words. It is not his fault. Every possible details of any happening is beyond description. Therefore, consciously or unconsciously, he is selective and thereby creating a sequence of happenings far removed from what actually happened. In other words, he puts his *intentions* into his *descriptions*. Though he would very much like to believe himself or give the impression to 'others' that his way of describing the happenings is the *only objective* way. Describing an episode, narrating a narrative, telling a story, even sympathising or agreeing are all done by human agents with some intention or motive. A human being without any intention is a contradiction in terms. But this posture, a being without intention, often pays, at least it helps to deceive oneself, as long as it is not clear to him/her that by suspension of intentionality (s)he has been reduced to mere animality. But a mere animal cannot read intentions of "others". This make-believe situation where an individual projects him(her)self devoid of any intentionality but able to find intentions in "others" is a kind of hypocrisy with which we all live and yet we vehemently deny. This unauthenticity is quite natural and almost necessary with ordinary existence.

This introductory note was meant to make it clear that actions are performed by agents with some intention. Such agents who can formulate an intention are specifically human agents and the unauthenticity described tells us that there are two divergent views on the nature of human beings. According to one view, human beings, in sharp contrast to non-human beings, is a being-off-the-world, a pure consciousness, a thinking being, a cogniser. Obviously, it is the Platonic-Cartesian legacy. According to the other view, human beings, like any other being, are beings-in-the-world, a mere body, a puppet. The unauthenticity is due to an oscillation between the two beings. But for the philosophers, since the days of Plato, two essences of the same being seemed contrary to reason. One of the beings -- either the being-in-the-world or the being-off-the-world -- is to be considered as *the* essence while the other is either to be explained or to be explained away. Thus, philosophers have been constantly searching for an essence for existence, somehow the essence and existence ought to coincide -- Platonic legacy again. Consequently, the search for an essence of human beings, following Platonic-Cartesian line, ended up with a being-off-the-world, a pure consciousness, a pure cogniser, only intention,

a thinking being. A reaction to such a view led some philosophers to the other extreme and they thought of human beings as a being-in-the-world, only performer, constant change.

Such a sharp distinction between the two conceptions of human beings, has led to two different forms of action sentences. Broadly speaking, we may decipher two different tendencies so far as the logical form of action is concerned -- extensional and intensional. According to the extensionalist thesis, actions are only a subclass of the class of events. In other words, actions are just out there, they are purely physical. Hence, a proper characterization of them is possible in terms of extensional language alone. On the other hand, the intensionalists are of the opinion that actions are intrinsically connected with the inner states of the agents -- the intentions, the desires, the will etc. On account of this internal element involved in actions, we must have a non-extensional language, an intensional language, for a proper characterization of actions. The two views are largely based on the nature of action, that is, whether action is primarily a change in the state of affairs or is primarily an intention of an agent to make something happen. Consequently, there has to be a presupposition regarding the nature of the agent as well, that is, whether a change in the state of affairs is brought about by an agent out of necessity or the agent brings the change about out of his free will.

The logical form of action sentences, according to the extensionalist thesis, can be characterized purely in terms of extensional language, that is in terms of first-order predicate logic. This is possible because, actions are thought of as mere changes among the states of affairs. Actions are events. For example, the action sentence, "The teacher thumped the desk" would take the form :-

$$(\exists x) [\text{thumped}(\text{the teacher, the desk})x] \quad \dots (1)$$

which in quasi-English may be read as, "There is an event, x , such that x is thumping of the desk by the teacher". An action acquires its designation due to its peculiar position in the causal nexus. An action is preceded by a mental event where there is an appropriate want and desire. For an explanation of the performance of an action, according to this view, it is necessary and sufficient to cite the causal antecedents of the bodily movements associated with the action, namely the agent's wants, desires, beliefs etc. An immediate consequence of this is that an action is not identical with the associated bodily movements. That is, "Thumping the desk" is not identical with "Moving the arm". An action is a complex event

involving at least bodily motions, neurological events and brain events. The wantings and believings are part of the action performed. The logical form of the action sentences take the shape :-

$$\begin{aligned} (\exists x) (\text{willed to thump}(\text{the teacher, the desk})x) \text{ caused} \\ (\exists x) (\text{thumped}(\text{the teacher, the desk}) y) \quad \dots (2) \end{aligned}$$

Hume taught us that causes and effects are distinct events. In other words, neither any part of the cause should be the effect nor any part of the effect should be the cause. Since wanting and believing are wholly accommodated in the action performed, can wanting and believing be also causes of the action performed? An escape from this dilemma can be found if one equates action with the bodily movements. In that case, analysis of action sentences would take the form of a series of conjunctions of sentences starting from a want and ending up in the bodily behaviour via beliefs³. Under this modified theory of the extensionalists, the objections are bypassed since bodily movements associated with actions are neither part nor include the believing and willing associated with the action. However, this modified version has its own problems. The most important of them all being that of explicating the notion of bodily behaviour associated with actions -- can we call, "moving of one's arm in sleep" an action? Secondly, the notion of action becomes too narrow. There are no non-basic actions. The sentences like, "The teacher deliberately tried to delay the submission of his work" are not action sentences at all but is only a short expression for a causal chain in which "the teacher moved his arm" is an action sentence which in turn logically generates the sentence, "The teacher moved his hand to hit the desk".⁴

It is important to make a distinction between *doing* and *bringing about*. By *doing* certain things we *bring about* something else. For example, by "thumping the desk" the teacher brings about a "delay in the submission of his work". The thing done is the *result* of an action and the thing brought about is the *consequence* of the action. The connection between an action and its result is logical or conceptual. If the result does not materialise the action simply has not been performed. The distinction between the result and the consequence of an action opens up an unending debate regarding the distinction between a basic action and a non-basic action. We cannot afford to get involved into the debate here. It is sufficient for our purpose to mention that the distinction, in an important sense, is relative. But an action is to be distinguished from bodily movements. An

action is essentially intentional.⁵ A bodily movement may just occur, may be due to conditioned reflexes. An element of intentionality is always associated with action. In fact, the intentional element differentiates actions from events. It is true that both action and event imply change and by courtesy we may call non-change as events or refraining etc., but actions are characteristically different from the events in the sense that events are mere change, while actions are intentional change⁶.

However, the category of events itself is no less dubious. There has been no general agreement regarding the nature and ontological status of the category of events, among the philosophers. Three distinct lines of thought have been generated depending upon the linguistic expressions at our disposal. On one view, events are particulars, in very much the same way as my body or this paper is. Strictly speaking such event particulars, though spatio-temporally locatable are not repeatable. The greatest advantage of such a theory of events is that events can be expressed in a purely extensional language. We can only name the events and each event will bear different name. The events are object like. Such a view may be ascribed to Heraclitus or the Buddhists. The ontology of events will remain epistemologically opaque, since the occurrence of an event and its description are temporally separated entities. On the second view, events are thought of as a complex of particulars and properties. Here, of course, events are construed as abstract and repeatable entities but provisions have to be made for quantifying over the properties as well in the language for an adequate description of them. That is, such a view on events requires a higher order language for a proper characterisation of events⁷. According to the third view, events are proposition like objects, in the sense that they are repeatable but not spatio-temporally locatable. Thus, events are abstract entities. For a proper description of an event, under such a view, a provision for quantifying over propositions should be made. Thus the language used is not extensional any more. But events have a dual nature, in the sense that it has a generic element through which identification of it is possible while it has a particularity through which it can be spatio-temporally located. That is, a generic type of event is capable of being instantiated again and again though every instantiation is somewhat different from the others. Thus, the category of event must make room for an abstract entity, the event-type which itself is not spatio-temporally locatable but which can be instantiated in some spatio-temporal locations. Events are abstract as well as concrete. The very possibility of an abstraction from a concrete situation makes it possible that the events can

be identified and re-identified again and again across spatio-temporal boundaries. In nature, we find a continuous sequence of change. But to comprehend and to describe this continuum, as adequately as possible, we have to assume a discrete time medium. Characterisation of change involves the temporal notion of "And Next"⁸ which can make sense only in a discrete time medium. There is no escape from Zeno's paradox, if we grant a continuous time medium -- change becomes impossible, we are trapped in a ceaseless changelessness. Thus, at the conceptual level, a segment of the continuous time is cut out and frozen and is given a name. This process, we may call an *abstraction*, or *fixation*. Once such a segment is abstracted or fixed and is given a name, the segment itself forms a unit which may have many sub-units as well. These units, once given a name, once abstracted, once fixed, does not retain the original sequencing pattern any more. On the contrary, it generates possible sequencings out of all or some of those times to retain the name. Such abstractions may be at different levels, having finer or coarser items which form their own units to make a larger unit. This itself is a complex issue and requires another occasion.

The fundamental units or building-blocks for an intensionalistic theory of action sentences would be propositions or proposition-like objects and a monadic operator over them. The notion of the operator is that something is *made true*, some propositions are *made true* by an agent in any action. The basic syntactical expression in this language would be something like -- an agent, A, performs an action, a, such that the proposition, p, is made true. What corresponds to an event in this framework, is a state of affairs which is brought about and a description of which is made true. Thus, the notion of states of affairs and obtaining of them are implicit in the ontology. Corresponding to the states of affairs, we have propositions to describe them. For the sake of brevity, instead of writing, "an agent, A, performed an act, a, such that the proposition, p, is made true", we may simply write, "A does p". However, the point to be noted here is that an agent can never do p, which is a proposition; he can only do something which makes the proposition true or false. Thus, for action sentence, "an agent does p" we may write 'Bp'. Obviously, its negation would be 'NBp', and 'BNp' its contrary (Using the standard Polish Notations). The negation of "an agent does p" would be "it is not the case that an agent does p" (NBp) while "an agent does not do p" would be the contrary (BNp). Some are of the opinion that 'Bp' is closed under conjunction elimination. That is, if p and q is brought about then p is brought about and q is brought

about :

$$CBKpqKBpBq \quad \dots(3)$$

is valid. If we are thinking of successful action, we may reasonably assume that if p is brought about then p is the case :

$$CBpp \quad \dots(4)$$

It obviously suggests a close resemblance of structure between modal logic and some locutions of actions. However, the structural resemblance breaks down under a closer scrutiny. If (2) and (3) are added to the axioms of the classical propositional logic, we will get :

$$CBNpBCpq \quad \dots(5)$$

as a thesis which in quasi-English may mean something like if not p is brought about then if p then q is brought about. This is one of the paradoxes of strict implications. Nevertheless, the basic insight that one can derive from the intensionalistic approach towards action sentences is that action is to be construed as a change among the state of affairs brought about by an agent - a proposition is made true by bringing about the corresponding state of affairs.⁹ Such a view, obviously puts man at the center, in the sense that the world as such is a ceaseless, directionless, change but man through his deliberate interventions may alter the course of happenings, may make something happen, may give a direction. The man, instead being an actor, becomes a director. An agent's intentions and other internal aspects are all important that enable to view the change in a particular form. Thus, we find that the two views on the logical form of action sentences stem from the two views on the nature of the agents, the nature of human beings. For a mere being-in-the-world, actions are events and consequently caused by some other events (Davidson). For a mere being-off-the-world, actions are proposition-like and are goal-oriented, teleological (Von Wright). The extensional character of the agent, the thingness of the agent, makes it possible to view actions as mere events and thus action sentences are extensional. The intentions of the agents give rise to the intensional character of the action sentences.

It was observed earlier that to characterise a continuous change the continuum has to be broken into bits and a name is to be given, a process of abstraction and fixation is involved. Only by fixing a segment of a continuum, one can comprehend it and can talk about it. In other words, a description of an action is made possible by externalizing the act from the agent. The externalization of the act from the agent is made possible only through the availability of a system of symbols, a language. To

externalize the act from the agent, a fixation is needed and to fix an action is to describe it in some language. Let us take a concrete example. "The teacher was unnecessarily critical of the paper". The act of "being critical" does not involve any particular agent, that is, one can very well say, "someone was critical" without being specific about the agent. This is how the act of "being critical" is abstracted from the actual happenings. Thus, the act of "being critical" is externalized from the agent, the teacher. Moreover, human actions which are expressed in language by a verb allow for a plurality of arguments ranging from no argument (being critical) to an indefinite number of arguments (*the teacher was unnecessarily critical of the student's article on....*)⁹. This variable polyadicity of the verb forms appearing in the action sentences is typical of the fixation of an action. Each addition of an argument delimits the possibilities of interpretations, adds specificities to the mental spaces around the description of the action. The situational variabilities are overlooked through abstraction and again an attempt is made to situate the description of an action through the additions of the arguments, by adding specificities. The world, as such, with or without any human beings, is a continuum, while the conceptual apparatus breaks the continuum into bits. To act is to bring about a change in the states of affairs while to describe action is to freeze the change. The audience in a cinema hall sees the continuous unfolding of a sequence, but the technology behind has captured only the frozen frames.

The dialectics between change and permanence makes the problem of action sentences interesting as well as intriguing. Action, as such, is usually directed towards a sequence of changing patterns but a description of it tries to bring it out of the spatio-temporal frame. A temporal sequentiality involved in any action is made atemporal by giving a description to it. Metaphorically speaking, a description of an action immortalizes the action. A human action which is usually in the form of a discourse is made a document by giving a description to it. It is true that a being-in-the-world makes the movements, but the being-off-the-world plans the movements. Action definitely requires an agent and an agent is neither a pure being-in-the-world nor a pure being-off-the-world. A human agent is neither totally determined by the external forces nor is he totally free to make anything happen. An agent acts with an intentionality, he has a practical reason for his actions. He has to make plans and thereby describe actions in advance. An agent has to be a cogniser, a being-off-the-world in order to make an action-like movement in order to be in-the-world. Cognition leads to action and through actions we cognize. There

seems to be a circularity at the conceptual level. In actual practice, there is no circularity. The ability to act and the ability to cognize are the two sides of the same coin. An agent without a world is just intention, while a world without an agent is mere change. It is only in action, human action that is, the world and the intention are brought together -- man transcends mere animality and becomes a rational animal. In other words, man, an agent, though placed amidst the changing sequentiality of the world becomes capable of comprehending it. Thus, action becomes describable and describing itself is an action. This brings us to the fact that human actions, like speech, are means of communication. Hence it has the dual principle of being a text in a context.¹⁰

It was earlier observed that a human individual, an agent, is neither merely a being-in-the-world nor a pure being-off-the-world, but these are the two dimensions of the human individual. The two dimensions are so fused together that only at the conceptual level, a separation between the two is possible but not at the ontic level. Of course, the Indian concept of Nirvana or Mukti suggests that such a separation at the ontic level as well. But the whole problem of action and action sentences would take entirely a different turn. Thus, any theory of action which emphasises only one aspect of the agent is bound to be a partial theory in the sense that it characterises only one side of the coin and refuses to accept even the existence of the other side. Such theories have a fixed conceptual frame-work and dogmatically refuse to accept anything that eludes their conceptual scheme. This dogmatic refusal gives a facade of omniscience of which the whole of Western philosophy is a victim since the days of Plato. The cogniser, the knower, is always conceived as a being totally cut off from the world, a being-off-the-world, though everything else is a being-in-the-world. It is true that for any cognitive enterprise, there has to be a conceptual separation between the subject, the cogniser and the object of cognition. But this separation need not be at the ontic level. For a cognition to be *objective* there has to be an *object* as different from the subject, of cognition. Thus, the subject-object distinction has to be made at the conceptual level. But this distinction, if stretched to the ontic level, we get a distorted picture. One has to remain satisfied with this distorted picture in order to eliminate doubt, to be certain.

In order to set the picture right, we would like to make a distinction between two types of action sentences -- action sentences from the agent's point of view and action sentences from an observer's point of

view. Action sentences from an agent's point of view is less problematic in the sense that they are like avowals -- incorrigible, if the agent is taken to be honest. However, the agent himself may describe his action as an action of being-in-the-world, as causally determined and sometimes as an action of a being-off-the-world, as teleologically oriented. Often the agent denounces any responsibility of his own action and takes refuge in the safe custody of causal determination, becomes a pure being-in-the-world. Occasionally, he accepts the responsibility of his actions and becomes a being-off-the-world or the master of the world. The more problematic cases are action sentences from the observer's point of view. In this case, responsibility is assigned not to the self but to an agent who is an 'other', an 'other' is held responsible.

When an action is performed, something is brought about, some event takes place, some change is found in the existing state of affairs. The very fact that we describe it as an action performed by an agent, we assign responsibility to him. This assigning of responsibility to an agent, an 'other' implies that he could have done otherwise. In short, we refuse to accept that the agent performed the act of necessity. Thus, an agent is assumed to be a being-off-the-world, who is capable of contemplating, who, as a cogniser, must have cognised (at least contemplated) the consequences. Thus, an agent, in order to be an agent, must transcend the mere objecthood of being-in-the-world. Yet, the agent cannot be totally lifted out of the world and assigned a place beyond it. He maintains contact with the world by deriving his group-identity through some socially given myths, *lebenswelt*. Thus the agent's subjective intentionality gets objectified through the socially accepted norms and myths of the society to which he belongs. This does not mean that an agent acts with a complete obedience to the social norms. On the contrary, the role played by an individual in a society is never totally determined. An agent performs within a given broad frame-work whose minute details are always filled in by the agent himself. Thus, we may conclude that to differentiate action from the events, to act, there is a primacy of the being-off-the-world over the being-in-the-world. Since through a process of contemplation, cognition etc., an agent makes a non-actual possibility actual, the very actualisations of the non-actual possibles are actions. The very idea of a possibility emerges from a being-off-the-world. Only by transcending the world, one can look beyond. A mere being-in-the-world is monogamously wedded to 'is', a being-off-the-world is also monogamously wedded to the 'ought' or 'could'. A being-off-the-world is totally cut off from the actuality, it loses contact

with the world, it is a pure consciousness, he can only play with the concepts, actualisation of them is an impossibility. A being-in-the-world, on the other hand, is pure matter, devoid of any intentionality, reduced to thinghood, possibilities are beyond the grasp. But an actual agent is neither a pure being-in-the-world nor a pure being-off-the-world but rather a hybrid of the two, a being-in-off-the-world, and that is why he has to grapple with not only the 'is' but also with what 'could have beens' or what 'might have beens'.¹¹

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Hyderabad - 500 134.

CHINMOY GOSWAMI

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This is a very common scene in the universities now-a-days. There are reasons much deeper than what meets the eye at the very first glance. A thorough data-based sociological investigation in this area is long due.
2. It is usually believed that *truth is objective*. The notion "objective" has created a lot of confusion regarding the nature of truth. It is debatable whether the notion of objectivity is related to objects, facts, state of affairs and the like or is related to the social agreement or consensus. For such perspectives see Mulholzer, P - "Objectivity", *Erkenntnis*, 1988, pp.185-230; Gilbert, M. - "Modelling Collective Belief", *Synthese*, 1987, pp 185-204; Goswami, C. - "Science, Society and Objectivity", *Filozofska Istrazivanja*, 1987, pp 553 - 558.
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6. For a detailed discussion on the difference between actions and events see Gautam, S.P. *op cit* and for their identification Davidson, D. *op cit*.

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9. Kenny, A.; - *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, in which he brings out the polyadic nature of the verb form.
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11. An earlier draft of this paper was presented in a seminar organised by the Indian Philosophical Association. I am thankful to the participants for their comments and remarks. I am also thankful to all my colleagues and the students of the department of philosophy, university of Hyderabad as they provided very useful insights through their actions while I was revising this paper.

MARXISM AND THE LOGIC OF FUTURAL DISCOURSE: A BRIEF REFLECTION

For many, it has always been something of a problem to make sense of truth claims about future states or events as these are enunciated in the major philosophical and religious traditions. To say, for instance, that one believes in the classless society or the coming Kingdom of God continues to be a source of genuine befuddlement and distrust. Prognostications like these, if they deserve this status at all, seem to belong to the sphere of mere assertion. Indeed while many find it possible at least to understand the view of human nature proposed by such traditions (eg. Christianity and Marxism), they often flounder when these same traditions engage in discourse about the shape of things to come. But discourse about the future seems to occupy a crucial role for genuine adherents of both the traditions. Christianity without the Kingdom of God or a Marxism understood without the classless society, would probably be unacceptable to mainstream followers of both the traditions. Both, it seems, are indispensable ingredients in the self-understanding of the two "believing" communities.

What I propose in this paper is a way of treating "futural discourse" or "eschatological imagery" in such a way that its intelligibility is clarified. I propose to do this by focusing upon the notion of the classless society. My goal is to show that the classless society is a transformative symbol - an invitation to action - and if understood thus, certain difficulties in Marxist interpretation can be readily overcome.

Images of the Classless Society

The precise nature of Marx's view of the classless society is debatable since he left us with neither a specific programme nor a detailed blueprint. His references, for the most part, are cautious generalizations. Nor, some argue, is this really surprising, since Marx was a materialist not an idealist. David McLellan writes :

If all ideas were a product of contemporary social reality, then a detailed

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projection of these ideas into a distant future was bound to result in idealism - ideas that were completely imaginary since they lacked an empirical reference.¹

Indeed Marx preferred to use the term "communism" for the movement that would overcome the capitalist order as distinct from the society and that would gradually emerge. Hence, in *The German Ideology*, he writes :

Communism is not for us a condition which ought to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to conform itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present condition.²

Extrapolating from this, it is fair to assume the classless society is not to be construed as communism as such, but is better understood as being non-capitalist, or better perhaps, post-communist. What we have here is an image of the future primarily based on the *via negativa*. To avoid idealist projection, Marx refuses to delineate the specific contours of both the communist and classless societies. His unwillingness to predict the future is also evident in his and Engels' criticism of the utopian thinking current among some contemporaries.³

Despite this obvious reticence, Marx on occasion does refer explicitly to his *hopes* for a classless society. If he refuses to provide a blueprint, he nonetheless offers a specific number of images that give us some sense of what he intends and wants. Above all, Marx proposes that the classless society will not be encumbered by the class repression of the old regime. The political and religious superstructure will wither away, since it will no longer reflect the ruling class' monopoly on society's means of production. Nor will it be needed to legitimize their rule. There will, moreover, be no alienation of labour. What is produced will affirm one's self and society's collective needs in which one finds one's true nature and goal (i.e., species being). The product of one's labour - an expression of one's self - will no longer be sold on the open market but used to meet the legitimate *needs* of other, not for profit, but for their betterment as persons. Marx writes :

I would have had the satisfaction of having acted as an intermediary between you and the human species, that is, of your feeling me to be a completion of your own being and a necessary part of yourself; that is, I would know my value to be confirmed in your thought and love....

For commentators like Robert Tucker the classless society envisaged by Marx (or what Tucker calls "ultimate communism"), is essentially aesthetic in spirit. It involves, if anything, the re-constitution of our perception of the world in such a way that utility gives a way to appreciation and

beauty. Tucker writes :

He (Marx) declares that 'The cultivation of the five senses is the work of the whole history of the world to date'. The positive transcendence of private property will complete the work of history. It will mean the liberation of the human senses to appreciate man-made objects for what they inherently are rather than perceiving in them only objects of utility and potential possession.⁵

Thus far, we have noted two apparently irreconcilable tendencies in Marx's thinking about the classless society. On the one hand, he refuses to talk in any explicit way for fear of falling prey to the danger of idealism. On the other hand, he clearly offers a vision of a classless community, one that is based on humanity's species being and non-alienated labour. What are we to conclude ? That Marx is subject to the inevitable inconsistencies that are part and parcel of a great man's thought ? Or that he could be consistent if he dropped the idea of the classless society and held instead to his social analysis ?

At this point, I simply want to propose that Marx's account of the classless society is not only appropriate but an integral part of his whole ideology. Before, however, I elaborate, I want to discuss another problem in Marxist interpretation - one related to Marx's view of the future.

The Ambiguity of Action : The Nature of Dialectic

The question of how a classless society will actually come about is one that goes straight to the heart of Marx's understanding of dialectic *per se*. Marx was undoubtedly one of the most uncompromising dialecticians in the history of human thought. Nonetheless one senses a frequent tension in his vision of the future as perpetual dialectic and his view of the future as absolute de-alienation in the classless society. While his appreciation of the dialectical method encourages the view that all historical states are surpassable and provisional, that is, that all historical periods ultimately contain their own negation, his hope for a classless society leads, at times, to the anticipated *arrest* of the historical dialectic. Marx writes :

It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.

As for how this state will ultimately come about, Marx equivocates again. On the one hand, Marx proposes that in order to "achieve" the classless society, society must acknowledge the laws of social development and

act in accord with their inner telos and destiny. By acquiring control of the forces of production - the forces responsible for social relations - Marx assumes the repressive forces of religion, culture, and the state, will finally wither away. This view of Marx - a view championed by Sartre and Luckas - underscores the need for human commitment and praxis.⁷

But another view has Marx placing considerable more emphasis on laws outside of human consciousness crucial for the development of a classless society. As early as 1845 in *The German Ideology*, Marx writes, "there is a world in which consciousness and being are distinct; a world which continues to exist when I do away with its existence in thought"⁸ Commentators like John Hoffman imply that by deemphasizing Marx's concern with a dialectic of nature, interpretations like those of Sartre and Luckas fail to make seriously Marx's own claims about natural laws and exist independent of human consciousness. As Hoffman notes, Marx himself concurred with Engel's exposition of the dialectic of nature in his *Anti-Duhring*. According to Hoffman, he also rejected a view of nature that was non-dialectical because it failed to account for the novelty and productivity crucial to explain humanity's own development. Indeed with the introduction of Darwin's *Origin of the Species* (1860), Marx wrote to Engels and referred to Darwin's classic as actually containing the natural historical foundation of his own outlook. Marx also makes an interesting reference to natural law in *Capital*, volume 1.⁹

Intrinsically it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results.¹⁰

Of particular interest here, is the reference to laws which move with "necessity towards inevitable results", something, it seems, substantially at odds from the emphasis on praxis in the former interpretation. The corollary of this is that human freedom (i.e., praxis) is radically curbed and the classless society is here understood as the inevitable outcome of the march on nature and history.

A Pragmatic and Transformative Symbol

I want to return, if only briefly, to reflect on the role of the classless society in Marxist futural discourse. I want to suggest that it serves as a transformative symbol. Understood thus, it can't be seen as an empirical prognostication; nor can it be seen as the kind of symbol that diverts one's

attention from the class struggle at hand.

My reflections here are largely indebted to the penetrating insights of C. Peter Slater, whose excellent book, *The Dynamics of Religion*, throws much light on the role of symbols in ideological systems both secular and religious. Slater contends that when *lives* by a specific set of symbols, that is, when one is guided by a master story or narrative (what he interprets as a shifting cluster of primary and secondary symbols), the symbols can't be seen as merely static or indicative. Symbols, he says, are also essentially transfigurative and directed towards the future. Slater writes :

If persuading someone to see the wisdom of a religious way of life is like sharing a joke, what we need are not pointers to what is always hidden but ways of transforming the other's vision of what is already potentially present.¹¹

Assuming this, Slater argues it's not that surprising that most traditions, secular and religious, are short on the specifics of "transcendent end states" (i.e., what a classless society or a Kingdom of God etc., will actually look like). This is because transformative symbols constitutive of traditions are essentially *pragmatic* and *eschatological*. Indeed Slater writes, "Lack of specificity in symbols of the end invites participation in the shaping of the end".¹² This, he claims, is the distinctive character of "religious" stories :

Whatever the sense of time or place adopted by the story teller, it becomes religiously significant when it is perceived as something from which we must move or which must be transformed.¹³

In this regard, too, the Marxist story is essentially religious because it calls, in effect, for the *total* transformation of our current society, that is, complete liberation from the oppression of the ruling class; it also invites our own involvement in bringing this change about. As for key principles and maxims that guide us to this end, these are to be found in the constitutive principles offered by each tradition. According to Slater, while love and justice have played this role in the Christian faith, "equality and fraternity" have served this function in revolutionary Marxism.¹⁴ Of importance here, too, is Slater's claim that constitutive principles used to guide "believers" always presuppose an organic continuity between adopted means and ends. It's not enough to start practising virtue on the first day of the Kingdom or to exhibit fraternity after the revolution. Means and ends in religious narratives always imply each other.

Our discussion thus far has significant implications for what I call the logic of futural discourse. If we take Slater seriously, the classless society should not be understood as an empirical proposition. To fault

Marxism simply on the basis that classless society has not come about, is not to understand how this concept works. It's to confuse, in effect, the empirical discourse of positivism with that of exhortation (i.e., moral recommendation). Or as Wittgenstein might say, it amounts to faulting a tennis player for not scoring goals.

In my opinion, Marxist discourse, while truly empirical in some respects, is ultimately governed by a pragmatic moral imperative. Its *primary* goal - as Marx once said - is not to understand, but to transform our current world. Praxis, then, is central, and this means working towards a goal that takes its cue from a vision of the classless society. This means, too, that to interpret Marxism with undue regard to its futural thrust is to risk abstracting from moral imperatives that invite our own response. Understanding Marxism means *acting* in accord with the moral principles of equality and fraternity consistent with the vision of a classless society. To play for a moment on Kant's formulation, principles without visions are empty, visions without principles are blind.

The classless society, then, is no mere empirical prognostication. According to Marx, it can't and even oughtn't to be, since to project such an image into the future is to fall into the idealism that his dialectic rejects. Its role, instead, is best understood as regulative moral principle - tied to the principles of equality and fraternity - and constitutive for directing current social praxis. Understood thus, the classless society can only be interpreted as a perpetual dialectic always falling short its own moral perfection, since to be a human being is, by definition, always to be imperfect.¹⁵

As for those strands in Marx which tend to treat the classless society as the inevitable outcome of the dialectics of nature, these, I think, must be re-examined with a view to reinterpreting their underlying intention from the moral pragmatic viewpoint. This means that rather than interpreting the classless society in terms of the horizon of a dialectics of nature (i.e., as its necessary and inevitable outcome) a dialectics of nature must now be understood in terms of the classless society itself understood as a moral and regulative ideal (i.e., not a future state). To borrow a theological term, the dialectics of nature ought to be demythologized or anthropologically interpreted in order to reveal the truth about praxis that lies disguised in the objectifying thought forms of a dialectics of nature. By "objectifying" here, I refer to a process either seen or interpreted as independent of action, but the meaning of which is essentially tied to human responsibility and praxis.

At this point, I would venture to say that existentially interpreted

(i.e. understood anthropologically) the *necessity* implied in a dialectics of nature could be re-interpreted as *unconditional allegiance to the principles enshrined in the perpetual quest for a classless society*. This, I think, is the moral and pragmatic counterpart of a dialectics of necessity, and something that accords with Slater's emphasis on the transformative power of the classless society as symbol.

Department of Religious Studies
St. Thomas University,
Fredericton, New Brunswick
Canada

COLIN O'CONNELL

NOTES

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3. See, for instance, Engel's letter to A. Bebel. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, (Moscow : 1956), 352-59.
4. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, ed. D. Struick (New York : 1964), 157.
5. Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, (Cambridge : 1961), 158.
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8. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, (Moscow : 1956), 255.
9. See John Hoffman, *Marxism and the Theory of Praxis*, (New York : 1975), esp. 45 ff.
10. *Ibid.* 144
11. Peter Slater, *The Dynamics of Religion*, (New York : 1978) 70.
12. *Ibid.*, 70

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13. *Ibid.*, 55.

14. *Ibid.*, 81. Slater argues that constitutive principles like equality and fraternity are characteristically exemplified in the constantly changing stories of the leading "saints" and shapers of the world's major traditions (e.g. Mao and Bethune in Marxism).

15. Note, too, Marx's remarks on the finitude of reason : Human reason, which is anything but pure, having only incomplete vision, encounters at every step new problems to be solved.

Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, (New York; 1963), 132.

McTAGGART ON PERCEPTION

McTaggart's views on perception, unorthodox and important (even if at times controversial) as they are, have largely remained neglected in the Anglo-American discussions of the subject. It must be counted as an inexplicable irony about fashions in philosophy that rejection of a thinker's philosophy, or of the school he represents, often leaves in its wake a complacently dismissive attitude even with regard to other important things he may have to say on issues of contemporary relevance. The problem of perception has been one of the most extensively and hotly discussed subjects in the analytic tradition (and of course in the phenomenological tradition of the Continent), and yet practically nothing or little has been heard about the views of philosophers like McTaggart on the question. It is this general (and unhappy) neglect which has urged me to bring the issue into light.

McTaggart's views on perception form a well laid out coherent theory and are no mere desultory statements of someone treating of the questions by incidence. His treatment of the different issues relating to perception is informed by an internal exigency and a thematic unity, as would become evident as we go along. That perception is one of the central concerns in McTaggart's thought (something which he shares with the phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, regardless of differences as to orientation and treatment) hardly needs emphasis -- a superficial look at his opus, *The Nature of Existence*¹ (NE), especially volume two, should show that. It is, however, not the relation that the problem of perception bears to McTaggart's system which is of direct relevance here. I do not thereby pretend to suggest that it is in every case feasible or even desirable to divorce a philosopher's reflections on a certain problem from his over-all philosophic position. That is, the suggestion is not that treatments of a subject like perception can *always* stand by themselves; sometimes a more studied attention to the background of the thought (on the issue at hand) may seem necessary. Even so, I think it would not be denied that it may sometimes be advantageous to lift (so to

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say) the problem out of the philosophic system in which it seems embedded and deal with it separately if only with the hope that its discussion may bring into relief at least some of the aspects hitherto not exclusively attended to, or throw some fresh or further light on the relatively familiar ones. In fact, this writer is persuaded that the value of McTaggart's views on perception (as also of his reflections on fundamental concepts such as reality, existence, substance, quality, relation, cause, time, etc.) remains relatively independent of the edifice that is built on them, and so is in itself worthy of attention.

McTaggart's utterances on perception are not all of them to be found under any single special heading. He deals with various aspects of the problem according as the context necessitates. Piecing them together is therefore a task worthy of attempt and also, as I think, philosophically rewarding. In doing so I would in general avoid consideration of his "idealism" -- sometimes the main talking-point of his philosophy -- unless indeed warranted. The same, however, cannot be done with regard to concepts of substance, quality, relation etc., without reference to which discussion of his theory of perception simply does not get started.

It would be well to begin our enquiry by noticing McTaggart's preliminary meaning of the term "perception." And McTaggart says the following :

I use the word perception to denote that *species* of awareness which we have of the *existent* - awareness being a mental state which is *not* belief, though it is *knowledge*.²

So perception is a species of awareness (which is equivalent to knowledge) of the existent. The view that perception is (or yields) knowledge goes back very far in the Western tradition. Thus Theaetetus says to Socrates : "So far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception."³ All knowledge may not be reducible to perception, but perception is without doubt the most primordial mode of consciousness we have of reality. Implicit in this view is the assumption about the 'general reliability' of perceptual experiences. This general reliability may sometimes come under a cloud, as, for example, in illusions or other cases of error, but our conviction about it is scarcely if ever *radically* shaken by the occurrence of such cases. We generally believe that we know, or can always devise, in case of need, ways and means of taking care of such aberrations. Perception, to use phenomenological language, is the human concrete

"opening" to the world through the windows of the senses and the base of our knowledge (of that world) and even of action.⁴ To perceive something - nay, even to be conscious of something - is already to single it out (however vaguely at times), to set it apart from the rest of the world, to take note of it with those of its features we can lay hands on in perception.

The word 'species' in the above quotation from McTaggart is to be marked. Perception being a species of awareness, not all awareness is exhausted in perception, even though it may share, with perception, the characteristic of being (possible) knowledge. To the explication of the terms 'Perception' and 'Awareness' and their distinction McTaggart attaches the greatest importance. He professes to having used both the terms in the sense given to them by Russell and explained by him in the chapter entitled "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" in his *Mysticism and Logic and other Essays*.⁵ To get clear about McTaggart's meaning we quote below some crucial lines from the passages from Russell quoted by McTaggart himself. Regarding 'awareness' and 'acquaintance' as synonymous, McTaggart says that one is aware of an object when one has (to quote Russell) a "*direct* cognitive relation to that object."⁶ Russell further says: "In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S."⁷ The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all, in a large sense, be called sense-data. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be called awareness of *particulars*, we have also (though not quite in the same sense) what may be called awareness of *universals*.⁸ Perception, according to McTaggart, "is the awareness of what Mr. Russell calls particulars, as distinct from the awareness of what he calls universals."⁹ Explicating further his meaning of the terms, McTaggart says: "In the terminology which I propose to adopt, it (i.e., perception) is the awareness of substances as distinct from the awareness of characteristics."¹⁰ McTaggart clarifies that though he does not accept "without reservation" Russell's view regarding the nature of the objects of which we become aware in introspection, "this does not affect the meaning of awareness."¹¹

Elsewhere too McTaggart clarifies that perception as knowledge is distinguished from other knowledge by "being knowledge by acquaintance, or awareness."¹² And he adds :

It is distinguished, again, from other awareness by being awareness of substances, as opposed to that awareness of characteristics which tells us what a quality like yellow, or a relation like superiority, is in itself.¹³

So perception in McTaggart's sense of the term means knowledge of "substances", and applies to both our awareness of the environing world of objects and our awareness of "the contents of my own mind which is given me by introspection."¹⁴

Before we proceed further it is necessary to call attention to one important point. We will note that while McTaggart's "perception" may be deemed as equivalent to Russell's "acquaintance with" in so far as it is limited to particulars (McTaggart's substances),¹⁵ there is a very distinct sense in which it differs from Russell's phrase. It is a crucial feature of McTaggart's use of "perception, to the details of which we shall return later, that it is impossible to perceive a substance (or particular) without perceiving it as characterized in certain ways, i.e., as so-and-so. So while McTaggart can always without difficulty make such statements as "I perceive X as black, as sad, as amiable, as jealous, and so on", one cannot in the Russellian use of the term say : "I am *acquainted with* as red." Russell, be it noted, expressly refers, in the essay concerned, to sense-data as the objects with which we are "acquainted".¹⁶

McTaggart's view of perception as knowledge of substances straight-a-way leads us into the heart of McTaggart's notion of substance. We shall not here attempt to enter on the details of the question but only note, in outline form, some special features of McTaggart's meaning of substance for it has direct and central bearing on his theory of perception.

It is here worthy of note that according to McTaggart, it is not only substances which exist but also qualities and relations, and further, qualities and relations of those existent qualities and relations.¹⁷ McTaggart dismisses the view that characteristics of existents do not exist, as patently unreasonable. If Socrates exists, and is wise, it would be unreasonable to deny that his wisdom exists. And his wisdom is nothing but his quality of being wise. And so does exist the relation of moral superiority in which Socrates stands to Nero, as also the quantitative relation in which his wisdom stands to the wisdom of Aristotle. So qualities and relations

belong to the basic "furniture" of the world.

The things which come first in the order of existents are substances, however. McTaggart's primary meaning of substance needs, I suggest, to be distinguished from what we should prefer to call his "Doctrine of Substance". And it is acquaintance with the former which is principally relevant for our present purposes. (Occasionally, though, we might need to refer to his Doctrine of Substance too; but that does not affect the distinction drawn.)

One useful way of approaching McTaggart's idea of substance would be to notice what McTaggart thinks a self-evident truth: namely that whatever exists *must* have, besides existence, some other characteristics which could be truly asserted of it.¹⁸ This, not because saying about something just that it exists is to say nothing significant - for saying of something that it exists at least helps in distinguishing it from the non-existent - but because it inevitably leads us to the question as to *what* that thing is.¹⁹ That is, the 'what' *invariably* and ineluctably goes along with the 'that'. The above position rests on McTaggart's firm view that whatever exists must have a *nature*, and this nature of the existent consists, according to him, of the characteristics it possesses. Lest this demand for some quality besides existence appear as a mere epistemological requirement, it deserves to be emphasized that this is indeed how it should be, it being a *self-evident* truth (as noted above) that what exists, possesses some characteristic besides existence. An unqualified something would be a mere non-entity, and indistinguishable from nothing. It would, as McTaggart says, be "a perfect and absolute blank."²⁰ (C.D. Broad too regards the above proposition as "self-evidently true" and thinks "existence" to be a 'formal' quality.)²¹ Thus, as McTaggart sums up, that which is "true of" something is a quality of that something.²² (McTaggart however hastens to add that this "being true of" (something) ought not to be taken as a 'definition' of quality, which, according to him, remains, like existence, indefinable²³.)

Again an existent, apart from having some quality besides existence, also stands in a certain relation to some other existent-assuming, that is, that there is a plurality of existents.²⁴ And thus is introduced the category of Relation. Relation too McTaggart regards indefinable, though it can be understood (he says) through specific examples. (Thus *X* is greater than *Y*, *loves Y*, is the father of *Y*, is to the right of *Y*, are examples of relation

in which *X* stands to *Y*). In fact the category of relation is established by the simple fact of an existent having, besides existence, some other quality; for the existent can have that quality only by standing in a certain relation to that quality. Saying that '*X* is happy' allows itself to be analysed in terms of the statements '*X* has the quality of being happy' (Quality) and '*X* stands in a certain relation to happiness' (Relation). This is, then, how we reach the conception of Substance.

Of the two definitions of substance which we come across in McTaggart's works the first one occurs in section 67 of *NE*, Vol. I, and means by substance something which has qualities and is related without being itself either a quality or a relation. The second definition, which amends the first one, and which is not only truer but also accords best with McTaggart's principles, is found in "An Ontological Idealism" where McTaggart says ; "That which has qualities and is related without being itself either a quality or a relation or having qualities of relations among its parts" ²⁵ -the last phrase being added to exclude 'facts'.

As will have been noticed, McTaggart approaches substance via characteristics. This means that substance cannot be reduced to qualities or relations even though either or both of them determine *what* a particular substance is. That is, even though a substance is identified as *this* substance by its characteristics, it is not to be identified *with* those characteristics. Deriving substance from qualities or relations would lead thought to a vain infinite regress. For anything to be actual, there must be some 'fixed starting-points' ²⁶ of actuality, and substances answer to this need; and thus we are spared the anguish of having to postulate characteristics of characteristics of characteristicsor facts about facts about facts ...or facts about characteristics of facts about characteristics ... or anything of the kind which would produce an unattached chain of dependence stretching away to infinity. ²⁷

The important points relating to McTaggart's notion of substance having been briefly noticed, let us now return to the question of perception proper. But before we do so, a crucial clarification, bears as it does on our treatment of the problem at hand, needs to be made. And it would be well if the reader keeps it in mind throughout the present discussion. There is nothing, I venture to suggest, in McTaggart's definition of substance (or of perception) which should prevent subsumption of what are called physical/material objects ²⁸ and events under the category of substance. It is true that

McTaggart finally came to reject the reality of matter, but this was on metaphysical grounds, and has, I want to insist, to do with his Doctrine of Substance and not with his definition (or meaning) of substance. For example, McTaggart's a priori conclusion that no substance can be simple, that every substance is compound (since it has an internal structure and, therefore, parts which are, in turn, substances) and so infinitely divisible, is no part of his *definition* of substance but, as he himself says, a 'synthetic' - even if 'self-evident' and 'ultimate' ²⁹ - proposition about substance. So if I am correct in my reasoning, there is nothing that gives us any presumption against regarding physical objects too as substances. They will be substances because they will have characteristics without either being a characteristic or a fact. And of course, substances would include (even on McTaggart's own specific view) self and mental states and thus count as (possible) objects of perceptual knowledge³⁰.

McTaggart's view of perception as direct awareness of substances brings him very close to what is called 'direct realism' and what Sellars prefers to call, rightly, 'direct realism'³¹. The direct realism of McTaggart's consists in his steadfast refusal to admit any surrogates (like sense-data, for example) meant to mediate between perception and its objects (physical or otherwise). This Direct Realism, I suggest, should be seen as, to put it in the words of Gram, "independent of the ontological question of whether there are any material objects in the world, whether the world contains both material and mental items, or whether whatever exists is mental". ³² If so, a more or less working formulation of what constitutes the essence of Direct Realism, could, to quote Gram again, be the following :

*In every case of perception we are directly aware of the perceptual object and not a deputy or representative from which we draw inferences to such an object.*³³

The one clear advantage which Gram's formulation of Direct Realism enjoys over other formulations of the theory - if it is a theory ³⁴ - is that in one stroke it rids the theory of the chronic and erroneous belief associated with it : namely that Direct Realism (or perception) has to do only, or at least mainly, with the external world of physical objects and events. And this in turn opens the way - and this is very crucial - for the admission of both physical and mental entities as actual or possible objects of perception. This is, again, what McTaggart's view of perception perfectly seems to accord with. In fact the above view of Direct Realism does not forbid an idealist, who only entertains the reality of the mental world, from embracing a direct realist theory of perception.

McTaggart's view of perception as knowledge of substances (as indeed his view of misperception too, as we shall later see) is, as should be obvious, a correlate of his view of substance. It is germane to McTaggart's view of perception that perception as knowledge of a substance has perforce to be a knowledge of what that substance is; it must tell us something about the nature or character of that substance; it must disclose, bring to our notice, some feature(s) of it so that we are able to identify it in *some* (however incomplete or inadequate) way. Any knowledge which fails to achieve this target must lose its *raison d'être*. It is this view of perception which gives it the preeminent place among the sources/modes of knowledge. To be sure, it is possible, says McTaggart, to know *a priori* what characterizes the existent as a whole³⁵ - just as it is possible *a priori* to determine that an existent, if there be one, must have some characteristic(s) besides existence (see above). But when it comes to particular substances, we find that their characteristics can only be known in perception of those substances. Knowledge concerning the characteristics of *particular* substances cannot but be empirical, and all empirical knowledge, in McTaggart's view, has its basis in perception alone. To see the matter expressed in his own words :

Although perception is awareness of substances, we find that it always gives us knowledge *about* the characteristics of these substances. If it did not, we should have no knowledge about the characteristics of any particular substance, except the knowledge that it had those characteristics which we know *a priori* to belong to all substances. For *all other* knowledge about the characteristics of any particular substance is empirical, and ...no empirical knowledge can be based on anything but perception.³⁶

Perception, therefore, is, to put it in McTaggartian terms, knowledge of something *as having* characteristics. To perceive a thing without perceiving it as characterized in certain ways is to fail to know it as an individual, and so not really to perceive it. It is, as intimated above, integral to McTaggart's notion of substance that it is the nature of a (particular) substance - which nature consists of characteristics, i.e., a substance's primary qualities and the relational qualities directly born of its original relations, and so on - which individuates it, makes it the kind of substance it is, and so distinguishes it from other substances. It is to be borne in mind that it is none of McTaggart's claims that whenever we perceive something as so-and-so, something is *indeed* so-and-so. Not all cases of perception are cases of knowledge; for we may well be misperceiving. But in case a certain perception *is* a case of knowledge, it is by its very nature knowledge of something *as having* certain characteristics. This key proposition of McTaggart's "metaphysics of knowledge"³⁷ (as we may call

it) undermines in one stroke the notion of bare particulars³⁸ however hard Russell may have tried to give that notion a measure of respectability by his talk of "proper" names".³⁹

It bears explicit mention (though it should have been obvious by now) - lest McTaggart's idealism lead one to suppose otherwise - that McTaggart firmly believes - in common with the realists and in disagreement, for example, with Berkeley - that the objects of knowledge and so the reality (known) is independent of our knowledge of it: the very nature of knowledge, he would say, presupposes it. In so far as, therefore, we are concerned with the question of the existence or reality of perceptual objects, the existence of the percipient subject is a matter of indifference. The objects towards which perceptual consciousness turns its gaze are presumed to be existent as a matter of course, and in independence of that consciousness. The fact that the objects of perception are from the outset *felt* as known in their character confirms the above. Expressing a similar conviction, Husserl remarks:

Before the movement of cognition begins, we have "presumed objects," simply presumed in the certainty of belief. This certainty of belief continues until subsequent experience or the critical activity of cognition shakes it, modifies it to "not so, but otherwise," or "possibly so", or even confirms the presumed object in its certainty as "really being so" and "truly existing."⁴⁰

This preexistence or "pregivenness" (of objects), as he calls it, Husserl gives the name of "preliminary presence".⁴¹

The importance of the theme makes us venture some independent observations. It is to be marked that it is perhaps in perception alone that the (characterised) real presents itself (to consciousness) *directly* and *immediately* ('immediately') need not mean, as Strawson⁴² well says, 'infallibly' so that one can, with justice, talk of the (presented) content as *given*⁴³. The consideration that below perception there is no other "experienced" (or "felt") level (of awareness) which is *in character* different from it, should lend substance to the preceding observation. One important reason behind the common supposition that thought and imagination sometimes distort the real, seems to be that below imagination and thought is the felt level of perceptual awareness with the contents of which those of the higher levels (here, imagination and thought) can (always) be checked and compared and in the event of distortions coming into view it can be discovered that it is the 'manipulative' capacity of those higher levels which has introduced them into the contents of the former.

But below perception there is no such (felt) level against which the contents of perception can be checked. *The contents of perception are answerable to perception alone.* The mere sensation level, if there be any, is *not* qualitatively different from the perceptual one : the concern in both is with presentations. That is why, as we remarked above, perception has a "natural" claim to truth and so to reliability, for the 'perceived' is taken to be real. This claim however is not incompatible with the fact or possibility of illusion. Even the illusory content, as we shall see, comes to be seen as such, i.e. as illusory (and so corrected) only in some subsequent perception. Such a claim however is *not naturally* available to imagination and thought, felt as they are from the first, in whatever measure, as free⁴⁴ (since spontaneous) and manipulative (since creative).

It is to be noticed that the way our consciousness remains *glued* (so to say) to the object in question and its features (that is, those which 'appear' within the perceptual field) in perception, "feeling" itself 'unfree' (in the sense of finding itself *unable*) to 'create' or 'manipulate' the character of the given - even when in actual fact it does so on occasions (as, e.g., in cases of errors etc.) - only, again, serves to highlight what we have said in the foregoing.

This is not blandly to spurn a priori the suggestion regarding the percipient subjects' own contribution - a la Kant or otherwise - in the end-result called knowledge : there may be some such thing, for all one knows. Our point only is that, given, even, that, the perceptual activity seems scarcely to be aware of any such *role* of its - which role is susceptible of being ascertained only in reflection - apart from its awareness of itself being a perceptual act. It is a different thing, though, that we come to be aware, however vaguely, of the alleged form of an object (in case of Kant, the spatial and temporal ordering) in perception itself of that object.

Besides upholding the independence and anterior reality of the objects, McTaggart would hold - unlike e.g. F.H. Bradley⁴⁵ - that the subject - object distinction is there (nay, announces itself) from the first, and is not the result of some subsequent abstraction. It is indeed the objective constituent which, McTaggart would say - in common with Brentano⁴⁶ and G.E. Moore⁴⁷ distinguishes one state of awareness from another.

Perception not judgement

At this point a crucial clarification - crucial even for McTaggart's metaphysics of substance (or spirit) - seems called for so as to prevent misapprehension of McTaggart's meaning of substance. Perception as knowledge of a substance, say *X*, as being so-and-so, needs to be distinguished, according to McTaggart, from the knowledge *that X* is so-and-so. "For knowledge *that* anything is, or has, anything is a judgement and not a perception".⁴⁶ McTaggart here is concerned to draw a distinction between perceptual awareness proper and judgemental awareness based on that awareness. Ordinarily it is supposed that when we perceive something our knowledge of its being so-and-so is a result of an act of judgement. That is, it is supposed that all perceptual awareness is at root only judgemental awareness. And judgements are invariably tied to a 'that' clause. McTaggart however disagrees with this view. He does not deny that there are, or can be, judgements⁴⁹ which have their basis in perception. He only, but importantly, insists that perceptions *qua* perceptions should never be taken as, or, as having the form of, judgements. Therefore he remarks: "The best expression, I think, for the relation between the perception, the perceived substance, and the characteristics is to say that we perceive the substance *as having* characteristics."⁵⁰ McTaggart would concede that the issue is a ticklish one, that the distinction between the knowledge of *X as having* characteristics and the knowledge *that X* has characteristics, does not easily admit of neat verbal formulation. But that does not mean, he would urge, that the distinction is non-existent or nugatory and idle. Appealing to introspection, he says that the said distinction becomes evident to anyone who reflects on e.g., the judgement, "I am sad" and the (introspective) perception of himself (as sad) on which that judgement is based.⁵¹ One direct consequence of this doctrine⁵² is the repudiation by McTaggart of the customary view which sees all knowledge as necessarily propositional in so far as propositions necessarily involve judgements⁵³ (of one sort or another) and in so far as judgements are wedded to a that-clause.

McTaggart goes on to argue further the distinction between perception and judgements - the full import of which distinction can be more completely appreciated only when one considers McTaggart's system as a whole. The distinction is however important even from the limited point of view as ours. A perception, McTaggart points out, is *always* definite in a way in which judgement cannot be. I can judge that an

object possesses a 'determinable' *without* judging or being able to judge what 'determinate' form of that determinable it possesses. In perception, on the other hand, McTaggart holds, I perceive an object as possessing a perfectly determinate form of the characteristic.⁵⁴ (Professor Geach has called this principle 'perceptual determinacy').⁵⁵ Thus I can *judge*, for example, that the eyes of the present Prime Minister of India have a certain colour without judging what specific colour they have; but I cannot *perceive* his eyes as having colour without *also* perceiving them as having some absolutely definite and determinate colour. And it does not matter whether my colour-vision was normal or not and whether I could *name* that colour. (And what holds true of judgements, holds, in this respect, true of assumptions too.) The point is important and is often missed by those who neglect or play down the distinction between perceptions and judgements. Here in one stroke, the Absolute's shrewd family solicitor⁵⁶ clinches what to many might seem a muddled view.

Before proceeding further, I wish to pause and invite attention to what impresses me as a striking affinity of view point between McTaggart and Husserl. Husserl too sees a basic distinction between what he calls "experience" and "judgement", the distinction (between these two different *kinds* of act) consisting in the fundamental differences in "the *logical form* of their respective noematic *Sinne*".⁵⁷ The noematic *Sinn* of experience is "singular meaning",⁵⁸ whereas that of an act of "judgement" is a proposition. To the extent - and this extent is quite much - "experience"⁵⁹ includes perception, our empirical judgements and beliefs have, as their foundation and source of justification, perceptual experience⁶⁰ and to that alone they continually return and strive to "adjust". To Husserl, perception is at root 'non-propositional', i.e., does not involve a 'that'-clause. To be sure, Husserl does admit "perceptual judgement", but this, he emphasizes, is judgement which is made against the testimony of the appropriate perceptual evidence.

One good way to understand Husserl's distinction between the act of judging and the act of perceiving is to understand his distinction between what he calls a "predicative" act and a "pre-predicative" act. Perceptual judgements are "predicative experiences" (and judgements in general, "predicative acts") and perceptions "pre-predicative experiences". Husserl's view of the perceptual experience as a pre-predicative act is tied to his view that perception is a kind of *direct* relation to the individual.

Experience in the first and most pregnant sense is defined as a *direct*

relation to the individual. Hence, those *judgements* which are *primary in themselves* are, as judgements with individual substrates, judgements about individuals, *judgements of experience*. They are preceded by the self-evident givenness of individual objects of experience, i.e., their pre-predicative givenness."⁶¹

It is necessary to emphasize - lest Husserl's view of perception as "pre-predicative" experience lead one to think otherwise - that to Husserl perception is not an experience of 'bare particulars' divested of properties, but of objects always "given" to us as having properties.

The existent is always given, at bottom, *qua* natural body, provided with natural properties accessible to simple experience If this experience is given at first hand we call it *perception*, more precisely, *external perception*.⁶²

So whatever the other connotations of the term "pre-predicative" experience be - on which we shall not enter here⁶³ - it never means for Husserl awareness of 'bare' existents.⁶⁴ Husserl too believes, like McTaggart, that our perception of the external (physical) world is "direct" and not mediated by the awareness of a *sensum*, appearance or any such third entities. He says :

I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the tree there in the garden; that and *nothing else* is the real object of the perceiving "intention".⁶⁵

The perceptual act, according to Husserl, is a *sui generis* 'species' of act; the perceptual experience is therefore not an experience which is "founded" on some more primitive experience such as direct or immediate awareness of sense-data or things of that kind. Husserl's use of the term "sensory data" is quite different from the sense data as they generally were understood in the British-American tradition. Husserl, like McTaggart, did not admit any surrogates in virtue of which we come to judge (or infer) that there are physical objects or events.

McTaggart rejected off-hand (though not without producing plausible reasons which were, to be sure, chiefly of metaphysical sort) the sense-datum theory at a time when it was a reigning doctrine and when actuated by a procrustean impulse it was winning over new advocates everyday who vied with one another in submitting refined versions of it in their eagerness to assimilate it to their epistemology and metaphysics. The consequences of admitting sense-data as objects of direct and immediate experience have been all too obvious. These explanatory postulates of empiricism gave rise to more problems than they solved even at the time of their conception.

To continue with our main theme. If perception, according to McTaggart, is knowledge of a substance as having characteristics, does it mean that it should provide knowledge of *all* the characteristics the substance perceived possesses in reality? McTaggart sees no such necessity.⁶⁶ Lest this perceptual 'limitation' lead one to draw conclusions more than are in fact warranted, it is extremely necessary to emphasize that one does not need to perceive all the characteristics of an object in order to perceive some (or any) of its characteristics.

This point is of considerable importance. To refer to an aspect of McTaggart's metaphysics, if the universe, as McTaggart believes, and as (e.g.) Russell and Wittgenstein do not, is an organically connected whole, 'complete' knowledge and description of one substance would perforce include - "since it would include all facts true of"⁶⁷ it - descriptions of the totality of the substances in the universe.⁶⁸ The task may not be impossible, though it seems improbable. But even if we put aside the consideration of what the universe is truly like, a perception need not give us knowledge of the whole set of characteristics a substance possesses. In fact it is possible - and is presumably mostly the case - that a thing, say *X*, is *perceived* as having only the quality *A*, while in fact it *has* the additional qualities *B* and *C*. And yet, be it noted, it is the whole object which is the referent of knowledge. The perceptual object at the particular point of time may go, and in fact generally goes, beyond the datum of sense (and herein incidentally sometimes lie the germs of both truth and error).

It is also not necessary, according to McTaggart, that when we perceive a substance, we must perceive *all* the original and relational qualities it has. The distinction between original and relational qualities,⁶⁹ though valid in itself, is not relative to the original qualities being perceptible when the substance they characterize is perceived. We may, in perceiving a substance, fail to perceive all the original qualities it has, but perceive successfully some of its relational qualities.⁷⁰

Perception and the Principle of Sufficient Description

From this we are led on to consider another important point concerning McTaggart's theory of perception. And to make this point intelligible to ourselves, we need to understand the meaning of one of the most important principles of McTaggart's : the principle of Sufficient Description.⁷¹ This principle is closely bound up with another key

metaphysical principle, namely, the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse⁷² (McTaggart's name for Leibniz's principle, the Identity of the Indiscernibles, to which McTaggart subscribes), and in fact derives from the latter.

It is common knowledge that every characteristic of a term constitutes a 'description' of it. And if the characteristic happens to apply to only one term and to none else, it becomes an 'exclusive' description of the term. If any two substances are different, which they must be, on the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, then each of them must have some characteristic or set of characteristics which constitute an exclusive description⁷³ so that one is distinguished from the other. 'Father of Julius Ceaser' is an exclusive description which can apply only to one term; it would not, however, be a sufficient description, for the term 'Julius Creaser' is a proper name and remains undescribed. The necessity that attaches to the above principle is not that without it no term could be *known* so as to be distinguished from other terms; it derives from the 'fact' no two substances can be similar and that, therefore, a substance which is not *absolutely similar* to any other has of necessity an exclusive description.⁷⁴

Now if an exclusive description does not involve reference to merely designated terms but consists wholly of characteristics, it becomes a Sufficient Description.⁷⁵ Thus, to borrow an example from Geach, it would be a sufficient description of Adam and Eve to say that they are the 'first man' and the 'first woman' respectively, if all the human beings were to be descendants of them. Notice that it is not necessary that a sufficient description of a particular must, in order to *be*, be known to us: it is sufficient, says McTaggart, that a substance *has* a sufficient description. The necessity that there should be sufficient descriptions McTaggart derives from the fact that there must be an exclusive description applicable to every particular.⁷⁶

Now if every substance must have a sufficient description, the question arises, is it necessary that when we perceive a substance we must perceive it as having the characteristics which are enough to constitute a sufficient description of that substance. McTaggart denies this too. He conceives it perfectly possible that we perceive a substance as having the qualities *ABC* and as having no other qualities,⁷⁷ though it might in *actual fact* have other qualities which together with *ABC* form a sufficient description of it. And it is, McTaggart would say, not inconsistent

with the fact or the possibility that there should be another substance in the universe which also has the qualities *ABC*. (A fortiori, as noted above, a substance can be perceived without being perceived as having all the characteristics, or even all the original qualities which in fact it may be having).

McTaggart further holds that perception gives us knowledge about characteristics.⁷⁸ Take e.g., the statements 'I am extremely sad' or 'I am intensely sleepy' (to take McTaggart's own examples). In these statements, McTaggart would say, I am asserting extremeness as a characteristic of sadness, and intensity as a characteristic of sleepiness which characterize *me*. Likewise, the judgement that the shades of *A* and *B* are incompatible when *A* is red and *B* black, is, McTaggart would add, given to us in perception. It is only through perception that I know that I am sad or sleepy and further that I am extremely sad or intensely sleepy. Again it is only through perception that I come to know *A* and *B* as being red and black respectively, and it is again in perception that I come to know the two shades as incompatible. (To such knowledge of things W.E. Johnson has given the name 'intuitive induction'.⁷⁹ Russell covers some of these cases under what he calls 'intuitive knowledge', regarding them as 'self-evident').⁸⁰

Structure of Perception

One very important feature of McTaggart's theory of perception is his view of the 'structure' of a perceptual cognition. He sees a definite, nay precise, isomorphism between the structure of the perception in question and the structure of the object perceived. This view seems novel and is (I think) of considerable importance for philosophical psychology. What I mean is that while the principle may have been implicitly entertained in discussions on psychology of perception it has perhaps not been held by any previous philosopher, at least in the form in which McTaggart states it. One (implicit) assumption of the principle, not brought out by McTaggart but germane to it, can be briefly stated as under.

It is common knowledge that some of our images of things such as (e.g.) trees, tables, buildings have their basis in perceptions of those objects; and these images, when recalled, always present the form (or structural aspects) of those objects depending upon the 'intentionality' of the recalling consciousness. There must then be some principle under which our perceivings register the form of the objects as they are presented

to sense, and are themselves accordingly structured; so that when recalled these (past) presentations, surviving now in image-form, are able to deliver to consciousness the forms (which include, I assume, the spatial and temporal characteristics) of the objects.

The only theory I can think of, which seems to anticipate in some ways McTaggart's doctrine is the theory of perception of *Advaita Vedānta* in the Indian tradition. It is a cardinal feature of the *Advaita* theory that in the perception of an external object the 'mind' ('*manas*' or '*antaḥkāraṇa*' in the original language) goes out to the object through the senses (which themselves are conceived as actively receiving the stimuli coming from the objects, and so reaching out to them, but only under the 'impulse and guidance' of mind) and assumes the 'form' of the object i.e. gets determined into a mode (or *vṛtti*) like the object, occupying the same spatio-temporal position as the object. The critical condition here is that the object must be capable of being grasped by the senses. Both the mental mode and the object are, according to *Advaita*, pervaded (i.e., illumined) by consciousness or the self⁸¹ which is of the nature of consciousness. This is how the object with its 'apparent' (that is, perceived) formal structure comes to be known and determined as so-and-so. Since at the time of perception the object and the mental 'mode' that takes on the object's form remain identified, we know only the object and not its image. But with the disappearance of the object's contact with the sense, we are left only with the image in memory. It is through this image that we are able to call to mind the object with its perceived form when we happen to remember the object. As should be plain, in this 'going out' of the mind⁸² is implicit the suggestion of the priority of the knowing subject over the known, so that the meaning of knowledge is safely retained. The physiology assumed in the *Advaita* doctrine is extraneous to our purpose and hence should be ignored. My only object was to invite attention to the non-trivial kinship that seemed to me to exist between the *Advaita* doctrine and that of McTaggart's.

To return to McTaggart. A perception, then, corresponds in its structure to the way it represents the object (perceived) as differentiated. If I perceive an object as having parts, my perception will be differentiated into parts according as it represents the objects as differentiated. Perception of a complex structure will itself be complex, just in the way and to the extent the substance is complex.⁸³ Mark that it is the 'apparent' (or perceived) differentiation that matters. If a substance has parts but they are not perceived as such, then this would not differentiate

the perception that represents the substance (or the whole) of which they are parts. (And what holds for perception holds for 'imaging' too. In terms of internal structure imagings resemble perceptions; they are however, in McTaggart's sense of the term, not cognitive; they are neither knowledge nor error.) From this follows the famous doctrine of McTaggart's which states that perceptions of parts of wholes can be parts of the perceptions of those wholes.⁸⁴ As McTaggart says:

It seems to me that this is possible, and, indeed, that our experience assures us that it is sometimes true.⁸⁵

Or again :

It must, I think, be admitted that the perception of a part may be part of a perception of the whole.⁸⁶

This situation is possible (or conceivable) only when a self *S* perceives *W* (the whole) *as* containing *P* (part of the whole) and perceives *P* as contained in *W*. For it is possible for *S* to perceive *W* without at all perceiving *P* though the latter is a part of *W*. Again, it is perfectly possible, according to McTaggart, to perceive both *W* and *P* without perceiving *W* as containing *P* or *P* as contained in *W*. But there are cases where *S* perceives both *W* and *P* and perceives *P* as part of *W*.

Suppose, to take McTaggart's own example, I judge that there is a carpet in the room with a pattern on it. This judgement cannot perhaps be based except on my perception of the carpet, the whole, and of the pattern, the part. So McTaggart would say we do perceive two entities *W* and *P* and see the latter as part of the former. But the question to be decided is : Is it that in such cases my perception of *P* is *part* of my perception of *W*? One may also ask a further question whether it is *only in such cases* that my perception of *P* is part of my perception of *W*?

To take up the latter question first, McTaggart does not rule out the possibility that in one perception we might perceive only *W*, while in our other perceptions we might perceive each of parts (*Ps*) of *W*, and that then we might perceive the relation between the perceived *W* and the perceived *Ps*. There can be cases, however, where, McTaggart contends, this does not happen as e.g. where I perceive both *W* and *P*, and where, therefore, my perception of *P* is part of my perception of *W*. This McTaggart tries to show on the evidence of introspection. Consider, for example, what happens when "we gradually perceive the parts of a datum of which we only perceived the whole before - as when, with a gradual increase of light, more details appear in the pattern of the carpet."⁸⁷ The change here, says

McTaggart, from a relatively simple perception to a relatively complex perception (of the carpet as patterned) does not consist in the addition of more perceptions (of parts) to a, to use Broad's words "persistent and internally unchanged"⁸⁸ perception of the whole.

Broad is unable to regard the example as "relevant" for McTaggart's purposes, and contends that what seems more plausible to assume in such cases is that different "sensibilia" are successively presented, each more complex - and differentiated - than its predecessor, and that, if inter-related, they form a single "sense-object". He, however, adds that an increase in the internal complexity of the "prehensum", which one perceives, "may, or may not, involve a parallel increase in the internal complexity of my prehensions."⁸⁹

This suggestion of Broad's seems defective and rests on a misunderstanding of McTaggart's view. We noticed earlier that according to McTaggart a perception is internally differentiated according as it represents the object perceived as being differentiated. We also emphasized that here it is *apparent* differentiation that counts and not the differentiation which may *be*, but does *not* appear to be so (in perception). It follows, then, that if an object, a perceptum (Broad's 'prehensum'), is *perceived* as differentiated, the perception too would correspondingly be differentiated. McTaggart next proceeds to show that it is only when I perceive *P* as part of *W* (which too I perceive) that my perception of *P* is a part of my perception of *W*. No one, he says, would suggest that my perception of *P*, which is not a part of *W* could be part of my perception of *W*. And the fact that *P* is part of *W* would not bring my perception of *P* any nearer to my perception of *W*, if *P*, though perceived, is *not perceived* as part of *W*.⁹⁰

As against this, Broad appeals to misperception - which McTaggart indeed admits - and argues that I may very well misperceive (or misprehend, as Broad would have it) *P* as *not* being a part of *W* while in actual fact it may be a part of *W*; and I may misperceive (he adds) *P*₁ as *being* a part of *W*, while in actual fact it is not.⁹¹

To this, I think we could reply as follows. To take a mental state as an example, we may say that while it is perfectly possible to misperceive a mental state (or an experience) as to its character or feature, it is *self-evidently* impossible to mistake as to its *belongingness*. I may perhaps mistake my state of anger for one of sadness but I cannot conceivably

mistake as to whom the state (of sadness) belongs. Is it conceivable by any chance that I *may* imagine my state of sadness as someone else's. Clearly none of these possibilities (if possibilities they are) seems probable; Broad's objection, therefore, though ingenious, fails to hold water. Notice what is being denied is not that misperception is possible, but that in an event where our perception of a whole is veridical, we cannot misperceive the parts of that whole as regards their belongingness. We can of course mistake one whole (or object) W or another whole (or object) W_1 and so also mistake parts of W for parts of W_1 . But that is a different proposition altogether and has no relevance whatever to the issue at hand.

Perception of Whole without Perception of Parts

One doctrine of McTaggart's which he barely adumbrates but for which, because of its significance, there is a warrant for more explicit allusion, is that in McTaggart's view it is possible to perceive a whole without perceiving *any* of its parts.⁹² The doctrine is similar to the view of Russell's which he expresses thus : "We must suppose that we can perceive, name, and recognize a whole without knowing what are its constituents."⁹³ Or again : "Whether it is possible to be aware of a complex without being aware of its constituents is not an easy question, but on the whole it would seem that there is no reason why it should not be possible."⁹⁴ Elsewhere⁹⁵ McTaggart, while contrasting a compound substance with a compound characteristic,⁹⁶ makes the point that it is possible to be aware of a "compound" substance without being aware of the simple substances that compose it. "For the awareness of a substance is perception, and we can perceive a compound substance without perceiving any simple substances as its parts."⁹⁷ The import of this teaching of McTaggart's can perhaps be better understood by referring to a principle of his Doctrine of Substance : namely the INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of Substance. The meaning, in brief, of this principle⁹⁸ is that since, as McTaggart holds, every substance has an internal structure (composed of a plurality of simultaneous and successive differentiations) and so has 'content'⁹⁹ and (therefore) parts (which comprise its content), every substance is a compound substance. Now the parts of this compound substance would in turn be substances for they would have qualities and stand in relations without being themselves either a quality or a relation (or a fact). And since as substances these parts will have a 'content' and therefore will be differentiated into parts which will be substances in turn, what we will have would be an unending series of seats of parts of a

substance. This is how we get a foothold on the idea of 'infinite divisibility' of substance.¹⁰⁰

Now given this doctrine (of infinite divisibility of substance), it should be plain that we shall be led into vicious infinite regress if we were to hold that one cannot perceive a whole without perceiving some at least of its parts. For then, to put it in the way Broad explicates it, I cannot perceive a whole, w , without perceiving at least one part of P_1 of it. But P_1 would itself be, given infinite divisibility of substance, a complex whole. So I cannot perceive P_1 without perceiving at least one part of P_{II} of it. P_{II} would in turn be a complex whole; so that I cannot perceive it without perceiving at least one part of P_{III} of it. And so on without end. The doctrine, therefore, that one cannot perceive a whole without perceiving at least one part of it, would entail that in the case of a whole which is infinitely divisible, the whole is perceived only if parts within parts to infinity of that whole are *also* perceived. And this on the very face of it is impossible. So McTaggart would conclude that there is nothing extraordinary or unreasonable about the assumption that one *can* see a whole *without* seeing *any* of its parts.

Now it appears to us that this view of McTaggart's, though very attractive, is not without difficulties. It is of course true that if McTaggart's view of the infinite differentiation of substance were to hold, it would be a stupendous undertaking for anyone to prove that perception of a whole is impossible without perceiving some at least of its parts. And the gravity of the problem would assume further proportions, were one to take the extreme view that perception of a whole is impossible without perceiving *all* the parts it has. So it would seem that if a substance is infinitely divisible, there is not much of choice between the view that a whole cannot be perceived without perceiving at least *some* of its parts and the (extreme) view that a whole cannot be perceived without perceiving *all* of its parts. But suppose that the truth of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of substance were to be denied. All sorts of views might be taken in that event. (That this would result in complete breakdown of communication - for it is self evident to McTaggart that every substance is divisible into parts into parts to infinity - need not worry us.) But one can here specially refer to one possibility. The opponent might allow the infinite differentiation of substance and yet argue that a distinction obtains between perceiving (the part) P , as a part of the whole, W , and perceiving P which *in fact* is a part of W . That is, one could say that one can perceive W without perceiving P

as a part of it, denying however at the same time that he can perceive W without perceiving P which in fact is a part of W .¹⁰¹

My own view is that we cannot afford to adopt a dogmatic posture on the issue. About certain wholes - e.g., a tree or a table - it may seem plain that we cannot perceive them without perceiving some parts of them. But there might be wholes perceiving which does not entail perceiving some or their parts, and so McTaggart's doctrine would hold in such cases.

It is interesting to note that G.F. Stout holds, in regard to the apprehension of a whole, a view similar in certain ways to the view(s) of McTaggart (and Russell). In rejection of Sensationalism according to which apprehension of a whole can only be built out of individual sensations, Stout strongly advocates the idea that we can have 'implicit apprehension' of a whole without apprehending its parts or details. An implicit awareness of a whole may precede explicit awareness of the parts of that whole. To quote some mentionable lines from Stout :

- (a) "It is certainly possible to think of a whole in its unity and distinctness without discerning all or even *any* of its component details."¹⁰²
- (b) "It is possible to distinguish and identify an whole without apprehending any of its constituent details."¹⁰³
- (c) "This circumstance suggests a name for that apprehension of a whole which takes place without discernment of its parts. We may call it *implicit* apprehension."¹⁰⁴
- (d) "The obvious conclusion from introspective data is that in perceiving the shape of an ordinary sensible object we apprehend the whole without apprehending all its parts."¹⁰⁵

Perceptions as Parts of the Percipient Self

We now turn to a question which for McTaggart is of central importance and which is one of the premises on which rests McTaggart's metaphysics of substance (or of spirit). This question concern McTaggart's assumption that perceptions are *parts* of the percipient self.¹⁰⁶ This, McTaggart thinks, can be shown to be the case if it could be shown that perceptions are states of the self which perceives. McTaggart feels that this fact - viz. that perceptions are states of the percipient self - has not been adequately appreciated by those who see in perception - nay in all awareness - a mere relation, i.e. a relation between the self that perceives and the object that is perceived.

McTaggart duly recognizes that a certain special relation obtains between a self and the object which it perceives. If a self, *S*, perceives an object, *O*, this fact involves a relation between *S* and *O* "of such a nature that it only holds between a percipient and its perceptum."¹⁰⁷ But McTaggart goes on to ask whether there is not, besides this relation, "a state of perception which is part of the percipient self."¹⁰⁸ McTaggart here obviously sees no incompatibility between perception being a relation and its also being a state of mind. There are, thinks McTaggart, introspective grounds for believing it to be so, but he prefers to urge certain other considerations (for after all other people might interpret their introspections differently) which, he thinks, go to prove the hypothesis that perception is a state and hence part of the self within which it falls. Even as a state - and not only as relation - a perception has a special nature in the sense that no one perception can be a part of more than one self.¹⁰⁹ McTaggart regards this proposition as 'synthetic' and 'ultimate'.¹¹⁰

The first argument that McTaggart puts forth in support of his view is as follows. There is a "characteristic observable difference"¹¹¹ between the experience of perceiving many objects simultaneously and that of perceiving fewer objects simultaneously. There is again a difference between the experience of perceiving many objects in rapid succession during a certain period and that of perceiving fewer objects during a period of the same length. This difference, says McTaggart, can be best expressed by saying that the self is "fuller" in one case than in the other. And the appropriateness of this metaphor can be best seen only in terms of the theory that each perception is a different substance and is a part of the self that perceives. "For one thing is only fuller than another if it has more content, which means more substance."¹¹² This difference would not have been expressed thus if the self had merely stood in the relation of perception to more objects on the earlier occasion and to fewer on the later occasion.

As against this Broad contends¹¹³ that the self might be more "variegated" on the former occasion than on the later. This involves the supposition that to every relational property (of the form, to put it in Broad's words, 'prehending the object *O*'¹¹⁴) of the self there corresponds an original quality such that acquiring the relational property determines acquiring (by the self of) the corresponding quality. Patterson¹¹⁵ calls this supposition of Broad's "extraordinary" and feels, even without accepting McTaggart's view, that the posting of such a large number of original

qualities would involve our assuming a pre-established harmony to account for them. Besides, a quality, the acquisition of which was causally determined by the acquisition of relational property, would, Patterson observes, appear itself to be a relational property. Patterson's own suggestion is that the difference between the two states might lie in a "feeling of some sort." ¹¹⁶

McTaggart's second argument in support of his view that perceptions are parts of the self that perceives, is that our cogitations, volitions, and emotions, taken together "exhaust the self, so that it is completely comprised in them." ¹¹⁷ It should be clear that the self could not be composed of or "exhausted" in all its various relations (or relational properties). But even if they exhausted its nature, which in point of fact they do not, they would not be parts of it. On the other hand, McTaggart argues, there is no difficulty in supposing that experiences (i.e. perceptions), if they are states, are parts of, and make up, the whole self.

On the other hand, if they are states, and therefore parts, of the self, it is easy to see that they do exhaust it, since there is a very real sense in which a substance is exhausted in a set of its parts. ¹¹⁸

McTaggart's third contention - and this again strikes one as novel - relates to (what he calls) the "direct difference" that the cognitive relation makes to the knower than to the known. ¹¹⁹ X's cognition of Y makes, according to McTaggart, greater direct difference to X than to Y: the direct difference between X who perceives Y and X if he does not perceive Y is more profound than the direct difference between Y who is perceived by X and Y if he is not perceived by X. Even a consideration of the indirect difference yields, in McTaggart's view, the same result although it may *appear* to be different. To borrow McTaggart's own fine illustration, if a detective knows the murderer, *causally* this is more likely to affect the future fate of the murderer than that of the detective. But if we consider *just* the fact of the acquirement of knowledge, just that something is being thought about or known, this makes much greater difference to the detective, the knower, than to the murderer, the known. Now if knowledge (here, perception) were a mere relation, this greater difference would not be accounted for. For then the knower would just be one term in the relation, a term which knows, the other term being the object, which is known, and there would be nothing, says McTaggart, in these two characteristics (the characteristic of being a 'knower' and the characteristic of being a 'known') which could account for the greater

difference that knowledge makes to the one than to the other.

If, however, knowledge is also considered a part of the knowing self, the problem, says McTaggart, is solved. In his opinion, the cognitive relation involves in the knowing self the "presence" of a part with certain characteristics - which is cognition - which did not exist in the knower before the cognitive relation was established and which without it he will not possess. On the other hand, the cognitive relation involves nothing in the object known "except a relation to the knowing self".¹²⁰ So this asymmetry in the "correlated changes" (Broad's phrase) of knowing self and known object is easily explained, in McTaggart's view, on the view that perceptions are parts of the percipient self.

McTaggart's final argument¹²¹ in support of his view is directed against people who admit that pleasures and pains are parts of the self who suffers them, but deny that cognitions, including perceptions, are parts of the self.

(i) McTaggart remarks, first, that such people are not being consistent in that they admit one set of experiences to be the states of the self but deny the other set of experiences to be parts of the self on the ground that selves can have no parts. Part of the reason for this unwillingness to admit that the self has parts, stems, says McTaggart, from the supposition that the peculiar kind of unity which characterizes a self is incompatible with its having parts. McTaggart however denies that there is any such incompatibility. A substance, he points out, must have parts (see above), and so if a self (which is a substance on McTaggart's definition) exists at all, it must have parts, irrespective of whether its cognitions are these parts or not. In fact, he adds, a self would have not only pleasures and pains as its parts (as is admitted even by the opponents), but also would have parts in the temporal dimension, if it (the self) existed in time.

(ii) McTaggart's second point is that pleasures and pains are very closely bound up with cognitions. For example, we often say about a memory that it is painful, or about an anticipation that it is pleasurable. Such utterances must imply, going by the view under consideration, that when we enter into a certain cognitive relation (whether of remembering or of anticipating with an object, a certain state, painful or pleasurable, is excited in the mind. Now it cannot be literally true, especially in the opinion of the theory that denies that selves can have cognitions as their parts, that the "memory" is painful or that the "anticipation" is pleasurable. There are only facts, the fact of a self entering into a relation of remembering

with one object, or into that of anticipating with another. And facts cannot literally be painful or pleasurable. Now McTaggart believes that what we call a "painful memory" or a "pleasurable anticipation" is not simply a memory or an anticipation causing pain or pleasure respectively. It is memory *qualified by* painfulness or an anticipation *qualified by* pleasurableness. Pleasure and pain, according to McTaggart, are not separate bits of mental content, but qualities which belong, like emotions, to states of cognitions and to them alone.¹²² So McTaggart concludes that cognitions including perceptions are part of the self. Cognition indeed implies a certain definite relation between the cognizing self and the cognized object, but that does not mean that cognition and the relation are identical,¹²³ though that also does not mean that the relation is a non-entity. There can be both a relation and a state.

Lest there be any misapprehension on the point, McTaggart is quick to point out that the doctrine that cognitions including perceptions are parts of the cognizing self does by no means imply that when, e.g., I perceive an object *O*, it is only the perception which I know directly and that my cognition of *O* is mediated by my perception of my perception of *O*. This, he says, would be absolutely incorrect. My knowledge of *O*, he would say, is immediate and consists in my perception of *O*. It is in no way 'dependent' on my perception of my perception of *O* which "may or may not accompany" my perception of *O*.¹²⁴

Misperception

We are now almost at the end of this rather long winding discussion. And it would be well if, before we close, we devote some consideration to McTaggart's view of misperception.

There is a dread associated with misperception and the error born thereof. It can make philosophers run for their lives and look for securer homes. The history of modern Western philosophy in particular is a standing testimony to this observation. We already find a Descartes reeling under the severity of the dread as he introduces his famous device of Doubt which through various of its forms - viz: complete distrust of the testimony of the senses (for they have a way of deceiving us), the involved dreaming argument, the myth of the malicious demon, and other more particular kinds of illusions - renders radically insecure (and vulnerable) every existential claim about the world, until, that is, we are put in possession of

an apodictically certain and necessary truth : the Cogito. And although it is true that Descartes does not stop there and does finally come to regard himself enabled, albeit through his faith in the existence of a benevolent God who ensures against pervasive and systematic error, to recover his belief (provisionally suspended) in the reality of the external world and in the general reliability of the senses, his method leaves set in motion a crusade for the indubitable - the crusade getting specially frenzied with those who are not lucky to have a benign God on their side guarding against universal illusion, and therefore who end up finally, and presumably by the logic of it, torn between the Cartesian *concern* (though not necessarily his findings) for the indubitable (which they share) and scepticism, not able to break free or find their exit. Or the dread may lead to phenomenalist scepticism (coupled with solipsism) of a Hume finding its anchor in his characteristic immanentism. It may again lead a Husserl to suspend, as part of his programme of phenomenological reduction (reminiscent in certain ways - though I leave the details of the comparison open - of the Cartesian reduction), philosophic judgement about the existential status of the "natural" world (given to us in "natural attitude") and seek 'epistemic security' in (absolute) pure consciousness (left only - but to Husserl significantly - with its immanently constituted objective "essences" and the "meant" world), free, since purified, of categorial/ metaphysical commitments (though reflecting nevertheless Husserl's indictment of the objective world). Or the dread may lead, as it evidently did, many men of repute in our age to introduce, in their quest for the indubitable, some third entities, the sense-data, between mind and the world leaving one wondering as to what earthly good an indubitability was which left one shut up within one's own consciousness and which in effect rendered the external world in its bareness ever unreachable, desperate devices to the contrary notwithstanding.

These brief remarks, apparently superficial but made in all earnestness, are not in the nature of animadversions. The philosophers referred to above represented movements of thought which make up a sizeable slice of what goes by the name of modern philosophy and which have considerably determined its subsequent course. My purpose was only to highlight how deep can the dread go into a philosopher's soul and how much profoundly can it effect his way of regarding the world. It is surely a measure of McTaggart's sagacity (as indeed it was of Kant before him) that he was able to maintain, even though surrounded by ideologies (inherited or otherwise) born (at least partly) of the fear psychosis hinted

above, his level-headedness and declined the security provided by those ideologies. He just epigrammatically believed - what may to some seem a pragmatic procedure but was with him a philosophic principle - that men are capable both of knowledge and error and that they are also, in principle, capable of effecting an entasis unless the error is of the nature of such 'phenomenal' (not 'real') truth as infects the view of all thinking beings (as, for example is the case with Time whose metaphysical reality McTaggart rejected,). It is surely pathological to dismiss all our beliefs as false; and it is equally unwholesome to hold, à la Protagoras, that all human beliefs are true and hence beyond question. Human beings, McTaggart firmly held, generally live in a mixed state of knowledge and error.¹²⁵ The problems of scepticism, 'indubitably certain' knowledge and the like, while they agitated (even emotionally) his contemporaries in England and elsewhere, seemed to have worried McTaggart very little. And behind this unruffledness there was something more than a mere obstinacy (if obstinacy there was).

Now if, as McTaggart believes, there is both knowledge and error, and if perception gives knowledge, then there must somewhere be some room for misperception too. McTaggart's pronouncements on misperception are of a piece with his views on perception but are not for that reason likely to be less resisted. In fact the temptation to oppose McTaggart may perhaps here be greater. McTaggart belongs to that breed of philosophers who visualize the possibility of error in perceptions¹²⁶ themselves and not necessarily or always in judgements. It has been an article of faith with some thinkers that it is in our judgements that we go astray, not in our perceptions. One well-articulated version of this latter doctrine - with which McTaggart's may perhaps be servicably contrasted - is to be found in Kant. The following passage from Kant nearly sums up his view in the matter.

Truth or illusion is not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the *judgment about it*, in so far as it is thought. It is therefore correct to say that *the senses do not err* - not because they always judge rightly but *because they do not judge at all*. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgement, i.e. only in the relation of the object to our understanding. In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of understanding there is no error. In a representation of the senses - as containing no judgement whatsoever - there is also no error.¹²⁷

McTaggart here would be one with Kant in holding that error is to

be looked for in the (erring) subject, regardless of whether the error is one of judgement or of perception. "Whatever the cause of the error can be found, the error itself can only be found in one place - in the observing subject."¹²⁸ He would however differ with the Kantian view that error characterises judgements alone. McTaggart by no means denies that error can belong to judgements too; only he sees nothing extraordinary or exceptionable in the view that our perceptions too can err. One can see that Kant gives no reason why senses can never go wrong. He only avoids the question by stipulating (so to say) that senses do not err because they cannot judge and that error, properly, is to be found "in the relation of the object to our understanding." The view therefore that it is only our judgements that go awry is, to McTaggart, nothing more than a dogma born of prejudice. It is to be noted that McTaggart's view of misperception is a natural, nay a necessary corollary of his view of perception as knowledge of something as having characteristics, and the latter's difference from the knowledge (i.e. judgement) *that* something has characteristics. The point simply is: If we can (correctly) perceive (i.e., without necessarily judging) things as having a certain character, why can't we misperceive them, without bringing in the element of judgement, as having a character which they do not have. (In fact, given his premises, even Kant's view seems consistent. He sees the possibility of even Kant's view seems consistent. He sees the possibility of error in our judgements because he finds truth also only in judgements.)

The admission of erroneous perception, however, be it noted, should not lead to the (illicit) conclusion that it is possible (at least on some occasions) that "nothing" in fact exists, and that something is only misperceived as existing. This, says McTaggart, would land us in complete scepticism. When we misperceive there is no doubt, McTaggart holds, that *something does exist*;¹²⁹ it is with regard to *what* that 'something' is that we err in misperception.¹³⁰ Misperception always consists in investing this real, contrary to our own intentions, with features which do not in fact belong to it. When, for example, I mistake a rope for a snake (or a treestump for a man), I definitely see something as existing; only I wrongly ascribe the snake-character (or the man-character) to the perceived existent i.e. rope (or the tree-stump). It is in this false ascription of a character to perceived object that misperception is supposed to consist. In fact it is this distinctive feature of misperception which marks it off from experiences such as hallucinations (or dreams) where the error is primarily in regard to the *existence* of things (and not their character).

To make a slight additional comment, the 'mistaking of the character' in illusion talked of above, while it may owe its occurrence to any number of reasons, takes generally the form of erroneous identification of two objects of different sorts ('objects' here being used in the widest possible sense) : e.g. the rope and the snake or the tree-stump and the man. This misidentification cannot however serve as the paradigm of the whole range of such experiences. There may be cases - e.g. (mis)perception of double moon - which do not fit into the misidentification model and where the error is not necessarily or always discovered in a subsequent (falsifying) perceptual experience. The terms of analysis of these cases would naturally have to be different.

While some philosophers - e.g. A.J. Ayer¹³¹ - would agree with McTaggart that perceptual illusion is always with regard to the character or the nature of what is perceived, and not with regard to whether something exists or not, those like D.M. Armstrong, who, even though they share McTaggart's view that perception yields knowledge about the objects perceived (and not of the sense-data which Armstrong rejects) would not accept McTaggart's analysis of erroneous perception. The analysis that Armstrong offers of what he calls 'sensory illusion' is in terms of false belief or inclination to believe falsely that we are (veridically) perceiving some physical objects or state of affairs¹³² (just as to have perception or sense-impression is (in Armstrong's view) to believe, or be inclined to believe, that we are immediately perceiving something, some physical object or state of affairs).¹³³ And so Armstrong concludes :

When (or in so far as) we suffer from sensory illusion there is *no* object at all, physical or non-physical, which we are perceiving in any possible sense of the word 'perceiving'. There is simply the (completely) false belief that ordinary perceiving is taking place.¹³⁴

Now without going into the details of Armstrong's view, we may note that in conceiving perceptual illusion merely in terms of false beliefs or inclination to such beliefs Armstrong neglects what is perhaps the most pronounced character of perceptual illusion: that it is an act of 'perceiving'. I may, for example, *believe falsely* that X has gone to Calcutta; while I may *misperceive* a rope for a snake (due perhaps to darkness). The former (false) belief may well be a result of lack of full information on my part, namely, that though X told me about his plans to go to Calcutta, he changed his programme at the last moment due to some emergency. The latter illusion, on the other hand, has an *obvious* (and therefore indisputable) perceptual character. It is not that Armstrong does not realise the difference

between perceptual illusion and mere false belief, but this, he says, is nothing "more than an *additional* false belief."¹³⁵ And this 'additional' false belief consists, according to Armstrong, in our falsely believing that our illusory experience had a perceptual character.¹³⁶

A brief critical comment here is certainly called for. It is one thing to maintain that the illusory character of our perceptual experience does not come to be discovered unless it has been annulled or falsified by a subsequent correcting perception, and quite another to hold that we mistake *even* about the *perceptual* character of that illusion. The perceptual character of our experience announces itself in the very act of perception of or at least in the succeeding introspective act. It is therefore plainly false to entertain the possibility of our going wrong on this count.

Turning now to Armstrong's view that in misperception we are mistaken even with regard to the 'existence' of something, that in fact "there is no object at all, physical or non-physical" we may remark that this on the face of it is false, and that Armstrong neglects the very obvious distinction between a case of illusion and a case of hallucination. After all - and there seems to be general consensus on this - the illusory nature of our perception consists precisely in the fact that something is (mis)perceived as different from what it is, so that the conviction that there *is* something which is being perceived can never be deemed as open to question. It is concerning the character or features of that something that our perception may turn out to be mistaken as is revealed by a subsequent (correcting) perception.

Before we close our discussion of misperception it is perhaps needful to point out how unintelligible can McTaggart's theory of misperception become if one were to follow Broad's practice of replacing 'perception' every where by 'prehension'. It is because the word 'prehension' was used by Cambridge philosophers of the time to denote the way we are supposed to apprehend our sense-data that Broad finds himself flabbergasted by the teaching that perception can err.¹³⁷

Presumptive Correctness of all Perception

I would like to conclude the present discussion by drawing attention to one of McTaggart's extremely important doctrines which is not only integral to his treatment of perception but which also enables us to see the

whole issue of perceptual aberrations (such as misperception, etc.) in perspective. I choose this occasion specifically to allude to the doctrine because I feel that our foregoing discussion has proceeded from this doctrine as an unstated premise, and that the reader must have prepared by now to receive it and comprehend more fully its implications. This is the doctrine of the 'presumptive'¹³⁸ correctness of all perception. The doctrine concerns the recognition that *all* perception *prima facie* *presumes* itself to be correct.¹³⁹ Now what does it mean? Having maintained that error can belong to perception proper (and not merely to judgements), McTaggart feels obliged to give an account of error which would make for both veridical and illusory perceptions. I cite below two important statements by McTaggart which indicate his view on the question.

- (i) "When I contemplate any case in which I perceive any perceptum A as having a quality X, it seems to me self-evident, not only that A *then* (my emphasis) exists, but that it *then* (my emphasis) has the quality X."¹⁴⁰
- (ii) "And, when in general I contemplate what is the nature of perception, and what is the nature of the relation of a perception to its perceptum, it seems to me self-evident that such a self-evident correctness belongs to all perceptions."¹⁴¹

The view under reference has caused Broad considerable consternation and led him to conclude in despair: "...it is unfortunate that I must confess that I cannot make sense of his doctrine."¹⁴² Considerations of space prevent me from considering Broad's objections¹⁴³ in detail and showing the specific points at which Broad seems completely to miss the full import of McTaggart's principle. So I will remain content by just pointing out what seems to me the spirit of McTaggart's principle. (I quite concede, though, that certain of McTaggart's expressions are likely to appear misleading. It is perhaps partly because of the context in which McTaggart's statement of the doctrine appears for the first time. But let us leave that aside.) What McTaggart means by the 'self-evident' correctness of perception is *not* that it is a *self-evident truth* that all perception is correct: that would without doubt involve him in a blatant self-contradiction. For McTaggart does not even regard it to be true, let alone self-evidently true, that perceptions are without fail correct. Doesn't he hold, as we saw above, that there can be error in perception? Doesn't he also maintain - what does not form part of the present discussion - that all our perception of objects as in time is fundamentally erroneous, for on his view there is really no time. It does not therefore require much insight, rather a bit of common sense, to see what McTaggart is truly aiming at. A slight rephrasing of his language reveals beyond a shred of doubt that what McTaggart means is

that perception, to use Geach's words, "has of its nature a *presumptive* correctness."¹⁴⁴ That is, every perception *prima facie* lays a claim to correctness (and hence reliability). It is this presumption of being correct which is a self-evident and essential feature of every perception. The presumption is surely very much and always capable of being shown to be false (in some subsequent experience), and so disbelieved, but it stands so long as it has not been *actually* falsified. It is then only proper that McTaggart proceeds to put one limit - a *temporal* limit - on the self-evident correctness of perception. And a proper linguistic form of a perception's presumptive correctness as subject to a temporal limit would, to use McTaggart's own words, be: "This that I perceive is as I perceive it *while I now perceive it*."¹⁴⁵ Notice that here there is no general presumption or claim that this that I perceive is as I perceive it *before* or *after* I perceive it.

This principle, I think, must be granted. In fact better account, and even better statement, of this primary feature of perception seems inconceivable. And once we have grasped the truth embodied in this principle we can begin to perceive why perceptual errors (e.g. illusions, etc.) are what they are. Perceptual errors, it deserves to be emphasized, are as errors entirely and unqualifiedly retrospective discoveries. Question this self-evident presumption of perception and you are faced up with major consequences. If every perceptual error were able to discover itself as such at the very moment of its occurrence there would never be any error at all. Secondly, if all perception were to disbelieve itself from the first it would just not get started and so all optimism about the knowability of the world would founder on the rocks. And this in turn would land us in a scepticism which would be total.¹⁴⁶

Department of Philosophy
Delhi University
Delhi - 110007

RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

Notes

1. J.M.E. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, ed. C.D. Broad, 2 vols. 91921-27; reprint, Cambridge : At the University Press, 1968). (Hereafter cited as NE)

2. *NE*, I, sec. 44, Italics mine. (in case of *NE* I have throughout referred to section numbers, and occasionally, also page numbers alongside.)
3. Plato, *Theaetetus* as included in *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, trans. with a running commentary by F.M. Cornford (1935; reprint, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 151E (p.29).
4. Merleau-Ponty goes further. His primary perception, as a mode of cognitive behaviour, is primary not only because it is the way in which we become aware of objects as such but also because it is "the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (1962; reprint, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. VIII. On the relationship between the common-sense view and the scientific view of the physical world, Professor Strawson, echoing a view similar to Ponty's, says: "Science is not only the off-spring of common sense; it remains its dependent." P.F. Strawson, "Perception and its Objects", in *Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies to them*, ed. G. F. Macdonald (1979; reprint, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 59.
5. Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917), chapter 10.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 209, Italics mine.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 209-210.
8. *Ibid.*, p.212.
9. *NE*, I, sec. 44.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p.41, footnote 2.
12. *Ibid*, II, sec. 299.
13. *Ibid.* We may here contrast, in passing, McTaggart's view with the views, for example, of Stout and Blanshard. Both include under objects of perception (Stout's 'simple perception') not only things but also (what are not properly things but) qualities (and relations). Thus G.F. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1918), II, p. 4, says: "By simple perception is meant the immediate identification and distinction of an object presented to the senses, whether this be a simple sensible quality, like red or

blue, or a complex thing, having a multiplicity of parts and of sensible qualities, each of which is capable of being separately identified". Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*. 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939), I, pp. 52-53, says; "Perception is that experience in which, on the warrant of something given in sensation at the time, we unreflectingly take some object to be before us 'Object' is a wide term here; it may mean a certain *thing*, a certain *kind* of thing, or what is not properly a thing at all, but quality or relation."

14. *NE*, I, sec. 44.
15. There are philosophers - e.g. A.J. Ayer - who hold that if "acquaintance" is taken to mean 'direct awareness' then it is properly application only to sense-data, and not to material things especially if the latter are taken to be existing independently of our knowledge of them. Ayer denies that awareness of sense-data is a kind of 'knowing' which word he wants to restrict to its 'propositional sense'. For Ayer it is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of sense-data that they should *in fact* be experienced. And if sense-data cannot exist unless experienced, Ayer hesitates to call awareness of the m. knowledge. See A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (1940; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 78-79.
16. *Mysticism and Logic* p. 210; cf. also p. 212.
17. *NE* I, sec. 5.
18. *Ibid.*, secs. 59, 60.
19. *Ibid.*, sec. 59.
20. *Ibid.* Compare Nelson Goodman, *Ways of World - making* (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), p.6: "Talk of unstructured content or a substratum without properties is self-defeating."
21. C. D. Broad, *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, 3 vols. (vol. 2 in 2 parts) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933-1938; New York: Octagon Books, 1976), I, p. 128 (hereafter cited as *Examination*).
22. *NE* I, sec. 60.
23. *Ibid.* But quality, though indefinable, can, however, be understood by pointing to certain examples, viz., redness, goodness, wisdom, happiness, etc.
24. *Ibid.*, chapter 8, sec. 78. A relation, however, says McTaggart (*Ibid.*, sec. 79),

can even have only one term, "at any rate in the ordinary sense of the word." Thus a subject can have a relation to itself, e.g. the relation of identity with itself. But even in such cases the term that stands in a relation, has without doubt an aspect of plurality - though not a plurality of substances.

25. J.M.E. McTaggart, "An Ontological Idealism," in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st ser, ed. J.H. Muirhead (1924; reprint, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1925), p. 253. It would appear that W.E. Johnson's conception of what calls 'substantive' comes, in certain ways, close to McTaggart's notion of substance. Johnson's substantive also covers, like McTaggart's substance, both 'continuants' and 'occurents'. A 'substantive', again, must have characteristic without itself being a characteristic. For details see W.E. Johnson, *Logic*, 3 pts. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1921-1924; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964), II, secs. 1-3.
26. P.T. Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles : Univ. of Callifornia Press, 1979), p. 44.
27. *Ibid.*
28. When I say "what are called physical/ material objects" I have in mind the protest voiced by J. L. Austin against certain philosophers calling the external objects 'material things'. See his *Sense and Sensibilia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 8.
29. *NE* I, sec. 167
30. Although G.E. Moore's talk of 'direct' and 'indirect' apprehension in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (London George Allen & Unwin, New York : Humanities Press Inc., 1953), pp. 67-71, comes close to 'acquaintance' and 'description' distinction, his subsequent view as expressed in a note added to the above-mentioned book is that 'knowledge by acquaintance' can neither properly be called 'knowledge' nor 'acquaintance'. "There is no common use," he says, "of 'know' such that from the mere fact that I am seeing a person it follows that I am knowing him" (*ibid.*, p. 77, n. 1). Moore is surely wrong here, for in perceiving a person we do come to notice certain (physical or otherwise) characteristics of him. And that is knowledge, even if it is not complete knowledge of that person. But the latter is not entailed by the proposition that perception does give us knowledge of substances or objects. C. S. Peirce too held to the theory of 'direct' perception of (independently existing) objects. Endorsing the Kantian viewpoint, he says : "We have *direct experience of things in themselves*. Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas. That is indeed without

exaggeration the very epitome of *all* falsity ... (A) If experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented." See Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. 6 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1935), 6.95 (p. 73).

The view that perception gives knowledge has been challenged by philosophers like H.A. Prichard. Prichard refuses to grant (any variety of) perception the status of knowledge. He even denies that we can ever 'directly see' physical bodies : the very existence of perceptual illusions (says Prichard) suffices to undermine the possibility of direct perception. See H. A. Prichard, "Perception," in *Knowledge and Perception* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1950).

31. Wilfrid Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 61.
32. Moltke S. Gram, *Direct Realism : A Study of Perception*. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol. 12 (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 4.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 5. C. S. Peirce too rejects the idea of 'deputy'. "It (the chair, for example) obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not 'as' anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway." Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 7-8 (in one), ed. Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1974), 7.619. For a comprehensive attempt to expose the basic instability of the conception of a 'perceptual representative', see Gustav Bergmann, *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pt. 2, *passim*.
34. Making out a strong case for Direct Realism (or what he calls 'real realism of common sense'), Professor Strawson argues that it is "inappropriate" to represent that realism as having the status of a 'theory' (as A. J. Ayer, according to him, does). P.F. Strawson, "Perception and its Objects," in G. F. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 ff. Indeed Strawson goes on to call this realism 'pre-theoretical' (*ibid.*, p.51): its acceptance constitutes *the* condition for sensible experience to be recognized for what it is, namely that which supplies the data or evidence for such a theory; this evidence, consequently, cannot be allowed to be construed as another theory. This realist view (which is in fact evidence and not a theory based on it) comes to be as Dummett puts it, "knowing it as God knows it." See Michael Dummett, "Common sense and Physics," in G. F. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
35. *NE*, II, sec. 300. Also cf. *ibid.*, I, sec. 55, where McTaggart says : "It would

be possiblewithout discussing this [i.e. the question whether something exists?] to consider what characteristics are implied in the characteristic of existence, and then to say conditionally, that, if anything does exist, it has these characteristics."

36. *Ibid.*, II, sec. 300. Last italics mine.
37. The phrase "metaphysics of knowledge" is here taken from the title of Book I of T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* ed. A. C. Bradley, 5th ed. with a Preface by E. Caird (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1906).
38. The doctrine of 'bare particulars' is now generally out of favour. For a scathing and well-reasoned attack on 'bare particulars' see Willfrid Sellars, "Particulars" in *Science, Perception and Reality*, chapter 9.
39. Russell, be it noted, omits from view one important consideration, viz., that if we cannot *otherwise* distinguish one particular from another, 'proper names' serve no purpose in a language one is to speak with others or even oneself. Therefore, as Bergmann remarks, "In this sense as well as in some others, ideal languages are not really languages." G. Bergmann, *Logic and Reality* (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 93.
40. Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgement*, rev. and enl ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 29; cf. pp. 28-31 for further elucidation of the theme.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
42. Strawson, "Perception and its Objects," in G. G. Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 47
43. Our talk of "the given" should be seen as free from such (unsavoury) associations which the word conjures up when some philosophers mean by the objects 'immediately and directly *given*' (to consciousness in sense perception) only sense-data. "Freedom", however, need not mean arbitrariness.
44. "Freedom", however, need not mean arbitrariness.
45. For details of Bradley's view see his "On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience", in *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), chapter 6.
46. Franz Brentano, "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena", in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. Oskar Kraus and trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and Linda L. McAlister (London :

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 88.

47. G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in *Philosophical Studies* (1922; reprint, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 17.
48. *NE* II, sec. 301. Italics mine.
49. We should be on guard against regarding McTaggart's final rejection of the reality of judgements into the distinction he is attempting to draw here.
50. *NE* II, sec. 301.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Consistent with this view of his, McTaggart prefers to use the words 'correct' and 'erroneous' for those perceptions which yield knowledge and those which are infected with error, respectively, thus reserving, in deference to the tradition, the words 'true' and 'false' for judgements. See *NE*, II, sec. 517.
53. Carl Ginet, *Knowledge, Perception and Memory*, p. 119, seems to argue to a somewhat similar conclusion, though on different grounds. "It cannot be maintained that ... to perceive is, necessarily, to make a perceptual judgement or to have some epistemic attitude towards some sort of proposition having to do with that perception." George Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1917), pp. 70-71, also opposes the 'absurd thesis' that "sense-perception consists, either wholly or in part, of entertaining propositions and assenting to them, of making (conscious) judgements, or anything of that sort."
54. *NE*, II, sec. 418.
55. Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality*, pp. 55, 125.
56. This sobriquet for McTaggart I take from C.D. Broad who used it in admiration of the lawyer-like care and clarity with which McTaggart used to set forth his arguments.
57. Izchak Miller, *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984), p. 33. I have here generally followed Miller's interpretation.
58. *Ibid.* By "singular meaning" Miller means a meaning "which could be expressed by a singular term", and by "singular term" he means "a term which,

when made subject of a sentence, the verb of that sentence is inflected in the singular' (*Ibid.*, p. 55, footnote 2).

59. Husserl's 'experience', even while including, in a good measure, perceptual experience, has wider connotations. Husserl takes experience as a generic name designating such "functions" of the mind as present before it the entities which it apprehends. These entities may even include (e.g.) numbers. Cf. Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 33f.
60. Husserl, *Experience and Judgement*, "Introduction" passim, esp. pp. 27 ff, 45ff, 52ff, 64 ff.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 27. Husserl further says: "An object, as the possible substrate of a judgement, can be self-evidently given without having to be judged about in a predicative judgement. On the other hand, a self-evident predicative judgement concerning this object is not possible unless the object itself is given with self-evidence" (*Ibid.*, p. 20). For further details see *ibid.*, pp. 20 f.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
63. For explication of Husserl's distinction between 'pre-predicative' and "predicative" acts, see Izchak Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff. The act of perception, says Miller, is the paradigm case of the "pre-predicative" act, while the act of judging is of the "predicative" act. (*Ibid.*, p. 48)
64. In fact Husserl maintains that even in cases of perceptual "manipulation" (which in its most basic form means "singling out" of individuals (i.e. objects) in what is hypothetically presumed to be genetically prior and not yet (mentally) "organized" perceptual field - which latter contains various "prominences" which attract the Ego's "interest" (*Experience and Judgement*, p. 104) - the objects singled out are already apprehended as having at least some physical properties. Husserl designates this way of apprehending an object's properties perceptual "explication" (*ibid.* p. 105), and goes on to emphasize that perceptual explication is a purely "attributive" process and not a "predicative" one, (Cf. Izchak Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 48) (Also see *Experience and Judgement*, pp. 104 - 123, esp. 123 for Husserl's use of the term "attribute").
And to call it an attributive process is, according to Miller, to mean that it does not involve judgements (Miller *op. cit.*, p. 48). For Husserl's distinction between "attribution" and "predication" on which in turn depends his distinction between "pre-predicative" and "predicative" acts, see his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Appendix II, p. 313; also p. 52. Also see Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

65. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (1931; reprint, London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., New York : Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 240-243. Italics mine. (First German ed. Published 1913). Quoted in Miller, *op. cit.*, p.25.
66. *NE*, II, sec. 407. Compare Gram, *Direct Realism*, p. 59: "We need not perceive all of the properties of perceptual particular in order directly to perceive any of its properties."
67. *NE*, I, sec. 221, p. 234.
68. *Ibid.* This is roughly what A. N. Whitehead too has in mind when he talks of 'the solidarity of the universe'. As he observes: "The difficulty which arises in respect to internal relations is to explain how any particular truth is possible. In so far as there are internal relations, everything must depend upon everything else. But if this be the case, we cannot know about anything till we equally know everything else. Apparently, therefore, we are under the necessity of saying everything at once. This supposed necessity is palpably untrue. Accordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how there can be internal relations, seeing that we admit finite truths." *Science and the Modern World* (1926; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953), p. 203. Whitehead therefore goes on to provide solution out of this impasse. See *Ibid.*, chapter 10.
69. For McTaggart's notion of Original Qualities and Relational Qualities see *NE*, I, sec. 86.
70. *Ibid.*, II, sec. 407
71. For McTaggart's full statement of the principle see *NE*, I, chapter 11.
72. *Ibid.*, I, sec. 99. for McTaggart's enunciation of the principle see *ibid.*, chapter 10.
73. That is, Exclusive description is one "which applies only to one substance, so that the substance is absolutely identified by the description." *Ibid.*, I, sec. 101, p.102. An exclusive description of a term however differs from a 'Complete Description' of it. Cf. *Ibid.*, sec. 101.
74. *Ibid.*, secs. 104, 105.
75. *Ibid.*, sec. 102.
76. *Ibid.*, sec. 105. For Broad's restatement of the principle which facilitates our comprehension of it, see his *Examination*, I, pp. 182-183.

77. *NE*, II, sec. 407.
78. *Ibid.*, sec. 301.
79. W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, pt. 2, p. 29.
80. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912; reprint London : Oxford Univ. press, 1964), p. 138. This 'self-evidence', however, adds Russell, is a matter of degrees (*Ibid.*, pp. 138-139).
81. In all empirical (i.e. phenomenal) experiences the mind and the self remain indistinguishably fused so that the mind can properly be regarded as the subject of knowledge and experience.
82. I am aware that the idea of 'the mind streaming out towards the object' is not likely to find ready acceptance even among those in the West who do not subscribe to the Lockean suggestion that the mind is a *tabula rasa* or to Russell's view (cf. *The Analysis of Mind* [1921; reprint, London: Allen & Unwin, 1922] p. 130). that in a perceptual situation the standpoint of the observer is the "passive" place in contrast to that of the object which is "active" place. The dominant view in the West - which is shared by even Kant (as per his conception of 'sensitivity') who otherwise proposed the idea of the knowing subject's own contribution in knowledge - emphasizes on the whole the idea that the mind does not go out to meet the object, but only receives (passively) the stimuli coming from it. While it cannot be my purpose here to defend the *Vedānta* view - considerations of relevance rule that out - I think one can still make bold to submit that there is nothing inherently extraordinarily grotesque about the mind's alleged active participation in the perceptual situation.
83. One notices here a certain affinity between McTaggart's view and some of Hume's statements concerning the inner world of sun, moon and stars, towns, houses, mountains, etc. and the outer world of the very same things. This alleged parallelism between two 'systems of beings' (as he calls it), Hume uses to refute the idea of the simplicity of the Subject or soul. (McTaggart's self is however complex consisting as it does of mental states. A self's perceptions themselves are complex according as they represent the perceived object as complex.) Hume is however far from formulating the principle in express and precise terms. See David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3 vols. (in one) (1888; reprint, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958), bk. 1, pt. 4. sec. 5 (pp. 242f.)

McTaggart on Perception

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84. Cf. *NE*, II, sec. 413.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, II, sec. 236.

87. *Ibid.*, II, sec. 413, p. 96.

88. Broad, *Examination*, II, pt. 1, p. 48.

89. *Ibid.*, 49

90. *NE*, II, sec. 413

91. *Examination*, II, pt. I, p. 50.

92. *NE*, II, sec. 413.

93. *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1940), p. 128. Explaining, Russell points out that the 'datum which appears as subject in a judgement of perception is a complex whole whose complexity we do not 'necessarily' perceive." *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

94. *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 211. It would seem, though no finality is claimed here, that within McTaggart's framework a whole - atleast in so far as this whole is a self - is ontologically prior to its states or parts, even though the states or parts are all there is to the whole.

95. *NE*, I, sec. 175.

96. For McTaggart's meaning of 'compound characteristics', see *Ibid.*, sec. 64.

97. *Ibid.*, sec. 175.

98. Cf. *Ibid.*, chapter 22 for McTaggart's enunciation of the principle.

99. 'Content' is defined by McTaggart as that plurality which is identical in the different sets of parts of a whole. *Ibid.*, sec. 125.

100. The proposition that every substance has content and, therefore, parts McTaggart regards synthetic, for the conclusion is *not* implied in the definition.

101. Some of these formulations, though slightly modified by me, I owe to C. D.

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Broad. Cf. Broad's *Examination*, II, pt. I, p. 54.

102. G. F. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, I, p. 78. Italics mine.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

104. *Ibid.* For details see *ibid.*, chapter 4, esp. secs. 4-5 (pp. 92-95).

105. *Ibid.*, II, p. 22.

106. *NE*, II, sec. 412.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

108. *Ibid.* Italics mine.

109. *Ibid.*, sec. 401.

110. *Ibid.*

111. The phrase is Broad's. See his *Emamination*, II, pt. I, p. 40.

112. *NE*, II, sec. 412, p. 93.

113. *Examination*, II, pt. I, p. 40.

114. *Ibid.*

115. Robert Leet Patterson, "A Critical Account of Broad's Estimate of McTaggart," in *The Philosophy of C.D. Broad*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1959), p. 144.

116. *Ibid.*

117. *NE*, II, sec. 412, p. 93.

118. *Ibid.*

119. *Ibid.*, sec. 412. See details there.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 94

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-96.

122. *Ibid.*, sec. 481

123. *Ibid.*, sec. 412.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

125. *NE*, II, secs. 508, 511.

126. *Ibid.*, secs. 302, 508, 513.

127. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (1929; reprint, London : Macmillan, 1973), p. 297. All italics mine. Also cf. Kant's *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to present itself as a science*, trans. With Introduction and Notes by Peter G. Lucas (Manchester Univ. Press, 1953), pp. 47-48. The same doctrine Russell expresses as follows: "There are in fact no illusions of the senses, but only mistakes in interpreting sensational data as signs of things other than themselves. Or, to speak more exactly, there is no evidence that there are illusions of the senses." *Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge : Its Scope and Limits* (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1948), p. 182. In fact, the doctrine goes back very far. It would be of profit to reproduce here a few lines from the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus.

Socr... "We have advanced so far as to see that we must not look for it in sense-perception at all, but in what goes on when the mind is occupied with thing by itself, whatever name you give to that.: Theaet. "Well, Socrates, the name for that, I imagine, is 'making judgements.'"

Socr. "You are right, my friend. ... Tell us once more what knowledge is."

Theaet. "I cannot say it is judgement as a whole, because there is false judgement; but perhaps true judgement is knowledge."

See Plato, *Theaetetus* in F. M. Cornford, , op. cit., 187A - 187B.

128. *NE*, II, sec. 520, p. 206.

129. *Ibid.*, sec. 517. Cf. what Socrates says : "when I become percipient, I must become percipient of something for I cannot have a perception and have it of nothing." Plato, *Theaetetus*, in F.M. Cornford, op. cit., 160A

130. *NE*, II, sec. 517. This principle seems to find an echo in the principle - namely that in order to be something or to have any predicate it is necessary to exist - which modern Western logic expresses in the form

: $Fa(Ex) (x = a)$. See Bernard Williams, *Descartes : The Project of Pure Enquiry* (New Jersey : Humanities Press, 1978), p. 92. J. Hintikka, "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance" *Philosophical Review* 71 (1962) : 3-32, reprinted in W. Doney, ed. *Descartes : A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, New York : Anchor Books, 1967) pp. 113-14, attempts to illustrate through an example - 'Hamlet thought, but Hamlet did not exist' - the possible plausibility or consistency of ' Fa , but a does not exist'. For a reply to Hintikka see A. Kenny, *Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy* (New York : Random House, 1968), p. 61.

131. A. J. Ayer observes: "If I perceive a physical object in any way it will follow that it seems to me that I perceive something in that way, though not necessarily the same thing as I do perceive." *The Problem of Knowledge* (Penguins, 1956), p. 103.
132. D. M. Armstrong, *Perception and the Physical World* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), chapter 7.
133. George Pitcher, *A Theory of Perception*, pp. 67 ff, also equates sense perception with acquiring of beliefs and so looks upon (nay, identifies) certain perceptual states of a person with his being in "a certain kind of belief state" (p. 69). Further Pitcher regards illusions also as consisting in "our automatically *believing*, or assuming, or having an immediate impulse or inclination to believe" (p. 70) that X is the case rather than Y . Pitcher, however, does not, unlike Armstrong (see below), question the 'perceptual' character of illusions.
134. *Op. cit.*, p. 83.
135. *Ibid.* p. 82.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
137. See Broad's *Examination*, II, pt. I, pp. 332-333.
138. This is P.T. Geach's word and seems very apt. See his *Truth, Love, and Immortality*, p. 140.
139. Detailed treatment of the doctrine is to be found in *NE*, II, secs. 513-514.
140. *Ibid.*, II, sec. 513, p. 200.
141. *Ibid*

142. *Examination*, II, pt. I, p. 333.

143. For Broad's detailed objections to McTaggart's doctrine see *Ibid.*, pp. 332-340.

144. P. T. Geach, *Truth, Love and Immortality*, p. 140. it is indeed a significant coincidence that Husserl too explicitly talks of what he calls "empirical" "presumptive" certainty of external perception, with which he contrasts "the opposing mode of apodictic certainty". (*Experience and Judgement*, p. 306). "The certainty of external experience", says Husserl, "is always, so to speak, on notice, presumptive," even while this certainly "is repeatedly confirmed in the progress of experience" (*Ibid.*). Husserl advises us to guard against confusing "this confirmed, presumptive certainly." either with a mere 'conjecture' or with 'probability'. "The insight that the certainty of the world of external experience is only presumptive in no way implies, therefore, that it is a mere conjecture or probability" (*Ibid.*)

145. *NE*. II, sec. 634. Italics mine. Cf. also sec. 514.

146. *Ibid.*, sec. 513.

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DISCUSSION

DERRIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECONSTRUCTION

Derrida, the modern father of deconstruction, is the exponent of the "textual activity". He is against the logocentric prejudice and traditional notions of thinking. He appreciates the free play of language as an endless *difference* of meaning. His analysis is beyond all philosophical categories and his influence on literary criticism, sociology, politics, psychology, anthropology etc., is remarkable.

Like the structurlists and other post-structurlists, Derrida is against the traditional metaphysical categories of subjectivity. He was very much influenced by his phenomenological teachers, Husserl and Heidegger and acknowledges his debt as follows :

My philosophical formation owes much to the thought of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger is probably the most constant influence, and particularly his project of 'overcoming' Greek metaphysics. Husserl, whom I studied in a more studious and painstaking fashion, taught me a certain methodical prudence and reserve, a rigorous technique of unravelling and formulating questions..... In fact, it was Husserl's method that helped me to suspect the very notion of presence and the fundamental role it has played in all philosophies."¹

But it is interesting to note that Derrida extended his deconstructive method to his own masters. For example, in his two works, *An Introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry* (1962) and *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), Derrida gives a deconstructive reading of Husserl's philosophy of signification. He argues that phenomenology as a quest for radical origins and beginnings contains within itself the seeds of its own undoing - the possibility of its own self-overcoming. In short, there is the "logocentric spell" in Husserl and Heidegger, according to Derrida. The history of western thinking always centres its understanding on notions of "presence" (*logos*), says Derrida. While commenting on the history of metaphysics in

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Writing and Difference (1967) defines it as a narrative of the "determinations of being as *presence* in all the senses of the word". He argues that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have designated the constant of a presence - *eidos*, *arche*, *telos*, *energeia*, *ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject), *aletheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man and so forth. Derrida, who is against this logocentrism, argues that through deconstruction it can be shown that there is no such "centre".

Logocentrism, according to Derrida, is phenocentrism. In western philosophy, the logocentric prejudice actually operates through the priority to speech (*phone*) over writing (*Gramme*). One can see this in the writings of Plato. Writing was treated with great suspicion by Plato. It has been argued that in "writing", there is a possibility of other interpretations quite different to those originally intended. Plato in *Phaedrus* says that speech is the only authentic medium of language and writing is merely a debased and derivative function, substituting lifeless signs for the ideal self-present unity of thought and speech. The priority to speech over writing degrades writing as "parasitical on speech, a secondary medium of arbitrary signs, deprived of the authenticating "presence" vested in spoken language. Plato feels that once speeches have been written down, they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not : and if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them, and they cannot protect or defend themselves.²

For Derrida, writing takes on an extended significance beyond its customary sense. Derrida's "proto-writing" (*archie'criture*) is that which precedes and places in question the entire structure of assumption which governs traditional thought. The idea of speech as self-presence goes along with a belief in the ability of thought to arrive at an authentic knowledge beyond reach of doubt because it is transparently open to inward self-scrutiny. Derrida in *Of Grammatology* (1967), has shown how this "phonocentric" bias operates across the widest divergences of western philosophic thought by taking numerous examples from Plato to Saussure and Husserl.

The western metaphysics relies upon a series of oppositions - between mind and body, the intelligible and the sensible, culture and nature, male and female, signifier and signified, writing and speech, parole and

langue, diachrony and synchrony - in which one pole is elevated above the other, but can only be so prioritized through denegations of its dependence on its contrary, which generate a fundamental incoherence. Here, the opposites are not maintained in dynamic tension, but are placed in a hierarchical order which gives the first priority. Derrida says that at the point at which the concept of *différance* intervenes all these metaphysical oppositions become non-pertinent.³

Writing, according to Derrida has dual function to play. He uses the term "différance" to denote the dual function of writing as both a *differing* (where each sign differing from the other) and a *deferring* (the endless chain of signs postpones any termination of the chain in some original signified). The functioning of difference *within* speech is the "arche-writing", according to Derrida. Arche-writing is a sort of writing before writing and it cannot be objectively defined. It cannot be reduced to the form of a presence. It is a non-logocentric linguistics, i.e. "grammatology".

According to Derrida, language finds its source in "différance"⁴ as the linguist Saussure had claimed. The arbitrary nature of linguistic signs and their constitution through difference, are the chief notions by means of which Saussure attempted to explain *langue* as a system. The idea of difference completes the insulation of *langue* as a self-contained system. "In language, there are only differences", says Saussure.⁵ Though Derrida accepts Saussurean contribution to the inseparability of the signifier from signified, the problem with Saussure, according to Derrida, is that for Saussure, the signified is a determinate "idea" or a "meaning" fixed by the conjunction of word and thought. This would lead to the view that the signified could exist as the "pure concept" or "pure thought" independent of the signifier.

Meaning, says Derrida, is created only by the play of difference in the process of signification. Writing, for him, does not refer to a script as such, but to the spacing inherent in the notion of difference. Difference permits all thought, speech and writing, and makes possible the opposition between the signifier and the signified.⁶ Difference presumes a "spatial" dimension which is also a "temporal" one. Space is "in" time; it is time's pure living - itself, it is the "outside - itself" as the self-relation of time, says Derrida.⁷

Différance indicates that difference involves an integration of the

"spatial" and the "temporal". Derrida by breaking away from the Saussurean distinction between synchrony and diachrony, argues that once this distinction is abandoned, difference is recognised to exist only within the temporal process of deferring, continual loss of present to future and to past. Signification only operates through difference or "trace." It is "origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, ... is no more ideal than real, no more intelligible than sensible, no more transparent signification than an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it."⁸ All signs and all texts include traces of others. Language, for Derrida, is the active force for differentiation present in trace form in all consciousness.⁸

Sometimes, it is argued that deconstruction is nihilism because it criticizes the idea that there is a centre/fixed point. If there is no such fixed point, then it follows that there is no fixed and final meaning to a text. If there is no ultimate meaning, then any interpretation is as good as any other. But this criticism is not proper. Derrida, in one of his interviews, makes it clear that this is nothing but misinterpretation of his deconstruction. He says :

I regret that I have been misinterpreted in this way... people who wish to avoid questioning and discussion present deconstruction as a sort of gratuitous chess game with a combination of signs, closed up in language as in a cave. I totally refuse that label of nihilism which has been ascribed to me. Deconstruction is not a enclosure in nothingness, but an openness towards the other¹⁰.

For Derrida, no term or text is the bearer of a self-evident meaning. This meaning must be instituted through a further term or text, and the meaning of this in turn by a further term or text, in a process which Derrida names the "logic of supplementary". Meaning is a textual activity, for Derrida.

It has been argued by Peter Dews in *Logics of Disintegration* that Derrida's philosophy of difference is no real advance on a philosophy of identity.¹¹ This would mean that the process or method of deconstruction is nothing but an empty reversal of the domination of identity over difference. Even this criticism is not proper because for Derrida, identity is not something given, something simple, but rather it is a product of both *differing* and *deferring*. Both are included in "difference". Hence deconstruction is not an empty reversal of the domination of identity over

difference.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for
Advanced Study in Philosophy,
University of Madras,
Madras - 600005.

S. PANNEERSELVAM

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BOOK - REVIEW

Gupta, (Dr.) Rita; *Essays on Dependent Origination and Momentariness*; Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Culcutta, 1990; pp. V + 251; Price : Rs. 180/- (HC).

The present book is a collection of nine articles of Dr. Rita Gupta, written over a period of thirteen years. Some of them were published earlier in different journals -- Indian and foreign --, although it also incorporates four papers hitherto unpublished. Those which were published earlier have been included in the present anthology with slight modification, (Acknowledgement, p.i) thus ensuring that their basic structure remains unaltered. As is evident from the title itself, the essays under consideration are broadly related with two themes of major concern in Buddhist thought - *Prañīyasamutpāda* and *Kṣaṇikā*. These essays reflect Dr. Gupta's sustained interest in Buddhist philosophy and invite attention of the concerned to study carefully the nature and significance of the themes mentioned above and the contribution they made in shaping Buddhist scholarship in this country, prior to its disappearance in the post eleventh or twelfth century era of Indian Philosophical deliberation, inspite of internal differences of opinion and dissensions among the adherents of the principal strands of the Buddhist philosophical thought of Indian origin.

Taking perhaps a clue from the empirical tradition pioneered and articulated by David Hume and J.S. Mill and pointing out some of the important similarities which the Buddhist thought exhibits with it, Dr. Gupta seeks to impress upon the concerned that causal analysis presented by the Buddhist enterprise is at least as rich as that presented by Mill, going beyond the limitations of it as available in the Humean analysis of causation. By way of comparison this is certainly important. Her effort of this kind, however, would have paid richer dividend were she to show that this kind of similarity between them is not a matter of mere accidental occurrence but rather is backed by concern for similar kind of rationale. Similarly, with regard to *Pratītyasamutpāda*, her analysis of the theme would have gathered enhanced value if she were to enlighten the interested regarding the contribution which adherents of the principal currents of Buddhism made to the growth and development of it leading to finer and

deeper insight, inspite of some of the decisive differences among them. That is, such an exercise should have unfolded points of seminal importance within the framework of intra-school Buddhist controversy and its contribution to the philosophical thought of Indian origin -- both Buddhist in particular and broadly Indian in general. In this context it may also be suggested that were she to exploit the distinction between reasons and causes or *sahetukatā* and *Sakāraṇatā* on the one hand and that between anthropocentric and discretely cosmocentric on the other, Dr. Gupta's analysis of *Prañītyasamutpāda* would have turned out to be more instructive and thought provoking.

The other group of essays concentrate upon *Kṣaṇikatā* as a decisive theme in one form or the other. Dr. Gupta is certainly right in holding that *Kṣaṇikatā* was brought in to explain *Anityatā* -- one of the main pillars of Buddhism (p. 236), especially under the pioneering efforts and stewardship of Dharmakīrti (of pp. 116, 142, 177) and elaboration of *Kṣaṇikatā* later on at the hands of such Buddhist stalwarts as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the one hand and Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti on the other. From the *Prācīna Nyāya* side the issue of *Kṣaṇikatā* discussed and elaborated by Buddhist philosophers has been responded to and critically evaluated by Vācaspati, Udayanācārya etc, while from the *Navya Nyāya* side by Raghunātha, Gadādhara etc, although during the time of the latter, Buddhism had ceased to be an intellectual force to reckon with. The issue of *Kṣaṇikatā* as discussed by Dr. Gupta, with the help of authoritative texts, certainly brings out one important aspect of it -- viz. (*Prācīna*) *Nyāya* - Buddhist controversy. It is indeed true that this theme engaged attention of the prominent scholars from both the sides for couple of centuries. But in studying this aspect of the controversy Dr. Gupta has merely re-presented the arguments as available in the concerned texts from both the sides. There too, she accepts that in majority of the cases the *Nyāya* scholars presented the Buddhist position and arguments in "the onto - epistemic framework of the *Naiyāyika*" (p. 198) and that "if we treat these *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* trappings as essential parts of the questions "then" it becomes all the more difficult to answer these questions satisfactorily from the Buddhist standpoint" (p. 198). Likewise, although she does raise the question, "we do not know how, a competent Buddhist logician of the stature of Dharmakīrti or Ratnakīrti, if he were alive at the time of Udayana, would have reacted to Udayana's objections against the Buddhist views" (p. 195), in the entire book there is, however, no attempt to answer it, however partly and incompletely it might be. It is certainly true that such an attempt would have required her to investigate into the sort of conceptual framework

within which the arguments from both the sides were formulated and the kind of respective rationales by which they were backed. This is nowhere readily articulated in any book, no matter written in Sanskrit or any other language. But it is precisely for this reason that undertaking such a task would have been more challenging and illuminating as well. Instead, as remarked earlier, Dr. Gupta seems to have chosen to remain content with articulating briefly the aspects of the controversy under consideration as they are available in books written in Sanskrit either by Buddhists or *Naiyāyikas*, although in the latter, as observed earlier, their own bias and conceptual preference is most glaringly and unmistakably present in such a bold relief that it is difficult to fathom through it into the characteristic Buddhist approach and perspective, not to talk of its justifiable rationale. Dr. Gupta holds that it is Dharmakīrti who, for the first time in the Buddhist tradition, formulated the conception of *Kṣaṇikatā* leading later on to the doctrine of *Kṣaṇabhaṅga*, the latter being elaborated by Ratnakīrti in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. In this context, it needs to be noted that although expressions like *Kṣaṇa*, *Kṣaṇika*, etc. do occur in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*, *Pramāṇavārtika* etc. and commentaries on them, none of them, however, could be said to be given to elaborate and defend the concept of *Kṣaṇa* as well as that of *Kṣaṇabhaṅga* and whatever they imply. These expressions also occur in the works of earlier Buddhist scholars like Asaṅga and Vasubandhu not to talk of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka as well. Yet, none of them is said to have systematically formulated the doctrine of *Kṣaṇikatā* to explain *Anityatā* as later on is obviously done. On the count of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, it is the work of Dharmottara bearing the same title that seems to have pioneered the basic tenets of the doctrine under consideration, which under the impact and influence of Jñānaśrī seem to have been summarily reformulated by Ratnakīrti in its two main forms. Be this, however, as it may.

This also brings one to another aspect of the issue under consideration. It consists in recognising that the discussion of *Kṣaṇikatā* as explanatory of *Anityatā* at the hands of later Buddhist Scholars seems to have twin aspect : on the one hand, inter school controversy between adherents of Buddhism and those of *Nyāya - Prācīna* or otherwise; on the other hand, it also brings in aspects of intra-school Buddhist controversy. It consists basically in the fact that although adherents of Buddhism from earlier times did subscribe to *Anityatā* as a decisive feature of Buddhist thought, yet adherents of each sect and strand of Buddhism did not necessarily stretch it in the direction of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*. Accordingly, there arises a question : What would have been those compulsions which

might have necessitated some of the later Buddhist scholars to probe and investigate in these directions? What sort of inadequacies did they notice in the thought of their predecessors and how did they attempt to get over them with the help of *Kṣaṇikatā* and *Kṣaṇabhāṅga*? Were the reasons basically epistemological, ontological or methodological in character? Or rather, were they combinatory of them? What was the sort of rationale by which they were backed? An investigation along these lines would have enabled Dr. Gupta to unfold some of the important aspects of intra-school Buddhist controversy as well. The growth and development - not to talk of degeneration and decay as well - of any philosophical strand in this country in ancient and medieval times seems to have been shaped by two-fold controversies - inter-school as well as intra-school, both of them occurring almost concurrently, although some times one or the other aspect of it might have remained predominant and preponderant. An inquiry along these lines would have made Dr. Gupta's work more illuminative and rewarding an intellectual exercise.

To say, however, these things does not in any way amount to undermining or belittling the worth and importance of her work. It is certainly interesting that she has brought out some important aspects of *Pratītyasamūpāda* and *Kṣaṇikatā* to the notice of the concerned through her essays published in this anthology and for that matter any student of Buddhist philosophical thought should be grateful to her. In years to come one may rightly hope greater illumination and insight coming from her which would be intellectually more rewarding and fulfilling than what it has been in the present case.

Department of Philosophy
University of Poona
Pune - 411 007.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

THE TAGORE-GANDHI CONTROVERSY REVISITED

-Or, Further, In Search of Development-II

After tracing the salient features of the Tagore-Gandhi Controversy in part I¹, let us now proceed with consideration of a few of its modern implications and their importance for the future.

I MODERN IMPLICATIONS

1. The Question of Development and Progress; And Other Questions

By advocating and defending burning of garments made from foreign cloth, abandonment of the fetish of English study, taking up spinning of the Charkha, and connection of physical events with man's morality, Gandhi presents one stand point from which the Indian mind could have blossomed. Tagore, on the other hand, by his strong rebuttal, and forceful espousal of ways at variance to these, is the other ideological source from which the modern Indian mind could have gained inspiration.

But what is it that one sees? Neither the integrity nor the appeal of these viewpoints has percolated to even the superficial depths of our national ethos. And why should it be so? Because the controversy, which should have sparked and helped crystallize a national consciousness, has, unfortunately, not even generated enough enthusiasm to initiate a national debate.² The blame, if one can justifiably attach it to anyone other than oneself, cannot rest on the publishers for not bringing out this work earlier—they have done so as early as 1961.³ It can only rest, if at all, on the social thinker, the so-called intellectual of India today, who has not deemed fit to give it any thing more than a casual scrutiny, let alone attempt to understand or endeavour to put forward his own viewpoints on the issues.

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We shall try, therefore, in the next few paragraphs, to make some amends. Let us begin by first asking a few questions pertinent to a proper understanding of Development.

What, after all, should be considered development in the present Indian context? This question is important because unless we can know what we are searching for, how are we to seek it; or, recognise it when we reach it? Apart from its scientific, economic and other material implications, what *ideological* issues our concept of *proper* development should arouse? How far should science, technology and economics be allowed to guide our ideas of Development; and when should a proper understanding of Development aid in the effective utilization of the means of progress that modern instruments lay at our disposal? Should we consider science, technology and economics as these instruments, nothing more, nothing less? Can we then allow instruments to become our major guide? Can instruments ever guide the goal? Or the goal should be the motivating factor behind our choice of instruments?

Have we been confusing issues by considering Development as synonymous with progress? And if development is our goal, and not progress alone, should we not be able to adequately differentiate between these to confusingly inter-twined concepts? We consider this issue of some worth and will elaborate upon it a little here. While in progress, a going forward *is* involved, it need not necessarily lead to development. In development, a going forward may be involved, but it is not obligatory. At times, development may be the result of going backward, of introspection, of the ability to critically evaluate personal and social history, leading to personal and social development respectively.⁴

Both Tagore and Gandhi voice strong opinions on the matter of development and progress, though not necessarily using these very words. Tagore says, "...I do not believe in the material civilization of the West just as I do not believe in the physical body to be the highest truth in man"⁵ (p.21). But he also believed that the West had powerfully possessed this age 'because to her is given some great mission for man' (p.23) and any effort to alienate ourselves from the West would be a 'spiritual suicide' (p.22). Gandhi believed, "I doubt if the steel age is an advance upon the flint age. I am indifferent. It is the evolution of the soul to which the intellect and all our faculties have to be devoted" (p.78). He also says earlier, "I do want growth. I do want self determination, I do

want freedom, but I want all these for the soul" (p.78).

For Tagore, material and physical progress is important, but it cannot be the highest truth or goal. Gandhi is more explicit. He even lays doubts whether the steel age is a sign of advance on the flint age. Material civilization may be a sign of progress or advance. But if it is development that we seek, then, for Gandhi, this is irrelevant unless it is connected with the evolution of the soul. And it is, therefore, to this that our energies have to be channelized. In other words, Tagore seeks development with progress; Gandhi is ready to consider development even without progress. For both, development is obligatory, progress incidental, and only that progress is acceptable that leads to development. Again instruments can give rise to progress and progress may lead to development. But, if improperly harnessed, progress can as well lead to annihilation, to nuclear warfare, to superpower fights and colonisation. And one doesn't need to go very far in the past to realize this.

2. Tradition- Modernity- Caution Sounding

We must take up two points here. The first concerns the basic ideological conflict that belief in the traditional and change toward the modern involves. This conflict is especially accentuated in the context of modernity which may be hampered by tradition that drags feet. But steadfastness need not necessarily lead to stagnation. And progress need not necessarily mean showing tradition the dust bin. Both such interpretations of Gandhi and Tagore need to be avoided. The doggedness of Gandhi and the pragmatism of Tagore are both assimilable and synthesizable. In fact, though they appear at variance, it is in the efficient incorporation of both in our ethos that the success or otherwise of our national life will be judged. And what applies to the national applies to a greater or lesser extent to the individual as well. Each one of us will have to have certain ideals that one holds on the steadfast, while many others will be amenable to change with the times. This will give rise to change but with non-effacement, progress but with non-disintegration, growth but with roots firmly in the ground. This will avoid *schiz* in the *psyche* of individual and national life-styles. It will lead to Development.

Secondly, we must also address ourselves to how far shall we carry on in our endeavour of caution-sounding and resolution making. They are essential allright. But we cannot end there. In fact, if anything,

we have to begin from there. To what purpose should we, as the writers of this monologue, continue in our efforts to gain approving nods from you as a reader who thinks more or less on similar lines? Because if you did not think so till now then this exercise has been of some benefit. But if you have already carried out your own caution-sounding and resolution making, and if this exercise only involves sharing notes about a third party which is anyway uninvolved, and uninvolvable, in this search for identity, then are we not putting a lot of precious effort in sounding aggrieved and mutual consolation which is nothing more than sharing notes in sobbing together? What is needed is the ability to make this voice heard, the determination to forward its consideration even beyond the confines of social philosophy, the ability to reach it to the average thinking citizen. Therein will lie its test, therein also its fulfilment. That shall be the true test of the viability of this and identical exercises. This may probably also be a significant step forward in search of Development.

3. The Condition of the Indian Mind Today

With our foregoing understanding of what development means we may now wish to know : Where have we moved in the development of the Indian *mānas* ?

Here , we may briefly survey the Indian scene as it exists today. The situation is not cheerful, to say the least. There has been a major bombardment of the Indian mind by foreign thought in various forms. Literature, films, cultural norms, language— all have played their role in continuously exposing the nubile Indian mind to the vagaries of an alien, notably western, influence. This is a situation that started right from the imperialist period (and should, mercifully, have ended there), but is lasting till today. In itself, this is not undesirable., An exposure to different approaches can be claimed to help expand the horizons of one's mind and develop the ability to have a world-view of things. But, for a nation in its infancy, to attempt not only to stand on its feet and recognize itself but also dedvelop the ability to differentiate between pathways and directions (without even the powers of self-scrutiny, let alone the ability of discrimination), can be a tragic situation indeed. If only there had been a breathing time- a time in which the Indian mind could have sat down to think, gone over its past and evaluated it in the light of the present. It could then have removed the chaff from the grain in the matter of its traditional beliefs and concepts, deliberated upon

and developed the ability to recognize the kernel of what is uniquely its own—the basic Indian mind. If only it could have carried this out in a situation which permitted it a total concentration within itself, with the least alien interference. If only the bombardment of outside influences had occurred after this had been achieved. Whatever acceptance and/or rejection that would have followed this would have had the best chance of being carried out in a healthy manner.⁶

As things stand today, since the ability to discriminate has not had the chance to develop (and the ability to assimilate, on the other hand, has probably over-developed), the mind flounders. When assimilation develops at the cost of discrimination, slavishness is the inevitable result. It may or may not be manifest geo-politically, but always manifests mentally. This is a ripe situation for people to become parasites forever waiting for food (literally, as well as in thought) from its host source. As Gandhi said, "At the present moment India has nothing to share with the world save her degradation, pauperism and plagues" (p.80). And, as Tagore very rightly felt, "Parasites have to pay for their ready-made victuals by losing the power of assimilating food in natural form" (p.41). He continues,

"In the history of man this same sin of laziness has always entailed degeneracy. Man becomes parasitical, not only when he fattens on others' toil, but also when he becomes rooted to a particular set of outside conditions and allows himself helplessly to drift along the stream of things as they are; for the outside is alien to the inner self, and if the former be made indispensable by sheer habit, man acquires parasitical characteristics, and becomes unable to perform his true function..." (pp.41-42). Talking further of lower animals he says something pertinent to the slavishly perfect man, "The bees, for millions of years, have been unable to get beyond the pattern of their hive. For that reason, the form of their cell has attained a certain perfection, but their mentality is confined to the age-long habits of their hive-life and cannot soar out of its limitations. Nature has developed a cautious timidity in the case of her lower types of life; she has kept them tied to her apron strings and has stunted their minds, lest they should stray into dangerous experiments" (p.42). And further, "The inertness of mind, which is the basis of all slavery, cannot be got rid of by a docile submission to being hood-winked, nor by going through the motions of a wound-up mechanical doll" (p. 55). And further still, "... the spirit of enquiry through out the whole country must be kept intact and untrammelled, its mind not made timid or inactive by compulsion, open or secret" (p. 63).

Gandhi too has voiced his views clearly on the topic of cultural influence/exchange. He says, "I want the culture of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any. I refuse to live in other people's houses as an interloper, a beggar or a slave" (p. 34). In a preceding paragraph he says, "I hope I am as great a believer in free air as the great Poet. I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed" (p. 34).

As things stand today, everything that appears attractive, new, exciting, is immediately, nay, hungrily imbibed. The mind, already conditioned to think and appreciate particular modes of thought, behaviour and living, just plods from one fashion wave to another. This has been made possible by the various means of communication so efficiently handled by those interested in influencing the minds and intellect of individuals at other places, especially in developing countries (reflecting clearly the imperialist designs of both democrats and Marxists — and what a paradox that groups that espouse causes such as these should have expansionist designs, both political and conceptual).⁷ Influencing the Indian mind can have a special flavour because India at least boasts of an ancient, probably unparalleled cultural heritage, which it claims has helped sustain it down the ages. This state of affairs cannot be glossed over. It must be first realised and then rejected, for as Gandhi said clearly, "In my humble opinion, rejection is as much an ideal as the acceptance of a thing. It is as necessary to reject untruth as it is to accept truth... Non-cooperation with evil is as much a duty as cooperation with good" (p. 39).

Under such efficient conditioning procedures, every attempt at thinking in a different light than the one accepted by the thinking majority at a certain point in time appears alien. (Ofcourse, this is liable to change, for the better as it is for the worse. But till such time, the majority thinkers are likely to consider it alien to their perception of the situation.) What can be more paradoxical than the fact that of all his belongings (and we use the word *belonging*, because we consider you have to belong in this situation), the Indian today is least proud of his Indian-ness. And the one who is, appears either a reactionary, a fundamentalist or a fascist to the thinking majority which prides itself on a certain secular and democratic image which is often a subterfuge to avoid commitment, to continue clever intellectual fence-sitting. Many a times, the two issues of democracy and secularism are confusingly intertwined. Ofcourse the practice of true democracy involves the ability to respect the other individual's right to religion. But a secularism which stresses this right to such levels that it looks askance at performance of

duties as a proper citizen in a democracy, is a poor intellectual exercise indeed. And, more important, it can have far-reaching and dangerous ramifications, as much for each community as for national consciousness as a whole. As of now attempts to think in a manner that may preserve this pattern of thought and integrate it into the prevailing system fails to strike a responsive cord amongst peers. They perceive this as out of step with the general trend of thought and event as they seem to progress in this country. Tagore has already said "... we must win our country, not from some foreigner, but from our own inertia, our own indifference" (p. 47). He warned that a mere collection of jointed logs without wholeness and with contrary pulls may be dragged a few steps by the temporary pull of some common greed or anger, but can never be called political progress: "Therefore, is it not, in our case, wiser to keep for the moment our horse in the stable and begin to manufacture a real carriage?" (p. 53) And leave behind our methods of urgency, ad-hocism or expediency? for, "Human nature has its elasticity; and in the name of urgency, it can be forced towards a particular direction far beyond its normal and wholesome limits. But the rebound is sure to follow, and the consequent disillusionment will leave behind it a desert track of demoralization" (p. 58). "... the foundation of Swaraj cannot be based on any external conformity, but only on the internal union of hearts," (p. 96). This Tagore thought was not possible by piece-meal measures like homespun thread, or religion, even political platform: "the religion of economics is where we should above all try to bring about this union of ours. It is certainly the largest field available to us; for here high and low, learned and ignorant, all have their scope ... if there we can prove that not competition, but co-operation is the real truth, then indeed we can reclaim from the hands of the evil one an immense territory for the reign of peace and goodwill" (p. 96-97). And further, elaborating on co-operation, he said "... politics for a particular people ... (is) a field for the exercise of their business instincts of patriotism. All this time, just as business has implied antagonism, so has politics been concerned with the self-interest of a pugnacious nationalism. The forging of arms and of false documents has been its main activity ... In the cooperation of nations lies the true interest of each ... then only can politics become a field of true endeavour" (p. 97). He sums up, "Co-operation is an ideal, not a mere system and therefore it can give rise to innumerable methods of its application. It leads us into no blind alley; for at every step it communes with our spirit" (p. 99).

3. The Controversy and the Indian Mind

Now, you may think, we have moved far from the main burden of the Gandhi-Tagore controversy itself. But we are not that far and will

come to it presently. The significance, in the present day, of the Gandhi-Tagore controversy is not only that it reflects the conflict between dependance and selfreliance, between keeping up with the West and the concomitant exploitation,⁸ between pride in the traditional and change toward the modern, as these situations come face to face with each other. This is what any developing society must undergo. But much more important is the way these concepts have to be synthesized in our minds.

If Tagore rejects Gandhi's contention to burn foreign cloth or study English, it is not because he is enamoured of either. If Gandhi advises them to be abandoned, it is not because he hates them or considers them inferior or unsuitable for the Indian.⁹ Far from it. Rather, they reflect attempts, which have to be seriously forwarded today, of how utilization of things foreign to oneself-physical or mental-have to be understood and assimilated. No right thinking Indian should be expected to shun total use of the English language or the English dress. That would be too naive a solution to any difficulty and such taking of sides in a controversy can never be encouraged. But we should honestly search into ourselves, and others, to know whether this use is at the expense of something indigenous which should also develop parallel, if not earlier, to this. If, as Gandhi felt, meaning of education has been reduced or knowledge of English and vernaculars are crushed and starved, it becomes essential to change such a concept of education. Learning a language has a definite value : it is a vehicle, a means of communication. But it cannot become an end.¹⁰ As Gandhi said, "Our Non-Co-operation is neither with the English nor with the West. Our Non-Co-operation is with the system the English have established, with the material civilization and its attendant greed and exploitation of the weak ... we say to them, 'Come and co-operate with us on our terms, and it will be well for us, for you and the world' ... (But) in order to be fit to save others, we must try to save ourselves. Indian nationalism is not exclusive, nor aggressive, nor destructive. It is health-giving, religious and therefore humanitarian" (pp. 80-81).

If use of the English language, or the English dress, makes us incapable of appreciating or accepting the worth or need for use of the Indian dress, or expression of the Indian language, then we are, no doubt, fully propagating in ourselves (and helping propagate in all those others whose thoughts and actions we can, by our example, shape), the slavishness we should have long abandoned with the attainment of freedom and self-rule.

4. Love - Truth, Reason

The controversy, again, should help the Indian mind distinguish between the different values that should be given to love on the one hand and truth and reason on the other. As Tagore said, "Our mind must acknowledge the truth of the intellect, just as our heart does the truth of love" (p. 61). He thought Gandhi's advocacy of Charkha may be born out of love, but it went against truth and reason.¹¹ Gandhian thinkers may probably be averse to differentiation of things in this manner, but we shall risk elaborating it nonetheless. By love here we mean adopting certain procedures purely out of liking. We like a certain individual, house, commodity: therefore, we love it. We like a certain way of living; therefore, we love living in that manner.¹² As opposed to this (sometimes, though not always) may be the voice of truth and reason. We may love to do a certain thing, but the voice of truth and reason may guide differently. We may like (and love) the neighbour's wife or his dog, but reason guides us to beware of the complications of indulging in either.¹³ Apart from the lighter side of this remark, this difference between love on one side and truth and reason on the other has implications a little more serious and we shall come to it presently.

In achieving our national or communal ethos, there are certain things we love or like spontaneously. The Hindus' love or liking for the Vedas or the Bhagvad-gita, the Christians' for his Bible, or the Muslims' for his Quran or the Shariat are some such. However, the voice of truth or reason may guide us differently. Thus, reason may demand that although the Hindu loves his Vedas or his Bhagwad-gita, he should not attempt to practice it in a way that comes in any major conflict with or causes a feeling of alienation in his fellow-beings who may not so believe. Truth and reason may demand that although the Christian loves his Bible and Jesus, he should make active attempts to interpret and utilize these teachings not only for in the Christian community or as per papal injunctions, but in the context of the heterogenicity of the Indian community, echoing in the bargain the wishes and aspirations of the people as a whole. Similarly, if the Muslim wishes to love his Quran and seeks protection of his personal law, he is also obliged, by the voice of truth and reason, to abandon any attempts to organize himself in isolation of the norms or modes that prevail in society as a whole. And, finally, if the Sikh wishes to love his Golden Temple and wants the sanctity of its holy precincts to be respected, he is also duty-bound, by the voice of truth and reason, to keep its precincts *holy*. For in this, as Tagore said in another context, "to give undue value to the comparatively

unimportant, lowers the value of the important ... If the small be put on an equal footing with the big, it is not content to rest there, but needs push its way higher up". It is not that the objects of our love are not important. It is that the fetish which we embellish them with are. And this differentiation can only be made if we ascend in our thinking from the emotional to the critical level.

We do not wish by these remarks to antagonize groups and are fully aware of the anger and hurt that people experience when they are thus chastised. We do not wish to chastise, either. We only wish to present the unpalatable facts which, nevertheless, have to be ingested into our system. And not only ingested, but well ruminated upon and digested — imbibing thereby what is useful for the national mainstream and eliminating the residue. And sometimes plain talk is unavoidable for, as Tagore believed, "Strategem is ... a barren policy ... (and) reliance on tactics is so ingrained in the cowardly and the weak, that in order to eradicate it, the very skin must be sloughed off" (p. 56). We must be guided by an abiding faith in the ability of our people to engage in a reasoned dialogue on matters that appear at present to be held emotionally, and aggressively, dear, and which apparently shut the door to a critical enquiry. This is only to carry forward Tagore's questioning of blind faith, of shibboleth and totem-worship; and the refusal to abandon independent thought that he stressed when Gandhi's followers accepted his views without enquiry. It is the very antithesis of that parasitism that basks in the unhealthy sunshine of dogma and blind belief. And by putting things in perspective, the worth of such faith as is essential to constructiveness is brought into bold relief, as it is sifted from the chaff of obscurantism. Dogma itself, thereby, cannot but be the richer.

II THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUTURE

The Search for Swadeshi

Tagore felt, "The present age has powerfully been possessed by the West; it has only become possible because to her is given some great mission for man. We from the East have to come to her to learn whatever she has to teach us; for by doing so, we hasten the fulfilment of this age" (p.23). He further felt, "Our present struggle to alienate our heart and mind from those of the West is an attempt at spiritual suicide" (p.22).

At the same time, however, he also said, "You know that I do not believe in the material civilization of the West just as I do not believe in the physical body to be the highest truth in man" (p.21). Also, "... they (the West)

are waiting for the day-break after the orgies of night, and they have their expectation of light from the East" (p.30). To this probably Gandhi's rejoinder would be "Before ... I can think of sharing with the world, I must possess" (p.80); and for this, "India must learn to live, before she can aspire to die for humanity" (p.81).]

Communication with the West is necessary, but it is equally essential to possess first what is ours. This possession cannot involve an isolated view of one's country because, as Tagore felt, "this ... will run counter to the spirit of the New Age and know no peace" (p.70), as "... response is the only true sign of life" (p.72). And "... India, in order to find herself, must give herself. But this power of giving can only be perfected when it is accompanied by the power of receiving" (p.27). We cannot be "... content with telling the beads of negation, harping on others' faults and proceeding with the erection of Swaraj on a foundation of quarrelsomeness..." (p.73). He asks, "the West has misunderstood the East which is at the root of the disharmony that prevails between them. But will it mend the matter if the East in her turn tries to misunderstand the West?" (p.23). Subsequently, he, as though, offers as answer, "If we can come into real touch with the West through the disinterested medium of intellectual co-operation, we shall gain a true perspective of the human world, realize our own position in it, and have faith in the possibility of widening and deepening our association with it. We ought to know that a perfect isolation of life and culture is not a thing of which any nation can be proud" (p.27):

Hence the Indian-ness that we espouse should not boil down to fanaticism, to 'my country right or wrong' to misplaced pride in the past or its indiscriminate glorification, to apportioning blame on others for our ills; or shutting off the cognitive apparatus to external input. Rather, it will have to be steeped in the considerations of the troubled times in which we exist today. It is not for us to offer here what this will be. That can only crystallize over a period of time, as a result of a national debate. A point by point careful dissection of all aspects of our social, political, economic and religious lives must proceed in an atmosphere of open and honest enquiry, of give and take, and with the mind ready to accept, indeed welcome, a change of outlook that is vitalizing; all with the bare minimum of mulishness or obstinacy or misdirected sensitiveness that only fans emotions of pique and requital, encourages alienation, isolated world-viewing and anomie; and resultant fissiparous tendencies, and regional and sectarian parochialism.

We are aware that though we consider it worth carrying out, we have till now only spoken about what should be thought of as un-Indian. We have discussed what is not Swadeshi and what anti-Swadeshi, as well

as what is improper or false Swadeshi. We have not considered what is proper Swadeshi, nor what is false anti-Swadeshi. While the former can only materialise in the national debate we talked about, we will briefly touch upon the latter in the paragraphs to follow. We feel justified in discussing non-Swadeshim in its various aspects because unless we first know what is anti-Swadeshi or false-Swadeshi in us, how can we attempt to counter these, or actualize what indeed is Swadeshi?

We shall take up two points here :

1. We find it fit to distinguish between *non-Swadeshim* and *anti-Swadeshim*. Non-Swadeshim is a wider term which embraces both anti-Swadeshim and all other attitudes which cannot be considered Swadeshi at the present point in time. *Anti-Swadeshim*, on the other hand, is against Swadeshi, that is, it *oppose* Swadeshi. Thus, whatever is anti-Swadeshi is non-Swadeshi, (if not in person atleast in thought and action) but the converse is not necessarily true. Whatever is non-Swadeshi may not be anti-Swadeshi. In fact it may be necessary, may act as an adjunct to and may need to be incorporated into what is Swadeshi. Hence, only anti-Swadeshim need be imposed. In fact, some non-Swadeshim may have to be encouraged. For example, non-Swadeshim which is likely to be pro-Swadeshi is what we have in mind here e.g. the Indiophiles. The confusion over non-Swadeshi and anti-Swadeshim probably results because many individuals with non-Swadeshi attitudes are those with anti-Swadeshi ones as well. How we wish the strength of the genuinely constructive non-Swadeshi could increase. How we also wish that just as false or improper Swadeshim, viz. fanaticism, misplaced pride etc. disappear, false and improper non-Swadeshim (or anti-Swadeshim) e.g. making a fetish of Secularism, of rights that side-track duties, of privileges to certain sections of society that appear inviolable, sacred etc. also get removed. "Not only can there be false Swadeshim, there can also be a false anti-Swadeshim. Those interested in the genuine philosophical health of the country, cannot avoid distinguishing true Swadeshim from false Swadeshim".¹⁴ And they also cannot avoid the task of distinguishing between anti-Swadeshim, which has to be weeded out, and pro-Swadeshi non-Swadeshim which, as we earlier said, will have to be both encouraged and incorporated, atleast in some measure.

We must also comment here on a non-Swadeshism which professes to be *neutral*, i.e., which is neither Swadeshi, nor anti-Swadeshi. This type of non-Swadeshism is not only useless, it is dangerous. Those who profess it are unaware of the perils inherent in sitting over such a precariously poised fence - a fall from which can only dismember.

Non-Swadeshism, therefore, can be of three types :

- i) *anti*-Swadeshism
- ii) *neutral* non-Swadeshism
- iii) *pro*-Swadeshi non-Swadeshism

The first needs to be combated, the second converted, and the third actively considered.

We know by this exercise we have left the field wide open for definitions as to the types of attitudes and personalities that belong to each group. We are also aware that varied definitions can be put forward by varied groups and this can become as much a soul searching as a mud-slinging exercise. We have resisted the temptation of offering a ready made solution however. This is not because we may be unable to do so, but because we consider it immature at the present moment. We believe this also should materialise as a part of the national debate we contemplated earlier.

2. We must further qualify that for our purpose, we have considered *Indian* as equivalent to Swadeshi. This need not be so. The word '*Swadeshi*' means '*Of my country*'. It is synonymous with Indian-ness in the present context only because we are talking about India here. Swadeshi, we feel, is a much wider concept and, indeed, is a message to the world, to all peoples anywhere engaged in a struggle to gain self-identity, especially after suffering the ravages of colonisation. Further, this concept need not at all be contrary to a constructive world-view or a healthy universalism.

In this context, consider for example some pointers which both Tagore and Gandhi offered and are relevant to the present thesis. Tagore said, "India still cherishes in her heart the immortal mantram of Peace, of Goodness, of Unity : '*Sāntam, Śivam, Advaitam*'" (p.31). Gandhi emphasized, "My modesty has prevented me from declaring from the house-top that the message of Non-cooperation, Non-violence and

Swadeshi is a message to the world", (p.80) (to be adopted by all nations according to their own national ethos). Non-cooperation is an unsuitable translation of the Gandhian concept of *Satyagraha* which means the 'appeal of truth'. Non-cooperation means non-compliance while the Gandhian concept is refusal to comply with or cooperate with activities contrary to one's understanding of what is truthful. It requires as great a moral courage as needed in a rebellion, war or revolution, if not greater. It is a means as much of gaining personal freedom as freedom for nations under subjugation, of whatever form. However 'Non-cooperation ... (went) 'against the very grain of Rabindranath Tagore .. he regarded (it) as a policy of negation and a policy betraying lack of faith in humanity" (p.x.). This ofcourse was the commonest form of understanding, or rather misunderstanding to which Gandhi was, and still is, subjected.¹⁵ This is the misfortune of both the populace unaware of how best to benefit therefrom, not only to gain independence but further consolidate its gain. What *Satyagraha* has often been construed to mean in its present form is a convenient weapon to forward one's monetary and other parochial interests, and as a potent tool of trade-unionism, often without consideration for the moral legitimacy of the ends to be achieved.

Firstly, therefore, the Indian has to understand fully what he, and others, mean when they use these (and such other) concepts, or expect their Indian interpretation. This is the duty not only of those who consider themselves experts on Indian thought, but also of the average Indian thinker, as well as the Indian thinker who specializes in other disciplines. All of them will have to be proficient in its exposition, atleast as to essentials. And they will also have some conviction as to its basic worth.

III FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The implications for the future should follow as an offshoot of whatever we have discussed up till now. Firstly, the controversy (and also other such divergent, but honestly so, and essentially constructive systems of thought) have to be carefully read, discussed and dissected. All the possible ways in which these concepts can be understood have

to be explored. The maximum that each trend of thought can be justifiably stretched, to test its resilience - and, therefore, also its strength - should be attempted. While a debate of this type rages between people (and also in the minds of each one of them), there will crystallize sometime in the future - may not be the near but definitely in the reasonably foreseeable future - a thought and approach that is robustly Indian. Only then would we be anywhere near fulfilling the wish of the sages of yore (and the words of the politicians and thinkers of India today - and how one hopes these words were also genuine wishes) : India has a message for the world. Only then would such a message be delivered by a vibrant, living Indian mind.

Probably, there is less need today for a modern Vivekananda, a Gandhi or a Tagore. Atleast they are not indispensable. There is, however, every need today for a kindling of the spark that lies dormant in each one of us, which could envelop a whole people in a fire of self-purification, and ātma-yajña.

A lot of things will have to be offered to this sacrificial fire before the fruits that result from propitiation of the dieties can be enjoyed. "Nothing great can be got cheap. We only cheat ourselves when we try to acquire things that are precious with a price that is inadequate ... though it takes time to start a fire, once alight it spreads rapidly ... each seed, in its tiny spark, brings divine authority to conquer the whole world." (Tagore, p 100-101). But he taunts, "the difficulty ... is that you can never get all these millions even to spit in unison" (p. 100-101).

So there we are. The die is cast by this upstart remark that must shake us out of our affected urbanity. And its twin, somnolence. For, to offset the soporifics efficiently administered by the gallons all around, the tiny spokes of many lilliputions must be marshalled to awaken this slumbering Gulliver. And though no one can deny he is a giant, no one cannot but accept that he is a sleepy, lethargic, indolent one at present, whose size itself has demented its intellect. And whose tentacles have started showing the fibrillatory twitches of damaged neural pathways, for they no longer connect the centre with the periphery in a healthy manner. To overcome this, let there first be a restoration of dialogue amongst the disparate elements, then a common meeting ground, and a collective search in an atmosphere of free enquiry and a careful, even ruthless, cultural sifting, in which it is as essential to chop the dead-wood to preserve the delicate core, as to tender to it. If at this stage, we go back and recapitulate the essence of the Tagore-

Gandhi controversy that we have tried to capture in these two papers, we would have laid a proper foundation for the national debate that must follow.

13/14 Shiv Kripa
Opp. St. Mary's Convent
Nahur, Mulund (West)
Bombay - 400080

AJAI R. SINGH
AND
SHAKUNTALA A. SINGH

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1. "The Tagore-Gandhi Controversy Revisited - Or, Further, In Search of Development -I," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XIX-3, July, 1992, pp.
2. Or, rather, it has. Because we shall have occasion to talk about it in the sequel to this paper (Part III). We are tempted here to list some other ideological conflicts which have been noticed, but need more extensive and critical scrutiny. Atleast one, the Ranade-Tilak controversy, has been dealt with in the columns of this very journal in the near past (cf. "Purity and Power : A Study in Two Renaissance Profiles", by Diptee Gangavane, *Indian Philosophical Quarterly—Students' Supplement*, Vol. XII, No. 1, Jan-March 1985, pp. 1.12).
3. *Truth Called Them Differently* (Tagore-Gandhi Controversy) hereafter called (TGC). Compiled and Edited by R.K. Prabhu and Ravindra Kelekar, Navjivan, Ahmedabad, 1961.
4. Cf. K.J. Shah's, "In Search of Development", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan-1984, pp. 5-13, who differentiates between change and growth. He says, "Growth means change, but change does not necessarily mean growth; it may mean disruption and disintegration". In the present context we may say that while growth and change are essential for development, change, by itself, can never lead to development, however. And that progress which involves both change and growth is the type of progress worth seeking, because it alone can come anywhere near development.
5. All quotations to follow are from (TGC) above; parentheses, if any, added. The page numbers of TGC appear in parenthesis.
6. Of course this 'if only' is a futile exercise in itself and should if possible always be replaced by 'next time'. Thus, rather than wistfully proclaim, 'If only I had done so and so ...' etc., one should rather think, 'Next time, I will do so and so ...' etc.

Unfortunately, in this situation, there is no next time. So we seek amnesty from this otherwise excellent rule. *If only* there had been a *next time*. We will grant it to you if you feel inclined to think this whole 'if only' exercise indulged in here is redundant in the absence of a 'next time'. But let that not be mistaken for granting that the argument itself is faulty. An inward looking self-contemplation is an essential prerequisite to development; in fact it can become an important precursor of a healthy open-ness that can follow it. If you want a recent instance of this, see what Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* (restructuring) is attempting to do to the Stalinist Iron Curtain by *glasnost* (open-ness).

7. And we think the learning theorists and behaviourists, Watson, Pavlov and dear Old Skinner of recent times amongst them, would be happy at the mastery of their principles that these agencies have attained; or probably, hang their heads in shame at the weapons of potential danger they have placed in the hands of these uncompromising expansionists by expounding their theories of conditioning to such great lengths. We would much rather they do the latter, of-course. But who knows. If you read B.F. Skinner's *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, (Pelican Books, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Reprinted 1976), you may appreciate much better the levels to which learning theories and conditioning can be used to influence others not only as individual minds but as groups, as nations. (For a basic discourse on the Skinnerian deterministic model of man, see T. Bandopadhyay's, "Man and Machine", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No.1, Jan. 1985, pp. 51-54. The implications for the present argument will be brought into sharp focus). But let that not disturb us too much here; there is enough to disturb in what is to follow, and we wish you conserve your resources, as much as we wish to conserve ours.
8. Shah, *op. cit.*, p 11.
9. No pun intended when we use the word *un-suit-able*.
10. Ofcourse, except for the linguists.
11. Cf. Shah, *op. cit.*, p 7, Where he interprets Tagore thus.
12. We realise we are stirring up a hornet's nest by such an exercise, but will attempt it nevertheless. Firstly, equating love with liking itself can be open to question. Further, we refer to only that type of liking which is important for the feeling of love; or that type of love which is mainly dependent on liking. We have neglected all other viewpoints in the bargain. But we may still be allowed this argument from the common sense point of view.

We are well aware that Love or Liking (and, more so, its companion emotion - Happiness), has had a long and chequered career of conflict with Reason in the history of philosophical thought. However there have also been attempts at resolution such that "a genuinely humanistic theory of impulse and desire ... (results, in which there is) room for a psychology of emotions which will be adequate to the demands of epistemology and moral and social theory" (vide R. Sundara Rajan History and Nature: Some Reflections on the Ecological Perspective of the Marxian Theory of History', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan. 1984, pp. 47-48, Parenthesis added). And has not Gandhi himself said "... blind surrender to love is often more mischievous than a forced surrender to the lash of the tyrant. There is hope for the slave of the brute, none for that of love. Love is

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needed to strengthen the weak, love becomes tyrannical when it extracts obedience from an unbeliever" (*TGC*, p. 75).

13. For the dog can only bark; but she can do worse. She can bitch.
14. Shah, *op. cit.*, p 12-13.
15. This should become immediately obvious when we realize that on the eve of India's independence the champion of 'Non-Co-operation' with British Imperialism warned the leaders of Asian countries gathered in Delhi not to organise Asia against Europe or the white races. He was again firmly of the view that India accept the British invitation to join the Common-wealth : "He was pining for the day when the East and the West would accept co-existence as a law of life and work as equals for world brother-hood, and multi-racial co-operation" (*TGC*, p. xi).

CAUSAL FACTS AS LOGICAL ENTAILMENTS OF ACTION STATEMENTS

How much can be learned about particular causal sequences solely on the basis of linguistic competence? Very little, I will argue. The proposal I criticize here says that the transitive verb-form appearing in an action sentence entails causal facts about a particular sequence whose occurrence makes that sentence true on a given occasion of its use.

Not everyone believes that actions belong to causal sequences. But among those that do, it is generally acknowledged that standard, truth functional operators fail to simulate the connection between an agent's reason and the action that occurred because he had that reason.¹ And it is generally agreed that a primary or 'real' reason and the action it explains cannot be related without qualification in the same way as an explanans yields its explanandum.²

The alternative under scrutiny here is this : Some causal inferences about particular action are induced by regularities in speech behavior which are not captured or surface structure of sentences in everyday conversation. A listener makes appropriate associations to causal facts when confronted with such patterns; this is part of what constitutes linguistic competence. For instance language participants who believe that³

- (1) Jack moved his arm intentionally, ordinarily are impelled to believe that
- (2) Jack's arm moved; and further, that
- (3) Jack caused his arm to move.

This reasoning has been generalized into the following formula that holds for a large and controversial class of verbs :⁴

$${}_aV_{Tb} \rightarrow bV_I$$

Here the subscripts 'T' and 'I' respectively stand for transitive and intransitive forms of the verb 'V'. The further causal inference has been given a general formulation that is over 300 years old, according to Jennifer Hornsby. Quoting her presentation again :

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....[W]here 'a' designates a continuant (not an event) then it is a necessary condition of the truth of 'aV_T-s b' that a cause b to V_T.⁵

These persistent associations are not syntactic, since the schemata do not hold for all substitutions of 'V'. Nor are they semantic entailments in the sense of strict implication or of biconditionality since e.g. (2) may be true while (1) is false. So the precise nature of the entailment is unclear.⁶

Nonetheless, this approach is meant to suggest that just exactly as one assumes that heat caused the wax to melt if one believes that heat melted the wax, so too one assumes that Jack caused his arm to move if one believes that Jack moved his arm. The advantage here is that singular action sentences can be assimilated into the more general class of singular causal statements describing sequences of all sorts. This is an economizing move. If it works then no appeal to a special sort of agent-causation needs to be made to illustrate how primary reasons can be causes.⁷

So for example the transitive verb form of

(4) Jack opened the car door

implies that

(5) Jack caused the car door to open.

Then, by following Donald Davidson's celebrated suggestion for parsing the logical form of singular causal statements, Hornsby translates this one so that it quantifies over events.⁸ The first order symbolism then reads that there exists at least two events in ordered sequence, Jack's (action of) opening the car door and the car door's being opened, and the first event (which occurs inside Jack) caused the second.

This reconstruction of sentence (4) is offered as a 'logical continuation' of Davidson's thesis that particular actions are identical to nonrepeatable sequences of events.⁹

But problems arise with this assimilation, chiefly to do with ignoring how sequences are interpreted as actions done intentionally. The examples that follow show that it is misleading to associate causal assumptions with grammatical form because this obscures the degree to which interpreters normatively assess actions while they hypothesize factually about what is going on case by every case.¹⁰ One's beliefs about the contingent facts peculiar to each case are essential not

only to identify sequences as actions of different types, but also to decide whether an agent's intentions have been carried out successfully, ineffectively, inadvertently, deftly, and so on. By stressing the primacy of grammatical contours of action sentences, one may obviate the ability to make crucial distinctions that language participants recognize routinely.

For example, conditions that make it true to say

- 6) Jack caused the car door to open,
may differ between the situation where
- (7) Jack opened the car door intentionally.
and the situation where
- (8) Jack opened the car door inadvertently.

Suppose it is correct that sentence (6) containing the word 'cause' follows as a matter of grammatical form both from sentence (7) and from sentence (8). Suppose further that for anyone who is language competent, this transitive verb structure rules that his believing the causal statement expressed by sentence (6) follows from his believing the action statement (7) or (8). But then the causal statement (6) cannot indicate anything in particular about the sequence that did in fact occur, for *that* particular type of sequence counts among the truth conditions for statement (7) or for (8) but certainly not for both.

One might object that the problem here lies not with the causative verb principle under discussion but with this example. Some causalist theorists would insist that the car door's opening is a consequence of John's action and no part of his action. Therefore it is uninteresting to them in a test of any thesis about John's action, done intentionally or not. So I shift back to the example of arm raising, which for some theorists counts as crucial because they view it as a 'basic' type of action.

Attention to language participation reveals that much is assumed tacitly by participants who believe that

- (9) Jack raised his arm intentionally at noon,
which is not assumed tacitly if they believe only that
- (10) Jack's arm rose at noon.

Suppose Jack is driving towards an intersection and a

language participant observes that Jack's arm rose. Then if he also believes Jack was raising his arm intentionally, it is likely that the observer further believes that

- (11) Jack is an agent;
- (12) Jack ordinarily regards himself as able to raise his arm;
- (13) Jack is aware of what he is doing with his arm while driving;
- (14) Jack wanted to make a legal left turn at the intersection;
- (15) Jack was making a legal left turn at the intersection at noon.

All these auxiliary beliefs may be crucial to assessing the arm rising as a certain type of act done intentionally. The last is a likely belief to adopt if one believes (9-14). For the statements (9-14) may be true while (15) is false. Neither does (15) follow from the surface structure of any sentence in the set (9-14).

Conversely : the truth of (15) does not entail any details of the observable arm movement in virtue of which statements (9) and (10) hold true. Neither does the grammar of (15) indicate precisely what types of sequence might constitute the truth conditions of the action sentence (15) on any other occasion of its use. Knowing that Jack is making a legal turn does not entail knowing that his arm rose 90° from his trunk rather than 105° or 45° . Further, Jack could have been raising his arm incidentally at noon while he announced his left turn with a shout or by switching on a blinker with his foot on the floor pedal. Many different types of causal sequence can constitute the action of making a legal left turn. And yet only one of these types constituted the fixed bodily movements that did in fact occur at noon when the action statement (15) was true.

The problem here is one of overlooking the empirical nature of the beliefs about 'what happened at noon with Jack's arm when he moved it intentionally. This is not a problem peculiar to beliefs about actions. Consider the conditions that make an observer believe

- (16) The Morning Star is green.

Suppose he also believes that

- (17) 'The Morning Star' names the same planet as 'The Evening Star'.

It does not follow logically from (16) and (17) that (18) The Evening Star is green.

Sybil Wolfram argues that although sentences (16) and (18) express distinct propositions they make the very same statement since they say the same thing about the same object.¹¹ Still it doesn't follow logically from (16) and (18) that (17) must be true. If one is warranted to infer any one of these propositions because one believes the other two, then this warranty reflects one's knowledge of astronomy, not one's linguistic competence or skill in logical deduction.

Another problem for the causative verb thesis is that linguists themselves dispute about the significance and the source of a persistent ambiguity between 'direct' and 'indirect' causation implied by the transitive verb from.¹²

Suppose it is true that

(19) Jack moved the piano,

entails

(20) Jack caused the piano to move.

Suppose the piano being moved was something Jack brought about intentionally. If one wants to know further causal facts about how Jack's reasoning led to his getting the piano into a new location then it may or may not be trivial whether his getting the job done involved a lot of Jack's muscle rather than a lot of Jack's money.¹³ But consider the statement :

(21) Jack ridiculed Jane.

To be true, this statement requires that Jack acted intentionally. So its implications may run contrary to those of its purported causal entailment. For it could be true that:

(22) Jack caused Jane to be ridiculed — inadvertently, by his thoughtlessly flagrant infidelity across town

If on a given occasion of their use action sentences are true in virtue of a fixed type of causal sequence, then details identifying which type of sequence this is in a particular case cannot be specified without knowing further facts about the very episode so described. Grammatical facts about the action sentence by themselves cannot provide such details.

In defending the transitive verb formula for inferring causal facts, Hornsby concedes to its lack of generality. The objection, attributed to Chomsky, is 'that there are constraints on what sort of word

may suitably be attached to these transitive verbs to verify the formula.¹⁴ But on reading Chomsky's paper (1967) cited by Hornsby, one finds this is not his objection. Chomsky's concern there and elsewhere is methodological. He stresses that before endorsing any theoretical principle of grammar one must test it case by case with appropriately selected items in the lexicon. Testing hypotheses about deep structure requires appealing to the reactions of competent speakers, whose judgments in turn are subject to attrition.

According to Chomsky there can be no a *priori* guide for formulating principles of deep structure underlying surface structure, nor for setting limits in advance on the extent of a transformation rule's application. 'This is entirely an empirical issue.'¹⁵

Chomsky's emphasis on empirical method for correctly analyzing the data of verb cognates is a useful model for analyzing the data of nonverbal behavior called actions in this respect. The latter data classify into distinct types of action case by case. And types of action cross-classify further as successful or as failed, inadvertently, intentionally, irrationally, deftly, prematurely, and so on, case by case.

Whatever linguistic competence is required to recognize sequences as distinct types of action is also required to recognize success and failure case by case. Epistemically, it is unwarranted to prioritize action types over other evaluative attributes applied to sequences of events seen as intentional behavior. Consider the gyrations of agents moving up and down a snowy slope; in order to recognize what they are doing as skiing, one has to know what to count as success, what to count as a mishap, and which sequences to count as incidental to the proceeding. Likewise, whether to count Jack's pressing on the car door handle as part of a terrorist's plot, or an unwitting tragedy, or a foiled attempt to escape, one must know facts about the episode, not facts about the sentences used to describe the episode.

Certainly the linguistic data indicate that thoughts causing an agent's action can be surmised from the way he describes what he was doing. Asking Jack what he thought he was up to by opening the car door suppose he replies, 'I was sabotaging the enemy.' This statement gives evidence of the thoughts that caused his activating the car bomb at noon.

Suppose that subsequently it becomes apparent that the bomb was rewired, for by 12:02 Jack's activating the bomb inadvertently caused an explosion at his own headquarters. Thus his action failed. In

order to specify exactly what type of action it was that failed, one must describe the sabotage that Jack was engaged in at noon, as he was pressing the door handle.

The point here is that unless the transitive verb form sometimes does fail to yield causal facts about a sequence described as an action, there can be no way to report that a certain type of intended action never came off properly, or that it succeeded in some way other than the agent thought would happen. From statements an agent might assert about his action one can learn causal facts about the beliefs and attitudes that led him to act. But the fact that a belief is causal does not entail that the content of that belief must be factual. So, having determined the type of action intended, one then requires a certain familiarity with particular facts about the episode thus described, in order to further tell whether the agent succeeded or failed at what he intended. Clearly these facts about the sequence that occurred cannot be gleaned solely from the content or the form of a statement expressing what the agent believes and/or wanted to have happened. For the agent's beliefs may be false and from a falsehood anything follows.

Thus, causal assumptions that follow solely from sentences describing what has been done intentionally cannot be guaranteed to describe elements in the fixed particular sequence constituting what in fact occurred. Even when the agent knows what he is doing and precisely how he has succeeded in doing it, rarely do the agent's thoughts focus on the particular nonrepeatable sequence that constitutes what he has done. For instance, as I speak I am unaware of the movements in my larynx.¹⁶

But suppose an agent's thoughts are focussed precisely on the very thing he is doing 'directly'; facts about that sequence cannot follow solely from sentences expressing his knowledge. To show why, consider a controlled laboratory experiment, where the agent is a leading neurophysiologist who does know just what he is doing intentionally with his healthy, normal arm. Here the purported entailment may be expected to obtain between what the agent believes he is doing and what he is doing in fact. Still, one cannot be deducing the causal facts exclusively from the content or the structure of the agent's true propositional beliefs or assertions about his action. Otherwise there could be no ground for suspecting him of being mistaken about what he is doing on any other occasion.

It is distracting to separate off from each other the variety of grounds that warrant our causal assumptions about what is going on. Notoriously, there is no uniform way to formulate the recognized distinction between beliefs based on 'direct' experience vs. beliefs based solely upon 'semantic' features of other statements one holds true.

Consider a situation where the following statements are all true.

- (23) I saw a flash at midnight;
- (24) There occurred a flash at midnight;
- (25) Lightning struck at midnight;
- (26) There was a discharge of electrons from a cloud at midnight.

A blind physicist would be warranted in asserting (24-26) if he heard thunder a moment after midnight, but he would not be warranted in asserting (23) presuming he is totally without retinal stimulation. A nonscientific layman who can see might be warranted in asserting (23-26). He cannot warrantably infer that lightning struck from (23) alone, although he might be warranted to infer (24) from (23). In any case, what should be said about the grounds for a sighted physicist's asserting (24)? Does he draw this belief from his direct observation of the flash at midnight or from his knowledge of photon emission and electromagnetism?

Apparently the warranty for believing a given statement sometimes depends upon facts about the individual believer. The important point to note here is that there is no uniform way to determine which statements these will be.

Overall, then, it may seem misguided to isolate the way transitive verbs operate as a distinct class to elicit causal beliefs. To polarize sources of inference as logical vs. empirical has been found, on balance, to be unilluminating; to point this out with respect to inferences about events is itself a platitude. By sorting inferences now into a threefold partition of logical form vs. surface structure vs. direct observation, it is hardly evident that we can be doing any better.

Perhaps the more generic concern has to be with gaining clarity about how different sources of inference together warrant causal inferences about actions. Yet suppose we did discover what there is about language participation that allows for the frequency and the ease with which we assess and explain actions in everyday

conversation. Nothing so far indicates that we would thereby have hit upon something special about actions that distinguishes them from every other kind of occurrence.*

Department of Philosophy
University of Ghana
Legon (Ghana)

HENLE LAVER

NOTES

1. Donald Davidson, 'Causal Relations,' in *Actions and Events (A&E)* (1980) esp. pp. 152-153; 158.
2. Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (1965) New York, pp. 466-489.
Also Davidson, 'Hempel on Explaining Action,' *A&E*, pp. 261-275.
3. H.P. Grice coined the influential phrase 'conversational implicature;' 'Logic and Conversation,' *Speech Acts: Syntax and Semantics* series no.3 ed. P.Cole and J. Morgan (1975) New York, pp. 41-58.
4. Jennifer Hornsby, *Actions* (1980) London, pp. 2, 124. The thesis discussed here is found in her chapters one, seven and Appendix A. Recently the inferential power accorded causative verbs was endorsed by James Higginbotham (MIT) in discussion of his paper 'Knowledge of Reference,' delivered 31 May 1988 to Wolfram Society, Oxford. Early reference to verbs that 'signify causation' is in C.J. Ducasse, *Nature, Mind and Death* (1951) Illinois, pp. 103-104. For a different construal of 'causal commitments' I have relied elsewhere on Wilfrid Sellars, 'Actions and Events,' *NOUS* (1973) pp. 179, 202, esp. p. 189.
5. Hornsby, *op. cit.*, p.13.
6. Formal systems have been proposed: H. Reichenbach, *Elements of Logic* (1947) New York. Also in *Causation and Conditionals* ed. E. Sosa (1975) Oxford, see D. Lewis, N. Rescher, R. Stalnaker, p. 132.
7. Davidson, 'Causal Relations,' *A&E* p. 154; Hornsby, *Actions*, p. 132.
8. Hornsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 126.
9. Davidson, it should be noted, explicitly rejects the meanings of verbs and the surface forms of sentences as indicators of logical form: 'Agency' (1971) and in discussion of 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' *A&E*, pp. 44, 142.
10. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* p. 463.

11. Sybil Wolfram. *Philosophical Logic* (1989) London, p. 69 et pasim.
12. Noam Chomsky. 'Remarks on Nominalization—*Reading in English Transformational Grammar*' eds. R. Jacobs & P. Rosenbaum (1970) London, pp. 184-221, p. 218n.16. See also his *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965) MIT, pp. 189, 190, 214n.15.
13. Hornsby sees the concern over this ambiguity as clearly trivial where 'basic' actions are addressed, e.g. Jack's moving his arm: *Action*, pp. 14-15.
14. Hornsby, *op. cit.*, p. 126 n.1.
15. Chomsky, 'Remarks on Nominalization,' *op. cit.*, pp. 185, 186, 188, 193.
16. I owe this point to David M. Rosenthal, 'Propositional Attitudes' seminar at the City University of New York, Graduate Center, 1983.

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CATEGORIES AND REALITIES

A very central concern of philosophy - both Western and Indian - has long been that of becoming clear about the more basic features of our thought and talk about the world. These 'more basic features' I call (following the tradition established by Aristotle and Kant) our 'categories', and among such categories a central place must be given to those which concern physical reality- such categories as substance, *kind* (natural and otherwise), *cause* and *effect*, and of *space* and *time*. Even if philosophy has interests far wider than this, it has always had much to say about these basic, physical world concepts, the basic features of our thought and talk about reality.¹

The question I want to address first concerns this very activity of describing our categories. In answering this question, I will be led into a second which goes in to rather deep waters, a question about the existence and nature of a reality independent of our concepts. Do we have to - and *can* we- make sense of a reality existing *prior* to (logically and temporally prior to) any conceptualisation in terms (*inter alia*-and most basically) of our categories?

Aristotle and Kant

I start with what is - relatively speaking - the easier question: Is a philosopher who engages in the activity of categorial description more properly construed as attempting to describe the basic features of reality itself, or as attempting to spell out the basic features of our *thinking and talking* about reality? The contrast can be put nicely in terms of the two philosophers already mentioned - Aristotle and Kant. In the work now known as *The Categories*, Aristotle lists ten different categories or 'predicables' as follows :

Of things said... each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough

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idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last year; of being-in-a-position: is lying, is sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned.²

Aristotle's categories are 'predicables' because they are things predicated of something: when we say, for example, that 'Socrates is a man' we are predicating being-a-man of Socrates, i.e. a certain kind of substance. Again when we say that 'Aristotle is in the Lyceum' we are predicating being-in-the-Lyceum of Aristotle, i.e. a certain place, physical location. The ten predicables are the ten kinds of 'things' that can be said of something.

I use 'thing' here intentionally, to convey the fact that Aristotle is talking about the world and not about language or thought. It is being-in-the-Lyceum *as such* that is predicated of (or said of) Aristotle, not the expression 'in the Lyceum' which is (if at all, and certainly in a different sense of 'said of') said of 'Aristotle' the name. But I use 'thing' *also* to convey another fact about Aristotle's predicables, namely that the list involves a division into ten *types* or *kinds* of what can be variously called 'things', 'entities', 'existents' or 'beings'. Socrates is one kind of thing, a substance, and so is Aristotle; in-the-Lyceum is another kind of entity, a place or location; four foot is a quantity, white is a quality, yesterday is a time, and so on. Aristotle, in drawing up a list of ten different kinds of things predicable of something else, is drawing up a list of the ten different kinds of beings, entities, existents or things.

Kant's list of categories differs widely in form and content from Aristotle's. Yet there is sufficient reason for Kant to borrow the term 'category' from Aristotle: their primary purpose was the same, identified by Kant as that of listing the fundamental concepts employed by us about reality.³

For Kant, there are twelve categories to be listed, and he divides them into four groups: the categories of quantity are unity, plurality and totality; the categories of quality are reality, negation and limitation; those of relation are substance and accident, cause and effect, and reciprocal interaction; while those of modality are possibility, existence and necessity.⁴

Now wherever Aristotle gets his categories from, Kant certainly does not look for his in the world lying outside of and independent of our thought about it, for his official view of *such* reality

is that it lies totally outside our knowledge. There is no way whereby we can attain any knowledge whatsoever about such thought-independent reality, so the source of the list of categories must be within ourselves. This source is logic, the study of the different forms of propositions (or 'judgments' in Kant's more psychological terminology). Borrowing (and somewhat modifying) the list of forms of Judgment from traditional logic, Kant generates his list of categories to match. For example, in making the judgment 'Socrates is wise' the predicate is being related to the subject categorically, hence (says Kant) we are applying the category of *substance* (and attribute). Again, in the judgment 'If you press that spot, I will feel pain' we are using the hypothetical judgment form, and so (according to Kant) we are applying the category of cause (and effect).

I will not stop to question this derivation of categories from logic: the point to stress is rather that Kant - in stark opposition to Aristotle - treats the categories as the fundamental forms of *thought*, embedded in the forms of judgment. For Aristotle, they were *natural*, *real* divisions among things in the world. Kant could be called a 'categorical conceptualist' and Aristotle a 'categorical realist', marking precisely this distinction. And now, the first of my two questions, which can be put in these terms. Should we look upon philosophers engaged in categorical description through Aristotle's eyes or through Kant's? Do the categories mark real kinds to be found in the things which collectively make up reality, or are they rather the fundamental features of our conceptual scheme, of our thought (and we can add 'of our talk') about reality? Should we be *categorical realists* or *categorical conceptualists*?

Undermining the distinction

My answer to this first question is that it offers a *false dichotomy*. I think I can show that we do not have to make a choice between these two, for the simple reason that a description of our thought and talk about reality is a description of reality itself. In order to mark this collapse of the false dichotomy of 'categorical realism' and 'categorical conceptualism' I will call the view to be argued for by the name of 'conceptual realism'. It is the view that to conceptualise is to bring about reality itself, so that the basic features of our conceptualising (of our thinking and talking) are the basic features of reality itself.

I want to provide an argument for conceptual realism by a slightly indirect route, by criticising an *alternative argument* which has

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been constructed by David Hamlyn.⁵ I will take away from Hamlyn's argument whatever seems to be unsupportable elements, and then build upon what is left. This in fact reconstructs the route my own thoughts have followed. It represents a logical set of steps towards an attractively 'intuitively-correct' perception of the facts.)

Hamlyn's argument for conceptual realism centrally links *facts* with the notion of *what people agree to be the case*. Since (with certain reservations to be sure) Hamlyn thinks that general agreement makes the facts in the world, for him the thesis of conceptual realism is established by an easy and direct move: people agree in their thought and talk about what there is, hence what they say constitutes *the facts*. Features of our thought and talk - our concepts, including our categories - are reflected in features of reality itself. The question must therefore be: how does Hamlyn get to this powerful premiss, that links *fact* with *general agreement*? He does so by borrowing two ideas from Wittgenstein and adapting them in a way not to be found in Wittgenstein's published works.

The first Wittgensteinian idea borrowed is that there is a link between language being usable as a device for communication, and there being (broad) agreement in judgments between would-be communicators. This thought is expressed in the well-known passage 242 of *Philosophical Investigations* :

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call 'measuring' is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.⁶

In this passage Wittgenstein is offering a quite *plausible* thought: if people do not agree on this use of language, how can they communicate? A little more accurately, Wittgenstein is saying something more than that. What more? That there is a connection between people communicating with each other and their not falling out over *all* the facts. Take Wittgenstein's own example. If there is going to be a *practice* of using terms for the lengths of things, then this requires that people in general agree on the results of the process of measuring. For the (communicative) language of measurement to exist, there needs to be fairly general agreement over the facts concerning length.

It will be obvious that there is a large gap between this Wittgensteinian idea and Hamlyn's claim that general agreement is

(except exceptionally) definitive of fact. To bridge the gap Hamlyn borrows a second Wittgensteinian idea, expressed in the dictum 'an inner process stands in need of outward criteria'.⁷ The source of this idea is Wittgenstein's own earlier discussion of the language we use for talking about people's pains, hopes, fears, thoughts and so on. I refer to the set of comments known as 'the private language argument'⁸ the gist of these comments is that the practice of describing other people's 'inner processes' (and, as it turns out, one's *own* too) presupposes that there are *criteria* for establishing their existence and nature. Furthermore, these criteria are *public* in kind, making use of features of behaviour and demeanor that are publicly available. For example, if a man is in pain he exhibits this in characteristic ways - ways quite different from what he does when happy, or contented with life.

The notion of 'criterion' at work here is a term of art introduced by Wittgenstein which expresses the *special* relationship between, in this example, pain and the characteristic manifestations of it. The relationship is loose enough to permit the 'manifestation' of pain when 'pain' is absent and contrariwise the presence of pain 'without' the characteristic manifestations. The phrase used by Wittgenstein's interpreters is that '*normally* pain and pain behaviour go together'. What precisely 'normally' comes to has been a matter of some long-standing perplexity, since it is not here used as equivalent to 'usually', a *statistical* notion. Moreover, it is generally said (by Wittgenstein's interpreters) not to be equivalent to an epistemic notion, such that it implies that pain behaviour is good evidence for the presence of pain, and its absence *good evidence* for the absence of the latter. One can only surmise that the relationship is somewhat stronger than an epistemic one.⁹

So far, this is the second Wittgensteinian idea only; it becomes Hamlyn's own adaptation when he generalises the theme that inner processes - hence concepts concerning a person's *inner* life - stand in need of *outer* criteria, too: *all* concepts stand in need of criteria. This implies (which the original idea did not) that even such concepts as *observational* ones require them too. The concepts 'red', for example, Hamlyn takes¹⁰ to have a 'criterion' which is that of 'looking red': normally if something *looks* red then it is red.

To stay true to the spirit of Wittgenstein's approach, the criterion for a given concept must have the relevant kind of distance from the concept: in this case, obviously something can *look* red yet not be red and vice versa. What of the concept of *fact* (and *truth* and

objectivity, which are intimately connected to *fact*)? what is the criterion of fact? Hamlyn's answer is this : general agreement.¹¹ Normally, if people agree on something it is true, it is a fact. Public agreement might *not* exist, for some special reason, on some particular facts, and public agreement for some reason exist where fact does not. Nevertheless public agreement is closely attached to the concept of fact in a manner which goes merely beyond the merely inductive.

How do the two Wittgensteinian ideas come together to yield Hamlyn's conclusion? In the first place, Hamlyn seems to be relying not only on the 'private language argument' passages for the notion of a criterion which he duly extends to all concepts; he also relies on the general conclusion of that section of *Philosophical Investigations*, namely that *all* language is communicative since there cannot be a *private* language which could not be used for communication. The flow of Hamlyn's thinking seems to be as follows.

The concept of fact must have a 'criterion'. This must have the relevant distance from the concept to constitute a 'criterion' in the Wittgensteinian sense: and public agreement seems to fit the bill. But how can we justify saying that public agreement is the criterion, rather than some other phenomenon? What has public (intersubjective) agreement got to do with fact, truth and objectivity anyway? True enough, the notion of objectivity implies that something is the case independently of one person's saying so, it implies the idea of that which is intersubjective in the sense of not *subjectively* judged to be the case - yet this does not get us to intersubjective *agreement* in the sense of *general* acceptance of the fact in question. However, language is essentially public, can always be used for communication, and there is a general connection between this feature of language and agreement in judgments. *This* provides the missing link. Agreement must be the criterion we are looking for; general agreement is the criterion of fact (and of truth and of objectivity).

A New Argument for Conceptual Realism

I have tried to bring out the manner in which Hamlyn adopts and adapts two of Wittgenstein's ideas, to yield his proof of the thesis I have called 'conceptual realism'. It essentially turns on the claim that general agreement is the criterion of fact, that normally if people agree on something, it is the case. I hope I have said enough to indicate where my major reservations lie: Hamlyn makes double use of the so-called 'private language argument', one to adopt the notion of 'criterion' and

the other to put to work the idea of a link between communication and public agreement. I will not criticise the private language argument itself here, only note that it has received much criticism from others.¹² If it cannot be said to obviously pass through those criticisms unscathed, then Hamlyn's argument must be thereby weakened. I will briefly note some reservations, however, about his generalisation of the use of the notion of a criterion.

The *first* objection is that no *justification* is offered for this generalisation beyond Wittgenstein's use of it in connection with our language of inner processes. *Secondly*, it appears to lead to an infinite regress, since every concept involved in the criterion for one given concept will need a criterion too. The concept of pain, for example, is provided with a criterion involving a set of alternative descriptions of behaviour and demeanor the satisfaction of any of which normally ensures the existence of pain - but each description makes use of concepts which themselves require criteria, such as 'clutching the stomach while emitting a moan'. *Thirdly*, when we get down to observational terms like 'red' and 'sour' there seems to be an imminent circularity: the criteria offered by Hamlyn involve those very terms - the criterion of being red is looking red, the very concept of redness appearing in its own criterion.

To come to my own argument for conceptual realism I take Hamlyn's thesis that public agreement is the criterion of fact, and drop the notion of 'criterion'. Is there some other connection, then, between public agreement and fact?

Public agreement cannot be a *necessary condition* for a fact to exist, since there are obviously many facts which people have not yet agreed upon or perhaps never will. Examples should spring readily to mind. Nor, equally obviously, can public agreement be said to be a *sufficient condition* for fact, since there are a great many falsehoods which have been a matter of general conviction.

Perhaps, instead of 'public agreement on the individual fact' we take public agreement on *what would constitute* a particular fact, or *what would count as establishing* the fact in question as the necessary or sufficient condition for that fact. Something like rules for carrying out an investigation or for saying something is the case. something is a fact, of a publicly agreed kind.

There are at least two changes to be made to this idea, however, to make it acceptable. In the first place we must drop the requirement for *publicly agreed* rules, since this is a demand

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consequent on the 'private language argument' considerations. If we are not to rely on that notion, we can offer instead the thesis that *rules* (whether public or private) for carrying out investigations and for saying when something is the case are necessary and sufficient for facts to exist.

And finally, it is surely wholly implausible to say that the existence of a procedure or rule of this kind is *sufficient*, on its own, to bring about a fact. Surely it is at best a *necessary* condition, for example, that there be rules for counting and individuating chairs, for it to be fact that there are three chairs in the room next door: whether there are three chairs depends also on the outcome of applying these rules. Let us say, therefore, that rules or procedures are necessary conditions for facts.

If that is acceptable, I can now give my proof of conceptual realism. Rules or procedures such as I have indicated are nothing other than concepts. A concept is something which permits its possessor to see the world in a certain way, to recognise an instance of a kind when presented with one in reality or to conceive of a kind in thought. When someone has the concept of an F he knows one when he sees one, and can expect, hope for, imagine and contemplate an F too. Having the concept of a dog involves knowing what dogs are, and that brings with it all those skills. There are facts of a certain kind only when there are rules or procedures for investigating and deciding on those facts. There are facts of a certain kind, therefore, only when there is the relevant concept. Conceptual realism is therefore established.

Conceptual Realism and the 'Status Rerum'

Conceptual realism is not without its problems, I will admit. There are little ones (like the need to spell out the different kinds of failure of reference between a concept such as 'phlogiston' and a concept such as 'unicorn') which little problems provide a spur for further enrichment of the theory. But there is a very large problem looming, which I must not turn to and which seems to threaten the theory of conceptual realism at its core. This is the second question which I said at the very start leads us into very deep waters, the question about the existence of a 'reality' independent of our concepts.

What could such a 'reality' be? What I have in mind is the sort of thing referred to by Kant as the noumenal world, the level of un-conceptualised reality occupied by things-as-they-are-in-themselves (things-in-themselves-or perhaps thing-in-itself).¹³ *Noumena* are what according to transcendental idealism 'affect' the human sensibility to produce, when filtered through the forms of sensitivity

and of understanding, the *phenomena* of which we are aware. *Phenomena* constitute conceptualised reality, *noumena* the prior unconceptualised reality. There are some parallels here in Śaṅkara's notion of *Brahman* - *nirguna Brahman* - as that which is real and untainted by human conceptualisations.¹⁴ A similar reference is made much more recently by the phrase '*status rerum*', the state of things as such, a phrase introduced by C.K. Ogden and adopted by D.J. O'Connor in his book *The Correspondence Theory of Truth*.¹⁵ In O'Connor's words, this *status rerum* is a 'raw unexperienced welter of objects and events' which predates and inevitably far exceeds the concepts we have for its description. *Noumenon*, *nirguna Brahman* or *status rerum* - that is the idea of reality I have in mind as posing a threat to conceptual realism.

But why should the thesis of conceptual realism be threatened by such an idea - in what way is this a large problem for conceptual realism? Because (a) the claim that a necessary condition for the existence of facts, of reality, is the existence of a conceptual scheme, that facts, are in a sense made by the concepts, appears to imply that there is a level of preconceptualised reality on which to apply our concepts; and (b) the very idea of such a preconceptualised reality appears to *be incoherent*. The thesis of conceptual realism therefore apparently has an incoherent implication, and that would be sufficient to refute that thesis.

I think this issue of an unconceptualised reality is one of the most difficult in metaphysics, one of the easiest to propound confused ideas about, and one of the most perennial and most pressing. I will try to explain my own thoughts about it which led me to discount the idea, and hence the threat, in the first instance. And then I will try to explain why I now feel tempted to reinstate the idea as a necessary ingredient in any metaphysics, and *a fortiori* in the metaphysics of conceptual realism. If I am correct in my present suspicion that the idea must be taken seriously, that to some extent reduces the threat to conceptual realism as such (as one alternative in the arena) - unless, of course, conceptual realism is in direct conflict with such an idea.

I will rebut this last thought immediately. Why should conceptual realism conflict with the idea of unconceptualised reality? Claim (a) above - that conceptual realism apparently implies the existence of such a reality - says the exact opposite! The answer is that conceptual realism is precisely the thesis that reality is conceptualised for reality is dependent on the existence of a conceptual scheme. I

suggest we clear up this confusion by making a distinction between 'reality' as involving the facts, things, events, qualities and so on which we deal with in experience, in thought and in action, and that other 'reality' intended by Kant, Śaṅkara and O'Connor. Let us reserve the term 'reality' for the first, consistent with the spirit of conceptual realism, and adopt O'Connor's term '*status rerum*' for the second. Conceptual realism is now reinstatable as the thesis that reality is the world of facts, things, events, qualities and so on and is dependent on our conceptualising activity: that cannot be taken as *inconsistent* with the thesis that there is a level of *status rerum*.

But does it imply it? And is that latter idea, as claimed in (b) above, an *incoherent* one? Well, what conceptual realism implies is that we cannot make coherent claims *about* the *status rerum*. It is easy enough to see that we cannot state any *facts* about it, if fact and concept go together; but what about the things, events, process and so on? Cannot it be said to contain these at least? If the facts in reality are concept dependent does this not at least hold open the plausibility that things etc. are not? 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things' said Wittgenstein in the opening passage of the *Tractatus*.¹⁶

But that is a false dichotomy if ever there was one: facts and things etc are not to be contrasted ontologically like that. Of course a fact is not the same type of being as a thing, or a quality or an event; but their existence is nevertheless intimately involved with that of each other. If Big Ben is taller than 60 feet, then Big Ben the thing exists, and so does its property of being taller than 60 feet - but so does the fact that it has this property. If Big Ben *exists* even, then the fact of Big Ben's existing also exists. Take away the fact and you take away the thing; take away the fact and you take away the property. One more peculiar feature of facts, to be sure! And - if this is right - we can now see that the *status rerum* cannot be said to have, if not facts, then at least things with properties, engaging in events and processes, and so on. The *status rerum* cannot be described in these terms at all. We can offer no coherent descriptions of the *status rerum* since we are debarred from the machinery of our conceptual scheme in a big way. It is not just that *facts* are absent from the *status rerum*, but that no conceptual devices can be put to work in that area at all. We are reduced to the unhelpful 'neither this, nor that'!

If by the way, the *status rerum* is as indescribable as this, O'Connor's description of it as 'raw welter of objects and events' must be rejected. There are no objects or events in it, since these follow only

from our conceptualising activity. But why does O'Connor want it to be? Because he thinks it demanded in the context of a defence of whatever truth there is in the empiricists' favourite theory of truth, the correspondence theory.

O'Connor distinguishes indeed not between two 'realities' or 'worlds' but three.¹⁷ The 'A-world' is the *status rerum*, the unconceptualised flux of things and events; the 'B-world' is one of things and their properties, situations and events as experiences and conceptualised - the B-world we inhabit being dependent on such contingencies as our peculiar sensory apparatus and the limits of our conceptualising abilities, so that there are different B-worlds for different species and different subgroups of the same species. There are also, says O'Connor, different 'C-worlds', worlds articulated and described in different languages which hence form or structure those worlds differently.

My quarrel with O'Connor is primarily one concerning his description of the A-world of the *status rerum*. His reason for giving it the kind of richness of conceptual structure which he does is that only in that way can our thoughts, sentences and beliefs be said to 'correspond' to reality or fail to correspond to reality, as the correspondence theory requires. The A-world reality is mind-independent, and linguistically independent, and provides an independent original against which to match our beliefs etc. But he cannot have it both ways. As David Cooper has recently written :

If it is to be really 'untainted' by our concepts, *status rerum* must be a mere welter or flux (though not in any literal sense of these terms, for then we would again be conceptualising). But if it is to serve as the world which true statements 'model' or 'map', then it must possess sufficient order and structure to be 'transmitted' to these statements. Unfortunately, *status rerum* cannot satisfy both conditions. Either it is conceptually ordered, in which case it does not take us out of the tainted universe of B-worlds; or it is featureless Being-in-itself of which nothing counts as a map.¹⁸

I add to Cooper's comment, that the correspondence theory really doesn't need to have a 'modelling' or 'mapping' relation between thought and language and reality. If it did, it would be doomed to failure anyway.¹⁹

Now does the fact that we can give no coherent description of the *status rerum* imply that the very idea is incoherent? Is the idea of that which cannot be coherently described an incoherent idea? It is not at all obvious what to say here, except perhaps to rely on analogy.

What would we say about the idea of an inconsistent idea - is it inconsistent? I think not. We are quite in philosophical discussion to describe ideas of others as inconsistent, and presumable we are not always involved thereby in a kind of pragmatic paradox which undermines our claim. If the idea of an inconsistent idea can itself be a consistent one, perhaps by analogy the idea of an incoherent idea is a coherent one. And then by analogy again, the idea of that which cannot be given a coherent description is perhaps a coherent description of an idea. The suspicion remains though that there is something of a paradoxical air about it, and certainly we seem to be able to give little content to it except in negative terms. It reminds us of Locke's notion of substance which is 'a something, we know not what' which underlies qualities, and which Berkeley took to be a damning description of the very thought.

My original position about conceptual realism²⁰ was that it did not in fact have such a presupposition, and still I think that the reasons I had for that position have some weight.

I do not, for example, think that conceptual realism need say of the world predating or postdating all animal life - and hence all conceptualising - that it existed or will exist as the *status rerum*. A feature of concepts is their applicability beyond what is directly given, now, in experience: a concept allows us to describe and think about things lying beyond the here and now, and that includes things existing before or after anything possesses that concept. We can talk about facts temporally and spatially far distant from us, and of facts of a general nature such as the speed of light and the nature of gravitation. A conceptual scheme therefore need not be limited to the place and time of those that have it, so conceptual realism is not committed to the *status rerum* before and after conceptualising beings exist.

What, however, of that part of O'Connor's description of the *status rerum* as its 'inevitably far exceeding the concepts we have for its description'? How could that be said to follow from the thesis of conceptual realism, since conceptual realism does not contain a clause about our concepts limiting reality in any way. Looked at from this angle, however, it could be claimed that conceptual realism has to have the machinery to make sense of a world exceeding the concepts we have for its description for there certainly is a limit to the conceptual scheme we do in fact have. The limit requires we make sense of what lies beyond it.

I think, once more, that conceptual realism is faced with no insuperable problem here, for the following reason. Conceptual realism

is quite consistent with the idea of a change in conceptual schemes overtime, and hence can easily take on board the idea of facts becoming available later on which are not dreamt of at the moment. Indeed, we have got to our present scheme by a painful enrichment and alteration of what previous generations had-and the individual too goes through a period of such conceptual growth. This relativity of conceptual schemes allows conceptual realism to avoid a commitment to the *status rerum* as wider than any conceptualisation we may have. True, there is the thought that our concepts are a limited means for grasping reality but what this comes to from the conceptual realist's point of view is the thought that our conceptual scheme needs and will need continued enrichment and change: It is not the thought that the world avoids capture in a conceptual net, that a *status rerum* lies above or below or beyond the facts reflecting conceptualisation: rather, it is the thought that the world exceeds the concepts we now have or have had in the past. Maybe it exceeds the concepts we will have, too, in the future - or even that any animal life will have either. But that too is only a limit on the actualisation of the whole range of possible concepts, for facts might lie forever unrevealed because concepts are not developed for their investigation.

I conclude that conceptual realism has not been shown to be committed to the *status rerum*, either as going beyond whatever concepts there might be, or as predating or postdating the activity of conceptualising. Is - not conceptual realism nevertheless logically committed to the *status rerum* as follows? A concept is a tool for making sense of what is thought of as experienced, it is something which is applied to that which is said to be thereby conceptualised. There is therefore something prior to this conceptualised end-product, something logically prior to the act of applying the concept. What is prior to conceptualising is the *status rerum*.

The first response to this has to be that, of course, facts have their constituents, concepts are applied to something to make up those facts. But what is the concept, for example of a table applied to if not the table, the category of a particular or the concept of spatial proximity if not to the table and the chairs? As far as what it is that concepts (including categories) applied to it is concerned there seems no reason to look for anything other than the world of tables and chairs, particulars, space and time and so on.

Secondly, it can be admitted that there is a sense in which a concept produces out of *something else* that which it then gets applied

to. New facts are made out of old facts. One example is the application of the concept of a dining room suite, which brings together the table and the chairs under this new term; the latter things pre-exist the new thing, the suite. Again, two people can be brought in relation to one another as employer and employee, this new concept creating a relation out of two pre-existing particulars. These very examples show, however, that the something else, out of which the concept produces the fact need not itself be construed as a *status rerum*. What becomes an ingredient is a new fact, through the introduction of a new conceptualisation, is a particular, a relation, a table, a spatial proximity, and so on. No *status rerum* has been introduced into the account of conceptual realism, even when the metaphor of 'producing a fact' is taken literally.

Yet if conceptual realism is not committed to the *status rerum* because of the account of the fact-concept relationship, surely it is when we get down to the fundamental level of categories. The fact-category relationship is surely the point at which a preconceptualised ingredient must be introduced into the picture? So thirdly, I offer the following thought. The categories, being the most fundamental features of our thought and talk about the world, might seem to occupy a position on the bottom of a ladder of conceptualisation. Once the 'raw data' of the *status rerum* has received its original 'working up' in terms of space, time, substance and so on, other more detailed concepts such as 'act' or 'table' or 'dining room suite' can be brought in to play, providing a richer tapestry, a richer reality, for us to inhabit.

But this whole metaphor of ladder of conceptualisation is totally suspect. Categories are fundamental concepts, to be sure, but we do not apply them *first* and then go on apply, for example, 'act' or 'table'. (Kant seems to have been in the grip of this mistake, by the way.) Categories are fundamental concepts, but not at the bottom of a ladder. This should be obvious from the examples recently quoted, since the *dining room suit* is a *particular*. The particular emerges at the higher level of 'table plus chairs gives suite.' The *relation* of *employer-employee* is something that rides on the particulars which are the two persons involved, and both category and concept get applied at this higher level. Furthermore, natural kinds are a quarry for scientific investigators, who are already *au fait* with a complex world of particular, relational and spatio-temporal facts. Where is the implication of a preconceptualised world, a *status rerum*? Where, indeed, is the *room* for such a notion?

These are the thoughts which originally led me to discount the idea of the *status rerum* as - if at least a coherent one - not one which is required by the thesis of conceptual realism. Maybe there are ingredients in that thesis which remain suspiciously close to generating a *status rerum* concept, but I think they are not those which I have just discounted. These responses to the claim that the *status rerum* is prior to conceptualisation I still believe to have some force. To explain my present suspicion that any metaphysical theory - including conceptual realism - ought to take the *status rerum* idea seriously I need to refer to Kant once more.

What reasons did Kant have for introducing his *noumenal* world, his world of things-in-themselves, things as they really are in themselves independently of the features of the human (or any) mind (bar a non-discursive, creative mind such as God's)? This question is equivalent to the question, why did Kant adopt the metaphysics of transcendental idealism? His official response is that transcendental idealism is required to give a satisfactory account of a *priori* knowledge - of our possessing, prior to and independently of experience, such a *priori* concepts as he calls 'the categories', and such a *priori* pieces of information as the principle that every event has a cause, or that through every event there exists a substance to which the change of properties can be attributed.²¹ Moreover, he takes transcendental idealism to be required for an adequate explanation of the status of arithmetic and geometry²², and for a resolution of metaphysical puzzles such as the conflict between freedom of the will and physical determinism.²³ The greater part of this group of problems needs no more than the idea of conceptual realism, however. If we can take the human mind itself as contributing substantially to the form which experience takes for us, then we have provided sufficient explanation of a *priori* knowledge. From this point of view, Kant has reason enough to introduce the notion of *phenomena* - things as we experience them - but no reason to introduce the other idea central to transcendental idealism - viz. *noumena*. If my reasoning above is right, *phenomena* do not presuppose *noumena*.

The other 'official' reason Kant acknowledges for introducing the noumenal as well as the phenomenal world is in the context of traditional (i.e., pre-Kantian) metaphysics and moral philosophy. In an attempt to make room for faith in God, freedom and the immortality of the soul, the transcendent world is put outside of the reach of human knowledge.²⁴ The phenomenal - noumenal divide is

the knowledge-faith divide, which traditional metaphysics has always tried to cross. The phenomenal - noumenal divide is, among other things, the key to resolving the metaphysical problem of freewill in a world of rigid causal laws.

I will not stop to criticise this aspect of Kant's philosophy, which in my opinion is by far the weakest area of his metaphysical and epistemological thinking. I think Kant had a far better reason to introduce *noumena* as well as *phenomena*, though he did not make this plain to himself in his official philosophy. There is a clue to it, nevertheless, in what he says about the *regulative* use of the 'ideas of pure reason' such as the idea of the *cosmos* - the world as a whole - and the idea of God - the *ens realissimum* or most real being.²⁵

The function of the ideas of pure reason is, if not as 'constitutive' of human knowledge as the concepts of the understanding, at least a positive one in relation to our knowledge. Their function is to offer an ideal of human knowledge, an end to which we can strive, and 'objective' control on our endeavours. Within the context of our knowledge-acquisition activity, the noumenal does indeed have a role to play, on Kant's approach. I don't believe he spelled it out as fully as he might have done, nevertheless. The point I have in mind is this.

Let us assume that conceptual realism is correct, that facts are in the relevant sense a product of our conceptualising, and hence that concepts are a necessary condition for the existence of phenomenal reality. What guarantees, however, that you and I and the rest of us manage to conceptualise a world in common? And what constraints are there on each of us, to conceptualise in one way rather than another? Perhaps the answer to each of these questions is to be found in the same direction, namely in a world which is not dependent on your or my activity of conceptualising. If Kant had taken Berkeley's position instead of transcendental ideal he would have looked to our creator as the guarantor of objectivity in our ideas about the world. As it is, he tries to present us with one of the earliest non-God-centred metaphysical and epistemological accounts and needs, therefore, an alternative account of the *control* exercised over our conceptual schemes. You and I and the rest come to share a reality, conceptualised though it be as conceptual realism requires, because we share a constraint on our conceptualising activity. The 'ideas of pure reason' as Kant calls them are a reflection of this preconceptual or concept-transcending *status rerum*, the noumenal reality which our concepts are to make up into the world as we experience it and as we think about it.

The most telling way I can think of putting this is to effect a reversal of focus of Kant's philosophical preoccupations. For Kant the primary question was to explain how it is that we can have some striking *a priori* concepts and an awareness *a priori* of some striking principles. There is a question which is Kantian in spirit yet quite the converse of Kant's own: how to explain how it is that we can have even the most mundane of empirical concepts and a knowledge of even the simplest of empirical facts? The idea of a phenomenal world was introduced by Kant to answer the question he posed, and as we saw it need not - at least in connection with *that* question - have brought in its train the idea of the noumenal world, the *status rerum*. The idea of the noumenal is required, however, to provide an answer to the Kantian - like question about our ability to have *empirical* knowledge.

Returning now to the thesis of conceptual realism. Is there anything in that thesis which leaves open scope for the noumenal - or indeed which positively demand such a notion? I suggest that there is. It was claimed that concepts are a *necessary* condition of fact, that they are fact generators in that sense, but not that they are *sufficient* conditions. Developing concepts, be it a category of a full-blown conceptual scheme, provides no guarantee that they will latch onto anything at all. The world has to provide that material to which our concepts can be applied, and we are often called upon to revise, to think again, to try another route. There isn't phlogiston simply because there is the concept, nor witches because people use the term, nor unicorns. The *status rerum* is needed as a control on the knowledge-gathering activity of science and everyday life, our conceptualising and hence 'fact-making' cognitive activity.

If I am anywhere near the truth, the notion of a *status rerum* is needed to give an adequate account of our relationship to the world. Not only is the idea coherent, but an account of facts which left it out would be incomplete. Whereas my original thoughts were to attempt a defence of conceptual realism against this implication of a *status rerum*, my present conclusion is that it would have been defective without it. I hope I am now a little closer to the way things are.

Philosophy Department
Nottingham University,
University Park
Nottingham NG 72 RD (U.K.)

BRIAN CARR

BRIAN CARR

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NOTES

1. A version of this paper was delivered at the University of Delhi in April 1990, in the Indian U.G.C. sponsored seminar series. Thanks are due to Professor S. R. Bhatt for organising and hosting the occasion. I am grateful too for the very helpful comments from those at the seminar, especially Vijay Bharadwaja, Margaret Chatterjee and Indira Mahalingam.
2. Aristotle, *Categories* 1b25; from J.L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford University Press, 1963, p.5
3. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A79/B105; see Norman Kemp Smith (ed.), *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd edition, 1787, Macmillan, London, 1964, pp.112-114.
4. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A80/B106; see Kemp Smith edition, p. 113.
5. D.W. Hamlyn, *Theory of Knowledge*, Macmillan, London, 1970, pp. 68-75, 136-42. See also his inaugural lecture at Birkbeck College, London University, 'Seeing Things As they Are', 1965
6. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1953; 2nd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, paragraph 242.
7. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, paragraph 580.
8. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, paragraphs 240-315.
9. See, e.g., R. Albritton, 'On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term "Criterion"', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXI, 1959.
10. D.W. Hamlyn, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 71.
11. D.W. Hamlyn, *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 141-142.
12. See, e.g., S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds), *Wittgenstein : To Follow a Rule*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
13. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A235/B294 ff.
14. See, e.g., Śaṅkarācārya, *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, Chapter III Section II. I explore these parallels in my article on Śaṅkara in the forthcoming I. Mahalingam and B. Carr (eds), *Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, Routledge, London.
15. D.J. O'Connor, *The Correspondence Theory of Truth*, Hutchinson, London, 1975; the phrase 'status rerum' is introduced on p.130. See also D.J. O'Connor and Brian Carr, *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982, Chapter VII.
16. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1921; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
17. D.J. O'Connor, *The Correspondence Theory of Truth*, p. 130.
18. David E. Cooper, 'Truth and Status Rerum' in Indira Mahalingam and Brian Carr (eds), *Logical Foundations*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 59.
19. Cf. Brian Carr, 'Truth' in G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.), *An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Routledge, London, 1988.
20. Brian Carr, *Metaphysics*, pp. 154-157.
21. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction.
22. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Aesthetic.
23. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Antinomies, esp. A444/B472 ff.
24. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Preface to the Second Edition, Bxxx.
25. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, A642/B670 ff.

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HOW SIGNIFICANT IS SOCRATES' MIDWIFERY?

Introduction:

In the opening dialogues of the *Theaetetus* Socrates refers to himself as midwife. He says, "I am the son of a midwife.... I practise the same art" [8]. It is obvious that Plato is using 'midwife' in a metaphorical sense. The significance of this metaphor has been questioned¹. In general, often, three implications are drawn from this metaphor:

(1) Through the metaphor of the midwife Plato refers to a particular method used by Socrates in practicing and teaching philosophy which is found mostly in the *Theaetetus* and in the *Sophist*.

(2) For Plato midwifery is the method of extraction of a body of *a priori* knowledge that is in the mind of the knower.

(3) For Plato *a priori* knowledge is really *Recollection*. This is sometimes also referred to as the doctrine of *Anamnesis*.

My purpose, in this essay, is to present a cautious survey of all these three implications and show that the metaphor can only be rationally concluded to imply (1); midwifery refers to a method which is also sometimes called the dialectical method. Any attempt to extend the metaphor beyond that to (2) & (3) may lead to baseless speculation. In this paper I shall also show that although there are different uses of the word 'dialectic', as opposed to the method of the sophists (which is the 'art of persuasion'), when used in connection with the metaphor of the 'midwife' the word 'dialectic' has a very restricted sense — that of hypothesis testing.

This essay is divided into three main sections. As this essay is a search for the significance of the metaphor of 'midwife', in section 1, I shall try to counter-act those views that claim that the metaphor of

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the midwife is a 'literal joke'. In the same section I shall also try to bring out why I think that the metaphor of the midwife refers to a method at all. In section 2, I shall try to bring out the exact nature of the method that is referred to by the metaphor of the midwife. In section 3, I shall consider the other implications that are sometimes drawn from the metaphor. In subsection 1 of this section I shall point out the following: In the absence of sufficient evidence, it is baseless speculation to say that the use of the metaphor of the midwife implies that for Plato there is a body of *a priori* knowledge in the mind of the knower. Further, Plato uses other metaphors both in the *Theaetetus* and in other dialogues which also imply that we cannot conclude that for Plato there is a body of *a priori* knowledge in the mind of the knower which has to be brought out by discussion in the style of Socrates. In subsection 2, I shall consider whether the metaphor implies the doctrine of *Anamnesis* at all. In the conclusion we shall consider whether or not this method, as used in the *Theaetetus*, shows that there is an unbroken continuity in Plato's thought.

1. The Question of Method

Socrates' claims in the *Theaetetus* that he has adopted his mother Phaenaret's profession -that of midwifery. Socrates says, "I am the son of a midwife... I practise the same art..." [8]. Socrates also says that while Phaenaret deals with women, he deals with young men. Further, while Phaenerte deals with the physical body of the women, Socrates deals with the *intellect* of the young men. Socrates says, "My art of midwifery is in general like theirs; the only difference is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth" [9]. So what Socrates does can be termed 'intellectual midwifery'. This means giving birth to viable ideas from the mind of the young men pregnant with ideas.

As I believe that the metaphor has a restricted significance, I shall begin by refuting two these. First is that of Campbell's [21], according to which the metaphor of the midwife is a 'literal joke'. To this my reply is that the metaphor does become a 'literal joke' when pushed too far. By "pushed too far" I mean that it is meant to imply the doctrine of *Anamnesis*. For, as Macdowell says, "The theory of Recollection.... is a doctrine; and one moreover which is now generally agreed to be *Platonic* rather than *Socratic*....". But so far as the metaphor refers to a method, it is not a literal joke. Wengert [20], also questions

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the significance of this metaphor. According to him, Socrates can never be an intellectual midwife as he does not have the qualifications of a midwife. I refuse to accept this. Why? In order to answer this question let us see what the qualifications of a midwife are. A midwife is a middle-aged woman, who once did give birth to children but is now past the age of child-bearing[4]. Further, the midwife cannot create the offspring but can only bring it out from the mother's womb. Also, the midwife, has other subsidiary charges, like testing a woman and declaring whether she is pregnant or not. However, the most important task of the midwife, as I see it, is to test the offspring and declare whether it is healthy or still-born. There are three significant things to be noted about a midwife.

1. She does not put the child into the mother's womb.
2. She merely brings out the child.
3. She tests the offspring to see if it is healthy or not.

Now, let us go back to Socrates. The metaphor of the midwife is found only in the *Theaetetus*. Let us see what qualifications Socrates declares that he has, in this particular dialogue. *Theaetetus*, it is generally agreed, is one of the later dialogues of Plato where we see a matured Socrates. Socrates says, "I am so far like the midwife, that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom.... I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me"[9]. He tests younger men to see whether they have some ideas in their mind, (i.e., whether they are spiritually pregnant or empty). Socrates responds to Theaetetus's concern over his inability to answer the question on knowledge as he did the one on mathematics by claiming that Theaetetus is not empty but pregnant. Now Socrates takes upon himself the task of eliciting the idea from the mind of Theaetetus, an idea which he, as a midwife, has not put there. Socrates tests the idea to see if it is genuine or is still-born. Socrates says, "And the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth"[9]. So we see that Socrates performs the following functions.

1. He produces no philosophical theses himself.
2. He elicits these from the mind of others.
3. He tests theses for genuineness.

So we see that Socrates performs all the tasks of a good midwife. One important thing about the *Theaetetus* is that all the ideas produced by

Theaetetus are refuted. This has led some commentators² to conclude that Socrates' methodology is merely destructive. I refuse to accept this conclusion. I see the method as both constructive and destructive. I would say that Plato presents in a constructive light the destructive dialectics of Socrates. As Ryle puts it, "He (Socrates) can abstract ideas from his pregnant answerer and test them, if necessary, to destruction. Apparently this destruction is nearly always necessary. Here Plato seems to be sitting on the fence. He is representing Socratic dialectic as being at one and the same time eclectic and solution-hunting, as thesis-demolishing and thesis-hunting"³[23].

1.1 Miwifery as a Method

The metaphor of the midwife occurs only in the *Theaetetus*. What is significant about this sole occurrence? The significant thing is that Plato deliberately sets up the metaphor of the midwife in the *Theaetetus* in order to contrast the true philosophical method with another method. What is this other method? Plato deliberately chose as opponents to Socrates the opposite viewpoint of Protagoras, who represents the school which believes in the 'art of persuasion'. Thus, the 'other' method of teaching philosophy is *sophistry* or *rhetoric*⁴. The further proves that he has one rival method in mind — *sophistry*. The philosopher's method is the dialectical method in contrast to the sophist's method. What is the basic aim of the sophists? Their aim is not to reach truth but to win over the opponent by mere play of words. So the sophists have no particular wish to produce a healthy offspring (in this case an idea). Their only aim is to get victory irrespective of what idea they produce. In contrast to this, the dialectical method used by Socrates is used to attain truth. In this case the question of attaining the truth is taken seriously. The difference between the two approaches can be seen in their basic philosophy. For Protagoras, who is one of Socrates' opponents here, "man is the measure of all things", which can be interpreted as being individualistic. Personal victory is important for this kind of thinker. Whereas for the philosopher, the real seeker after truth, not personal combat and victory, but the attainment of real knowledge is the goal. Further, whereas the sophists *claim to give knowledge*⁵, the philosopher-dialectician brings it out from the mind of the person she is questioning. The dialectician, after eliciting important theses from the minds of his student, tests each thesis and either accepts or refutes it. Burneyet says, "Here, then, are two

contrasting notions of education. The sophist treats his pupil as an empty receptacle to be filled from the outside with the teacher's ideas. Socrates respects the pupil's own creativity, holding that, with the right kind of assistance, the young man will produce ideas from his own mind and will be able to work out for himself whether they are true or false. Like childbirth, the process can be painful, for it hurts to be made to formulate one's own ideas and, having done so, to find out for oneself what they are worth (151a,c)"[15].

2. Nature of the 'Method' of Midwifery

We have said before that the reference to Socrates as a midwife occurs only in the *Theaetetus*. It occurs at the beginning of the discussion between Socrates and Theaetetus, where Socrates explicitly says that he will act like a midwife and help Theaetetus to give birth to ideas. What does this signify? This signifies that by the method of midwifery we should mean that method used throughout the *Theaetetus*. What I deem most important of all in *Theaetetus* is the method of hypothesis-testing. I hold hypothesis-testing to be the core method of the *Theaetetus* because this is the method followed by Socrates throughout in order to get a definition of knowledge. This fact is directly supported by Socrates when he says that the highest point of his art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth[9].

In order to understand this method more thoroughly we have to know about the general structure of the method used in *Theaetetus*. *Theaetetus* is a search for the answer to the question 'What is knowledge?' In answering this question throughout *Theaetetus* proposes one hypothesis after another and Socrates gives each a thorough examination and then rejects it. This shows that the core of the method used in *Theaetetus* is thesis-testing or rather hypothesis-testing. And since Socrates explicitly talks about his using midwifery in *Theaetetus* my suggestion is that it is this hypothesis-testing method that is referred to by Socrates as the method of midwifery. This method involves several sub-steps. Although at first glance it seems that midwifery, as the hypothesis-testing method, is the examination and destruction of all hypotheses put forward by Theaetetus in response to Socrates' question 'What is knowledge?', however if we probed closely we shall see that the metaphor of 'midwifery' has a deeper significance. The

hypothesis-testing method really involves some deep steps and sub-steps, by which such a destruction of each hypothesis (or as Socrates calls them, Theaetetus's 'offsprings') are cancelled. The real significance of these subtle steps is that they have a distinct pattern, a pattern which connects Plato's entire methodology, used from *Phaedrus* 265A-266E, and *Phaedo* 101E and *Republic* 510B, 533C, through *Theaetetus* to its most sophisticated form in the *Sophist*. This is what I propose to show next. For this essay, this point is very important, because contrary to people who think that midwifery is a joke, this midwifery as the hypothesis-testing method becomes really a chain in a larger series of the method (henceforth P_m) which Plato hints at in his earlier dialogues, but which he finally spells out explicitly in the *Sophist* as the method of division and collection. Further, my claim is that at the centre of P_m is the search for necessary and sufficient condition or *definition* of things-like knowledge or virtue. To summarize, my claim against those who say that midwifery is a literal joke is this: Midwifery is the hypothesis testing method, but it has a greater significance also. It connects the center of P_m from the earlier dialogue say *Phaedo*[31], where P_m comes under the guise of hypothetical method (henceforth H_m), through *Republic* as the "upward and downward" method (henceforth M_{ud}) to *Theaetetus* as the hypothesis testing or method of midwifery, and finally P_m gets its most sophisticated form in the *Sophist* as the method of collection and division (henceforth M_{dc}). It may be objected by some that this claim is too much and there is no basis for this. This is the objection that I shall refute.

Let us start by looking at the methods used in Plato's earlier dialogues starting with *Phaedo*, where Plato searches the question 'What is cause?'. Regarding his method in the *Phaedo*, Socrates clearly says, ".....if anyone hung on to the hypothesis itself, you would dismiss him, and you wouldn't answer till you should have examined its consequences, to see if, in your view, they are in accord or discord with each other; and when you have to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you would give it in the same way, once again hypothesizing another hypothesis, which should seem best of those above, till you came to something adequate;...." Now what does "accord" refer here? It refers to consistent hypothesis. So we can reformulate what Socrates has said in the following way. H_m is a method where the consequences are tested for mutual consistency and mere lack of contradiction, and subsequently

finding another less objectionable hypothesis from which it is deduced. Symbolically it can be put forth in the following fashion:

If P is the consequence of the negation of Q , then Q is the consequence of the negation of P . Hence the negation of P provides at least one sufficient condition for the truth of Q . Let us see how through the hypotheses-testing method this same method is carried out.

Before that let us mention, very briefly, the method used in the *Republic*. Take the case in the *Republic* 510B, 511B-C, 533C[33]. It is said that the first step is to see that two propositions are consistent. The second step is to provide grounds for the hypothesis by deducing it in the same fashion from the other hypothesis "above" it which itself can be shown to have mutual consistent consequences. This procedure is complete when the hypothesis has reached "satisfaction". This is the "upward" path, which is similar to the method of collection. Zellar calls this "upward path" "The synthetic-theory" leading up to the idea of Good[16]. Against this Robinson points out that the Idea of Good cannot be the terminus of the "upward-path", as being the "summum-genus"[30]. Also, collection being a form of generalization would have to be empirical. For generalizations pick out universals out of particulars given to sense. I hold that Robinson's view is erroneous. Why? For it is erroneous to hold.

(a) The outcome of collection is to arrive at a general.

(b) The contention of picking out particulars from universals, is also erroneous. This is shown in the *Sophist.*, which I shall show subsequently. Now let us go back to the H_m , and pick up the thread from there to the *Theaetetus*.

I shall show in the following pages how H_m is used in the *Theaetetus*. Take what Socrates says in *Theaetetus*: ".....we shall prefer first to study the notions we have in our own minds and find out what they are and whether they are, when we compare them, they agree or are altogether inconsistent"⁶[14]. I shall show that the terms 'agree' or 'inconsistent' in *Theaetetus* has the same significance as 'accord with' or 'discord with' in *Phaedo*. In *Theaetetus* Socrates seeks the answer to the question, 'What is knowledge?'. And young Theaetetus comes up with different suggestions (all of which are refuted).

Theaetetus's first suggestion is that "Knowledge is perception". Socrates, like a true philosopher 'dialectically' combines

this thesis with the Protagorean thesis 'Man is the measure of everything'. Now the thesis stands as follows:

If man is the measure of everything, then what appears to me or what I perceive is true to me, and what appears to you is true to you. No one has any right to say that the other is wrong. So perception is always infallible and of what is. If the wind appears cold to me, then it is cold, for it so appears to me. The same wind may appear warm to you. Neither has any right to say that the other is wrong. If $w = \text{wind}$, $c = \text{cool}$, $r = \text{warm}$, then we have the following:

- (a) The wind is cold.
- (b) The wind is warm.
- (c) The wind is both.


Now clearly, in Protagoras's own theory, we cannot accept either (a) or (b). Can we accept (c). Commonsense tells us that we cannot. But Socrates tells us that although to the general public (c) is impossible, it is still possible, according to the "secret doctrine". What is this doctrine? This doctrine can be summarized as follows:

Nothing is one thing just by itself, but always in the process of becoming. So things of which we say 'are' are really 'are not' and so on. Qualities reside neither 'in' the objects, nor 'in' the observer, but is a "twin-product" which arises as a result of interaction between the two. One consequence is that the wind is not distinct from its properties. This is a result of the use of H_m . If this seems vague to the reader, we should try to make it clear by using another example.

The application of the use of H_m in *Theaetetus* is more obvious in the case of the discussion of false judgments. Plato accepts false judgment[13] while examining Protagoras's thesis of man-measure doctrine. Now if we accept man-measure doctrine, one consequence is that it cannot have false judgment (as we cannot have false perception), and if false judgment is possible then we cannot have man-measure doctrine. By this logic Socrates was finally able to refute the man-measure doctrine.

Now carry this over to the method of the Sophist. The method used here is M_{dc} . What actually is M_{dc} ? It is really a search for definition (in this case the definition of a sophist). And a definition is nothing

other than a necessary and sufficient condition. Let us see how we get a definition out of a method of M_{dc} . Suppose I want the definition of X, now what I do is this. I first "collect" something and divide it, and as we go on, we collect when the division is done.



Now, we can collect one side of the ladder, $M+F+B+W$. And we formulate our definition of $X=WFBM$. So we see here the same search for necessary and sufficient condition. This diagram also shows why we can call this method "upward-downward" method.

We find an echo of this method in *Phaedrus* 265A-266E. Here Plato directly refers to the method of "division and collection" method[32]. Plato here says, that he referred the to procedure where we can disperse with plurality under the single form seeing it all together. He talks about the "reverse" of this method. By this reverse we are enabled to divide into forms, following the objective circulation.

Now, my suggestion is that it is this method P_m , that in the the earlier method appears as H_m or upward-downward method or later as the hypothesis-testing method, or the M_{dc} method. So, the true significance of hypothesis-testing method can be appreciated if we put it in the context of the larger chain of P_m .

3. Platonic Knowledge: A priori or Anamnesis?

3.1 Knowledge as A priori

Socrates says, ".....the many admirable truth they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within". From this commentators have sometimes drawn the conclusion that for Plato one implication of the metaphor of midwifery is that there is a body of a *priori* knowledge in the mind of the knower. I refuse to accept this thesis. Why? Because the above citation, which is taken as a basis to draw the above conclusion, directly clashes with another citation from which a contradictory conclusion can be drawn. This citation is, "....I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul"[9]. Why does this contradict the above thesis? Because, if everyone possessed a set of a *priori* knowledge, then Socrates would have it too, but as this citation shows he does not⁷. My contention is that the most we can infer from the former citation, without being speculative is, as Burneyet says, that Socrates respects the pupils' own creativity. He helps them to develop their creativity. Like childbirth, the process can be painful, for it hurts to be made to formulate one's own ideas and, having done so, to find out for oneself what they are worth (151a, c)[15]. This also supports what Shorey says about Platonic knowledge, "....Plato reserves the term knowledge, intelligence, pure reason, for the man who co-ordinates his opinions, unifies them by systematic reference to higher principles, ideals, and "ideas", and who can defend them against fair argument against all comers"[24].

Further there are two other metaphors used in *Theaetetus* which also contradict the above thesis. The first is the metaphor of the aviary. Socrates compares the mind with an aviary, which is empty at birth, and is subsequently filled with birds. Had there been a *priori* knowledge this aviary would have been already filled, and there would have been no need to fill it.

Further, Plato also uses the imagery of a wax tablet. There is something in each of us like a wax block prepared to receive impressions. The quality and duration of the impression depends on the nature of the block. So long as this impression remains we say that a man has memory and knowledge[12]. If knowledge was already inherent in the mind of the knower, then what is the point in bringing in impressions?

Further, Gulley says the elements in our consciousness is got there by sensible experience. This means that the source of our knowledge is experience. However this experience, as Gulley puts it, is a different kind of experience. What does he mean by "a different kind of experience"? Gulley says, "....it is the only mode of *apprehension*⁸ which can properly be called knowledge at all, and is thus superior to other modes of apprehension." [27]. What does Gulley mean by "apprehension" here? And why does Gulley say this? My best guess for the basis of this statement is to go back to *Timaeus* where the Demiurge takes the souls into the chariot, and carries them to the star to "show" them the universe. We can substitute "apprehension" for "show" here. Of course this might be reading more than what Gulley thought, but this seems to me to be the most reasonable answer.

Further it is said that for Plato knowledge if elicited from the mind of the knower, is really Recollection. This view is held by Cornford [2] and rejected by Macdowell. I support Macdowell on this point. Let us see in the next section what are my reasons for doing so.

3.2 Midwifery and Recollection

Cornford in his *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* supports the view that the metaphor of midwifery implies the doctrine of Recollection. Cornford says that this portion of Plato's dialogue is in agreement with *Meno* where he brings in the theory that learning is the recovery of latent knowledge inherent in the soul which is immortal. Cornford says, "The probable inference is that *Anamnesis* was a theory which squared the profession and practice of Socrates with Plato's discovery of the separately existing Forms and his conversation from Socratic antagonism to a belief in immortality" [1]. Another supporter of the theory that the metaphor of the midwife really implies the theory of recollection is Leon Robin in his book *Platon*⁹. He gives the following example. Socrates ends his refutation of the thesis that knowledge is perception by urging that there is something which the soul "herself by herself" sees without any help of the senses [11]. Further, he also says that this theory is supported by such statement as, "....things whose being is considered, one in comparison with another, by the mind, when it reflects within itself upon the past and the present with an eye to the future" [10]. Further, let us consider the comparison of the soul with the aviary. Socrates says, "When we are babies we must

suppose this receptacle empty, and take the birds to stand for pieces of knowledge. Whenever a person acquires any piece of knowledge and shuts it up in his enclosure, we must say he has learnt or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge....".

Let us see why we do not agree with this. Firstly, regarding the theory of Recollection, Macdowell says, "The theory of Recollection.... is a doctrine; and one moreover which is now generally agreed to be Platonic rather than Socratic....". Further, suppose midwifery is tied up to the theory of Forms and Recollection, then all "instances" claimed by Theaetetus to be knowledge, would have been correct. For knowledge is *always correct*. However, here we find that it is not the case, for in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates rejects all the "offsprings" that he elicits from the mind of Theaetetus. Also, one important aspect of Socrates' midwifery is that Socrates does not produce any philosophical thesis himself, but only elicits such thesis from the minds of young men. It is not clear how this would fit in with the doctrine of Recollection.

To Robin's argument we can point out the following objections. First, Robin reads in the theory some of the lines in the *Theaetetus*. There is nothing directly cited into in either of the texts asserted by Robin about Recollection. Moreover the theory itself assumes varied forms in *Meno* from which no definite conclusion can be drawn. Further Robin's citation of the aviary in 197E has nothing positive to apply to the theory of Recollection. As R. Robinson points out that contrary to what Socrates says, the aviary is empty at birth; but the aviary should have been full, if the theory of Recollection is to be true. Contrary to this, for Plato, "....until we are grown up and have had training we are unable to catch in our hands the birds that we have in our cages...."[25]. Further, the comparison of the soul with a waxen tablet is contrary to the doctrine of Recollection, although Socrates does not specifically point out that the tablet is empty at birth. But to draw the conclusion that the soul is filled from the previous birth is to indulge in too much baseless speculation. Also, in the *Meno* Plato talks about the *anamnesis* in the connection of the knowledge of Forms. How does this knowledge at all get into the soul? There is no direct answer to this in the doctrine of this dialogue. Norman Gulley says, "Anamnesis proper thus affords merely 'isolated data', lacking all orientation....,"[26].

One further point may be brought out in this connection. According to some commentators the method of division and collection can be tied up to the doctrine of recollection[29]. How? By saying that division and collection is really *re-cognition* of the similarity and dissimilarity amongst forms. Now, if we say that the hypothesis-testing method we have spoken of is a part of a larger chain of method- P_m then it follows that the method of hypothesis-testing implies the doctrine of recollection. My point against this view is that we cannot conclude that the hypothesis-testing method, at least in the *Theaetetus*, is any evidence for the theory of recollection. Why? Because there is no general consensus among commentators as to whether Plato still holds the theory of recollection in his later dialogues[34]. Also some writers maintain that there is a radical distinction between recollection, as a technique in the earlier dialogues to come to know forms, and the later 'technique of relation' or 'specification' which supersedes recollection[34]. In the face of lack of general consensus, we are in no position to draw a conclusion.

4. Conclusion

As the title of this essay suggests, my aim is to deal with the question 'How significant is Socrates's Midwifery?'. I believe that through this essay I have shown one thing clearly, that the metaphor of the midwifery is not entirely vacuous, nor is it a 'literal joke'. However, we should be careful not to read too much into the metaphor. The standard implications have been subject to critical scrutiny and I have shown that the metaphor, as it stands, warrants us to draw only one of the implications with reasonable grounds. To go beyond that is to indulge in baseless speculation.

Further, we can draw one more conclusion from the fact that in the *Theaetetus* the core method is hypothesis-testing. This conclusion is that there seems to be a continuity in Plato's thought with respect to the method used, which we proposed to call P_m^{10} . *Theaetetus*, it is generally agreed, is a later dialogue of Plato. The method used here is similar to the destructive method used by Socrates in the earlier dialogues. It is used in the *Phaedrus* from 265E to 266B. Gulley says, "The first formal exposition of the method of collection and division is found in the *Phaedrus*"[29]. P_m is used in the *Phaedrus* under the apparent inspiration of the H_m . P_m in the *Theaetetus* is used under the metaphor of midwifery. However, P_m is used explicitly and in sophisticated form

in the *Sophist* where Plato calls it the method of Division and Collection. Does this mean that there is a continuity in Plato's thought in so far as the method of teaching in general and of teaching philosophy in particular is concerned? An interesting historical note from Cherniss may be pointed out here. Cherniss says, ".... in the gymnasium of the Academia he saw a group of lads distinguishing and defining the kinds of animals and plants. In silence they were bending over a gourd. Suddenly and without straightening up one said: "It's a round vegetable; another: "It's a grass".... they went on drawing their distinction.... the parody testifies at most to the notoriety of the method of division and classification practised by members of the Academy"[28]. Does this mean that Plato, through his dialogue, is depicting method for teaching?¹¹. Although no conclusive answer can be given to this, the merit of the method cannot be denied. In this context we can conclude with a quotation from Sayre, "Plato emerges... as the author of the first explicit and practicable method of philosophical analysis"[19].

Philosophy Department
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003 (USA)

RINITA MAZUMDAR

NOTES

1. See Gulley [26] and Cornford[1].
2. Nature of the 'method' of Midwifery.
3. Parenthesis mine.
4. As Plato points out in the *Sophist*, the sophist 'hunts' young wealthy men as students, to teach them philosophy.
5. Of course their it is only a claim. For they can give something which gives the impression of knowledge. They can never give knowledge which involves truth.
6. Italics mine.
7. Provided that Socrates is being serious here.
8. Italic mine. I did this italics to emphasise that by sensible experience is meant what Gulley calls "apprehension", which I shall clarify subsequently.
9. I have taken this from Gulley's book. See Gulley[29].
10. See above.
11. The method which he followed in his Academy to teach his pupils.

Reference

- [1] *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, translated with a commentary by F.M. Cornford, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1959.
- [2] *ibid.*
- [3] *ibid.*, p. 24.
- [4] *ibid.*, p. 24.
- [5] *ibid.*, p. 27.
- [6] *ibid.*, p. 25.
- [7] *ibid.*, p. 26.
- [8] *ibid.*, p. 24.
- [9] *ibid.*, p. 26.
- [10] *ibid.*, p. 107.
- [11] *ibid.*, p. 185.
- [12] *ibid.*
- [13] *ibid.*, p. 187.
- [14] *ibid.*, p. 42.
- [15] 'Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration', by M. F. Burneyet, from Bulletin no. 24, published by the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 1977.
- [16] *Plato's Analytic Method*, K.M. Sayre, University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- [17] *ibid.*, p. 218.
- [18] *ibid.*, p. 237.
- [19] *ibid.*, p. 238.
- [20] 'The Paradox of the Midwife', by R.G. Wengert, published in *History of Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan 1988.
- [21] Campbell
- [22] Campbell
- [23] *Plato's Progress*, by G. Ryle, Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- [24] *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, by Paul Shorey, The University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- [25] *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, by Richard Robinson, Oxford, 1953.
- [26] 'Plato's Theory of Recollection', by Norman Gulley, *Classical Quarterly*, n.s.4 (1954).
- [27] *ibid.*, p. 196.
- [28] *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, by H.F. Cherniss, New York, Russell & Russell, 1962.
- [29] *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, by Norman Gulley, Methuen and Co. London, 1962.
- [30] *Plato's Earlier Dialectics*, by Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975.
- [31] *Phaedo*, by Plato, translated with notes, by David Gallop, 1975.
- [32] *Plato's Phaedrus* by R. Hackforth, translated with a commentary Cambridge, 1972.
- [33] *Republic by Plato*, ed., and translated by Lewis Campbell and B. Jowett. New York, Garland, 1987.
- [34] *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, by Richard Robison, Oxford, 1953.

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3. F.M. Cornford; *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, translated with a commentary. The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1959.
4. Plato's *Phaedo*, translated with notes by D. Gallop, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.
5. R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge University Press, 1972.
6. *Plato Republic ed.*, and trans., by Lewis Campbell and B. Jowett. New York, Garland, 1987.
7. M.F. Burneyet 'Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration', from Bulletin no. 24, published by the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 1977.
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11. Norman Gulley; *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, Methuen and Co. London, 1962.
12. H.F. Cherniss; *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, New York, Russell & Russell, 1962.

THE CONCEPT OF KARTRTVA IN THE NYAYA - VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

In this paper* I seek to clarify the concept of *Kartṛtva* from the *Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika* point of view. I shall also try to show how this concept is applicable to different usages of *kartā* as found in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

In common-sense parlance, a *kartā* or agent is one who performs an action. Not only that, he can perform an act freely. This idea is not abandoned in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. If we consider some of the famous *Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika* uses it would be clear to us. According to Annambhaṭṭa, the concept of agenthood involves direct cognition of the materials (of the product), desire to perform the action and capacity to do the action (*upādānagocaraparokṣajñāna - cikīrṣākrītimattvam*)¹. The writings of Gotama indicate that an agent is one who is at least partly responsible for an action. In a verse of *Nyāya-Sūtra* it is stated that "the so-called untruth in the *Veda* comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice (*na, karma kartṛ sādhana vaigūṇyāt*)². From both these descriptions we can understand that among other characteristics an agent to perform an act must possess volition³. An action, prompted by volition is a voluntary action. One who performs a voluntary action is responsible for his action. Let us try to understand the point with an example. Suppose I want to throw away the tea from my cup and I actually do it. I can be said to be the agent of that action. Now suppose, it so happens that though I have the intention to throw away the tea, and the tea actually spills all over the ground, still I may not be able to perform the intended action. Because it may so happen that somebody pushes me from behind and the tea falls on the ground. In this case, it cannot be said that I am the agent of that action, though I intended that. My action is determined not by my volition, but something else.

Anyway, let us come back to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* position. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers think that there are two types of *kartā*

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(i) infinite and (ii) finite, since they admit two types of selves - infinite and finite.

(i)h It is clear that the Infinite *kartā* is no other than *Īśvara* as conceived in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. That *Īśvara* is the *kartā* has been proved with the help of an inference by the *Nyāya* philosophers. We can discuss this argument briefly¹. "The World has some *kartā* (here it means creator), because it is an effect just like a jar (*Kṣityādikam sakartṛkam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat*). We know that every effect is preceded by certain causes. Apart from the materials, it requires some conscious being who assembles the materials to be transformed into an effect. For example, in the case of an earthen jar, apart from the mud, there is a person who makes the jar out of sheer mud. Now, the world is constituted of atoms of different kinds. Unless a conscious being desires to create the world out of these atoms and actually creates the world, the world cannot come into existence. And this conscious being or *kartā* or creator of the world is *Īśvara* or God. It may be questioned as to why *Īśvara* has been regarded as the *kartā* of the world, why are we not accepting *jīva* to be the *kartā*? It is required that there should be a conscious *kartā* and *jīva* fulfils that requirement. In reply, it has been said that one must have direct cognition of the materials which are operative in producing the effect. Atoms are not perceptible to the normal *jīvas*. These are perceptible only to God. Hence, God is the creator of the world. By his volition and desire to create He creates the world. His volition causes motion in the atoms. Such motion leads to conjunction between two atoms and a new substance called *dvyanūka* emerges. Three *dvyanūkas* combine to form a *trasareṇu* and so the process of creation continues.

The inference by which the *Naiyāyikas* try to prove the agency of God, has been challenged in many ways. Speaking in a general way, we can say that in any inference, the referent of the middle term acts as the mediator between the referents of the major term and the minor term. In *Nyāya* terminology, with the help of *hetu*, a relation between *sādhya* and *pakṣa* is established. It is required that the *hetu* must be present in the *pakṣa* and there must be universal concomitance between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*.

Now, the opponents offer a counter-argument to disprove the former argument, that tried to prove that God is the *kartā* of the world. According to this new argument - "The world etc. have no *kartā*, because

they are not produced by any physical body" - (*kṣityādīkam akar-
trkam, śarīrājanyatvāt*). Here, the presupposition is that a *kartā*
should have some physical body. Now, if the world has no such *kartā*,
then it is ridiculous to establish that God is the *kartā* of the world. This
objection however cannot be accepted. The *hetu* of the counter -
argument needs to be modified. There is no necessity to add the phrase
'by any physical body' in the *hetu*. The argument would have been
sufficient, if it would have run thus. "The world etc. have no *kartā*,
because they are not produced". Hence the argument offered cannot
hinder the former argument to establish the fact that God is the *kartā* of
this world.

Again it has been argued that the characteristic of being
embodied is involved in the very notion of *kartā*. God is disembodied.
Hence he cannot be a *kartā*. That the world etc. do not possess any *karta*
can be established by perception also. In reply, it is said that the
definition of *kartā* or agent does not have any *essential* reference to the
body. So, a disembodied being can definitely be a *karta*. Again, the
argument that it is a perceptual truth that world etc. have no *kartā*, is
a type of forced argument. It has no backing behind it.

Some opponents want to reject the *kartṛtva* of *Īśvara* on the
ground that the concept of *kartṛtva* is a self-contradictory concept. It
includes the feature of having physical body and a gain does not include
it. It is logically impossible to conceive this. This objection can be
answered very easily. It has not been proclaimed that the notion of
kartṛtva would involve the characteristic of having a body and its
negation at the same time. Sometimes *kartā* possesses body and
sometimes he does not. This is acceptable. Hence, God can be regarded
as a *karta*. Therefore, an infinite self can be termed a *kartā* in *Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika* philosophy.

(ii) There is another kind of *karta* accepted by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣik*
philosophers. The finite selves are considered to be *kartā* in this sense.
In other words, the finite *jīvas* are such *kartās*. In the case of the infinite
self there is no reference to the body. But as the finite *jīva* is a complex
of body and mind, *kartṛtva* here involves reference to some body. A
kartā, on this interpretation, satisfies, however, the criterion accepted
in the case of infinite self. *Kartā* here, can have
upādānagocaraparokṣajñānacikīrṣā kṛtimattva. But the *kṛt*, in this
case, requires some elucidation⁵. This *kṛt* or *prayatna* produces *ceṣṭā*

or physical effort, which in its turn gives rise to *kriyā* or act. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers, this *prayatna* can be classified into two broad types. (a) *Jīvanayoniprayatna* or such processes which are actuated by the life of the organism and which give rise to involuntary physical functions etc. (b) *Ichhādveṣapūrvakaprayatna* i.e. volition which is actuated by *iccha* (desire) and *dveṣa* (aversion). In other words, this second type of *prayatna* emerges because of my own will. Presently we shall confine ourselves to this second type of *prayatna*. *Kṛti* in this second sense, can be translated as volition. It is preceded by at least three conditions. The agent can have *kṛti* or volition regarding a particular action when he has desire to perform that action (*cikīrṣā*). This desire is the result of the cognition of one's ability to perform that action (*kṛtisādhya-tājñāna*) and also the belief that the action is conducive to the good of the agent (*iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*). (*Cikīrṣākṛti sādhyeṣṭasādhanatvamati-tathā*). Now, the *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* is qualified by the cognition of the absence of any stronger evil consequence (*balavadaniṣṭānubandhi-ṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*). This qualification requires some clarification. Whenever we perform an action with a goal, we are pleased if we attain the goal. But for this we have to undergo some amount of exertion accompanied by pain. Still we do not withdraw ourselves from the action. Why is it so? It is so because the pleasure which we get afterwards is not overwhelmed by the pain. In the terminology of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers, it is *anubandhi* to *balavadanista*. If we realize that the pain of exerting would be preponderant to the pleasure to be attained, generally we would not have intended to perform the said action.

According to the older *Naiyāyikas*, all the three conditions of *kṛtisādhya-tājñāna*, *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* and *cikīrṣā* are necessary for the production of a volition and consequently a volitional action. If *kṛtisādhya-tājñāna* were dispensable, then one would have tried to bring moon for lighting up his room. But a normal person does not do it. If *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* were dispensable, then one would have been seen to involve in some futile action like playing with water. If *cikīrṣā* were dispensable then a hungry man would have taken some poisonous food intentionally. He does not take it, because though he has *kṛtisādhya-tājñāna* and *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*, he does not have *cikīrṣā*.

In the writings of Viśvanātha and Dinakara we find more clarification of these conditions. According to them

kṛtisādhyaājñāna must be *tadānīm*, i.e., must be present while the agent intends to perform the action. For example, a boy does not bother for the pleasure he is going to enjoy in his youth. The *Neo-Naiyāyikas* do not consider *kṛtisādhyaājñāna* as a necessary condition of volition and consequently a volitional action.

Just like *kṛtisādhyaājñāna*, *iṣṭasādhanaājñāna* must also be *tadānīm*. It is a fact that what appears to be good at one moment and under certain conditions may not appear to be so at another moment and other conditions. When a man is hungry he desires food. But he does not have any desire for food after having it to his heart's content.⁶

Now, if we consider these conditions and the volition, which is the result of them, then it appears that the whole explanation presupposes that finite selves have *kṛti* only when they are embodied. Though every self is omnipresent, cognition, volition, pleasure, pain etc. are localised for each individual. Only when a self is conditioned by a body, it becomes the locus of these qualities. Again, volition leads to *ceṣṭā* or some physical movements. Without these movements a volition cannot be translated into act. Thus, the body is an important factor in the whole process.

If body is of such an importance, then how can we say that *Isvara* or God has *kṛti* and that He is the *kartā* or creator of this world? In the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣik* philosophy, God does not possess any body, but he is considered to be having *kṛti*. Should we then come to the conclusion that the *kṛti* for God is something different from the *kṛti* found in the finite *jīva*? The *Naiyāyikas* may not give any direct answer. But they can explain the *kṛti* of God. They hold that the qualities like volition, cognition etc. associated with God, do not require any physical body for their being localised and actualised. These qualities are uncaused and eternal with God. This observation, however leads to another problem. Cognition, desire and volition are related in a causal chain with the finite *kartā*. God's cognition, desire and volition cannot be connected in that way. Then how can God be said to be having *kṛti*? The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers would say that in the case of God what is required is not the causal connection among these qualities, but the coexistence of them. This again throws up a very crucial problem. God's qualities being eternal and coexistent, God should have created the world always. But He does not do so. So the answer is that the *adrṣṭa* of the finite *jīvas* (i.e. the merits & demerits acquired by the

finite *jīvas* for their action) is the auxiliary cause of creation. The time of the realization of *adr̥ṣṭa* is the time when God creates the world. Again, the factor of *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*, which is so active in the production of *kṛti*, cannot be applied in the case of God. God can have no *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* or the cognition of something being conducive to His good, because nothing is good or evil for Him. He is *āptakāma* or one who has no necessity or need.⁷ It seems that at this point, at least, the explanation of *kṛti* for the finite *jīva* and the analysis of *kṛti* with reference to God differ. Speaking literally, we can suggest that a *kartā* is one who performs some action (*yaḥ karoti*) and in this sense both God and the finite self are regarded to be *kartā*.

The factor of *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* i.e., the factor which distinguishes God's *kṛti* from that of the finite *jīva* brings forth many questions for the *jīva*. As has already been explained, this *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* is qualified by the cognition of the absence of any stronger evil consequence. In the first place, it can be asked that if the awareness of good is so important in producing a volitional action, how can one explain the concept of moral evil? How can a person act unethically if he knows that there is no good in doing that? A possible answer is that for the time being the person is unaware of the evil or he knows that stronger evil consequence (*balavadaniṣṭa*) will follow unless he does that action. For example, suppose a person steals some money from another person. From one point of view it is wrong to steal something. But the person, who is stealing, may consider this to be absolutely necessary to maintain his family, i.e., he considers the collapse of his family to be a stronger evil consequence than being involved in stealing. Similarly, we find that people often commit suicide, being fully aware of its consequence. What is the explanation for this? The *Nyāya* philosophers offer another explanation also. According to them, the strong passion or immediate pleasure (*ukaṭa-rāgādīnā*) may make some people temporarily unaware of stronger evils. As a result, these people indulge themselves in forbidden acts.

Now, it is clear that the cognition of stronger evil varies from person to person at the same time and to the same person from time to time depending upon circumstances. The factors of the sense of duty or responsibility, sense of *dharma*, lust, greed, passion etc. all these mould the sense of *īśa* and *aniṣṭa*. Even those who believe in the *Vedas* and also in the existence of hell, sometimes perform such actions, which are forbidden in the *Vedas*. Generally we accept that

the duties prescribed in the *Vedas* should be admitted and performed universally. But there is always a difference between what should be done and what is actually done. Again, there is a section of people who does not accept the *Vedas* as the authority. Hence, there is no necessity for them to perform actions prescribed in the *Vedas* and consequently it is not necessary for them to accept the result of these actions to be *ista*. So, their conception of *ista* and *aniṣṭa* will differ from those who believe in the authority of the *Vedas*.

Should we then accept that there is no absolute standard of morality in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy? Somebody may suggest that we should consider the factor of social prescriptions and social values. It is true that these social values do change in different societies and in different times. But for a certain society at a particular time these relatively stable values seem to be operative in deciding what is to be regarded as *ista* and *aniṣṭa*.

Perhaps this course of argument is not to be taken by the *Naiyāyikas*. Therefore, I am not entering into a discussion regarding them. Though *ista* and *aniṣṭa* vary from person to person and to the same person from time to time, still underlying the notion of relative good there always is the concept of Absolute good in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* framework. So, in the ultimate analysis that which will produce Absolute freedom from suffering will be considered Absolute good by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers. Here, we find that there is a difference in kind between the empirical actions resulting from attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) (that cause the sense of difference in *ista* and *anista*) and the non-empirical impulses leading to *mokṣa* or the Highest good? In empirical actions we seek *sukha* or happiness and try to avoid *duḥkha* or pain. My volition in such cases is prompted by the forces of attraction and aversion. As such, I can not attain *mokṣa* if I follow such a course of action. My empirical action can give me only relative freedom from pain. It has nothing to do with the Transcendental impulse where complete or absolute freedom from suffering can be attained.

BRINDA SEN

Department of Philosophy,
Victoria Institution (College)
78B, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road,
Calcutta - 700 009
(West Bengal)

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2. Gotama, *Nyāya-Sūtra* (2.1.58) (P-313) Edited by Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa, *Nyāyadarsana O Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* (Pascimabanga Rajya Pustaka Parsad - June, 1984).
3. For some other description of agent see Siddhesvar Varma's "The concept of Agent - Philosophical & Grammatical - in Sanskrit Tradition" in *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha* (Vol. XXVIII, Jan - April, 1972, Part I) (Allahabad).
4. This discussion is based mainly on the fifth chapter (*pañcama* stabaka) of Udayanācārya's *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* with the commentary Haridasi. Udayanacarya, *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* (With Sanskrit Commentary of Haridas Bhat tacharya. Hindi explanation by Visvesvara Bhattacharya). (The Chowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, Varanasi, 1962).
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6. See Amita Chatterjee's article "Can There be an Inconsistent Action in the Nyāya Scheme of Intentional Actions" in *Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. I No. I) 1989 (Jadavpur University, Calcutta - 700032) for a very interesting discussion of *krti*.
7. An observation regarding the agency of God can be found in detail in Srilekha Datta's paper "Self as Agent" presented at the National Seminar on *Self and Ontology* organised by the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University in 1985.
8. See S.K. Maitra's *The Ethics of the Hindus* (University of Calcutta, 1963) for an analysis of volition in Hindu Ethics.

INTENTION AND CONVENTION IN COMMUNICATION — REUNDERSTANDING BHARTṚHARI

*Four are the definite grades of speech
The learned and wise know them
Three of these are deposited in secret
They indicate no meaning to the common man.
Men speak the fourth grade of speech
Which is phonetically expressed.*

Rg Veda, 1.164,45.

In view of the recent developments in the area of philosophy of language, there has been a gradual shift of interest from *form* to the *language act*. Language is no more considered to be a simple matter of phonetics, syntax and convention, but a complex network of activities involving the speaker's intention, hearer's understanding, context of speech, linguistic meaning, intended meaning and many more elements. So the recent discussion on the philosophy of language marked a tendency to cross the boundaries of *linguistic meaning*. These new developments prompt me to take stock of a very ancient, yet a very bold philosophy of language propounded by Bhartṛhari. I strongly feel that the endeavour is not totally fruitless. My task is not in any way associated with the romance of reliving the past. Rather, it is undertaken with the intention of getting some insights from the past to understand the present better. As Bhartṛhari himself puts it, "the goddess of learning does not smile on those who neglect the ancients"¹. However, I also make it clear that my intention is not to pass any judgement on the relative superiority of either Bhartṛhari or recent thinkers in the area of study, but to examine how these two trends of thought separated by several centuries explicate some central issues in philosophy of language.

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The philosophical discussions on the problem of language and meaning during the last four decades are dominated by two distinctive strands of thought. On the one hand the formalists like Frege, early Wittgenstein, Chomsky projected language as a rule-governed activity; on the other hand, the communication-intention theorists like later Wittgenstein, Grice, Austin and others highlighted the functionalistic and communicative dimension of language. Both the schools agree that language is a rule-governed activity but they differ regarding what should be considered to be the primary meaning. For the Formalists, *linguistic meaning* is primary, whereas for the latter, the *communicative meaning* is primary. In other words, the communication-theorists argue that the fundamental concept of meaning should be understood in terms of 'speaker's *meaning something* by an audience-directed utterance on a particular occasion'. As a result they contest the formalists' thesis that the rules of syntax and convention are the only things which need to be taken into account if one has to understand the concept of language. They rather insist that the rules and conventions are explicable in terms of the communication-intention. Grice even goes to the extent of arguing that it is possible to expound the concept of communicative meaning without presupposing the notion of linguistic meaning. He shows that a system of convention can be modified to adjust the needs of intention to communicate, which we can scarcely imagine to exist before the system existed. And these modifications, in turn, can create the possibility of thought which would not have been possible without presupposing these modifications. This proves that language is not just a reproductive activity on the part of the speaker; it is creative too. There is always a scope for modifications and enlargements in the area of linguistic meaning, making language a living affair. There is always an interplay between the rules and conventions on the one hand, and the intention to communicate, on the other. As Strawson succinctly puts it, "Primitive communication-intentions and successes give rise to the emergence of a limited conventional meaning-system, which makes possible its own enrichment and development which in turn makes possible the enlargement of thought and communication-needs to a point at which there is once more pressure on existing resources of language which is in turn responsive to such pressure. And of course there is an element of mystery in this; but so there is in human intellectual and social creativity any way"². The communication-intention thesis definitely unfolds a very important dimension of language by exploring beyond the limits of the linguistic

meaning. One may not agree with Grice on the point that communication—intention itself is sufficient to explain the conception of meaning without any reference to the rules of convention and syntax. But, at the same time, no body can deny that a close relation between the communicative needs and rules of convention should be presumed, if one has to conceive language as a living social affair. Still, it seems that the presumption about this relationship is not adequate enough, if one intends to investigate the nature of language and its capacity to convey meaning. It becomes mandatory for him to examine the nature of the relationship between the communicative intention and the rules of syntax and convention. The element of creativity that is a part of linguistic expression, which Strawson prefers to leave aside by calling it “an element of mystery”, should be explored further to have a comprehensive idea about the true basis of the communicative role of language. Besides, there are certain baffling questions about linguistic communicability which needs considerable attention, viz, Is linguistic communication possible just because the speaker expresses his intention to communicate through the uttered speech? If so, then why in certain cases, the hearer, inspite of listening to the complete utterance by the speaker, fails to grasp the meaning? Again, how, in certain cases, even before the speaker has completed his utterance, the hearer grasps the meaning? These questions make one uncomfortable about accepting the communication-intention theory of meaning without probing further into some of the basic concepts of communication. For any thinker who advocates the theory of communicative meaning, explication of three primary ideas becomes mandatory, viz, (I) the speaker, (II) the hearer, and (III) the common bridge of inter-subjectivity. The *speaker* is the one, who not only utters certain strings of words, but also *intends* to communicate his thought or belief to somebody. Moreover, he not only intends to communicate but through his speech-act, he intends ‘to secure an uptake’ (if I may be allowed to borrow the phrase from Austin) from the hearer. The *hearer* is the person who *understands* what the speaker intends to communicate through his utterance. He follows it up either by speaking his reactions, or by acting in accordance with the speaker’s intention. But the most crucial concept in case of communicative interpretation of meaning is providing a ground for the inter-subjectivity. In other words, one has to explain how the meaning is transferred from the speaker to the hearer? The obvious answer to such a question seems to be: because the speaker and the hearer belong to the same linguistic community,

they share the same rules and conventions of the "language in use". This answer seems so obvious that it prompts David Lewis to remark, "It is a platitude-something only a philosopher would dream of denying-that there are conventions in language"³. But the philosopher is like a devil, who often loves to tread the area where the angel dreads to step. And he does it with success and sufficient justifications. So philosophers of language analyse the concept of 'convention' and examine whether it can serve as a solid bridge for communication between the speaker and the hearer. Before I take up how the communication-intention theorists handle the issues, I deem it fit to discuss Bhartṛhari's views on the notion of language, meaning and communicability.

II

Bhartṛhari belongs to the grammarian tradition of India- a tradition which is never considered to be a part of the classical Indian systems of philosophy. This is one of the reasons for the apathy and indifference meted out to his philosophical contributions by the scholars on Indian philosophy. However, Bhartṛhari's magnum opus *Vākyapadīya* stands out as an unique work in philosophy of language that once formed the part of Indian scholarship. My claim can be supported by the way Bhartṛhari himself outlines the scope and limit of the so-called "grammatical" work. He specifies eight topics as coming within the fold of grammar, they are- (1) meaning determined through analysis (abstracted meaning), (2) given or stable meaning conveyed through the sentence (3) linguistic forms that figure in grammatical derivations (4) the linguistic forms that are to be analysed (5) cause-effect relationship between the intention of the speaker and the utterance (6) the relationship of capability between the forms of speech and meaning (7) the relations that lead to merit, and (8) the relations that bring out communication⁴. Does the "grammarian", as we understand the term today, deal with such questions? The topics specified above clearly indicate that Bhartṛhari's interest is not confined to rules and forms of language, but a depth-analysis of the concepts of 'language' and 'meaning'. His aim is to explore the general conceptual conditions of language as a whole. In this sense, he is more a philosopher of language than a grammarian.

Before we proceed on with our task of examining Bhartṛhari's views on the issues raised in the introductory part of the paper, one point

must be made clear. All through our discussion, we are going to use the term *Śabda*. The term is loosely translated as 'language'. But in English 'language' usually means "the uttered or written meaningful expressions determined by the rules of grammar and syntax". But *Śabda* has a broader denotation in Bhartṛhari's philosophy. It not only refers to the uttered words, but the very linguistic potentiality and the principle of expressibility through words, which is present in any conscious being. We have already noted that Bhartṛhari includes the problem of linguistic communicability within the scope of his study on language. *Vākya-Padīya* contains many insightful remarks about the problem, which shows his deep interest in the subject. The way he handles various issues associated with the problem of communicative meaning impels one to take serious note of his views. It also makes one confident enough to reinterpret his thought in modern philosophical idiom. At the outset, one may also note how his views broadly agree with the basic stand of the communication-intention theorists. He believes that language is primarily a means of communication. It is, no doubt, a rule-governed activity, but at the same time it is something more than that. He admits that there is an interplay between the needs to communicate and the rules of convention. Rather, he holds that the intention to communicate is conceptually prior to the rules of convention⁵. He very successfully proves this point by arguing that convention cannot be the basis of language because convention itself pre-requisites the use of language. Thus far there seems to be a broad agreement between Bhartṛhari's and communication-intention theorist's views. But these points of similarities should not be stretched too far without a proper assessment of their respective approach to the subject-matter. So, it will be better for us to examine in more detail Bhartṛhari's conception of language and meaning.

Bhartṛhari conceives *Śabda* to a complex, and multi-layered affair. The uttered level of *Śabda* is just tip of the ice-berg. Though the level of utterance is a very important phase of linguistic expressibility, it is not the whole of it. Even when the uttered speech is not at work, our linguistic competence does not slumber, for this is the very basis of our thought, consciousness, as well as knowledge of the world. Anything that exists is as good as non-existent unless and until it is named and linguistically conceived. So, the phonetic level of speech is nothing but externalisation of the very speech-potentiality present within us. Our phonetic expressions are not simply sounds caused by air and the vocal organ. It is the manifestation of *Śabdātātva* or linguistic potency or

linguistic principle. This potency is manifested through *Prāṇa* (breath) and *buddhi* (intellect)⁶. So when a speaker intends to say something he thinks of the appropriate words to express his thought through verbal means. What is on the level of thought finds expression in the form of utterance with the help of vocal organ and articulation. The essence of Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning is epitomised in his concept of *Sphoṭa* (etymologically speaking, that which has a tendency to burst forth, i.e., *Sphuṭ*). It is very difficult to find a correct English synonym for the term. It has been translated by different interpreters as 'Real-word', 'Meaning-essence', 'Real language', 'Logos' etc... But the standpoint from which I intend to handle Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, it will serve our purpose better, if the term *Sphoṭa* is understood as 'Linguistic Potency'. According to Bhartṛhari, this potency is manifested through three levels of speech, viz., *Paśyanti Vāk* (unitary level of meaning, *Madhyamā Vāk* (mental level of speech) and *Vaikharī Vāk* (phonetic level of speech).

Since the modern discussions on language centres on the concept of uttered speech, it will be preferable for us to start with Bhartṛhari's analysis of *Vaikharī Vāk*. This offers us a better scope to explicate his views in modern idiom; and also allows us to note how much of it is relevant and how much of it has become obsolete with time. The first and foremost point which I want to emphasize is that for Bhartṛhari, our uttered speech is not just a string of inert and sterile symbols; it is an *act* of doing certain things. This is clear from his concept of *Artha Pravṛtti*. He specifies: "On language depend the principles governing the practical purposive activities..... What depends on language may be the speaker's intended meaning, the possibility of applying a word to thing, the ability to combine words into sentences, the connecting of objects with actions, identification of a thing to be accomplished or the projection of the content of an awareness as an external object"⁷. With this, he brings into light the various types of activity involved in speaking and using the utterances. But very broadly speaking, language is used as a means of expressing the speaker's intention. This intended meaning may refer to facts both physical and mental or may be used to accomplish certain acts; i.e., the act of commanding, questioning, stating etc... This shows that the *Vaikharī Vāk* is a very important phase of the analysis of *Śabda*.

If we look at the constitutive factors of *Vaikharī Vāk*, we note that, for Bhartṛhari it is a complex network of many important elements. Initially Bhartṛhari identifies two. According to him, in any

expressive language, two elements can be discerned, i.e. the sound-pattern and forms of words (*dhvani*) and the meaning (*Śabda*). But an elaborate study of his treatise shows that apart from these two, some other elements also are involved in the act of speech. Accordingly, I shall try to bring out four important constitutive elements of the uttered speech. They are : (a) sound - pattern (the phonetic element), (b) form of words (syntactic element), (c) meaning (semantic element), (d) intention of the speaker (pragmatic element).

He identifies the phonetic element as *dhvani* or *nāda*. The *dhvani* occurs due to the presence of our vocal organ. The phonetic element is characterised by variations in accent, pitch, intonations from speaker to speaker. Of course, later on, he introduces a subtle distinction between two levels of *dhvani*, i.e., *Prākṛta dhvani* and *Vaikṛta dhvani*. The former represents the sound pattern vocally unmanifested and the latter represents vocally manifested sound. So to be specific, we must say that, at the level of utterance the phonetic element can be identified as the *Vaikṛta dhvani*. We shall discuss *Prākṛta dhvani* later on. The *Vaikṛta dhvani* gives vent to the structure and forms of words. The second element, i.e., *vācya* is the expressive linguistic form which is the conveyer of meaning. The role of the forms and structures of expressive words (*vācya*) is very crucial, for it is that to which the hearer pays attention when the speaker wants to communicate through utterances. It is that element which has to be recognised by the hearer before he grasps the meaning of the utterance and the speaker has to think of it before he expresses his thought. Bhartṛhari points out, "Both the speaker and the hearer have to think of the word first before thinking of the meaning"⁸. When the hearer fails to recognise the form of the uttered words, he asks the speaker "what did you say?"⁹. But people intending to understand meaning, often fail to recognise the distinction between the expressive words and the expressed meaning. In fact, the *vācya*, the forms and structures of words, are just the bearer of meaning. *Vācya* is the symbol which symbolises the meaning. This brings us to the third element of *vaikhari vāk*, i.e., the *vācaka* (the meaning/content). *Vācaka* is that which finds expression through phonetic and syntactic element. So, there is a close relationship between *vācya* and *vācaka* because the words have a natural fitness (*yogyatā*) to express meaning. It is a relationship of the conveyer and the conveyed, which is otherwise known as *vācya - vācaka bhāva*. However, the element of meaning considered in isolation stands for certain unitariness which is diversified by sequential nature of the

uttered words. The whole meaning cannot be expressed simultaneously, because our utterances by nature are sequential. We utter words syllable by syllable; and the moment one syllable is uttered it is replaced by another syllable. It should be noted here that not only Bhartrhari, but most of the schools of Indian philosophy point to this peculiarity of the uttered speech. The philosophers of the present century have not paid much attention to this peculiarity. It seems that they consider it to be an insignificant characteristic. But in Indian philosophy of language, this characteristic of uttered speech occupies an important place. They consider that the question of communicability of meaning cannot be settled unless and until one decides how the discrete and sequential phonemes and syllables convey the unitary meaning to the hearer. This issue gets much attention in Indian philosophy of language, because they explicate meaning not only from the speaker's standpoint, but hearer's too. The hearer has to attend to the sequential speech form to get the sequenceless meaning out of it. So the element of meaning is in a sense unitary, expressed in a diversified form through the uttered words. The fourth element of the uttered level of speech is the intention of the speaker. "The uttered level of speech is possible, because the speaker intends to communicate"¹⁰. The relationship between the speech and intention is named as *kārya - kāraṇabhāva*. Bhartrhari points out that it is the intention of the speaker which necessitates the use of particular forms of words. So, it is a relationship of *kārya-kāraṇa* (cause - effect). "When the speaker seeks to superimpose linguistic forms into his intended meaning, the language appears to change its nature into something else (meaning) and project it as sounds from the vocal organ"¹¹.

Apart from these four elements, the uttered speech, the *Vaikhari Vāk* necessarily implies the issue of referring. The act of referring is no part of the phonetics and syntax; it is rather the function of the meaning. What is meant or conveyed has the function of referring. When one utters the word '*ghaṭa*' (jar) it refers to the object '*ghaṭa*'. But the relationship is not a sort of 'Fido' - Fido" relationship as Mill conceived it. There need not be one-to-one relationship between the meaning and object, nor does the act of reference imply the existence of the object. We may as well refer to the entities that do not exist at all, such as the 'wheel of fire', or 'hare's horn'. The act of meaning is not confined to stating facts only. It can be used in various ways such as eliciting acts as in the case of the command 'bring water', or refer to certain mental states, or even to understand the forms of language. The

act of meaning has the primary function of making all sorts of cognition possible. Therefore, the understanding of *Vaikhari Vāk* remains incomplete if we analyse it only from the standpoint of the speaker. Hearer is an important factor too. So in Indian philosophy of language, the concept of *Śābdabodha* or the hearer's understanding is given a very important place. The functionalistic interpretation of language makes it imperative to examine the concept of hearer's understanding. Bhartṛhari remarks, "Hearer's knowledge of a sentence arises from the words of the speaker and it reaches him through the words, and these words having been understood ends in the shape of knowledge, which is again in the form of words"¹². Further elaborating this concept of hearer's meaning, B.K. Matilal says, "The structured thought that is supposed to arise in such an ideal hearer is something that is inter-subjectively available; it is presumably shared by any competent language-user who hears the sentence uttered"¹³.

At present it will suffice for us to note the two most important consequences that follow from the inclusion of hearer's role in the analysis of uttered speech. First, Bhartṛhari strongly advocates that sentences, not the words, are the primary units of the meaning communicated. Second, a distinction is to be maintained between the linguistic meaning and the intended meaning. Regarding the former issue, a series of arguments and counter - arguments are recorded in the history of Indian Philosophy. Bhartṛhari offers some very subtle yet incisive arguments in favour of the sentence - meaning to silence his opponents who argue in favour of the primacy of word-meaning. But once a thinker admits the communicative-theory of meaning and thereby admits the role of hearer, cannot but accept that it is the sentence which conveys meaning. Even if the speaker utters just a word, the hearer understands it in sentential form. For example, when somebody comes running and utters 'fire', the hearer understands that 'some building or some object is on fire'. The primacy of sentence - meaning has been so unanimously accepted by present day linguists and philosophers of language that it seems unnecessary to dwell on this point any further. So, let us proceed to discuss the second point, i.e., the distinction between the linguistic meaning and intended meaning. Bhartṛhari does not elaborately discuss the issue. But he makes the point clear with several examples. While discussing the role of homophones, he indicates that in such case the hearer must take into account the factors like situational-context and sentence - context to discern the intended meaning. Besides, in our day to day life, we come across the use of many sentences where the implied

meaning is more important than the linguistic meaning. Bhartrhari offers us some illuminating examples to prove this. When a traveller says to his companion, "We must go and look at the sun", the meaning conveyed by the speaker is not that of looking at the sun, but the hearer must realise how late it is in the day¹⁴. Similarly, in response to the command, "see that the crows do not steal the butter", not even the child is so literal minded to allow the dogs to steal the butter¹⁵. These examples in a way prove that the hearer has to grasp the intended meaning, not the linguistic meaning. The importance of the concept of intended meaning cannot be properly explicated if, in the analysis of communicative meaning, the entire emphasis is shifted to speaker only.

III

Thus far we have been discussing the structural and functional components of the uttered speech, as envisaged by Bhartrhari. It gives us sufficient scope to realise that Bhartrhari succeeds, to a large extent, in focusing attention on the multiple facets of speech at the level of utterance. But Bhartrhari does not believe that *vaikharī vāk* on the uttered level is enough to explain the concept of linguistic communicability. Communication implies that speaker must say something and the hearer must understand him. But how is the meaning transferred from the speaker to the hearer? Is meaning conceptually inseparable from words? If this is so, then the same meaning could not have been expressed in different forms of sentences. And further if this were so, then one language could not have been translated into another. Again, how, in certain cases, the hearer understands what the speaker intends, even if he mumbles something. So, it will be too simplistic to say that the meaning is conveyed because the speaker utters a string of sounds in accordance with the rules of grammar and syntax; and because the hearer follows the same rules, he will understand the meaning just by listening to the utterances.

Bhartrhari's answer to such questions would be that utterances are just a part of the linguistic expressibility. The level of utterance points to the level of thought. Before the speaker uses the spoken words, he thinks of the appropriate words to express it. The hearer, too, hears the sound in a sequence and then thinks of the meaning that might be conveyed to him. This stage is known as the *Madhyamā vak*, the middle stage of linguistic expressibility. At this stage the distinction between the form of the words and the meaning is

maintained. The sequentiality associated with spoken words is also present in *Madhyamā vāk*. But the audibility of *vaikharī vāk* is absent on *Madhyamā* level. So, interpreters identify it with the *Prākṛta dhvani*, noted earlier. But this is not the ultimate ground of intersubjectivity as well as linguistic expressibility. *Madhyamā vāk* refers to a still deeper level of thought known as *Pasyanti-vāk*. To understand the importance of this stage, we need to have a brief discussion on Bhartṛhari's conception of thought, cognition and awareness.

Bhartṛhari offers us a sort of linguistic cognitivism which is evident from the following remark; "There is no awareness of this world without its being intertwined with the word. All cognitive comprehensions appear to be penetrated, as it were, with the word"¹⁶. This remark should not be understood in the sense that all our thought and cognitions are nothing but as Plato would call it "the silent dialogue of soul." Nor does he advocate a sort of Pan-Psychologism. He simply puts forth that, as Davidson would put it, 'the two (language and thought) are indeed linked in the sense that each requires the other in order to be understood'¹⁷. For Bhartṛhari the linkage between thought or cognitions or awareness and language is fundamental and essential. There can be no concepts without words and no words without concepts. Our consciousness itself is intertwined with the power of linguistic expressibility. Even our pre-linguistic awareness is not free from linguistic latency. If anything is cognitive, then it has a speech potential. This latent form of speech (*Śabda bhāvanā*) is inherent in all conscious beings. So he says, "when everything is merged in the speech-latency, no verbal usage can be accomplished in concept-free awareness... Just as illumination is the nature of fire, just as consciousness is the nature of mind, like wise, speech - latency is the nature of each awareness"¹⁸. Of course, one should be cautious enough not to confuse speech-latency with the audible noise. "This does not mean that we always make audible with our vocal chord whenever we cognize, think or perceive anything. Nor is it proper to say that we make 'inaudible' noise. On the other hand, it implies that we verbalize at some deeper level as we cognize, and we cognize as we verbalize"¹⁹. But, by tying up the notion of verbalisation with the concept of thought, is not Bhartṛhari taking recourse to a form of psychologism? Frege and early Wittgenstein avoided this path of analysing language and meaning on the ground that 'thought' implies a type of privatisation. We know that mental events and cognitive episodes are private, whereas language is public. The speech-latency, the latent form of speech, is something personal and private for each

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person. So, this sort of explanation of meaning and language demolishes the 'objectivity' of language. But what Bhartṛhari argues is that 'Śabda-bhāvanā (linguistic-latency) is expressible in audible speech and can break through the enclosure of privacy; it now becomes something which is intersubjectively available. Besides, the consciousness intertwined with 'Śabda-bhāvanā is something quite unlike "pain" that is purely private. Nobody can feel other's pain. It is something 'incurably private'. In this connection, we may take help from Bernard Williams's contrast between different paradigms of privacy. In case of 'pain', there is a difference between having the sensation of pain of oneself and thinking about some one's else's having pain. The other is the case of episodic 'verbalisable' thought. The second case is 'curably private'. As Williams remarks, 'episodic thought, which is totally verbal, is nevertheless the nearest thing in the inner life to public thought'"²⁰. In the true sense of the term, Bhartṛhari is not analysing the process of thinking, but the structural conditions of thought. I have this little digression to make the relation between thought and language clear, because Bhartṛhari's concept of 'śabda bhāvanā and his transference of the problem of language - analysis from the level of speech to thought may be misconstrued as a form of psychological explanation of meaning.

Coming back to the concept of *paśyantī vāk*, we should note that for Bhartṛhari on this level the distinction between *vacya* and *vacaka* merges into the indistinguishable one. "The power of being conveyer, i.e., the symbol (*śruti śakti* or *Prakāśakatvam*) and the power of being conveyed, i.e., the symbolised (*ārtha śakti* or *prakāśyatvam*) are always inherent in *śabdatattva* or the speech - principle"²¹. And it is this principle, inherent in conscious being, which is ultimately manifested through articulated speech. This power to manifest itself is called *sphoṭa*. Much misunderstanding is associated with the term *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari's contemporaries and subsequent thinkers and even the 20th century scholars conceive that Bhartṛhari was taking resort to mysticism by propounding the philosophy of language in terms of *sphoṭa*. Once this cobweb of mysticism is removed, it seems such a plausible concept. Etymologically *sphoṭa* implies 'that which has a tendency to burst - forth'. The inherent linguistic potency latent in all conscious beings finds its manifestation through some form of verbalisation. This principle of expressibility may find manifestation through different forms of verbal structure which may be adopted by different linguistic communities. The *paśyantī* is the stage where the

meaning is in latent form; this is the stage in which language is in the form of *sphoṭa*. This *sphoṭa* is the ultimate ground of intersubjectivity. We do not realise its importance because we often confuse audible speech with '*śabda*'. The linguistic potency is present both in the speaker and the hearer. They share the same '*śabda-bhāvanā*', i.e., language in latent form. Therefore, the communication does not mean transferring the meaning from the speaker to the hearer. Rather the spoken words arouse in the hearer the '*śabda bhāvanā*', and through it the hearer grasps the meaning. Communication is possible not because the speaker and the hearer obey the same rules of convention, nor is it due to sharing a particular language, but Bhartṛhari would insist that it is possible because they both share the common content of meaning and common linguistic potency.

Therefore, the understanding on the part of the hearer and the conveyance of intention on the part of the speaker imply a process on unification and diversification. Speaking from the speaker's standpoint, the unitary meaning is diversified in the form of *vācya* and *vācaka*, the conveyer and conveyed. The speaker, now, thinks of the appropriate words through which he can convey his thought and this results in further diversification in the form of sound, forms of words and meaning. Speaking from the hearer's standpoint, the process is just the reverse. The hearer listens to the diversified linguistic expression, and then unites *vācya* and *vācaka* and ultimately understands the unitary meaning. Bhartṛhari explains the hearer's position with the simile of the painting process. The painter, while painting, first of all sees the object in parts, then he has the vision of the whole and then paints it part by part²². Similarly, the hearer listens to the words in a sequence, and through it grasps the unitary meaning and ultimately responds as a speaker's standpoint, the *sphoṭa* or linguistic potency is the *nimitta* (causal ground) of the audible speech, and this audible speech conveys the meaning. But viewed from the hearer's side, audible speech is the causal ground (*nimitta*) of the awakening of linguistic potency, which, in turn, is the conveyer of meaning.

I have emphasised all along that in Indian philosophy of language, a lot of importance is attached to hearer's understanding of words (*śābdabodha*). So, the question is raised regarding the process of hearer's understanding, i.e., "how does the hearer grasp the meaning?" Bhartṛhari's answer to the question is - It is through *Pratibhā*. Loosely speaking, the term implies an inherent intuitive capacity of the mind. On the notion of intuition or *Pratibhā*, Bhartṛhari

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makes elaborate discussion. But we must present here in brief those aspects that are relevant to the present discussion. For him, intuition, as a means of knowledge, is different from perception and inference. It is a "means by which we understand the undifferentiated meaning-whole"²³. It is not the type of awareness which is produced by piecing together the fragments of meaning of different words. It is regarded as a flash of understanding which arises spontaneously in all conscious beings. It is a faculty of sentient beings for its root-cause is the speech-potency, which again is potentially inherent in all sentient beings. The acceptance of intuition as a means of knowledge can very well solve the problem of incommunicability of meaning in certain cases. Sometimes, even though one reads a passage several times, or listens to a sentence carefully he fails to get the meaning. Then suddenly in a flash of understanding, the meaning becomes clear.

So now we are in a position to come back to the original question, i.e., how is the interplay between the intention to communicate and conventional framework possible? We have stated how the intention to communicate puts pressure on the existing convention-structure, and this structure again leads us to think of newer ways to express ourselves. The principle of linguistic potentiality constantly forces us to enlarge the narrow confines of conventional forms. This makes language an act of creativity. Therefore, Bhartṛhari claims that the relationship between the forms of words and language is not conventional but eternal. There is a relationship of natural fitness (*yogyatā*) between the symbol and the symbolised, *vācya* and *vācaka*. This view may seem very inconsistent with what so far we have been discussing about Bhartṛhari's conception of linguistic communicability. If we accept this position at face value, then we have to admit that in Bhartṛhari's philosophy, there is no scope for enlargement and enrichment of vocabulary. To understand the true implication of Bhartṛhari's view, one must make a distinction between language as a principle and language as a form of usage. So, let us look at Bhartṛhari's remarks on the issue. He says, "The natural fitness of a word to convey meaning is known to us through convention (*samaya* or *samketa*), which is understood as the observation of use of words by elders. This use follows the natural capacity of words to convey meaning and he does not create it. Human beings cannot create the relation between words and meaning whether we look upon the latter as eternal or transitory"²⁴. He again remarks: "Language is of two kinds - eternal and produced. The produced sort is involved in usage and

reflects the nature of language. The eternal sort of language is the source of all usage, unsequenced, within everyone, the seat of all modifications, the locus of all actions, the basis of satisfaction and frustration....²⁵ These statements make it clear that he considers language at two stages. The linguistic potentiality which manifests in the conveyance of meaning implies the power of words to express meaning. This power is not human creation. But on the empirical level, when language is taken as a type of expression (Hindi, English etc.), then the relation between word and meaning is conventional. That the particularised form of language is conventional, is supported by Bhartṛhari's statement, "The grammatical treatises are composed from time to time by spiritual elite in difference to differing capacities of individuals by taking into consideration the changed capacities of expression as far as merit and demerit are concerned"²⁶. This amply proves that Bhartṛhari conceives the linguistic expressibility, the intention to communicate conceptually prior to the conventions. This also explains how the interaction between the intention to communicate and enlargement of conventions and rules of language in use are possible. He does it through the concepts of speech-principle.

IV

So far we have been examining the basic presuppositions of Bhartṛhari regarding the question of linguistic communicability. Let us now take a brief stock of the recent developments in this field, keeping Bhartṛhari's account in the background. I admit, my analysis will be brief and sketchy. There have been such an upsurge of views and theories highlighting on different dimensions of language in the present century that it is almost impossible to accommodate them within the narrow confines of the paper. Since our task, at present, is confined to an assessment of communication-intention theory I shall concentrate on three philosophers, Grice, Austin and Searle, and discuss those aspects of their philosophy which are relevant for the purpose.

The awareness that language is not exclusively a matter of 'structure' but of 'function' too, was crystallized after Wittgenstein advanced the dictum "Don't look for the meaning but for the use". However, it was Grice who came out openly with a communicative interpretation of meaning in his paper entitled 'Meaning'. He emphasized two important dimensions of communicative role of language. First, meaning something by an utterance is as good as

somebody intending to produce some effect on the hearer. As Grice specifies : "A meant something by X is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended to produce some effect in an audience by means of recognition of his intention'". Secondly, there cannot be a simple meaningful linguistic expression without somebody (speaker) claiming to utter it. This sort of analysis makes it clear that Grice wants to obliterate the distinction between the 'linguistic' meaning and 'intended meaning'. In case of meaningful utterance what matters are the 'speaker' and his 'intention' to communicate. The hearer's role is not at all emphasized by Grice.

Austin, on the other hand, exposes some more complexities involved in case of linguistic expressibility. In his book *How to Do Things with Words*, he shows that saying something is *doing* something, *in* saying something we do something, and *by* saying something we do something. In short, language is a matter of act and it involves complex layers of acts. The most important feature of his analysis of language is that he gives us a comprehensive account of language in terms of phonetics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Moreover, by showing the distinction between 'meaning' and 'force' of an utterance he makes the elements of propositional meaning (sense and reference) and intended meaning a part of what is conveyed to the hearer. But still one may note that the hearer's role is neglected here. Of course, he talks of perlocutionary act as a separate category of act. Perlocutionary act refers to "the achievements of certain effects by saying something". But communication does not, in all cases, mean achieving certain effects on the thought, belief or action of the hearer. The hearer has to *understand* what the speaker means by his utterance. Therefore, perlocutionary act is an element of the speaker's meaning, not hearer's meaning. As Searle very rightly points out "Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared by most other kinds of human behaviour. One of the most extraordinary is this : If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is I am trying to tell him I have succeeded in telling it to him".

We find a proper balance between the convention and intention, and balance between the speaker's meaning and hearer's meaning in the theory of Searle as propounded in his book *Speech Acts*. He agrees with Grice so far as he projects meaning as a communicative affair, But Searle does not go the extent Grice goes in claiming that communication of meaning is exclusively a matter of intention, and not

a matter of convention. Besides, Searle does not share Grice's view that meaning can only be defined in terms of intended effect on the hearer, because speaker does not always intend produce such an effect on the hearer. On the other hand, he agrees with Austin that "all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts", but he differs from Austin by analysing meaning not exclusively in terms of speaker's meaning but hearer's *understanding* of what is being conveyed.

Searle starts his investigation about the nature of language with three basic presuppositions :

1. Speaking a language is engaging in a rule governed activity.
2. Whatever can be meant can be said. (A given language may not have adequate vocabulary to say what we mean, but in principle, we can always express what we mean). This is otherwise known as the *Principle of expressibility*.
3. Sentence, not the word, is the unit of linguistic communicability.

Keeping these three presuppositions in mind let us understand how he explains the speaker's role, hearer's role, the concept of intersubjectivity and the relation between convention and intention.

Speaking from the speaker's standpoint Searle identifies three levels of acts i.e., (1) the act of uttering (utterance act) (2) the act of referring and predicating (propositional act) and (3) the act of expressing the intention (illocutionary act). Speaking from the hearer's stand, the act involved is the act of *understanding*. While analysing the problem of linguistic communicability from the speaker's stand-point, Searle makes a clear-cut dichotomy between the propositional act and illocutionary act, i.e., what the utterance *means* and what is *meant* by the utterance. Though he admits that in actual speech-situation these elements are not separable, yet on the level of abstraction the distinction is of considerable importance. This distinction should not be understood simply in terms of linguistic meaning and intended meaning. It is something deeper than that. In each case of utterance there is the propositional element (the element of reference and predication) which is stated by the act of utterance. This is one of the reasons because of which the same propositional element can be used to indicate different intentions of the speaker, such as, stating, warning, commanding, etc... But very broadly speaking, both the elements, i.e., the propositional element and force element, constitute the meaning that

is conveyed by the speaker to the hearer. The hearer's understanding also includes the understanding of these two elements.

Now the crucial question for us is to understand what according to Searle is the common ground of inter subjectivity between the speaker and the hearer. How does the hearer understand what the speaker wants to convey? Searle's answer is "the bridge between the speaker's side and hearer's side is provided by their common language". This answer is apt to dissatisfy us. Is 'common language' enough to explain the concept of communicability? Then why in certain cases the communication fails though speaker and hearer share a common language? Can't the person of a different linguistic community understand the speaker though the speaker uses a different language? To elicit Searle's reply to such questions one must examine what Searle means by the term 'language'? We know that he defines language as a 'rule governed activity'. But what are those 'rules'? Are they the rules of syntax and grammar set by the conventions adopted by a particular linguistic community? Are they the rules of *language* or *particular languages*? If he is talking about the rules of particular languages, then he fails to achieve his avowed task of providing us with "philosophically illuminating description of certain general features of language". Searle, of course, clarifies what he means by the rules of language, with the introduction of a distinction between the constitutive rule and regulative rule. According to him 'regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour... But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behaviour'. He further argues that on the basis of our knowledge of constitutive rules of language one can translate sentences from one language to another. So he clearly states that : "When I say speaking a language is engaging in a rule governed form of behaviour I am not concerned with particular conventions one involves in speaking this language or that... but understanding the rules which conventions manifest or realise".

So, we can safely conclude that for Searle the basis of transferability of meaning from the speaker to the hearer is the common constitutive rules of language. When he says that language is not a matter of intention but convention, too, he does not use term 'convention' as it is ordinarily understood. By highlighting the concept of 'rules' he parts company with Grice, for he insists that not only phonetics and syntax is a matter of rule but the illocutionary act too is guided by rules. Of course, from such an explanation one must not

conclude that Searle started with communication intention theory but ultimately comes back to a formalistic interpretation of meaning and language. He strongly believes that meaning is communicative and the speaker's intention plays a major role in his analysis of speech acts. His presupposition that whatever is expressible can be stated meaningfully is a pointer to the fact that the existing rules of convention and syntax can be responsive to the needs of intention to communicate. Unlike Formalists, he believes that understanding the concept of language is incomplete without explicating the concept from the standpoint of communicability. So, the conception of language as a rule governed behaviour along with the principle of expressibility leads him to analyse language in terms of speech acts, speaker's intention, hearer's understanding, propositional meaning and the rules governing the language. This makes his communicative-intention theory of meaning more comprehensive. Yet, certain questions remain unanswered - Even if the speaker and the hearer share the same constitutive rule, how come, in certain cases, communication fails? Again, how in certain cases the hearer understands what the speaker intends to convey without a complete utterance act and propositional act? Such questions seem unanswerable as long as the analysis of meaning is confined to the level of speech acts.

However, one may note certain points of similarity between Bhartṛhari's and Searle's views on language. Searle's principle of expressibility, though not as sweeping as Bhartṛhari's notion of speech latency (*Śabda bhāvanā*), seems to hint at certain *a-priori* conditions of linguistic communicability. Both share similar views on the notion of conventional and pre-conventional notions of linguistic expressibility. Both accept that the sentence, not the word, is the unit of communicability. But one should not go on adding the points of similarity without carefully noting the basic differences in the approach of these two philosophers belonging to two different ages and two philosophical traditions.

For Bhartṛhari linguistic communicability is a multi-layered affair, and without excavating the hidden layers beyond the uttered speech no analysis of language is complete. Therefore, he explicates the level of utterance with reference to the logical conditions of thought and cognition. But Searle avoids transgression into the area of 'thought'. He prefers to confine his analysis within the level of utterance and speech. He explains both, the speaker's *intention* and

the hearer's *understanding* in terms of the constitutive rules of language. Though the analysis of meaning in terms of intentionality and mental episodes is no more considered to be a form of psychologism, yet in his book *Speech-Acts* he avoids the route.

The second and the most important divergence of approach emerges from the distinction maintained between the propositional element and force element. This distinction was originally conceived by Austin, and it has been welcomed by most of the subsequent philosophers. Though the concept of 'Proposition' is the cause of serious bafflement for the Western thinkers, yet it continues to dominate the area of philosophy of language. For Bhartṛhari, propositional element and force element have no distinctive purpose, because whenever a statement is uttered its meaning exhausts the force, excepting certain ambiguous expression. In such cases contextual factors help the hearer to decipher the meaning. This difference of approach owes its origin to the role of 'proposition' in the Western philosophy of language. In this regard B.K. Matilal's remark is very illuminating. He observes, "Indian philosophers and logicians do not operate with the notion of proposition, which is so well entrenched in the Western tradition. Let me explain : each cognitive episode, unique as it may be as an event, has a *structure* which gets expressed in a linguistic utterance, and by virtue of that structure it differs from another cognitive event. But the structure may coincide in totality with that of any other cognitive event, or events taking place in the same person or different persons at the same time or at different times, in which case all these cognitive events will be structurally indistinguishable except by virtue of their temporality or by their occurrence in a different person or by both. All structurally indistinguishable cognitive events are treated by Indian philosophers alike in so far as their logical properties as well as philosophical analyses are concerned. The cognitive events, even when they are viewed and identified in this way, do not become propositions. The structural content is the minimal abstraction that is proposed here. The practice of the Indian philosophers, is to refer to cognitive events (structurally abstracted, but still treated as particular events) by identical linguistic expressions in which they are verbalised".

It is, perhaps, because of such understanding of linguistic expressions that Indian philosophers often refer to the mental level either in the form of *saṃskāras* or continuity in memory (as accepted by *Mīmāṃsā*) or in the form of '*śabdabhāvanā*' (as accepted by Bhartṛhari) to explain how the complete sense of meaning is grasped from the

sequentially uttered speech. But such differences of stand-points are bound to exist when the analysis of problems is based on certain key concepts, which to a large extent, are determined by the period of time and cultural conditions. However, this should not deter us from understanding the ancient thought in terms of the present and enrichment of the present thought in terms of the wisdom of the ancients.

Department of Philosophy
Utkal University
Vani Vihar
Bhubaneswar - 751004
(Orissa)

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'INTERSUBJECTIVITY' IN PHENOMENOLOGY

Husserl deals with the problem of Inter-Subjectivity in his *Cartesian Meditations* specifically in the fifth Meditation, where, as the title aptly suggests, he attempts to "uncover the sphere of transcendental being as a monadological inter-subjectivity".¹ He undertakes this project to deal with the possible objection that phenomenology could be seen as being vitiated by the problem of solipsism. It is his theory of inter-subjectivity in the fifth Meditation which demonstrates the independent existence of other's.

Before proceeding further, we must note a very important point, i.e. in the preceding introductory lines we hinted that the problem of the other arises in Husserl by way of the objection of solipsism. But the issue of solipsism which seems to emerge for Husserl is not really the same as the problem of solipsism for Descartes. For Descartes, the problem of solipsism appears as an ontological problem as to how the ego which is self-enclosed can justify its beliefs in the existence of other substances. Since it is formulated as a problem of knowing from the certainty of the existence of one substance i.e. ego cogito, to reasonable assurance about the existence of other substances i.e. since the problem is being formulated in ontological terms as a movement from one kind of being to other beings, the cartesian solution, necessarily, has to be ontological i.e. by way of another superior entity, namely, the omnipotent God. But Husserl's objective is, precisely, to remove the ontological formulation of the issue and hence the problem of solipsism here cannot be identified with its cartesian version. If one were to do so, by definition, the phenomenological solution attempted by Husserl would necessarily fail, for then it would appear that Husserl is attempting to solve an ontological issue at the phenomenological level, whereas the phenomenological stratum itself has been made accessible only after the suspension of all ontological claims. Hence, if such an interpretation is given, the Husserlian programme will be incoherent. Therefore, it is first necessary to clarify the sense in which the problem of solipsism is encountered in phenomenology.

As a step towards this, one must also remember Husserl's critique that Descartes lacks a conception of intentionality of consciousness.

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Because of this non-intentional character of the cartesian conception of consciousness the ego of Descartes appears as a self-confined substance without any real connection to the world. The cartesian doubt is ontological in the sense that the truth of any objective existence is suspended. Whereas the epoche of Husserl has certain similarities with cartesian doubt, yet it is not an ontic denial, it does not replace truth with falsity. What the epoche really does is to open ourselves to the things as they present themselves to the consciousness. In cartesian terms, after the epoche we are not left merely with the ego-cogito-cogitations-cogitata i.e., the consciousness which, by its intensive acts, is directed to objects as they are given to those acts. In simpler language, what the epoche does is to reveal the intensive direction of consciousness to the object. But, here, by object, we strictly mean object as presented to consciousness as a phenomenon. Hence, the world is not denied, but what is being opened up is the structure of the experience of the world as it is given to us prior to all metaphysical or ontological hypotheses. The reduction, therefore, opens the gate-way for a pure experience.

The problem of solipsism and intersubjectivity arises at this level. For phenomenology the experience of the world as a phenomenon is the experience of not merely the noema of the objects alone, but these noema, in their very presentations, are grasped as real or transcendent object. In phenomenological language, in perception, the thing-in-itself is given and not merely a sense-datum or a copy of it. In that sense, Husserl's theory is not a representative theory which was the cartesian solution; on the other hand, although the object itself is given yet it is not given in all of its aspects. But I grasp the object as that which has undisclosed aspects, which could be presented to other acts. This is the meaning of transcendency of the objects. Hence, a faithful phenomenological description of the experience itself suggests that to be real object is to be accessible to other intensive acts. Now, there could be two senses of transcendency of a real object, a weak and a strong sense. In the weak sense an object may be transcendent to a particular intensive act, if it is such that it is capable of being grasped in its other aspects by some other acts of the ego itself. In this sense, a single solitary ego is presupposed. But, Husserl's contention is that the experience of transcendency is a strong claim and not a weak one because my experience itself reveals that the object which is given to me is also an object of intentionality radically other than my own. It is not merely that I could perceive other aspects of the object, it is the

stronger claim that other egos perceive other aspects. That is why, strictly speaking, the other is an alter ego i.e. a consciousness like mine but yet different from mine. Husserl's claim is, this is what experience is seen to be after reduction. Hence, the phenomenological conception of objectivity itself demands a clarification of the sense in which the object is given to another ego. But what further complicates the matter is that the proof of the alter ego must itself be phenomenological i.e. it is not enough if I merely construct an argument which would imply the postulate of other subjects; rather to be strictly phenomenological, I must show how in my own experience the other ego is given not as an object, but as a co-constitutive subject. In other words, what is to be clarified is a transcendental experience of the other and not merely justify a transcendental hypothesis about the other. Since what is required is a phenomenological clarification of transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl must show how the other, as an alter ego, can be experienced in my own consciousness after the reduction. This is basically what the fifth meditation attempts to clarify.

Husserl, in the fifth Meditation, invokes the concept of alter ego. This concept of alter ego, however, is not equivalent to the concept of multiplicity of egos. In terms of the concept of objectivity, ego and alter ego are put in relation with each other. How far this is so, there arises no problem about the question whether the other exists, but the real issue, now, is 'how of other subject's givenness' the other subject is to be correlated with the activity of conscious subject to whom he is given. For this, the task would be to show that the other subject is a transcendental ego in the sense of being a subject beyond the mere conception of a worldly phenomenon. For understanding such a task one needs to discover the implicit and explicit intentionality of my own where the other subject becomes fashioned in me. And thus is the direction of Husserl's inquiry. Husserl undertakes the task of making explicit "the form of experience through which the consciousness not only intends merely an object within the world (as in the case of a perceived object) but also another subject with its own stream of experience and its own objects".² Accordingly, he presents an analogical account of the experience of others by explicating certain features which it shares with other forms of experiences. For him, the experience of the other is, to some extent, analogous to presentation and recollection. It is through this he hopes to give a phenomenological account of the others.

For Husserl, other's body belongs to the sphere of my ownness;³ for

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in relation to my actual and possible acts of consciousness it can be termed as 'transcendent' in the weak sense. More importantly he says that the experience of other's body as body (Leib) not merely as a physical object (Körper) involves a kind of analogizing apprehension. As in my own case the relation between my body and consciousness is seen in terms of body as an organ or expression of the consciousness, analogously other's body can be apprehended as the organ or expression of a consciousness. This consciousness is intended by a special kind of act, to which Husserl names as 'appresentation', ⁴ which involves the perception of the other side of an object which is not directly presented to the consciousness. In other words, 'appresentation' is the kind of act in which, along with the perception of the presented portion of the object, the other side i. e. the inner horizon of the same object is perceived as co-present. This act of appresentation is altogether different from the act of imagination or recollection because it presents something to the consciousness which does not have spatio-temporal presence at all. But it can be legitimately held that one can imagine or remember the other side of a presented object by having a determined image of the object. If it is so, then to demarcate the difference between the act of appresentation on the one hand and the act of imagination or recollection on the other, we can say that the appresentative consciousness is always necessarily accompanied by the presentation in the perception. Understood in this sense, the domain of appresented is the internal horizon of the presented side of the object. It belongs to the internal horizon of what is presented. It being so, the act of appresentation is not an independent act, for it is intended in a horizon consciousness. Husserl argues that as in my own case, in other's case too, his consciousness is given in appresentation as 'co-present' ⁵ with his body, as it were his consciousness is the other side of his body and here in the case of others also, the presented, as in my own case, is meaningful only with the togetherness of the appresented, for appresentation necessarily involves the presentation in perception.

Such is an account of Husserl's analogy to perception which makes explicit the fact that others body plays a very vital role in the appresentation of other's consciousness. But beyond this, the analogy to perception does not say any thing e.g. it does not take into account of what is given by another stream of consciousness. And Husserl, very systematically and perhaps, after noticing this lacuna, introduces his analogy to recollection, ⁶ a comparison to a different phenomenological

dimension which takes care of the draw-back noticed in the analogy to perception.

Recollection is a very special sort of act which renders present something which, at present, is not present. More importantly, recollection is different from the act of phantasy or imagination, for it locates its object in my own past. For Husserl, recollection, essentially, is the consciousness of something which is perceived or otherwise experienced by me in the past. Recollection, from this point of view, is constituted of the objects of experience as well. By recollection, in this sense, the present ego carries out an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode of itself (in the mode of past) as existing. The experience of recollection is a stream of consciousness which constitutes it. Thus, recollection is the living past which is different from the living present. In other words, one living present, in recollection, sees another original living present as past as in the case of the experience of the other. This is an analogy and to make this analogy more clear let us observe both the act of recollection and the act of appresentation more closely.

In the act of recollection, one stream of consciousness is given to another and both the streams are just complementary parts of the same stream. Both the streams of consciousness i.e. the past and the present form the continuity. But, at this point, it is to be noted that the recollected (i.e. past) can never be simultaneous with the recollective (i.e. present) act, whereas, on the other hand, in case of the experience of the others the object act is present simultaneously with the subject act. Secondly, in the case of recollection, the experienced present, temporally speaking, at the very next moment becomes past and hence the recollected has a kind of evidence and can be verified, if the necessity arises, by a certain procedure. In other words, the act of recollection involves the 'reactivation' or 'going back' of the things which are already experienced and retained, whereas the experience of the other involves the mediation of other's body.

But apart from these seeming differences, there is a very important way of understanding this comparison which leads to the intersubjectivity of the objective world. In recollection we notice an inseparable correlation between the experience and the experienced e.g. "to recall a musical performance is to recall hearing it and conversely, to recall hearing is to recall the performance itself".⁷ Similarly, in the case of the experience of the others the very act of being aware of another

person as a stream of consciousness implies being aware of his experiences. As Husserl puts it "when I am face to face with another person, I am aware not only of him but also that I am an object for him and that our surroundings are given to him as they are to me - or rather, as they would be given to me if I were in his place". In this sense, the appresented includes other's consciousness, his body, my body and the whole surroundings as they are for him and this is the most important point from the perspective of the alter ego. The alter ego, which is given by analogy in the experience of others, is a stream of experiences being rooted in the past with its own objects. The alter ego has its own world as I have one of my own and both the worlds are appearances or modes of the same givenness i. e. of the one and the same world. In this way, the strong sense of the transcendence can be understood in analogy to the weaker sense of it i.e. as the other is given to me by relation to my own actual and potential acts like wise the intersubjective object has the same status in relation to the multiple acts of different subjects. In Husserl's own language any acts and the acts of other "are so based that they stand within the function at community of one perception".

Thus is the phenomenological account of transcendental intersubjectivity which Husserl advances in the fifth Cartesian Meditations. But, before we conclude, let us note that this Husserlian solution of the problem of intersubjectivity has been found to be unsuccessful as well as problematic by many, even by the sympathetic commentators. What is more pertinent is to note that (perhaps) Husserl seems to have felt certain lacunae in the approach of *Cartesian Meditations* and that is why he, again, raises the issue of transcendental intersubjectivity in the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.⁸ But unlike the Meditations, in the *Crisis* the problematics of intersubjectivity is dispersed throughout and not collected in one essay or one chapter. From the point of view of Husserl, the unsatisfactoriness of the attempt made in the *Cartesian Meditations* has not any philosophical incorrectness or mistake. That is why, even in the *Crisis*, Husserl does not repudiate the approach of *Cartesian Meditations*. But, from the point of view of critics the difficulty with the *Cartesian Meditations* is the tension between reduction and constitution. Ricoeur⁹ and others have claimed that these two principles make antithetic demands and hence, it serves as a genuine reason for philosophers like Merleau Ponty for abandoning the entire programme of reduction itself. However, while such general responses may have

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 their own validity and reasonableness, yet we would suggest that abandoning the programme of reduction may not be as promising as it appears.

To see the above point we have to remember that the epoche, in Husserl, serves two functions, (i) With regard to the grounding of the objective world and (ii) With regard to the nature and status of consciousness itself. With regard to the problem of the world, right from *Ideas*,¹⁰ Husserl has argued that in the natural stand point the objective world claims to be absolutely real and only the phenomenological reduction which reveals the being of the world in its true form is relative to consciousness. But if the epoche, in this sense, relativises the world, it also correlatively gives us a true understanding of consciousness itself because in the natural stand point we are prone to a double distortion. On the one hand, a distorted conception of the world as absolute and a companion distortion of consciousness as merely a secondary and relative to the object. In other words, in natural stand point consciousness is seen as a purely derivative of a psycho-physical organism, but this is to misunderstand the notion of subject itself. It is reduction which really opens our eyes to true or genuine consciousness. Hence, any philosophical theory, which does not undergo the discipline of epoche will have only a caricatural understanding of the subject and hence it would follow that a phenomenological theory of subject without the safe-guard of epoche would be deeply unsatisfactory, for it could not have a proper understanding of subjectivity itself. If the notion of subjectivity is wrongly understood then a theory of subject would be equally contaminated.

Therefore, there seems to be a profound truth in Husserl's claim that a real clarification of the problem of the other is possible only on the basis of phenomenological reduction. If this line of argument has some validity then two things are followed namely (i) a short-cut to the problem of intersubjectivity as suggested by various critics, may not, in the long run, be philosophically viable and (ii) hence, if for some reason or the other, a different approach to the problem is to be adopted, that alternative approach also must, in its own way, be connected with reduction. It is important to emphasise this point, for in the *Crisis* Husserl does open up such an alternative path by way of life-world (*lebenswelt*). But, unfortunately, many critics and commentators seem to be assuming that the theme of the life-world in the later work of Husserl is an indirect indication of Husserl's giving up reduction e.g. David Carr suggests that the theme of life-world inaugurates a radical departure for Husserl. In

general, the idea of life-world has been treated as an alternative to reduction whereas I feel that as far as Husserl himself is concerned, the life-world is an alternative way of reduction and not an alternative to it.

Philosophy Department
Poona University
PUNE 411 007

LAXMAN KUMAR TRIPATHY

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RULE FOLLOWING AND WRIGHT'S SOCIAL ASSESSMENT: TOWARDS WITTGENSTEIN'S "ANTI-IDIOLECTIC" UNDERSTANDING

The problem of the private-language is a controversial issue in the philosophy of language. The recent social interpretations of Wittgenstein's concept of 'Rules' and 'Rule-following' have made the issue sceptical and ungrounded.¹ According to social interpretations the impossibility of a case of private-language endorses the view that 'one cannot follow a rule privately'. One does not give a rule to oneself and follow it because there is no such institution in our language. Besides, in such cases we cannot distinguish between 'following a rule' and 'thinking of following a rule' because we cannot have any criteria of what is right and what is wrong in such cases. This attributes to Wittgenstein the view of 'anti-idiolectic' understanding of the language. This paper attempts to give a critical account of Prof. Crispin Wright's² interpretation of Wittgenstein that validates the view of an 'anti-idiolectic' understanding of the language attributing to him a radical conventionalism or epistemological anti-realism.

1. Rule-following : Anti-idiolectic understanding:

By 'following a rule' Wittgenstein means our way of acting according to rules i.e., our being rule-abiding in our linguistic activity. It is a fact about our linguistic behaviour that we set paradigms or standards (rules) and follow them. Rule-following, in that sense, is a practice in a social setting. That is to say, we can learn and master it through a system of public checking. The public checkability for Wittgenstein is the fundamental criterion for rule-following because 'following a rule' presupposes corrigibility. Whether one is following a rule correctly or incorrectly in developing a series (e.g. 1000, 1002, 1004) from a given rule (i.e.+ 2) can be decided by the persons who have already mastered that technique. The concept of following a rule, as Wright contends, presupposes acting in accord with standards.³ For, in the absence of the normative activities and guidance distinctive of following rules, there will be no such thing as rules at all and hence

possibility of accord or conflict with rules.

Understanding Wittgenstein's private-language arguments Wright insists that there is no sense in the concept of following a rule privately. According to him nothing is affirmed in one's saying that one is following a rule privately which nobody else can detect or follow. This points neither to a private source of justification of one's acts of rule-following nor does it entail a case of subjective justification. There is nothing called justification at all in such cases, since there is no institution called giving oneself a rule.

Wright's point is like this. Somebody is sincerely thinking that he is following the rule never logically guarantees that he is following the rule. For, whether he really follows the rule requires that his action conforms with it and this is not settled by his thinking or intending himself to have followed it. In short, a rule must determine what counts as acting in accord with it. A person on a particular occasion is said to be following a given rule only if he acts in accord with this rule. Whether one is following a given rule correctly or not is checked by other persons who have already mastered that procedure. Obeying a rule or disobeying a rule always conforms to the public checkability. Otherwise, somebody's thinking that he is following a rule in an instance cannot be checked because there is no such criterion which can confirm his thinking to follow a rule with actually following the rule. It would be the case like 'whatever is going to seem right to one is right. And that only means that we cannot talk about right.' Following a rule, thus, is a social practice and so a case of private-rule following definitionally is one where public checkability is impossible to obtain.

It follows from the above argument that Wittgenstein's private language arguments . invalidate the notion that one can develop a language in social or linguistic isolation. One fails to express his inner feelings and sensations in such a situation. Others fail to understand his inner thoughts too. This, as Wright argues, leads Wittgenstein to the conclusion that "there cannot be such a thing as first-person privileged recognition of the dictates of one's understanding of an expression ---".⁴ That is, an idiolectic understanding of a concept (to say in general a private language) is not conceivable. Wright contends that it is the community, not an individual, to whom one looks for language development, rules, and criteria for rule-following according to Wittgenstein.

2. *Anti-realistic stand:*

Does this anti-idiolectic understanding of the notion of 'following

a rule' ascertain the rational character of one's following a rule in an instance? Does it establish the 'truth' of his following a particular rule in all the cases? How does one know it? What evidential support(s) are there in which one can justify the truth of his rule-abidingness? These questions are about the rationality of our rule-following activities. Wright postulates the view of 'investigational-independence'⁵ in this connection. Though there are varieties of realism developed by empirical minded thinkers about the knowledge of the external world, the common assumption of every realism is that 'there are certain objective truths' independent of our experiences (facts). The linguistic realists, for instance, Frege and Russell, believe in such 'objective truths' that exist independent of linguistic expressions. They argue that the meaning of the expressions are determined in the light of expressions that describe our experiences (i.e., facts of the world). Wright does not commit himself to a Fregean kind of realism on understanding a concept. His position seems to be quite anti-realistic. For him, 'investigation independence' view suggests that 'confronted with any decidable, objective issue, there is already an answer of which we investigate the matter fully and correctly we will arrive at'.⁶ That is, a decidable statement is objectively ascertained if it has 'investigation independent truth-value'. By 'investigation-independent truth-value' Wright seems to mean 'Paradigm Patterns'. According to Wright these patterns in reality are based on social agreement. These patterns, thus, are open to us and nothing is given to a person in linguistic or social isolation, because patterns of meaning and language-use are not developed independently in an idiolectic realm. Secondly, due to impossibility of *ratifying facts* or uses of words individually on any objective basis there is no objectivity of meaning (i.e., there is no case of rules determining the meaning of the expressions). So there is no guarantee that what one takes to be facts or truths has any significance in any case. Like Kripke, in relation to this view, Wright argues that Wittgenstein is sceptical about what he calls 'investigation-independence'.

Wright himself, however, does not accept all the above. He claims, as it seems, that if I cannot grasp my own patterns of rule-following there is no assurance I have understood a social one. As he insists, "so we move towards the idea that understanding an expression is a kind of 'cottoning on'; that is, a leap, an inspired guess at the pattern of application which an instructor is trying to get across".⁷

The difficulty is as follows. Even if one grants that community assent provides the basis for correctness of rule-following and, thus,

language use, since one cannot know from one's own case and because of the indeterminate nature of rule-following, social agreement itself is based merely on consensus from habit rather than any independent grounds of 'objective correctness'.⁸ It is, thus, indeterminate too.

Rule-following practices, Wright suggests, not only do not conform to investigation-independent facts but it is also the case that rule-following practices are not merely a matter of conformity to social consensus since these practices themselves are somewhat indeterminate or 'blind'. Therefore, according to him one cannot describe a practice systematically because "at any particular stage (a practice) may go in any direction without betrayal of its character. There is simply nothing there systematically to be described."⁹

The above interpretation of Wittgenstein has two implications. First, though no language can be developed by a person in social isolation (i.e., to say linguistic isolation) one cannot evaluate the community practices which are the source of language. One cannot say "a community goes right or wrong in accepting a particular verdict on a particular decidable questions rather it just goes."¹⁰ As linguistic practices are both based on community assent and authority and are at the same time somewhat indeterminate, one cannot evaluate the agreement itself. That is, there is no way to follow a rule or grasp a meaning which is not an interpretation. Secondly, social interpretation gives a sceptical base to language even if in a Humean form as Kripke argues. So Wright claims that there is no objective basis for language-rules, truths apart from what a society thinks are facts or truths. In this case social agreements themselves are also not free from doubt.

According to Wright, Wittgenstein then repudiates the "objectivity of sameness of use."¹¹ According to him social decision provides a background for the development of general language-usage which in turn is used to make judgements about individual uses of words and expressions. One cannot peep into social agreement nor can a community recognize or evaluate the truth or falsity of its own uses of words. The assumption that the social authority is a faithful reflection of the world is ungrounded and unverifiable.

This anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein originates from Wright's, as we saw above, noticing Wittgenstein's "anti-idiolectic" understanding of the notion of 'Rule-following'. Wittgenstein very consistently argues against a position that traces the understanding and truth merely to an idiolectic grasp of ratifiable impression patterns. This

is quite apparent in his attack of ostensive definition as the basis for language-learning and language development. Wright, however, has overreacted by ascribing to Wittgenstein an anti-realist (social) conventionalism which discards truth-conditions altogether. But this view is based on a wrong conception. That is, in this connection, Wittgenstein's conception of 'rules' and 'rule-following' are mistakenly interpreted. The other thing is Wright's insistence that rule following according to Wittgenstein is merely following rules 'blindly'. That is, a view which leads Wright to say that in rule-following one just 'goes' and evaluate one's rule-following "Cottoning on" habits.

The whole problem of anti-realistic interpretation of Wittgenstein is based on the confusion that a rule is an interpretation and the grasping of a rule always involves interpretation. Wittgenstein, however, does not support these views. Rather he says 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which exhibited in what we call "obeying a rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.... Hence there is an inclination to say every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term 'interpretation' to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another'.¹² This remark suggests that rules are not merely interpretations. To follow a rule is to apply a rule to a particular situation. This specific application is an interpretation of a rule but not identical with it. It is, for example in following the rule $x^2 = x.x$ the persons like A interprets $(x+y)^2 = (x-y)$, B interprets $(x+y)^2 = x^2 + y^2 + 2xy$, C interprets $3 \times 3 = 9$ (i.e. 3^3) and the person D may interpret as $0^2 = 0$. But all these possible interpretations are not the rule itself. Rather the rule (i.e. $x^2 = x.x$) is read off from these interpretations. It is the source of the interpretations. Understanding a concept often needs explanations or interpretations, but giving interpretations is not involved in grasping the concept. It is, as Wittgenstein aptly suggests, completely a matter of practice. This concept of 'practice' *prima facie* seems to be a socio-generic concept but for Wittgenstein it is not so. It is, however, a regular action guided by a rule (i.e. not an interpretation of the rule). Besides, the answer that Wittgenstein gives to the question 'How do I know that in working out the series + 2 I must write "2004, 2006" and not "20004, 20008 ? or the general question "How do I know how I have to follow the rule in the particular case ? is this: I know how I have to follow the rule in the particular case (and so on) in the same sense in which I know what the word 'help' means when I am drowning and shout 'Help!'. This is how I react in this situation; I am in no doubt as to what to do. The way

of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation of the rule implies that 'to act in a certain way in response to the rule without appealing to anything else for guidance.' ¹³ Thus, an individual is not merely dependent on social agreement for guidance in the correction of rules, nor is a society itself merely dependent on its dispositions and habits. Self-correction or ratification is possible on both levels even if it is the case that 'when I obey a rule I obey the rule blindly' because 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.' This 'grasping' is not merely rule-following but involves evaluating of the rule itself.

Arguing against Wright's position John McDowell¹⁴ states that Wright's understanding of Wittgenstein puts Wright into a "dilemma" of 'obliterating the normativeness of meaning' and 'eliminating the notion that understanding is a grasp of rules and patterns' One can here take a middle 'way out' between individualistic realist conventionalism. That 'way out' as a third possibility sharpens the distinction between empiricity and normativeness of our rule-following activities and will bring Wittgenstein closer to McDowell's position. McDowell interprets Wittgenstein's so-called 'socialism' as maintaining that one has membership of linguistic society where there are a multitude of minds reflecting and sharing linguistic practices. This is the possibility of a social agreement presupposed in using a specific language. But this does not entail that understanding involves, in all cases, interpretations since Wittgenstein has clarified this matter in section 201 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. As McDowell points out 'it would be a serious error... in his (Wittgenstein's) view, not to make a radical distinction between the significance of, say, 'This is Yellow' and the significance of say, 'this would be called "yellow" by (most) speakers of English.'¹⁵ Wittgenstein himself, thus, is not committed to an identification of meaning with social agreement or social assent, and so he is not committed to an anti-realist interpretation of rule-following.

McDowell, however, does not rule out the social element completely from the understanding of Wittgenstein. Rather, he accepts the fact that human beings share practices. Shared linguistic practices entail a social bond together "not be a match in merely externals (facts accessible to just anyone), but a capacity for a meeting of minds."¹⁶ But whether these practices can be taken as 'bed-rock', or foundational something or not is an open question. For, the matter is not easy to decide as it seems to be. They (practices) do not determine truths about the world because we attempt to understand truths through these practices and because we

interpret and evaluate these practices themselves.

One cannot, thus, attribute to Wittgenstein epistemological anti-realism even conceding McDowell's social position. This is because, as McDowell argues consistently, Wittgenstein's rejection of ratification of independent truths need not lead to a conventionalist anti-realist position where one simply follows social conventions or habits 'blindly'. But Wright's understanding commits Wittgenstein to the debatable thesis that all rule-following is interpretation where "for the community there is no authority, so no standard to meet".¹⁷ If the notion of a rule allows one to evaluate rule-following as Wittgenstein suggests in section 201 (as it has been understood above) one need not attribute Wittgenstein's views to an anti-realist conventionalism. One can very well dispute an idiolectic understanding (i.e. understanding of something in one's own case) and deny the logical privacy of rules and rule-following without adopting an anti-realist point of view. This does not, however, imply that Wittgenstein is not an antirealist either, but rather that neither realism nor anti-realism is foremost in his philosophical thinking. Neither his attack on idiolectic understanding nor the private language arguments lead him necessarily to anti-realism. To say, in a nutshell, such concepts may not be appropriate to his philosophical investigations.*

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad
Hyderabad - 500 134.

SATRUGHNA BEHERA

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* I am obliged to my teacher Dr.R.C.Pradhan for his valuable comments and suggestions on this matter. And I am also thankful to ICPR for financial-assistance in this connection.

BRENTANO'S DOCTRINE OF INTENTIONALITY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA

The term "consciousness" has generally been employed as a blanket term to designate most varied and disparate phenomena. For example, our feelings of joy and remorse, cognition, perception of external world etc. Brentano in his *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*¹ of 1874, however, restricted the term "consciousness" in its meaning and made it refer exclusively to the "mental phenomena" or mental acts". Accordingly, all conscious data, for Brentano, are divided into two classes: the class of physical phenomena and the class of mental or psychical phenomena.² Of these, the latter refers to presentations as well as all the phenomena that are based upon presentations.³ But as we can neither think of any act of thinking nor can we have any desire without there also being an object that is desired, the "intentional in-existence" is the distinguishing mark of all mental phenomena.⁴ Consequently, Brentano's notion of intentionality of consciousness unfolds itself in terms of his understanding of mental phenomena where the intentional in-existence of the object means that 'mental phenomenon which is not consciousness of an object.'⁵

The sphere of mental phenomena is, however, not an undifferentiated whole and is accordingly further divided into three classes: "Presentations", "judgements", and "emotions".⁶ Presentations, on the basis of their relative independence, simplicity and universality, are, however, primary in order of their natural order. Thus, whenever anything appears to us we have presentations. Accordingly, 'it is impossible for conscious activity to refer in any way to something which is not presented.'⁷ Judgements, on the other hand, are acts by means of which we hold something to be true or false. The third class, however, refers to all mental phenomena that are not included in the first two classes.⁸ The entire classification of mental phenomena is, therefore, based upon consciousness' different ways of being conscious of its objects. But when an object of presentation also becomes an object of judgement or emotion the duplication of objects takes place because in the latter case(s) consciousness enters into a completely new kind of relationship with the object by becoming concerned with it in two or more ways.

However, as the central theme of Brentano's characterization of mental phenomena is the intentional in-existence of the object of consciousness, the term "object" itself and with it the presupposed sense of consciousness-object relation needs further elucidation. In this regard, two different senses of the term "object" are discernible from Brentano's works.⁹ In its first use, the term "object" means a "thing" or a "real entity". The term, if so used, would have a meaning of its own, i.e. it is "*autosemantic*". Thus, when used autosemantically, the term "object" is equivalent to an "entity" or a "thing". In this context, the term 'object' simply refers to 'what we comprehend by the most general concept that we can attain by abstraction from perceptual data.'¹⁰ On the other hand, when the term "object" is used in constructions such as "to have something as an object", etc., then the term "object" has no meaning of its own, i.e., it is "*synsemantic*".¹¹

Therefore, when Brentano speaks of "intentional" or "mental" object he uses the term "object" synsemantically. Indeed, to avoid any confusion that may arise from these two different uses of the same word Brentano makes use of term "*object simpliciter*" or "thing" while referring to the autosemantic sense of the term. Therefore, when we use the term "object" synsemantically "to have an object" simply means to be conscious of something. That this distinction is generally overlooked by all those who theorize on consciousness, that the failure to recognize this distinction should mistakenly lead Meinong and Husserl to 'postulate different ... kinds of being, to distinguish between "being", "substance" ... and finally to introduce such fictions as "objections", "dignitatives", and "contents" having a timeless existence'¹² is, thus, only very natural for Kraus. If so rendered, Brentano's analysis seems to appear far better than it is generally thought because in Brentano's analysis all modes of being can be reduced to modes of conceptualization and to modes of self-evident a priori judgements based on such concepts and also to self-evident assertoric judgements.¹³

With regard to consciousness-object relation, it would be noteworthy to recall that for Aristotle every relation is comprised of two terms, viz, the fundament and the terminus. If we, therefore, view the consciousness - object relation in terms of *fundament* and *terminus* of a relation, then consciousness in our case is the fundament of the consciousness-object relation and the object of consciousness its terminus. The consciousness-object relation is, however, such that the object of consciousness as terminus of the said relation need not actually exist and in some cases the

object as a "thing" cannot even exist, i.e., its existence is an impossibility as in the case of square-triangle. The terminus of a mental act is, thus, that with which consciousness is mentally concerned. Accordingly, consciousness-object relation is not a relation in the strict sense of the term; consciousness is, thus, merely a "quasi-relation" (Relativities)¹⁴ because it does not acquire the existence of both the relata for its existence. Consciousness is quasi-relational or relation-like because while thinking of consciousness-object relation we are 'like someone who is thinking of two objects at the same time, one of them *inrecto*, as it were, and the other *inobliquo*'.¹⁵ Furthermore, for this relation-like relation to be realized the existence of consciousness is the only required condition. To this extent consciousness is no 'referential relation to something in the mind- whether that "something" does not exist, exists mentally, appears or is "given"'.¹⁶ Consciousness, therefore, as a relative determination 'cannot be characterized or distinguished by a factor which does not belong to consciousness itself- and still less by something which sometimes does and sometimes does not exist. Accordingly, the existence (being, subsistence) of the object of consciousness is essentially irrelevant to the concept of consciousness'.

Brentano's doctrine of intentionality of mental phenomena, thus, renders all questions about the existence of objects of consciousness superfluous because Brentano's notion of object is such that questions of existence *eo ipso* become irrelevant. However, any definite judgement on the matter requires a detailed study of Husserl's ideas where these ideas are developed into a fulfilled phenomenology.

Department of Philosophy
Punjab University
CHANDIGARH - 160 014.

RAVINDRA SINGH

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON NOAM CHOMSKY

We humans communicate with other members of our species, so do all other animals with theirs. But there lies a big difference. Descartes¹ points out that animal-communication is qualitatively different from human communication. Human communication, particularly human language, is not, like the sounds and gestures of other animals, just a response to external, or even internal emotional stimuli. Human language is 'creative' in the sense of being free from either external or internal stimuli. By the phrase 'creative aspect of language use', Chomsky refers to the same thing. But he is not just echoing Descartes. Descartes used this creative aspect of language use 'as a criterion for the existence of "other minds"². Chomsky appealed to this property of language use to picture man as a free, undermined agent. He writes:

"... we can considerably advance our understanding of language and arrive at interesting conclusions with regard to human intelligence and the innate structure of mind that permit us to act as free and creative beings, undermined, even probabilistically, by stimulus conditions, yet at the same time functioning within a certain system of rules and principles that are in part a product of intelligence, and in part fixed and immutable framework within which such products of intelligence are constructed.³

We all agree that we know at least one language. But what does knowing a language mean ?

1. It means to have the capacity to produce meaningful sounds and to understand or interpret such sounds produced by others. Chomsky, among others, thinks that this capacity, this possession of language, distinguishes humans from other animals. He writes :

"When we study human language, we are approaching what some might call the "human essence", the distinctive qualities of mind that are, so far as we know, unique to man.⁴

Seemingly, this definition of humans is too narrow, for it excludes the deaf and mute persons from the class of 'Human'; but actually it is not, for deaf and mute persons also produce and understand sign languages which have all the basic properties of other human natural languages, except the properties of being heard and spoken.

2. "To know a language" means to know the possible sounds

and sound-patterns of that language. Speakers of one language often pronounce words from foreign language with distinct uneasiness. This shows that the speaker detects some words as foreign to his native language. What is more, we can detect and ignore nonlinguistic sound-elements in speech. Even some involuntary cries and the filled pauses used in conversation are constrained by the native speaker's language.

3. 'To know a language' means to know that certain sound-sequences are meaning bearing, in other words, 'to know a language' means knowing how to relate sounds and meanings.

4. 'To know a language' means to be able to combine basic linguistic units which are finite in number to produce infinite set of sentences most of which are never heard before. Children do not learn a language by storing all the words and all the sentences in their memory. No one teaches them the rules of constructing sentences. Still they learn their language and produce and understand sentences previously unspoken or unheard. Chomsky refers to this ability as part of the 'creative' aspect of language - use. This 'creativity' supports the Cartesian contention that language use is not necessarily limited to stimulus - response behaviour. Some animals, given some fixed human utterances, may respond in such a way that it seems they understand human language. Talking birds may vocally imitate some human utterances. But these do not prove that they possess language, for they cannot either produce an unlimited set of utterances from a finite set of units or understand such utterances.

It is not possible, in principle, to memorise all the possible sentences in a language. For every sentence in every human language, a longer sentence can be formed by recursion of syntactic constituents within the same sentence. So, no limit can be imposed on the length of any sentence, and, as a consequence, no limit imposed on the number of possible sentences. In other words, human language is 'open-ended', and not a finite store of fixed phrases and sentences. If this be a part of the 'creative' aspect of language-use, then we should admit that 'creativity' is a universal property of human language. And this 'open-endedness' differentiates human system of communication from systems of communication employed by other species than man.

Though theoretically possible, it is of course practically highly improbable that we would form too long sentences. This difference between theory and practice is the difference between what I know about my language (in the words of Chomsky, my linguistic 'competence') and

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how I use this knowledge in particular situations (in the words of Chomsky, my linguistic 'performance').

5. 'To know a language' means to have some internalised set of 'rules' for forming and understanding sentences and judging strings of words which are sentences and which are not. As our brain in something finite, its storing capacity also is finite. Hence, it is assumed that these 'rules' must be finite in length and in number. Yet, these 'rules' are such as to permit us to form and understand an infinite set of new sentences.

The ability to judge strings of words as 'sentences' does not depend on (1) the sentence being heard before, (2) the sentence being meaningful, (3) the sentence being interpretable, (4) the sentence being true.

Though 'to know a language' means all these things stated above, this 'knowing' is 'knowing unconsciously'. A child produces a sentence not knowing what a sentence is. This is nothing unique to language. We know how to do certain things without understanding or being able to explain the principles of those doings. Still, to know the mechanism of human, mind, Chomsky takes up human language because "The particular system of human knowledge that has, so far, lent itself most readily to such an approach is the system of human language".⁵

We have some in-built linguistic capacity. And at the same time, we can go beyond those in-built mechanisms. There is no contradiction involved here. Rather, there lies our 'creativity'. Creativity is not perversity or disobedience to all sorts of restraints. We can break the linguistic 'rules' to create nonsense linguistic structures. But again, nonsense poetry is amusing because the sentences of the poem obey syntactic rules and sound grammatical. Ungrammatical strings of nonsense words are not entertaining. Linguistic creativity is best observed when we use language metaphorically. There, too, the basis of such creativity lies amid our in-built, species - specific, linguistic system.

Chomsky is well aware of the fact that some 'intrinsic properties of mind' alone cannot explain creativity. Be in language, be in science, creativity needs something more, namely, 'social and intellectual conditions'. He writes :

"There is no question of choosing between these. In order to understand a scientific discovery, it is necessary to understand the interaction between these factors. But personally I am more interested in the first."⁶

Human languages are many and points of diversity among them are innumerable. But linguists such as V. Fromkin and R. Rodman⁸ tell us that the number of mutually unintelligible languages is relatively small, somewhat over four thousand. Still, that number is formidable one. The interesting fact is that amid human languages of such a huge number, there are some common features :

a) Wherever there are human beings, there is language; (b) all languages are equally complex; (c) the relationship between the sounds and meanings of spoken languages are, for the most part, arbitrary; (d) all human languages have a finite set of discrete sounds which are combined to form meaningful elements which again form an infinite set of possible sentences; (e) every spoken language has the two basic classes of speech sounds - vowels and consonants; (f) similar grammatical categories, e.g. subject, object verb - are found in all languages; (g) semantic universals, such as 'male', 'female', 'animate', inanimate' are found in every language; (h) every language has a way of referring to the past, negating, forming questions, issuing commands, and so on; (i) Some languages are highly inflective (e.g. Sanskrit), some are not so (e.g. English), but every language contains a bit of inflection in it; (j) any normal child is capable of learning any language to which he or she is exposed.

The laws that are common to all human languages, representing the universal properties of language, constitute a Universal Grammar (henceforth UG). In the Chomskian sense, the 'grammar' represents our linguistic competence. In this sense, the 'grammar' includes the sound system (phonology), the system of meanings (semantics), the rules of word-formation (morphology), the rules sentence-formation (syntax), and the vocabulary of words (lexicon). Chomsky is of the opinion that there is a UG which is part of the human biologically endowed language faculty. The UG, according to Chomsky, may be thought of

"... as a system of principles which characterizes the class of possible grammars by specifying how particular grammars are organised (what are the components and their relations), how the different rules of these components are constructed, how they interact, and so on."⁸

The rules of sentence-formation, 'the Phrase Structure Rules' (henceforth PS -Rules) in Chomskian terminology, are only a handful in number. These rules of a language tell us not only what structures are found in the language, but which ones are not found. Despite differences in detail, all 'grammars' of all languages have the type of PS-Rules that determine

the constituent structure of sentences of the language and its syntactic categories. Ps -Rules with recursive properties explain how language is 'creative'.

But the PS-Rules have got some limitations. There remain many types of common English sentences that they do not account for. For example, there is the sentence (S) :

The boy is sleeping.

A PS-Rule for expanding the S node accounts for such structures: S \rightarrow NP (Noun Phrase) Aux (Auxiliary) VP (Verb Phrase). But this rule will not account for the following sentence :

Is the boy sleeping ?

The interrogative sentences are formed by the movement of Auxillary verb to the front of the sentence. This operation is applied to an already-formed constituent structure, to give another constituent structure that differs from the first in that some element has been relocated. Such operations are, in the words of Chomsky, 'Transformations' or 'Transformational Rules' (henceforth T-Rules). Logical subject and logical object are determined by the PS - Rules and are affected by the T-Rules. Some of these T-Rules are constrained by conditions that reflect language-universals. Evidence for all of these components of 'grammar' (i.e. PS-Rules, a lexicon and a few very general T-Rules constrained by conditions that reflect language-universals) is found in all human languages. The UG is the base of the 'grammar' of a particular language. Chomsky writes :

"It is only when supplemented by a UG that the grammar of a language provides a full account of the speaker-hearer's competence."

If it becomes possible to work out the UG in full detail, we can legitimately hope that grammatically and semantically faithful translation of texts of one language will be translated by computers without human intervention and travellers will be able to own a portable translator to receive a translation from any language in their own language.

II

This 'grammar' is not an instrument to be used in the domain of language alone. Lyons writes :

"... there is at least a possibility that other forms of typically human activity (including perhaps certain aspects of what we call 'artistic creation')"

will also prove amenable to description within the framework of specially constructed mathematical systems analogous to, or even based upon, transformational grammar"¹⁰

Surely, linguistic analysis becomes highly intriguing if it succeeds in throwing light on other aspects of human behaviour. Chomsky strongly believes it to be the case and cites the example of the great philosopher and linguist Humboldt. He writes :

"... Humboldt's conception of language must be considered against the background provided by his writings on social and political theory and the concept of human nature that underlies them ...

His denunciation of excessive state power (and of any sort of dogmatic faith) is based on his advocacy of the fundamental human right to develop a personal individuality through meaningful creative work and unconstrained thought....."¹¹

If the study of language sheds light on human nature, it must have something to suggest regarding the social and political man. If man is creative, his thoughts must be free from the constraint of dogmas. Man must have the right to develop his own individuality. Excessive state power must be denounced. If human spontaneity is gagged, human failure results. As Chomsky shows in his book *American Power and the New Mandarins* (Penguin, 1969), the Spanish Civil War failed, for the upsurge failed to give anarchist uprisings their due, and this failure resulted from failing to allow successful spontaneous political activity.

We are creative in the field of language. But either creativity is something more than the generation of new sentences, or it is moonshine. Language is not just a string of words; it is the expression of human attitude to life. It gives us a new perspective, a new value. Two different sentences may carry the same information, but may express two very different attitudes. Language, then somehow touches and effects reality. Sentences do not represent themselves, but present encounters of values. In the sphere contextualised, new sentences reveal the sphere in a new way. Generation of newer and newer sentences would mean creation of newer and newer encounters. And there creativity is highly prized.

If we try to map the universal features of language to the social domain, the point of attitude becomes prominent. According to the version of Racists and Imperialists, they alone are the civilised ones burdened with the responsibility of making other uncivilised persons civilised. In the

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domain of language, this attitude is reflected in the thesis that one language is incomparably superior to all other 'primitive' languages. In the domain of philosophical theory, anarchism is 'Primitive', because it speaks of freedom, not in abstract terms, but in terms of concrete human possibility discharging all the talents hidden in human beings as innate endowments. The imperialist attitude gets support from the behaviouristic position upholding the view that as man is completely determined 'by his genetic endowment and history of reinforcement'¹², human freedom and ability to choose are myths. Hence, in the name of ensuring survival of culture, an all-embracing control may be instituted in every walk of life.

When a linguist starts with the proposition that all languages are of equal complexity, the anti-racist and anti-imperialist attitude of the linguist becomes prominent. Dell Hymes¹³ may be absolutely right in saying that 'it is ideological confidence rather than empirical knowledge that leads linguists to say such things; but the attitude, or the 'ideological confidence' is most welcome.

As Chomsky points out in several articles, the behaviourist thesis is not supported by sufficient evidence. Of course, free choice does not mean the ability to choose anything, but it is quite reasonable to suppose that we are only marginally determined in our choice by environmental constraints.

Regarding the interconnection between language and freedom, Chomsky writes :

"Language, in its essential properties and the manner of its use, provides the basic criterion for determining that another organism is a being with a human mind and the human capacity for free thought and self-expression, and with the essential human need for freedom from the external constraints of repressive authority."¹⁴

The innate endowments and the environmental conditions are not restrictions. These are not imposed upon us by some outside legislator. Rather, these form the basis of our creativity, rationality and morality. Chomsky refers to Rousseau, Humboldt and Kant in his support and writes:

"... it is no denial of man's capacity for infinite 'self-perfection' to hold that

there are intrinsic properties of mind that constrain his development. I would like to argue that in a sense the opposite is true, that without a system of formal constraints there are no creative acts; specifically, in the absence of intrinsic and restrictive properties of mind, there can be only 'shaping of behaviour' but no creative acts of self-perfection."¹⁵

As language is natural to man, so is his creativity, his urge towards being free, his search for self-perfection. And to say that these are natural to man means to say that these are natural for all human beings, not for a handful of white collared people alone. We may end this essay with Dell Hymes saying :

"... (Chomsky) has understood that true intellectuals have a responsibility for the ends of their work, as well as the means; has understood that the ultimate justification of freedom for the intellectual and the academy is not that, being harmless, they should be left alone, but rather that only with such freedom can they serve society by independent criticism."¹⁶

Department of Philosophy
Sripat Singh College
Jiaganj - 742123
Murshidabad
(W.Bengal)

KUMAR MITRA

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AN OUTLINE OF SOME PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC COMPOSITION

The standpoint from which this paper is written, sees all art, especially music as a *language*. Art is seen as a language, because it is maintained that the artist craves for *communication* with an audience that can understand his ideas. Art, eg. music, is a language where the artist tries to convey *information* in terms of say, ideas / motifs / themes whether melodic, rhythmic, harmonic etc., and their treatment, form, structure, order etc. The information - content and ordering - form may vary from work to work. Thus in music, for example, information content may vary from moods to motivation for action to motifs to the order of the work itself and so on, while ordering - forms may vary from classical forms like fugue to aleatoric forms and so on. Art, thus, is seen as a language, albeit an *aesthetic* language. Though different from Natural and Formal languages, art nevertheless has both syntax and semantics. The *syntax* of a work of art, is seen in terms of its structure, the "how," whereas its *semantics* or more properly significance, is seen in terms of what it attempts to express, the "what". It is maintained here that the artist, especially a composer, tries to communicate or transmit to his audience a form / structure / order which has been imposed upon or generated from the content / matter of his work. The artist tries to communicate *order* in his ideas.

To come to music as a specific art, after the background of the above conception of art as an *aesthetic language*, two questions may be asked. *Why* is order needed in music ? *How* is order generated and communicated in music ?

As pointed out by Schoenberg¹, order is needed for music to be understood/comprehended and appreciated both emotionally and intellectually. Order is needed in order to *communicate*, and is generated primarily through form / structure². As far as music written in a thematic - motivic style is concerned, order is brought about by *unity* of form, making such music *monistic*.³ The invention of the twelve - tone method by Schoenberg, for instance, it is argued, was for the purpose of generating and communicating order by means of unity of form.⁴

An elaboration of how order is generated in a thematic - motivic style is needed here. Music which is written in a thematic - motivic style, derives its order from a single theme or motif or subject or idea. Thus, such music exhibits the unity of form mentioned above. Examples of such works can be found easily in works ranging from Palestrina to a lot of contemporary music. The themes or motifs in such works can be treated in three ways essentially, each of which attempts at generating order and communicating it : (a) *Repetition* - which establishes ⁵ the theme, and helps the audience remember⁶ it, (b) *Variation / Operation / Development* - which brings about a contrast by generating new themes from the old theme⁷, by means of operations on the motif like inversion, retrogression, retrogression of inversion, transposition, augmentation, diminution etc., and (c) the use of *New Theme* - which may in turn be repeated, varied etc.

Of these three treatments, the first two i.e., repetition and variation, work and rework *old* matter, while the use of a new theme works and reworks *new* matter. All three treatments attempt at ordering and making music comprehensible, through motivic cohesion in the first two, and contrast in the third. Contrapuntal techniques like fugue, canon, imitation etc., and formal techniques like recapitulation, development, sequence etc. use elements of *repetition* and *variation*. Thus, for example, canon can be seen as a delayed repetition (at varied pitch sometimes), sequence as repetition at varied pitch and so on. All of the above, it is argued here, are used to attempt to generate *order* and thus *communicate* with the audience. As Schoenberg points out, communication is the *sole purpose* of the composer's efforts, perhaps even that of other creative artists' efforts⁸.

Corresponding to the attempt to communicate on the part of the composer, by generating order, the audience should be able to perceive order. There can be communication in the language of music only when information / idea, the semantics, can be *transmitted* from the composer to the audience through form / structure, the syntax. It is maintained here, that there are two levels at which the audience may perceive order in a work of music, presupposing that it gets order, not disorder, from the work in question. The two levels are (a) *the Aural/Aesthetic level / Ear* - where order is perceived largely through an aural experience by listening carefully to a piece of music, and, (b) *The Intellectual level / Mind* - where order is perceived largely through an intellectual experience by analysis of the

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score of a piece of music. These two levels do not have a sharp demarcation and order in a given work may be perceived at both levels, though not in the same measure always. The two levels preserve the conception of art, or music in this case, as *both emotive and cognitive*⁹. The Aural / Aesthetic level corresponds very roughly to the emotive, while the Intellectual level corresponds very closely to the cognitive. Thus it is found, for example, that in older music, say pre-20th century music, order can be perceived easily at the aural / aesthetic level, especially when it comes to the classics, by aurally following motifs and their functions. The same cannot be said, perhaps, of modern music¹⁰.

To come to contemporary music, there is a three-fold classification of contemporary music here : (a) *Serialism / Atonalism* - exemplified by such British composers as Peter Maxwell Davies, Alexander Goehr, Harrison Birtwistle, Oliver Knussen etc. (b) *Minimalism*, exemplified by composers like Philip Glass, Steve Reich, Terry Riley etc. and (c) *Aleatorism / Electro-Acoustism / Non-Romanticism* - grouped together here for a reason that will be seen presently, and exemplified by such diverse composers as John Cage, Richard Rodney Bennett etc. Now, with respect to order as it is perceived at the Aural / aesthetic and Intellectual levels, it is maintained that (a) when it comes to Serialism, order is almost entirely perceived by the *mind* at the intellectual level upon analysis of the score - there is not much that the ear, even the most trained ear, can discover, for such music is *too complex for the ear*. (b) when it comes to Minimalism, order is almost entirely perceived by the *ear* at the aural / aesthetic level upon hearing the music - there is not much that the mind can discover, for such music, like most popular music, is *too simple for the mind*, and (c) when it comes to Aleatorism / Electro Acoustism / New Romanticism, there is not much order to be perceived at either the intellectual or the aural / aesthetic levels, which is why these three diverse movements have been grouped together here.

As opposed to Serialism, Minimalism, Aleatorism, Electro-Acoustism and Neo-Romanticism, the need for a new music is proposed here, which will contain and transmit order at both aural / aesthetic as well as intellectual levels. It is proposed here that such a music needs *both ear and mind*, both of which are necessary and neither sufficient by itself. The ear, it is maintained, is needed for *music*, the mind for *serious* music, or more properly classical music as opposed to popular music.

This leads to the *paradox of modern music*, and indeed perhaps modern art in general. To take up modern music specifically, it is held here that serial techniques, for example, were invented to communicate at the aural / aesthetic level by generating and transmitting order. But, instead, what is communicated *even to the most trained ear* at the aural level is disorder, or not the same order at least as is intended by the serial composer.¹¹ Order, it seems, in such music is and can be perceived only at the intellectual level and all channels of communication seem to have been blocked at the aural / aesthetic level.¹² In modern music, especially serial music, it would seem that order is not obtained aurally, which is what the serial composer would want, but only intellectually. Or, to use an earlier terminology, it would seem when it comes to serial music, it is *not the ear but only the mind which matters*. Order cannot be perceived through the *object language* - the language of modern music - via the aural experience, which is what the composer would want, but only through a *meta language* - analysis in ordinary language of the language of modern music - via an intellectual experience¹³.

Modern music, it would seem, is a *riddle* for the ear which is solved by the mind, though it is meant to be solved by the ear.

Why has this happened ? Must this be so? Why is it that the language of modern music has become *incommunicable aurally*, despite conscious efforts to communicate better eg. the twelve tone method ? Is there a need to take a wider philosophical look at notions like "art", "aesthetic language", "music", "order", "communication", "order in art" etc. ? Is there a need to analyse these concepts philosophically ? This is where philosophy comes into the picture. It is proposed here that there is a need to undertake such a philosophical exercise, and then return to music to see if communication can be *restored* in this language, perhaps by reconstructing the language, if needed.

Such an exercise, it is proposed, could lead to the evolution of a *via media* in music, in so far as both ear and mind are used in such music. The central thesis of the paper is that *the ultimate test* for a piece of music is how it *sounds*, not how it works merely on paper. Or, in other words, the aural experience is more important than the intellectual experience, though both are necessary, and neither sufficient by itself. The ear is more important, the mind only an aid in enhancing order, comprehensibility and beauty. First comes the aural / aesthetic and the accompanying feelings if

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any, and then comes the organising, analysing, unifying intellect which classifies, catalogues and identifies modes of making order. The science so developed can *enhance* the intrinsic joy of creating / comprehending / communicating beautiful expression / perception, but can *never substitute* it. Corresponding things could be said perhaps of the other arts too.

There remain some small problems to be stated, which do not have a direct bearing on the problems stated above. Firstly, the question arises whether composition, and perhaps art is general, can be taught or institutionalized. If Schoenberg is to be believed, then the answer to this question is in the negative, for "either it is inborn, or it is not there."¹⁴ Why then should composition be taught; the answer to this, to use the ear- mind distinction made earlier, is that the study of composition trains the ear and helps the mind understand music better.¹⁵ Secondly, what should the criteria for evaluation, if any, be when it comes to evaluating modern music? Are criteria such as melody, harmony etc. good enough, or should these be abandoned for form, timbre, sonorities etc. ? Thirdly, where do notions like "Beauty" fit in when it comes to modern art, more specifically modern music ? Is "Beauty" still a relevant notion ? Can art today be seen as an *aesthetic* language? Fourthly, where does audience - consideration or performer - consideration come into the picture ? Is music to be seen as self-expression only, and if so how far ? Fifthly, are old forms audible but outdated and hackneyed, and new forms inaudible ? If so, is there a need for new but audible forms ? Where do notions like continuity and novelty fit in the picture ? Sixthly, where does the old form - content debate fit in with today's music ?

These problems, if pursued seriously, lead to an area of research that is *inter disciplinary* and involves fields within Music and Philosophy like composition, history of music, aesthetics, philosophy of language, communications - theory etc., apart from other arts whether visual, performing or literary. The attempt in this paper has not been to really solve or dissolve these problems, but only to state as many of them as possible, as briefly as possible, in a *communicable order*. !

Deptt. of Philosophy
St. Stephen's College
Delhi University
Delhi - 110 007

SAAM TRIVEDI

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THE CONSTATIVE-PERFORMANCE DISTINCTION IN A JUSTIFICATORY PERSPECTIVE

This paper deals with Austin's framework. After pointing out the two different aspects - the justificatory and the explanatory - of the central problem of Austin's framework, it keeps the first and ignores the second in its scope of discussion. However, this ignoring of the second aspect need not be objectionable because the main aim of this paper is to extend an exposition of Austin's attack on the constative performative distinction with reference to the central problem that how we do things with words. Thus, the said two aspects are introduced in Section I, when the development of the constative-performative distinction is shown in II and it is shown in III that (A) the distinction is untenable and (B) it is to be assimilated into the family of speech acts. Finally, in IV, it is concluded with the suggestion that the distinction should be viewed from a justificatory perspective.

I

Consider the following two forms of answers :

(1) That we do things with words *because* we use words in such and such contexts;

(2) That we do things with words *by* such and such divided ways; which may be put forward in response to the question "How do we do things with words?"¹ The answer of the first form does not

admit that the above question has already presupposed the justifications or reasons behind the claim of our doing things with words. Redundancy does not afflict (1) only when no such presupposition is admitted. On the other hand, the form of (2) does admit such a presupposition in the question itself or, at least, it is least bothered about that. (1) is meant to provide the justificatory ground and (2) is meant to provide the explanatory ground for the same claim that we do things with words. The complementary relationship between the two grounds is : an answer of the form (2) attempts to delineate the rules or conventions or any other means keeping primary to what we carry out "the doing" already justified by (1) and, the more (2) approximates in its explanation of the divided ways in which we do things with words to the particular ways we do things with objects, the more it strengthens (1). For (1) really seeks to justify that we do things with

words on par with our doing things with objects. It seeks so because such a justification indirectly justifies the untenability of an essentialistic account of meaning in the sense that the holistic view - point illustratable in the 'language - game' or 'form of life' concepts of later Wittgenstein goes against an essentialistic stand-point of meaning and language.

My discussion is confined to an answer of the form (1) and it can be appreciated as a partial exposition of Austin's framework. For in *How to Do Things with Words*² itself Austin attempts to answer in both of the forms of answers, (1) and (2), which can be conceived as the two aspects of the same question : How do we do things with words ? As far as the first aspect is concerned, its success is widely accepted by the fact that any theorist of Speech Act accepts in some way or other, implicitly or explicitly, the truth of (1). For what is true of any Speech Act theory is that the use of language is an activity and on what the theorists mainly differ is the question of primacy of certain factors - for example, the "institutionalized rules" for Searle and the 'communicative intentions'³ of Grice - of that activity. Discussion of the second aspect is beyond the scope of this paper and I doubt⁴ the viability of any account that can be rendered in that respect without the refinement or development of Austin's framework.

II

Why, at all, is the necessity of rendering the reasons or justification behind the claim that we do do things with words ? If the sole function of language is to describe something then it is pointless to claim so. To say that 'describing' amounts to do something with the aid of words when the only thing you can do with words is to describe something, you really claim nothing more than 'we do describe something with words' when you claim 'we do do things with words'. Thus, the claim becomes philosophically interesting when it really wants to convey that we do perform many acts, besides the act of describing, with the aid of words. Thus, the first task before Austin (1962) is to condemn the 'descriptive fallacy' - the presumption that a sentence to be meaningful must be reducible to the mould of 'descriptive', must express true or false statement(s).

There are cases like 'I promise to be there at 4 O'clock; where the sentence is not used to describe something (as in the cases like 'He promised to be there at 4 o'clock or 'He is going to college') but the utterer

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does something in uttering the sentence. Austin calls these utterances as performatives which are contrasted by constatives. And the fallacy committed by those who claim that the sole purpose of making assertions is to describe some state of affairs is called as 'Descriptive Fallacy'. 'I promise to be there at 4 O'clock', 'This gun is loaded', 'you are a fool', 'There is a wasp in your right ear', and 'I love you' are all assertions made to do certain things for example, promising, warning, insulting, and appeasing respectively. It is not only that different sentences do different jobs in different situations but also that one sentence can do different jobs in varying situations. For example⁵, "There is a piece of fish on table" can be uttered

- (i) in a restaurant complaining to a waiter;
- (ii) to a husband by the wife, warning that the cat is in the kitchen;
- (iii) to incriminate a child who had raided the refrigerator;
- (iv) to assure somebody that his / her lunch has not been forgotten.

In these cases, (i) - (iv), "There is a piece of fish on the table" is used to perform the act of complaining, warning, incriminating and assuring respectively; it is not used as a mere description of a state of affair. Being performative, it is neither true nor false but can be either felicitous or infelicitous depending upon the context of utterance. For example, if I utter "I will be there at 4 O'clock, but I don't keep my promise then my utterance becomes infelicitous.

This account against the formalistic approach to language which commits the descriptive fallacy cannot be said to be substantial one just by citing some counter examples of sentences which are used as performatives. For the task ahead, to substantiate the account, to substantiate the answer of the form (1) that we do do things with words, really requires sufficient reasons to claim that every use of every sentence is an act of one kind or other. The performative - constative antithesis consolidates the claim that only some uses of sentences amount to 'doing' of certain things other than describing something neutrally. In other words, the distinction between perforative utterances and constative utterances assures the bifurcationary division of utterances. It puts utterances like 'I promise', 'I bet', 'I warn...', 'I greet..' etc. in one group and the utterances like 'the table is rectangular', 'snow is white', 'I am writing now', 'The sky is blue' etc., in another group. And, when with utterances belonging to the former group we do something, with the latter group's utterances we do not.

If we can blur this distinction of performatives and constatives and can assimilate the constatives into the performatives, then we can arrive at our destination - that each and every meaningful utterance is meant for doing something. Or, if we can blur the distinction and can assimilate the two into a third concept that can promise us to arrive at our destination, then we can succeed in our investigation. Austin takes recourse of this second way with a twofold strategy of (A) Extending reasons for the untenability of the distinction and (B) Showing that such a distinction can be assimilated into the theory of Speech Act (the third concept) which promises that every production of a sentence is an act in one way or other.

III

(A) The distinction is blurred out considering the following three important points :

(a) There is no purely verbal criterion to distinguish performatives from constatives.

(b) Constatives are liable to the same infelicities as the performatives.

(c) Truth and falsity are not peculiar to constatives alone.

(a) The normal forms which are supposed to be distinguishing performatives from the constatives are : that a verb is to be in present indicative active in cases the subject is a first person singular as in 'I promise you that ...' and that a verb is to be in present indicative passive in cases the subject is a second or third person singular or plural as in "Passengers are requested to cross the line by foot bridge only". But to say "shut the door!" is as much performative as to say "I order you to shut the door", "How do you do?" when functions as a substitute to "I welcome you" or "I greet you", it becomes equally performative though it does not satisfy the said normal linguistic forms. Again, 'congratulations' and 'thanks' etc. are usually conveyed without the sentential forms. And, "We promise...", 'we argue...' and 'we object...' etc., are neither in passive voice nor in singular, yet these cannot be denied as performatives.

The hazard of such a criterion, it has to encounter infinite number of such possible counter examples, lies behind a mistaken presupposition in the very attempt of extending any verbal criterion. The mistaken presupposition more or less coincides with the essentialistic stand point that the linguistic elements can state something independent of the context because each element's essence is supposed to be a 'picture' of an element in reality. For such an attempt of fixing a verbal criterion presupposes that

the contexts have the least importance in face of the formulas prescribable to issue an utterance of performative. In fact, the linguistic formulas ('I promise..' 'I order..', 'you are requested to ...' etc.), on the basis of what the grammatical criterion is searched, do not state but makes the action explicit - as the word 'salam'⁶ does not state any more than my act of removing my hat does state that I am doing obeisance to you. The word 'salam' makes my action explicit only. Often we need no explicit formula. The context, gesture and intonation in which words are uttered can make the performative explicit. Even the single word 'Dog' can stand explicitly for performatives like 'I warn you that the dog is about to attack us' when I utter "Dog" seeing a dog nearby when we are walking on the road. Thus, the verbal criterion is deemed to be rejected.

(b) The constatives can be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous besides being evaluated as true or false. This assessment gets the logical impetus from the 'implying' or 'entailing' character of some constatives. The failure so incurred by the non-fulfilment of these characteristic aspects of constatives is not identical with the failure incurred by contradicting a statement. "There are more ways of killing the cat than drowning it in butter"⁷. Those absurdities which are not obtained in terms of 'contradiction' can be named as different infelicities and if such absurdities are obtainable for the constatives then constatives are no more distinct from the performative on the basis of the criterion that felicity or infelicity is pertinent to the performatives alone.

An utterance of this sentence "All John's children are asleep" is infelicitous if John has no children as much as "I order you that ..." becomes infelicitous (null and void) when the utterer is not happened to be the proper authority to order. Again, "The cat is on the mat" become infelicitous (insincere) if I don't believe it, as much as "I promise..." becomes infelicitous if I have no least intention to keep the promise. And, "All the guests are French", becomes infelicitous (breach of commitment) if in the very next moment the utterer asserts "Some guests are not French" in the way that "I welcome you" becomes infelicitous if I treat you as my enemy or intruder after few moments.

(c) Truth and falsity are not peculiar to constatives, performatives can be assessed as true or false. For example, "I warn you that there is a snake in the garden" becomes a false warning more or less similar to "Sugar is sour", if there is no snake in the garden. Many performatives are questionable

as good as bad, fair or foul, just or unjust and so on; with reference to facts analogous to the question of truth and falsity of the constatives is to be answered on the basis of facts. For example, even if I am authorised to scold my son for his mistakes whether or not my scolding is just in a particular situation is evaluated with reference to the facts of that instance.

Such an evaluation of performatives cannot be demerited on the ground that performatives are 'quasi-objective' because 'truth' is no less quasi-objective. "Truth and falsity are not means of qualities, relations, not indeed one anything, but rather a whole dimension of criticism"⁸ that is, along with the facts, the situation of the speaker, his purpose in speaking, question of precision etc. are also accounted. For example "Oxford is 60 miles from London" is true so long as you want only a certain degree of precision and "France is hexagonal" is true for a man in the street with some purpose or in some context but not for geographers.

(B)

The second fold of the strategy consists in the assimilation of the two (performative and constative) into the third one (Speech Acts.) "The dichotomy of performative and constatives has to be abandoned "in favour of more general families of related and overlapping speech acts....."⁹ and "what we need perhaps, is a more general theory of speech acts, and in this theory our constative - performative antithesis will scarcely survive."¹⁰ Both being construed as the species of one general concept their distinction of being antagonistic to each other collapses. And the rationale behind this collapse is the truth of the claim that we do do things with words just as we do play a game of cricket or build a bridge or any other non-linguistic activities with the aid of certain non-linguistic devices.

Roughly and very briefly speaking, the production of a noise or mark on a paper by a being with certain 'intention' is a speech act. Speech act is logically presupposed in every instance of linguistic communication. For a noise or a mark on a paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, that is, to be different from natural phenomena like a stone, a waterfall, or a cloud it must be regarded as having been produced by a being with certain intentions. "It is not the token of the symbol or word or sentence but the production of the token."¹¹

The family of speech acts consists of locutionary, illocutionary and

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perlocutionary acts. These three types of acts are three different senses or dimensions of 'the use of sentence' or the 'use of language'. A locutionary act is an act of uttering a sentence with a particular sense and particular reference of the terms a sentence contains - it is an act of saying something. An illocutionary act is an act of asking a question, giving an order or making a promise, and so on - it is an act performed *in* saying something. A perlocutionary act is an act of persuading some one to do something, annoying someone, appeasing someone and so on - it is an act performed *by* saying something.

The family of speech acts engulfs the performative / constative distinction. For an utterance which could have been construed to be performative or constative is reconstrued to be a complex of acts that comprises locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For example, "I promise to be there at 4 O'clock" is now construed to be consisting of a locution (employing certain grammatical construction)¹² an illocution (that of making a promise) and a perlocution (e.g. to persuade or cheer somebody up to be there at 4 O'clock). So also an utterance like "The book is on the table" can be reconstrued as consisting of a locution (employing certain grammatical construction), an illocution (that of informing¹³ or exemplifying¹⁴) and a perlocution (eg., persuading somebody to go through the book or making somebody understand of some point by giving it as an example)¹⁵

IV

Although the trichotomy is not crystal - clear and the 'in / by' test is very slippery, yet the assimilation stands up right before the justificatory aspect. The following points may be noted very briefly to show the insufficient explanatory potentiality of the tripartite division. 1. To say that somebody made a promise *by* uttering "I promise..." is no less plausible than to say that somebody made a promise *in* uttering "I promise..." 2. Insinuating¹⁶ can least be said as an *effect* of an utterer *by* uttering what somebody insinuates because one insinuates *in* the uttering itself; Nor it can be said to be an illocutionary act such that one can say "I insinuate..." parallel to "I promise..." and "I warn..." etc. 3. There remains every doubt of producing a locutionary act independent of an illocutionary *force* because the meaningfulness of an utterance can hardly be saved from the said *force*¹⁷. 4. Illocutionary acts are not, always, performed in a conventional way. "It is red" may be uttered by me to object your claim of

something to be pink in colour or even to your claim of anything in general. There governs no convention of "It is red" for the conveyance of the force of objection as there is "I promise...." for promises.

The insufficiency of the explanation does not entail the untenability of the procedure undertaken to justify that we do things with words. The destructive strategy - the untenability of the constative-performative distinction - with reference to the justificatory aspect is very clear. The constructive strategy of assimilating the distinction into the family of speech acts is often demerited by being obscured by the insufficiency of the explanatory aspect.

Abandonment of the distinction by dint of the described assimilation becomes fruitless if the distinction is viewed from the explanatory perspective. For the divided dimensions of 'doing things with words' which remains central to speech Act - an important part of the constructive strategy, the important part of the abandonment-lacks the sufficiency of explanation. Hence, to do justice to the abandonment of the distinction, it should be viewed from a justificatory perspective. Whether it is the illocutionary force, the convention or the intention of a particular utterance that really explicates "Meaning" is not to be connected with the constative-performative distinction when the untenability of the distinction is viewed from justificatory grounds. Whether the locutionary act can be separable from an illocutionary act or not is not the point to ponder over, the point is here to say that whether there can be any production of utterance that does not come under speech act such that it cannot be said to be an act of any kind. The answer to the second point is obviously negative. Every utterance comes under Speech Act (locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary). If the illocutionary force is inevitably there in each and every utterance, then we do do things with words, and it is no less if the inevitability is questionable and the locutionary act is conceptually separable. Again, the consideration of a crystal-clear distinction of illocutionary/perlocutionary is not of more importance because the first form of answer made in the beginning claims that we do do things with words because each utterance is a speech act, not necessarily a rigid illocutionary act or a rigid perlocutionary act. This rigidity is possible only when the second form of answer is adequate enough to bring about a crystal-clear distinction of illocutionary/perlocutionary acts.**

Constative-performative Distinction

LAXMINARAYAN LENKA

Philosophy Department
Hyderabad University
Hyderabad - 500 134 (A.P.)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For example, consider a concrete situation where one asks you "How did you go there?" You can answer "I went there because...." where the question is asked with the intention that your going to that place is objectionable or, at least, not expected by him. So the question really demands the reasons or motives of your proceeding to that place and the answer you gave rightly is in the form of 'I went there because...'. But where the same question is intended to know the means (whether it is walking, cycle, car or bus etc.) by which you went there and is least concerned about the reasons (because the questioner knows or does not want to know the reasons), you are liable to answer in the form of "I went there by...." (the "....." is to be filled up by the 'means' you took to reach that place.)
2. J.L. Austin, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford : Clarendon Press; 1962)
3. For my exposition of 'communicative intention' see my "Meaning_N and Meaning_{NN} : An Exposition of the Unformed Gricean Intention" in SS, Vol. XVII, No.2, 1990, p.1-9 of this journal.
4. Because I understand Searle's frame work as a development over Austin's framework so far as the explanatory aspect of Speech Act is concerned. Thus, Searle's repudiation* of Austin's locutionary/illocutionary distinction can be meant as an attack against the viability of an explanatory account completely inside Austin's framework.
* See J.R. Searle "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts", *Philosophical Review*, LXXVII, 1968, pp. 405-424.
5. Example taken from J.R. Husford and B. Heasley, *Semantics - A Course Book* (Cambridge University Press; 1983) p. 234.
6. See J.L. Austin, "Performative - Constative" in *The Philosophy of Language* edited by J.R. Searle, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971) p. 16
7. *Ibid*, p.17
8. *Ibid*, p.21
9. Austin (1962) p.149

10. Austin in (ed.) Searle (1971) p.20.
11. Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in (ed) Searle (1971), p.39.
12. e.g., "I" as a pronoun refers to the utterer himself or herself. "Promise" being in the present indicative, it gives the sense of the utterer's promising to be somehow sincere at least in following the grammatical rules. "Promised" might have changed the utterance to be a description of a promise made in the past. Like this, the sense of "4'O clock" and the senses and reference of "there" along with the meaning of "to be" is to be determined. (Not only the grammatical rules but also the sound, and vocabulary are included in locutionary act. A locutionary act has three parts : the phonetic act (the act of uttering certain noises), the phatic act (the act of uttering these noises as certain vocables or words pertaining to certain vocabulary and grammar) and the rhetic act (the act of using these vocables and grammatical rules with a more or less definite sense and reference)
13. 'Informing' is illocutionary because 'to state' is also illocutionary in the sense that it has the descriptive *force* and this act of conveying a particular *force* in saying something is really what of more importance for an illocutionary act. About 'Describing' or 'stating' something Austin views;
...to state is surely every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to promise.
(Austin; (1962); p. 133)
14. As it is being exemplified in this sentence itself.
15. The details of the tripartite division is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain objections against the criteria of the tripartite division are briefly noted in IV.
16. See David E Cooper, *Philosophy and the Nature of Language*, (London : Longman (1973) p. 194.
17. See Searle (1968)

**I do acknowledge that this work is done during my availing of J.R.F. from the UGC in the University of Hyderabad. I wish to acknowledge my great debt to Dr. Amitabh Dasgupta for his valuable suggestions in a number of conversations.

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
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PERCEPTION AND ILLUSION

The argument which aims at stultifying the Naive Realist's claim that the physical object can be preceived directly is the Argument from Illusion. The main thrust of the argument is that with respect to what is directly presented to us through the senses, i.e., what is phenomenologically given, illusions, hallucinations and normal perceptions of physical objects are indistinguishable. The general point that is made here* is that the way things are presented to us is not entirely due to their own nature. The argument for drawing this conclusion relies upon certain empirical premises that can be brought under three groups. One of these brings together all the instances of illusion in which an object is misidentified, e.g., seeing a snake in a rope, taking a mother of pearl to be silver, etc. The second group consists of all the instances of hallucination, e.g., Macbeth's visionary dagger, a mirage, a patient feeling pain in his amputated leg, a drunkard's seeing pink rats and others. The third are the cases of normal perceptions of objects which are varied due to changes of perspective and/or due to the conditions of the relevant sense organs, e.g. a bus from the top floor of sky-scraper looks like a toy, a round coin looks elliptical, a square table seems to have a rhombuslike shape from a particular angle, the surface of the table seems extremely hard if I press it with my little finger but not so hard if I press it with my index finger, a straight ruler looks bent if I dip it in water, a coin feels bigger if I place it on my tongue than when I place it on my palm, etc. What we all take notice of is this that we realize that in the cases of illusion and hallucination there has been some mistake or other, and it is due to something in the causal process involved in the perceptual experience, i.e., there might have been inadequate light, the distance had perhaps blurred my vision, my sense organ might have been unfit, there might have been something in the medium to distort our vision, etc.

But what we fail to see and what the philosophers want us to take notice of is this : "the causal dependence of the way things appear to us upon these factors obtain as much in the normal cases in which our perceptual judgements are taken to be true"¹. In other words, the light, the medium of vision, the conditions of the relevant sense organ, the

laws of perspective all play as much a part in normal perception as they do in illusions and hallucinations.

In brief, the argument is as follows :

1. There must be something directly perceived in the case of perception.
2. We have variations in our experience due to laws of perspective and the state of the relevant sense organs of the perceiver.
3. We know that the physical object cannot have contrary qualities.
4. What are directly given are various and contrary to each other.
5. None of what are directly given in perception is the physical object, and all of them are appearances, only 'sense data', as they have been called by philosophers.

One may say that there is a mistake in this argument, for the premises at most prove that not all perceptual experiences can be said to reveal the physical object, e.g. the table cannot both be square and rhomboidal. But one could argue that to say that we can directly perceive the physical object does not entail that we always perceive the physical object. One may quite well say that we do sometimes perceive the physical object as it really is. We do so when and only when the conditions of perception are right, and fail to do so when the conditions are not so. It is true that in the case of total hallucinations there is no physical object which can be said to be seen. But from the mere fact that there is variation in our normal perception can we justifiably dissociate completely what is phenomenologically given from the physical object, and "treat what is in an effect the appearance as the only perceptual datum?"²

In answer to this question philosophers say that no reasonable account of our perceptual experience can give the status of veridicality to one of our perceptual experiences and not to others, i.e., tell us when the physical object is seen by us and when it is not. It would not be justifiable to say that along with a lot of appearances we also perceive the real physical object. One may indeed say that of all the various appearances presented in our experience one particular appearance is the physical object itself, i.e. in this experience it is the physical object

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which bodily appears as it really is. What is left to be sorted out is good enough reasons for distinguishing the apparant from the real is yet to be given. How does one determine which perceptible properties physical object does not *really* have? The word 'real' has numerous uses and thus we should be very clear as to the sense in which the word 'real' is used in this context. What is it to say that "The penny is really round though it looks elliptical from a certain angle" or "The wall is *really* white though it looks pinkish through the red glass window", or "The speck in the sky is *really* a big star"? The view that the real physical object is just one of the various appearances presented to our senses is very difficult to defend. Admittedly, it is only the appearances to which we have any access, there is nothing beyond the appearances which is equally presented to us and with which we can compare our appearances to arrive at the judgement that one among them is presenting the physical object in its true guise. The judgement of reality will have to be grounded on whatever appearances it has.

Naive Realists have often tried to meet this objection by saying that we can determine that the real colour of the physical object is that which is presented to a *normal* observer under conditions which are regarded as *standard*. But, then, what makes a condition *standard* and what makes an observer *normal*? The properties which a thing appears to have under the condition which can be regarded as *optimal* are the real properties, the properties the object really has. Hence, a condition is said to be optimal if it enables the perceiver to make the best possible discrimination: the idea is that the condition of perception which enables us to perceive whatever there is to perceive is the condition which would reveal the thing as it is, and so if the condition in which we perceive the object is such that the things, which are to be discriminated are so discriminated then that condition is certainly the one in which the physical object can be known in its true nature. Thus properties which the physical objects are judged really to have can be selected from those that the physical objects appear to have.

But then if we rely exclusively on what is directly given, one piece of perceptual experience is as good as another. In that case we have no justification for being partial to one. The optimal condition is never reached. Another point here is that we cannot define 'the optimal condition' without begging the question. Unless we have a way of determining which discriminations are there *really* to be made, we cannot identify a perceptual condition as optimal on the ground that it

enables us to make all the discriminations that are there to be made. And thus the problem of "the Criterion" would set in³. To illustrate the point I take the example of the perception of the table. One might say that if we look at the table from a distance our vision is blurred, the nearer I go the better I see. This would tempt us to say that what we see through the microscope is more real. But then a more powerful microscope would give still more real a picture, and this would go on. As Russell puts in the chapter "Appearance and Reality" of the *Problems of Philosophy*. "When, in ordinary life we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light", but "the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour". In brief this phase of the argument is as follows :

Let us suppose there is veridical perception among the various perceptual experiences.

1. It is difficult, in fact quite impossible, to identify which of the various perceptions is veridical.

2. The allegedly veridical perception is, phenomenologically, so very similar to the non-veridical perceptions that it seems that the kind of entity we perceive in the 'non-veridical' perception is the same as that of the 'veridical' one.

3. It is unreasonable to suppose that we see, in one of the varied perceptions, the physical object as it really is and not merely as it appears.

Thus, from the fact that illusions, hallucinations and normal perceptions are phenomenologically the same, we come to the conclusion that, given what our senses reveal, it is clear that the immediate object of perception (i.e., normal perception of physical objects) can never be identical with the physical object itself. In cases of a snake seen in a hallucination or an illusion, and a snake seen in normal perception, what is directly given to us, through the senses, is the same. In the case of hallucination, the perceptual object is not the same as the physical object for there is no physical object at all. Again, in the case of illusion, the perceptual object is not the same as the physical object for the former has properties which the latter does not have. In this respect, in the

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cases of normal perception the same thing happens: The perceptual object is not the same as the physical object for the former has properties which the latter cannot have.

The brilliance of the argument notwithstanding, I cannot but feel suspicious about the validity of the argument (from Illusion) itself. Why is it that though I see the table to be square from one side, rhomboidal from another side, and trapezoid from still another side, yet unhesitatingly I declare that I am seeing a square table? In spite of the perceived variety, never does this piece of conviction get abandoned. But I do understand sooner or later, at least in most cases, that when I had seen a snake in the dark alley I was mistaken and that it was a rope. In fact if seeing as such was such a doubtful affair could I at all be sure that it was a *rope* which I had mistaken for a snake? All this remains a mystery, a mystery which the Argument from Illusion cannot possibly solve.

On the other hand, if cases of normal perception were so very similar to illusions and hallucinations then why at all do we have words like 'illusion' or 'hallucination' as distinct from phrases like 'normal perception' in our language? I do not intend to say that language captures reality fully and that whatever distinctions that are made in language are to be incorporated entirely in our ontology. But, nonetheless, such distinctions cannot simply be brushed aside. In such cases the true task of a philosopher would be to bring out from the vagueness of language whatever truth there is in it and how far such hints regarding the distinction between two things should be taken. That is, the philosopher should tell what there is in our perceptual experience that will explain the distinction made in our language. Unless there is an overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a distinction made in our language should suggest a corresponding distinction in reality.

Then, again, keeping in mind Ryle's example of false coins which can only be there because there are true coins, we could say that in order to make the notion of non-veridicality intelligible we must admit at least one case of veridicality.

But these at most are hunches or suspicions. In order to show that an argument is unacceptable we either have to show that one or more of the premises are false and/or show that the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

I would at first try to state in my own way the flaw in the argument, A.J. Ayer points out in the section on the Argument from Illusion of Chapter IV of his book *The Central Questions of Philosophy*. Let us consider the premise in the second phase of the argument which says: "The allegedly veridical perception is phenomenologically so very similar to the non-veridical perception that it seems that the kind of entity we perceive in the non-veridical perception is the same as that in the veridical one". In other words, the allegedly veridical and the non-veridical perceptions being phenomenologically similar, it would be partial on our part to choose one as the veridical and reject the others as non-veridical. But, then, no concrete reason is given as to why one should not show favouritism as Ayer rightly points out. It is true that being phenomenologically similar we could have made a different choice. But whatever choice I make it really cannot be entirely arbitrary. On the contrary, there are quite a few practical reasons for making such a choice. To illustrate the point, it can be said that Macbeth could not kill the king with his visionary dagger, but could surely kill the king with a dagger he perceives normally even though it might look different from different perspectives. An illusory snake cannot bite but a snake of normal perception can. I can do the things which only a straight stick can do with a stick which looks bent when dipped in water. At this point we can recall the *Nyāya* contention that, that price of knowledge reveals the object as it truly is

"*Pramāṇato 'rtha - pratipattau
Pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavat pramāṇam*"¹
(i.e., which leads to successful volition).

What the argument can at most claim to have established is that the appearances which are not selected as veridical are as genuine as those which are not. But they are all genuine only in the sense that they all *really* appear to us, not in the sense that *reality* appears in all of them. It is quite consistent and plausible to maintain that all of them are real as appearances, but it is only in one of them that reality appears to us. We are not entitled to deny that those which are selected as veridical manifest the real properties of the object.

Ayer had in fact tried to define Naïve Realism in his book *The Problem of Knowledge* by saying that the argument (from Illusion) would have been conclusive, had we accepted the ruling that when a physical object is presented in a way other than what it is, it is not directly perceived. If we can perceive the physical object directly even

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when it appears differently, then the argument would not stand. And Ayer says that there is no ground for accepting the ruling that we never directly perceive the physical object if it appears to be what it is not. It makes perfectly good sense to talk of perceiving things directly which look in some way different from what they are. And moreover, the term 'direct perception' would lose its sense and application if we do not perceive things we are directly looking at⁵.

One could at this point initiate a discussion of a modification of Naïve Realism, which is more popularly known as the Theory of Appearing⁶. What it intends is that there is one particular kind of mistake involved in postulating sense data, as entities over and above the physical objects. The argument implicit in the sense datum theory seems to be as follows :

If the round penny appears elliptical in shape then there must be something which *is* elliptical in shape, viz. the appearing penny; and while we do not see the round penny itself we see its elliptical appearance. So it seems that the idea here is that there are two things which we will have to admit, one is the physical object which is round and the other is its appearance which is elliptical. It is then added that it is only the latter which we can be said to *see* in the strict sense of the term and the former is something which we can never see but have to infer or postulate or construct.

Now, what the Theory of Appearing wants us to realize is this: when we say that 'A appears B to me', the word 'B' is used in an adverbial and not a substantival sense. It is something like the statement "Carl Lewis is running fast". Here the fastness of Carl Lewis' run cannot be dissociated from the run and posited as a separate entity. To run fast is to run in a certain way and the way in which the run is run is not another run which the runner runs. We can take another example, "Lata Mangeshkar sings sweetly". In singing sweetly, Lata sings in a particular manner but the manner in which Lata sings is not another song that she sings. Similarly, "A appears B to me" really means 'A appears B-ish or B-ly to me'. But to appear 'B-ish' or 'B-ly' is only a manner in which A appears, but the manner A appears is not a *thing* other than A.

H.H. Price in his book *Perception*, while discussing The Theory of Appearing in the chapter "Modifications of Naïve Realism", gives an example of a certain penny stamp, which appears pink to a normal person from a particular angle, appears grey to a colour blind and actually is

colourless. Again it looks lozenge-shaped to one person, trapezoid to another but in reality is square. Price says that this example would be explained by the Theory of Appearing in the following manner :

It is true that the same penny stamp cannot actually be both trapezoid and lozenge-shaped or be both pink and grey; but *appearing* trapezoid and *appearing* lozenge-shaped in *not* incompatible with being square. And *appearing* pink or grey is not incompatible with *being* colourless.

So far the Theory of Appearing works satisfactorily. But there are other perceptual muddles which cannot be so easily solved by this theory. Suppose a pencil appears to John to be on the left corner of the table but it is really in the centre. In this case the predicate 'on the left corner of the table' translated according to the Theory of Appearing would be: "the pencil appears *to be* on the left corner of the table" and not "the pencil appears on the left corner of the table" like "the stamp appears pinkish" or "the stick appears bent", etc. As Price puts aptly "the disease of appearancy is attacking the subject of our proposition as well as the predicate". In this case what the proposition "A pencil appears to John to be on the left corner of the table but it is really in the centre" means is this: "*there appears to be a pencil on the left corner of the table*". Cases of double vision would bring out the difficulty of this theory better. When a pen appears double to me, 'double' is no predicate of the pen at all. What happens here is this : *there is a second subject of predicates*, in addition to the first. And if we want to express this within the theory, i.e., if we are to use the word 'appear' then this is how we would formulate the incident of double vision; "There appears to me to be a second pen besides the first". Now this is an entirely new sense in which the word 'appearing' is being used. As Price says this is a 'transition from Qualitative to Existential Appearing'.

Impressive though it is, I cannot really be convinced by this argument against the Theory of Appearing. I think the objection at all arises because again we are lapsing into making a substantial use of the word 'appearing' and not an adverbial use. To say that 'there appears to be another pen on the table' is to say "the pen appears *doubly*", just as "Lata sings sweetly" or "Bala dances divinely" or "the stamp appears pinkish". Thus, it is wrong to say that in such cases there is a shift from Qualitative to Existential Appearing. However, I still have some doubts about the correctness of an adverbial treatment of the number of appearances.

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Another way in which the Argument from Illusion or the Sense Data Theory has been attacked by philosophers adhering to the Theory of Appearing, is the way in which W.H.P. Barnes argues in his article "The Myth of the Sense-Data"⁷. He says that the sense data theory is in fact making an inference of the following form:

From the premises,

- 1) I see the rose;
 - 2) The rose appears pink to me;
 - 3) The rose is red;
- the following conclusion is derived,
- 4) I see a pink sense datum.

Barnes thinks that this is a fallacious argument because that something appears pink to me is not a valid ground for concluding that either the thing is pink, or there is some other thing which is pink. Moreover can I say that "I see the rose" without saying that "I see the rose as red" - because in order to *see* the rose, in the proper sense of the term 'seeing, I must see it as red because the rose *is* red and if I don't see it as red I cannot say, 'I see it' : Barnes says that seeing a pink sense datum contradicts with seeing a rose. Thus, one of the premises of the sense data theorist's argument contradicts the conclusion of his argument. Barnes also points out that to give the pink appearance of the rose, which he calls merely 'a mode of appearing', the status of an *existant* is thoroughly wrong. However, I am inclined to be doubtful about the legitimacy of Barnes' version of the Theory of Appearing because I fear that this too would face the difficulties that the other versions of the theory do.

There is another brand of philosophy, which is thought very different from the Theory of Appearing, yet like it, wants to obliterate the dualism of physical objects and sense data. But unlike the Theory of Appearing this philosophical view reduces the physical object to sense datum. The philosophers who adhere to this view call themselves phenomenologists and their doctrine that matter is reducible to stream of sense experience, phenomenism. According to phenomenism *phenomena* alone exist: there is no physical object over and above the groups of phenomena. We may *talk* about physical objects but that is just in the sense that we can use the terminology of physical objects, i.e., words like 'table', 'tree', 'mountain', 'moon', etc. But these words really refer to the phenomena and so we are talking actually about these phenomena

all the time, whereas we are supposing that we are talking about physical objects. Now, this is truly an extremely sketchy and inadequate way of expressing this theory but I cannot go into a detailed discussion of this without digressing from my original intention of showing defects in the Argument from Illusion.

But I mention phenomenalism here because it is one of the theories which have tried to solve the problem of perception raised by the Argument from Illusion without entirely agreeing with the argument. But it has, however, one notorious difficulty if all that we can be said to have experienced are sense data (discrete and fleeting appearances) then how do we ever find out that material objects exist even when no sense data are received? Any material object is believed to exist for some length of time and even when they do not become the object of experience for anyone. Things like a table or a chair in an empty room, or rocks and lakes in Antarctica (which are seldom seen) are not perceived by anyone. Yet, could I say that they do not exist? But on the phenomenalist theory the existence and persistence of the object consists of mere sense data, and so in the absence of them the physical object cannot be said to exist. Hence, unobserved things should, on the phenomenalist theory, cease to exist and things never observed never to have existed at all. Worse still, the material objects in a room must apparently come into and go out of existence as one looks at or away from them and with the blinking of the human eye are destroyed and created the next moment. Such an intolerable fragmentariness of perception led Berkeley depend upon God who is constantly having ideas of physical objects. But, then, can phenomenalism allow the unobserved Deity to solve this problem?

Phenomenalists over the years have tried to solve this problem created by the fragmentariness of our experience. Humeans tried to solve this problem by saying that owing to the regularity with which the same or similar sets of sense data occur, we imaginatively fill in the gaps by imagination and unhesitatingly suppose that a persisting, enduring object exists. On the other hand, Bertand Russell in his *Mysticism and Logic* postulates enduring 'sensibilia', which are "objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind". However, Russell later on saw that his contention cannot explain the causal process involved in perceiving (finding no answer to the question as to how the sensing of sensibilia brings sensa into being), and that no evidence can be given regarding the existence and nature of sensibilia. So, he abandoned this view. Factual phenomenalists

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like J.S. Mill, however, speak of the physical object as a group of actual and possible sense data, while the linguistic phenomenologists take an altogether different point of view. For the latter, the main phenomenalist doctrine was that to talk of physical objects is to talk of sense data (both possible and actual) and that all statements regarding physical objects can be translated into statements regarding actual and possible sense data. One may say that such actual and possible sense data being infinite in number, such translating statements would be infinite in number and thus a complete translation of physical-object-statements would be impossible. We can mention here Isaiah Berlin's argument. To cover the *possible* as well as the actual sense datum, the translation will have to be in a conditional form. If the conditions are so and so, such and such sense data would appear. Now it is not possible to state the antecedent of this conditional, excepting in terms of physical objects.

A modern way of countering the sense Datum Theory is found in the writings of David Owens. Sense data theorists, as we have already seen, assert that the only sense in which we can say that we see the physical object is that we see it by seeing something totally distinct from the physical object, i.e., by seeing the sense data. So, we can say that we see an orange only when we see a spherical orange patch in our visual field. David Owens, in his paper "Perception and Occlusion"⁸, rightly asks: how can one see the physical object by seeing something wholly distinct from it, wouldn't the patch stand in the way?

Sense data theorists would say here that it does make sense to say that we can see the physical object by seeing the sense datum because there is a functional dependence between the features of the sense datum and the properties of the physical object. If we inflate the orange, the spherical orange patch would also be inflated, if the orange is moved to the right the orange patch too would move to the right side of my visual field.

Owens says that the theorists have overlooked the possibility that though seeing the sense datum helps us to 'keep track' of the physical object, yet seeing the sense datum might also prevent us from seeing the object. Owen suggests that we could well imagine that we are not dealing here with a physical object and a sense datum but two exactly similar physical objects, one placed behind the other. And it might also be imagined that physical object which is in the front is functionally dependent upon the physical object behind. Even if they are so related, we can only say that we can see the physical object which lies behind, when the one in the front is removed from our line of vision.

The sense datum theorist at this juncture might retort that the sense data are somewhat transparent and thus do not occlude the physical object. But to this Owens says that when we look through a transparent object and see an opaque object, "we never see the opaque object by seeing the transparent object". We do not see the transparent object at all. In fact it is only when this is the case that we call it a transparent object. True transparency entails invisibility.

Thus, Owens concludes that if at all we are to make sense of the sense datum theory we have to say that when we see the physical object we do not see the sense datum. So, if at all we see the physical object we see it and nothing else, and thus we see it directly.

There seems to be one problem here. Very often we find glasses through which we do see objects but see them in a slightly distorted way. And what guarantee do we have for saying that the sense data are not like those slightly distorting transparent glasses?

This problem can be solved by saying that directness of access is not excluded by the presence of the medium and neither is it excluded by the fact that the medium distorts. For, even the inevitable media of vision, like light or air, can also distort our vision; and so, if we are to say that the presence of a medium, especially a distorting medium would exclude direct access to the object, then we have to say that we do not see anything directly.

But the greatest difficulty of Owens' argument is that the theory which he ascribes to the sense datum theorists is *at most* one of the versions of the sense datum theory. Owens' critique of the sense datum theory is based on one particular interpretation of the basic tenet of the sense datum theory, which is that we see the physical object by seeing the sense datum. This dictum - the basic tenet of the sense datum theory - is interpreted by Owens to mean: We see the physical object through the sense data. But let us take a paradigm case of a man sitting at his table through a glass partition. And there is no doubt either that if the sense datum theory is defined by what we have called its basic tenet, and this basic tenet is given the interpretation which Owen does, then the sense datum theory would be refuted by the kind of arguments Owens has put forward. But there is no reason to suppose that Owens' interpretation of the dictum is the only interpretation available; not even that it is the most natural interpretation of the sense datum theory. This interpretation, according to which we see the physical object through the sense data, implies the

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following things regarding the nature of the objects of perception and our perception itself :

1. There are two different objects of perception, viz. the sense datum and the physical object.
2. They are perceived in the same *sense*, though not in the same way.
3. In theory, at least, it is possible to perceive one of them independently of the other.

But it is extremely doubtful as to whether any sense datum theorist would subscribe to any of these, in other words, would interpret the basic tenet of the sense datum theory in a way which would force one to subscribe to these three assumptions. They would interpret the basic dictum "We see the physical object by seeing the sense datum" as "We see the physical object *in* seeing the sense datum". This interpretation itself may be interpreted in different ways, but none of them would force us to subscribe to any of the three assumptions.

To this extent we can say that Owens' argument does not succeed in defeating the Sense Datum Theory.

Thus, considering the Theory of Appearing, Phenomenalism and Owens' theory and their difficulties I cannot adhere to any one of them in spite of the fact that all of them by obliterating the distinction between sense data and physical objects, contradict the Argument from Illusion and the Sense Data Theory.

In general it has been argued against the sense data theory that there are serious objections against the contention that sense data are *existents*, in the true sense of the term. Perhaps the most impressive among them is one mentioned by Barnes in his paper "The Myth of the Sense-Data"⁹. Unlike physical objects, sense data do not always obey the law of Excluded Middle. According to the Sense Data theory a sense datum is what it appears to be. If I look at an object at some distance, it often happens that I am uncertain whether it is circular or polygonal. In such a case it is necessary for me to approach closer before I can determine whether it is circular or polygonal. Now this sense datum appears neither circular nor non-circular, under the sense datum theory. Is it plausible that reality need not obey the Law of Excluded Middle?

I will now go on to discuss what I feel is wrong with the Argument from Illusion and the Sense Data Theory. I am, however, not claiming

that this kind of opposition has not been previously made. I am just trying to state it in my own way.

I would like to make a distinction between four kinds of perception: (a) Standard Veridical Perception (e.g. when I see a straight stick as straight); (b) Deviant Veridical Perception (e.g. when a table looks differently from different angles); (c) Illusory Non-Veridical Perception (e.g. when we mistake a rope for a snake); and (d) Hallucinatory Non-veridical Perception (e.g. when a drunkard sees pink rats). I will now go on to discuss what I feel problematic about the Argument from Illusion. The main absurdity lies in the assumption that all the four kinds of perception are phenomenologically same. It is on this assumption that the argument draws the conclusion that the kind of thing that we perceive in the standard veridical perception is the same as the thing that we perceive in deviant veridical perception, and illusory and hallucinatory non-veridical perception. I am not ready to accept that even phenomenologically they are quite of the same kind. The problem with *any* form of Argument from Illusion is that it absurdly obliterates the distinction between illusion and knowledge.

I will come to this in due course. I will now try to counter an attack from the sense data theorists which is bound to come at this point. It is that it is quite impossible for any one to say that standard veridical perceptions and deviant veridical perceptions have different things as the objects of perception. Even if I see the table to be different in shape and colour from different sides, yet can I say that it is altogether different from the table I see in standard veridical perception? If we accept this, then are we going wrong when we say that there is something intrinsically wrong with the Argument from Illusion? I think I do have an answer to this. There must have been something that went wrong in the cases of deviant, illusory and hallucinatory perceptions. I am inclined to say that in all cases of perception a kind of identification is involved and this identification is judgemental in form. (This idea is very similar to D.K. Armstrong's idea that a kind of belief is always associated with perception¹⁰.) And it is here that the mistake creeps in. I shall formulate the judgements that one makes in the case of deviant perception:

1. I see in front of me something.
2. This something is a snake.
3. The snake is brown.

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In this case we only make a mistake in the third judgement. I am not mistaken about the fact that I do see something in front of me and that in reality it falls under the concept *snake* which I assign to it. But the quality I ascribe to it is not the quality which belongs to it in reality. My failure in identification is reflected in the false judgement I make.

Let us now take the instance of the illusion of a snake in a rope. The judgements that I make in this case are the same as those in the case of deviant perception. But here the mistake is more pervasive; it begins right from the second judgement. I make a mistake because I think that the thing which I *see* in front of me falls under a concept which in reality it does not fall under.

In the case of hallucination the entire judgemental process is mistaken. I am in fact even mistaken about my own state of mind. I think I *see* in front of me something when in reality I *do not see* at all.

Thus, I am inclined to believe that not only are the *objects* of standard veridical perceptions, and deviant perceptions different from illusions and hallucinations but they are also phenomenologically different. The Argument from Illusion being based on the false assumption that they are not different thus seems to me highly improbable. This in turn suggests that we shall have to have different theories for normal/veridical perceptions and illusions and hallucinations (as P. Snowdon says we are to have a Disjunctive Theory of Perception¹¹). The Sense Data Theory along with the Theory of Appearing, David Owens' theory and Phenomenalism, I think, make a mistake in trying to solve all kinds of perceptual muddles by one single theory.

Department of Philosophy
Jadavpur University
Calcutta 700 032

MADHUCCHANDA SEN

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LOCATIONS OF INNER SELF

Indian Philosophical Quarterly published an article entitled "Inner Self Located" by Bradley York Bartholomew in its Oct. '91 issue. Bradley has made a good attempt to co-relate Indian Philosophy with contemporary neuro-physiology to show the seat of 'Self' in the brain.

But there are some differences of opinion as far as his interpretation of the term *Rhadaya* is concerned. I wish to contribute something in this regard in the present attempt.

Bradley compares the *upaniṣadic* episteology about the states of consciousness with the E.E.G. data of neuro-physiology. In support of his thus fixing the meaning of '*Rhadaya*' as the mid-part of the brain, he also takes help of Sanskrit dictionary. Finally, he concludes that the *Rhadaya* is not the heart in circulatory system but is the part of the brain as far as the issue of consciousness is concerned. In my present attempt I explore into the position of *Rhadaya* and that of the *Hitā nādis* in the body.

I observe a basic difference of approach to study the states of consciousness between the *upaniṣadic* psychologist and western psychologists. The difference is that, their parameters differ. Western trend is to observe the differences in behaviour, physiology of a state of consciousness with respect to the normal waking state of consciousness. *Upaniṣadic* seers assume the *Puruṣa* i.e., the personality that undergoes changes to exhibit different states of consciousness. Since the object of study is the same, both the trends are bound to get similar results wherever the factors studied are common, and the differences are due to the change in approaches. I hereby try to present the *upaniṣadic* approach to study of the concept of 'Self' and the state of consciousness with respect to 'Self'.

I

Upaniṣadic Philosophy proposes two factors - *Prāṇa* and *Puruṣa* - active in the process of cognition. The *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* identifies the Body-Fluid as *Prāṇa*.¹ It transcends the sense

organs from *Mṛtyu* to reach their respective deities. Common meaning of *Mṛtyu* is death. In case of physiological process it is the case of reaction phenomenon. The deities are normally the personified forms of various energies. For the sense organs they are the range of frequencies that can be responded to by respective sense organs.² In biological words, when light falls on the retina of an eye it transforms the Rhodopsin molecules from *11 Cis* to all *trans*-forms.³ The energy that converts this signal into the code for a neuron is the *prāṇa* according to the *upanishadic* seers. For all sense organs the process of conversion of a signal into a code is the same.

Functions of *prāṇa* as interpreted by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* are, *Uktha* (activation), *Yaju* (fusion), *Sama* (equilibrium) and *Kṣatra* (healing property).⁴ These are specially given to emphasise the concept of *prāṇa* as the chemical energy in the body.

In the composition of *Prāṇa*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says that *prāṇa* is formed from the fusion of *Wāk* and *Manas*.⁵ *Wāk* comprises of the frequency and *Manas* comprises of electricity⁶. Both frequency and electricity combinely contribute to the formation of *Prāṇa* and the newly formed compound of the two possesses the body or is of the nature of Heat energy.⁷ These things formulate a nature of ionic chemicals.

Whatever the physiological changes that occur in the body such as the secretion of endocrine glands, variations in the E.E.G. etc. are governed by the *Prāṇa* type of energy in the body. Although the desires and emotions of an individual initiate the endocrine secretions, the desires and emotions are not always the causes of the physiological activities but the changes observed in physiological processes are the impressions of the desires and emotions.⁸ So, the physiological processes up to certain extent are independent from the states of consciousness. Thus, the brain processes come under the department of *Prāṇa*. *Puruṣa* is another factor. As a computer has 0-1-0-1 language of process, the body has +,-,+,- ionic language for the process. Neither the computer nor the body would understand the meaning of the processed data. The knower is different. *Upanishadic* seers assume the factor of *Puruṣa* as the knower. It participates in the process of cognition and the states of consciousness are due to *Puruṣa*. Since the physiological events are not in the capacity of *Puruṣa*, that may not be applicable to knowing what '*Puruṣa*' is.

II

In this part I try to understand the nature of *Puruṣa*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* explains the role of the Mind in the process of perception as, "My mind was somewhere else so I could not see, or I could nor hear etc."⁹ We have seen above the nature of mind as electricity. Biopsychological studies in this respect move parallel to the *upanīṣadic* opinion. They hold that the firings or the synapse occurring in the brain collectively contribute to form the substance of mind.¹⁰ *Puruṣa* as understood by *upanīṣadic* seers is *Manomaya* as well as is *Vijñānamaya*. According to Yājñavalkya, the *Vidyā* and *Prajñā* accompany the *Puruṣa* when it goes out of the body at the time of death. Logically we can say that, *Vidyā* and *Prajñā* are constituents of *Puruṣa* in addition to the mind. *Vidyā* is the knowledge and *Prajñā* is the intellect. Physical substance of these two is not yet identified, (as per my limited knowledge ofcourse.) The substance of mind i.e., electricity, works as a bridge to co-relate the two factors participating in the process of cognition, the *Prāṇa* and the *Puruṣa*. The states of consciousness depend upon the grip of *Puruṣa* on *prāṇa*. The change in the interrelation between the *Puruṣa* and the *Prāṇa* gives rise to manifestations of various states of consciousness.

In normal waking state, the place of *Puruṣa* is between the two eyebrows as per the Indian trend and in the Hypothalamus part of the brain as per modern science. Both opinions match each other up to this extent. This is well displayed by Bradley in his paper.

III

According to the *upanīṣadic* seers, *puruṣa* at the time of sleep moves from its position in the brain and settles down in the *Rhadayākāśa*. Commonly it is the point in or on the heart, the organ in circulatory system. Meaning of the term *Ākāśa* is not the space as commonly considered; it is rather the magnetic field.¹¹ The place of *Rhadayākāśa* according to *upanīṣadic* seers, is small like a barley seed. Biological dissections show the muscular part on the heart as the pacemaker point which contributes to control the biological clock of the individuals acting in co-ordination with the mid-part of the brain.

The R.B.Cs. in blood contain Iron and Hemoglobin which possess the magnetic property. Due to this the heart becomes the magnetic centre of the body. When the *Puruṣa* withdraws its control over the *prāṇa*, the charge in the body gets directed towards the heart.

Since we have only one dimension of *Puruṣa*, the electricity to locate the behaviour of *Puruṣa*, *upaniṣadic* seers claim that *Puruṣa* has displaced itself to the heart. Further withdrawal of control of *Puruṣa* over *prāṇa* makes the charge to disperse all over the body through the blood capillaries. Charge now settles in the capillaries among the tissues. The capillaries are minute in diameter and cannot be classified either as arteries or veins. These situations resemble with the nature of *Hitā nādis*.

Indian Philosophers classify the states of consciousness on the basis of knowledge or understanding capacity. This is another factor of *Puruṣa* namely *Vidyā*. *Ajātaśatru* makes this distinction on the basis of behaviourism. If all the sense organs are physically fit and under the control of *prāṇa* but the individual does not respond to the signals, then he is in sleep. Such an event also occurs in case of an unconscious person. Also, it happens to certain extent in case of 'Coma' patients. Then we need to apply another criterion. Let the person give no reaction to the signals, but has he capacity to receive the signals or not?

When in a normal wakeful state a person is aware of all things happening around him but willfully does not respond, it is the 'Titikṣu' state of consciousness according to *Vivekaśūdhāmāṇi*. In the 'Sleep-dream' the person participates the event and observes himself in the event as if the event is seen on a Television Screen. But in case of the 'Day-dreaming' he may participate in the event without locating himself on the screen. That is why the body actions may occur during the Day-dreaming. Both these kinds of dreams are different states of consciousness.

When I say that the charge in the body is directed toward the heart, no 100% charge gets accumulated over there. It is the excess amount of charge that fluctuates. If the brain possesses sufficient charge to record the event of charge flow in the body and if the recordings are stored in the memory and if they are processed for gaining the meaning of it, then only one realises that he has seen a dream during the sleep.

Thus is the nature and mechanism of the concept of *Puruṣa* in the *Upaniṣadic* literature. The position of the heart and *Hitā nādis* are as mentioned above. The correct form of the *Puruṣa* is not detectable from the physiological events but it may give us some directions to search the *Puruṣa* and its connections with the body. A deep study in this field would be helpful to understand psychology in more details. On the other

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hand, it may promote the progress in applied fields such as the Artificial Intelligence. I do not claim that my understanding about the concept of *Puruṣa* is totally correct. Genuine questions and objection from the readers are welcome which may contribute to more clarification.

Department of Philosophy
University of Poona
Pune - 411 007.

A. G. KARANDIKAR

NOTES

1. *Te houcuḥ kwa nu so'dyo na itham asaktety ayamasye'ntariti so' yasya āṅgirasō'ṅganān hi rasah - 1:3:8 Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Sobyasya āṅgirā so'ṅganān hi reash prāno va āṅganān rasah prāno hi vā āṅganān rasah - 1:3:19 Ibid (A)*

It is *ayasya* i.e. - not assuming any form like other organs. It is the fluid in the body.

2. *Sa vai vācam eva prathamamatyavahat sa yada mṛtyum ucyata so'gnirbhavat so'yamagniḥ pareṇa mṛtyum atikrānto dīpyate - 1:3:12 Ibid.*

It carried the organ of speech, the foremost one. first. When the organ of speech got rid off death, it became fire. That fire, having transcended death, shines beyond reach.

Likewise 1:3:12 to 1:3:16 speak about all organs and their respective deities. From which it become clear that the function of *Prāṇa* is to interconnect the organs with their respective range of perceptions to gain the knowledge about the environment.

3. Body has four basic receptors - pressure, chemicals, light and temperature. (now a days pain is considered to be the fifth receptor.) the eyes contain light receptor Tongue possesses chemical receptor. the ears possess pressure receptor. A change in these receptor makes initiation of the process of perception. (B)

4. *Ukthm prāno va uktham prāno hīdān s arvānuthāpayaty— 5:13:1 Ibid*

Yajuh prāno vai yajuh prāno hīmani sarvāni bhūtāni, yujyante — 5:13:2 Ibid.

Sama prāno vai sama prāṇe hīmani sarvāni bhūtāni samyanci — 5:13:3. Ibid.

Kṣatram prāno vai kṣatram prāno hi vai kṣatram trāyate hainam prāṇaḥ kṣaṇitoḥ prāṇakṣatram prāpnoti — 5:13:4 Ibid.

The healing property of *prāṇa* supports us to confirm that the vital force recognisable as the *prāṇa* is a type of chemical energy in the body.

5.6 & 7.

— *yaj kaśca śabdo vāgeva sā — 1:5:3 Ibid.*

In the '*Brahma Samanvaya*' Late Pandit Madhusudhan Oza has classified four types of *Vāk* - *Agnivāk*, *Vāyuvāk*, *Indravāk* and *Āpvāk*. Commenting on the meaning of *Vāk*, Dr. Thatte derives the meaning of *vak* as the frequency with reference to modern physics. (C)

— *athaitasya mānaso dyauḥsarīram* — *tan mithunan samaitam tataḥ prāṇojayata* — 1:5:12 *Ibid*.

Mind is electricity as clearly stated in 1:5:12. The same stanza further states that, *Vāk* in *prthivī* form and mind in *dyau* form unite together to form the *prāṇa* and the form of *prāṇa* is *ap* as follows :

Athaitasya prāṇasyāpah sariam — 1:5:13: *Ibid*.

Taking into consideration the origin of *āp*, I hold the meaning of *āp* as the heat.

— *tanmano kurutatananvī syam iti so rcan na carat tasyārcat āpo jāyanta* — 1:2:1: *Ibid*.

When there was nothing and the universe was covered with *mṛtyu* (inactivity), it desired to assume form and acted accordingly. First it assumed the form of *āp*.

When we compare this situation with Big-bang theory of the origin of the Universe, the heat is formed after the explosion (parallel to, 'acted accordingly'). In such environmental conditions the existence of any water molecule is practically impossible. So I held the meaning of *ap* as the heat. In the same way the meanings of five *bhutas* change from their matter forms to their energy forms. (D)

8. Physiological studies have shown that the emotions and enzymatic secretion are interconnected. Emotions arise first, followed by enzyme secretion. (E) The desires can be recognised from their foot prints in the body in the form of the enzyme secretions. (h)

9. — *tāny atmane 'kurutany atramana abhuvam nadarsam anyatramana abhuvam naśrauṣam iti manasā hy eva paśyati manasā sṛṇoti* — 1:5:3: *Ibid*.

It explains the buffer position of the mind between the organs and the knower in the process of cognition. It is to be noted that the *Upaniṣadic* seers held *manas* as an organ and traced the mind as the impression of the personality.

10. The action potential travels down the axon to the end feet where it initiates the relax

of chemical transmitters that affect the resting potential of other cells. These fundamentally important events take place in the brain thousands of times each second. These lightning swifts, electrical changes, these tiny surges of chemical transmitters are the basis of our perceptions, our thoughts, our emotions. They are the matter of our minds. (B) The portion of sensorymotor cortex devoted to each region controls body movements and hence referred to as 'Little Person' inside the Brain. (F).

11. Dr. Thatte derived the meaning of the term *Ākāśa* from comparison of the *Ṛkṣak* with the atomic physics. The revolving electrons create the electrostatic field. With reference to the term of *Vāk*, he clarifies the resemblance of the magnetic field in the form of *Ākāśa*. (C)

12. Stephen P. LaBerge in his article, "Multiple Consciousness" has reviewed various shades of consciousness as separate states of consciousness. (G)

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